THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DAVIS, APPELLANT.
No. 2009-2028
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted June 8, 2011-Decided October 4, 2011.
131 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-5028
{1 1} This appeal by defendant-appellant, Roland Davis, involves a capital case in which we are asked to determine two jurisdictional issues: (1) whether a court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider an appeal of a trial court‘s order denying a motion for a new trial1 in a death-penalty case and (2) whether a trial court has jurisdiction to consider a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
I. Factual Background
{1 2} A jury convicted Roland Davis of aggravated murder, murder, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery in 2005 in connection with the murder of 86-year-old Elizabeth Sheeler in her Newark, Ohio apartment, despite Davis‘s contention that the perpetrator was his brother. Davis was sentenced to death, and this court affirmed his convictions and death sentence. State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31.
{1 3} On January 14, 2008, the trial court dismissed Davis‘s petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court‘s judgment. 5th Dist. No. 2008-CA-16, 2008-Ohio-6841, 2008 WL 5381695. We declined jurisdiction over his appeal. 122 Ohio St.3d 1409, 2009-Ohio-2751, 907 N.E.2d 1193.
{1 4} On October 31, 2008, Davis filed a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Davis alleged that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering and producing the evidence at trial or within 120 days of the verdict, as set forth in
{1 5} The newly discovered evidence was the affidavit of a DNA expert, Dr. Laurence Mueller, a professor in the Ecology and Evolutionary Biology Department at the University of California, Irvine. Mueller stated that he had reviewed the state‘s DNA reports and tests, the testimony of the state‘s DNA experts, and other DNA evidence in the Davis case. In his affidavit, Mueller concluded “with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the DNA evidence recited in these reports and the testimony presented” at trial was questionable for four reasons: (1) the state‘s DNA experts failed to account for the database “hit”2 in the statistical analysis of the DNA test results, (2) there is no mention of laboratory error as a source of uncertainty in DNA profiling, (3) Meghan Clement, one of the state‘s DNA experts, incorrectly testified that it was impossible for nonidenti
{1 6} In his motion for a new trial, Davis argued that Mueller‘s affidavit undermined the state‘s DNA evidence, which was essential to its case against him. Davis argued that the affidavit demonstrated that trial counsel were ineffective by failing to mount an effective challenge to the state‘s DNA evidence. Davis also asserted that based on this new evidence, he “may be actually innocent of this capital offense.”
{1 7} The trial court denied Davis‘s motion. The court found that Davis‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from procuring Dr. Mueller‘s testimony within 120 days after the trial. The trial court also found that Davis failed to demonstrate that “but for trial error-the unavailability of Dr. Mueller‘s testimony-no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty.” The court stated, “Nothing in Dr. Mueller‘s testimony suggests that Roland Davis can be conclusively excluded as the source of the DNA evidence. Neither does Dr. Mueller‘s affidavit suggest that the DNA conclusively matches that of defendant‘s brother.”
{1 8} On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District held that the trial court did not err because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act on a motion for a new trial. The court relied upon Special Prosecutors, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162, in holding that “the trial court‘s granting of Appellant‘s motion for new trial would be inconsistent with the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court, affirming Appellant‘s convictions and sentence.” State v. Davis, 5th Dist. No. 09-CA-0019, 2009-Ohio-5175, 2009 WL 3119881, ¶ 12.
{1 9} We accepted Davis‘s discretionary appeal on January 27, 2010, on one of two propositions of law presented: “When the issue to be decided by the trial court does not fall within the judgment on appeal, the trial court retains jurisdiction to decide the motion before it. Further, to meet due process, a trial court must be able to consider a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence even after an appeal has been taken.
{1 10} We later ordered the parties to address “[w]hether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider the trial court‘s denial of Davis’ motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence under
II. Analysis
A. The Court of Appeals’ Jurisdiction
{1 11} We will first address the question on which we ordered briefing, that is, whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider Davis‘s appeal of the
{1 12} On November 8, 1994, Ohio voters approved an amendment to the
{1 13}
{1 14} The General Assembly then amended
{1 15} The foregoing language limits the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to the appeal of a judgment sentencing a defendant to death.
