We have considerable doubt about the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, that the judgment rendered in favor of Mrs. Claxton “against ‘Gertrude Simons’ was entered without jurisdiction” over the person of Mrs. Balogh and so was “void” as a judgment against Mrs. Balogh. State, ex rel. American Union Telegraph Co., v. Bell Telephone Co. (1880),
An order overruling a motion to vacate a default judgment is a final appealable order. See Cox v. Cox (1922),
The defendant insurer contends, however, that Mrs. Balogh could not have appealed from the order overruling her motion to vacate the default judgment in favor of Mrs. Claxton against Mrs. Simons because she had not been made a party to the action in which it was made. By filing the motion to vacate the default judgment against Mrs. Simons, Mrs. Balogh, as Mrs. Balogh, participated in the action as a party. No one objected to her so participating as a party. It is elementary that the right to object to a person participating as a party in an action is waived if not raised at the earliest opportunity. 41 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), 519, Section 52. Furthermore, Mrs. Balogh would be estopped by that participation from later making the inconsistent contention that she was not a party at the time when the court made its order overruling her motion to vacate the default judgment. See State, ex rel. Brickell, v. Roach, Recr. (1930),
Mrs, Balogh did not appeal from that order, It is now too
Of course, as the Court of Appeals pointed out in its opinion, if the judgment against Mrs. Simons did not represent a valid judgment against Mrs. Balogh because the court had acquired no jurisdiction over Mrs. Balogh’s person before it rendered that judgment, then Mrs. Balogh’s filing of a motion to vacate that judgment would not cause it to become a valid judgment against her. Hayes v. Kentucky Joint Stock Land Bank of Lexington (1932),
In our opinion, therefore, the foregoing judgment against Mrs. Simons now is a valid judgment against Mrs. Balogh; and, in view of the stipulation agreed to by defendant insurer and of the provisions of Section 3929.06, Revised Code, judgment should be rendered against the defendant insurer on the second supplemental petition.
It follows that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed and that of the Common Pleas Court affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