{1 16} We upheld the constitutionality of the amendments changing appellate review of death-penalty cases in State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 104, 684 N.E.2d 668: “[T]he plain language of the amendments speaks of ‘cases in which the death penalty has been imposed’ and ‘judgment that imposes the sentence of death.’ * * *
{1 17} Davis argues that the wording of the amendments is critical. According to him, the court of appeals lost jurisdiction over only those appeals taken from the judgment that imposed a sentence of death. He asserts that the court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider appeals from all other postjudgment motions. Accordingly, Davis contends that the court of appeals properly ruled on his appeal from the trial court‘s judgment denying his motion for a new trial.
{1 18} The state points out that Davis fails to address the language of
{1 19} The purpose of
{1 20} Courts of appeals have routinely ruled on appeals of judgments denying motions for new trials in cases in which a defendant was convicted of a murder that occurred after July 1, 1995, and in which a death penalty was imposed. State v. Stojetz, 12th Dist. No. CA2002-04-006, 2002-Ohio-6520, 2002 WL 31682231; State v. Lindsey, 12th Dist. No. CA2003-07-010, 2004-Ohio-4407, 2004 WL 1877734; State v. Jackson, 190 Ohio App.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-5054, 941 N.E.2d 1221; State v. Bethel, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-924, 2010-Ohio-3837, 2010 WL 3239480.
{1 21} The Trumbull County Court of Appeals appears to have been the only court to address the jurisdictional issue in the context of a motion for a new trial
{1 22} We agree. A holding that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relating to a death-penalty case would be contrary to the language of the constitutional amendments and the statute and would have the effect of delaying the review of future cases, a scenario that the voters expressly rejected in passing the constitutional amendments.3 We see no reason why the courts of appeals may not currently entertain all appeals from the denial of postjudgment motions in which the death penalty was previously imposed. We now hold that pursuant to
B. The Trial Court‘s Jurisdiction over the Motion for a New Trial
{1 23} Having resolved the issue of the court of appeals’ jurisdiction over Davis‘s motion for a new trial, we now turn to the issue of the trial court‘s jurisdiction. As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District, citing Special Prosecutors, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162, held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act on Davis‘s motion for a new trial.
{1 24}
{1 25} “Application for a new trial shall be made by motion which, except for the cause of newly discovered evidence, shall be filed within fourteen days after the verdict was rendered, or the decision of the court where a trial by jury has been waived, unless it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for a new trial, in which case the motion shall be filed within seven days from the order of the court finding that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from filing such motion within the time provided herein.
{1 26} “Motions for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence shall be filed within one hundred twenty days after the day upon which the verdict was rendered, or the decision of the court where trial by jury has been waived. If it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence upon which he must rely, such motion shall be filed within seven days from an order of the court finding that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence within the one hundred twenty day period.”
{1 27}
{1 28} In Special Prosecutors, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162, the trial court granted a defendant‘s motion to withdraw a guilty plea after a conviction and sentence based on the plea had been affirmed on appeal. After a trial date had been set, we granted a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial from proceeding. This court stated, “[T]he trial court‘s granting of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and the order to proceed with a new trial were inconsistent with the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court‘s conviction premised upon the guilty plea. The judgment of the reviewing court is controlling upon the lower court as to all matters within the compass of the judgment. Accordingly, we find that the trial court lost its jurisdiction when the appeal was taken, and, absent a remand, it did not regain jurisdiction subsequent to the Court of Appeals’ decision.” Id. at 97.
{1 29} We addressed a similar issue in State ex rel. Cordray v. Marshall, 123 Ohio St.3d 229, 2009-Ohio-4986, 915 N.E.2d 633. In that case, the defendant claimed in his appeal of a conviction for murder that the trial court had erred by failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense. The court of appeals rejected this claim and affirmed his conviction. Id. at ¶ 13. Several years later, the defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment and raised the same claims that had been rejected in his appeal. Citing the law-of-the-case doctrine, we held
{1 30} The law-of-the-case doctrine holds that “the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels.” (Emphasis added.) Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 11 OBR 1, 462 N.E.2d 410. This doctrine prevents a litigant from relying on arguments at retrial that were fully litigated, or could have been fully litigated, in a first appeal. See Hubbard ex rel. Creed v. Sauline (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 402, 404-405, 659 N.E.2d 781.
{1 31} Davis argues that under this doctrine, the trial court should have been permitted to rule on his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence because a reviewing court had never considered Dr. Mueller‘s affidavit during previous appeals. Davis asserts that there would not have been a conflict between the trial court‘s exercise of jurisdiction over the motion for a new trial and the appellate courts’ affirmances of his conviction and of the denial of postconviction relief because the issue to be decided was not “within the compass” of the appellate courts’ judgments. See Special Prosecutors, 55 Ohio St.2d at 97, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162.
{1 32} Several Ohio courts of appeals have permitted trial courts to consider motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence after judgments of conviction had been affirmed on appeal. See State v. Gaines, 1st Dist. No. C-090097, 2010-Ohio-895, 2010 WL 877549, ¶ 36 (the trial court abused its discretion in deciding defendant‘s new-trial motion without an evidentiary hearing); State v. Rossi, 2d Dist. No. 23682, 2010-Ohio-4534, 2010 WL 3722611 (due process requires that a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must, at some point, be considered on the merits); and State v. Franklin, 7th Dist. No. 09 MA 96, 2010-Ohio-4317, 2010 WL 3554109 (Special Prosecutors does not provide grounds for denying motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence).
{1 33} In his motion, Davis argued that his counsel were ineffective for failing to present a DNA expert at trial to refute the testimony of the state‘s expert witness. The state points out that Davis raised the same issue on direct appeal when he claimed that his counsel were ineffective by stipulating to evidence establishing the admissibility of DNA evidence. See Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 344.
{1 34} Contrary to the state‘s argument, the earlier claim is not related to Davis‘s present claim that newly discovered evidence (Mueller‘s affidavit) warrants a new trial. Indeed, this issue could not have been raised on direct appeal
{1 35} The state also claims that Special Prosecutors is only a conditional bar on the trial court‘s jurisdiction to consider Davis‘s motion for a new trial, for we held there that “the trial court lost its jurisdiction when the appeal was taken, and, absent a remand, it did not regain jurisdiction subsequent to the Court of Appeals’ decision.” (Emphasis added.) 55 Ohio St.2d at 97, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162. Thus, the state argues that Davis has a remedy by filing a motion with this court showing that his motion for a new trial has merit and then seeking a remand of his case to the trial court, which would then consider the new-trial motion. The state maintains that this court is in the best position to determine what issues were addressed in its previous judgment.
{1 36} The state‘s suggested remedy is cumbersome. The trial court is better equipped than this court is to consider testimony and other evidence matters alleged to be newly discovered. The trial court is also capable of deciding whether Dr. Mueller‘s affidavit involved matters “within the compass” of this court‘s previous decisions.
{1 37} We did not decide Special Prosecutors based on the law-of-the-case doctrine. However, that doctrine would not prevent the trial court from considering the effect of previous decisions on Davis‘s newly-discovered-evidence claim. We take this opportunity to specify that the holding in Special Prosecutors does not bar the trial court‘s jurisdiction over posttrial motions permitted by the
III. Conclusion
{1 38} We hold that pursuant to
{1 39} We also hold that a trial court has jurisdiction to decide a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in a case in which the imposition of the death penalty has been affirmed on appeal.
{1 40} Because the court of appeals misapplied the holding of Special Prosecutors in concluding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider Davis‘s motion for a new trial based on his claim of newly discovered evidence, we remand this case to the court of appeals to reconsider the trial court‘s ruling in accordance with this holding.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘DONNELL, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur.
Kenneth W. Oswalt, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick and Randall L. Porter, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant.
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin and Cullen Sweeney, Assistant Public Defenders, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Cuyahoga County Public Defender.
Davis, Polk & Wardwell, L.L.P., Sharon Katz, Sarah E. Malkerson, Sagar K. Ravi, and Edward Sherwin, urging reversal for amicus curiae The Innocence Network.