State v. WilliamsState v. Williams
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio (“State“), appeals a judgment of the Marietta Municipal Court that granted a motion to suppress evidence filed by defendant-appellee, Randy D. Williams (“Williams“). The State raises seven assignments of error; but we find the sixth assignment of error to be dispositive.
{¶2} In its sixth assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court incorrectly suppressed the results of Williams‘s BAC DataMaster test. The State contends that thе trial court erred in finding that the law enforcement officer who administered Williams‘s test lacked a valid permit to operate the machine. The State further claims that the trial court wrongly construed the Ohio Director of Health (“ODH“) regulations to mean that a BAC DataMaster senior operator1 permit holder must complete a proficiency examination that includes accepting “subject samples” in order for a renewal to be valid. We agree with the State. A plain reading of the regulations fails to support the trial court‘s conclusion. Instead, the regulations clearly outline the qualifications for rеnewal and do not require a BAC DataMaster senior operator permit holder seeking renewal to complete a proficiency examination before the renewal becomes valid. See
{¶3} Accordingly, we sustain the State‘s sixth assignment of error; and we find the other assignments of error to be moot. We reverse the trial court‘s decision grаnting Williams‘s motion to suppress the results of his breath test, and remand for further proceedings.
{¶4} On September 2, 2016, Ohio State Highway Patrol Sergeant Eric Knowlton responded to the scene of a motor vehicle collision involving the vehicle Williams had been operating. During the encounter, Sergeant Knowlton detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from Williams‘s breath. Williams admitted that he had consumed some alcoholic beverages. Sergeant Knowlton administered field sobriety tests and subsequently arrested Williams.
{¶5} The sergeant transported Williams to the Belpre Police station where he administered a BAC DataMaster test. Williams registered a .135 breath-alcohol content. Sergeant Knowlton charged Williams with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of
{¶6} On October 7, 2016, Williams filed a motion to suppress, inter alia, the results of his breath-alcohol test. Williams raised twenty-two grounds in support of his motion, but he later narrowed it down to the following two issues:
[1] The individual administering the breath test did not complete a proficiency examination in the past calendar year as is required under
3701-53-08(D) .[2] The individual administering the breath test did not present evidence satisfactory to the director that he or she continues to meet the qualifications established by the applicable provisions of rules
3701-53-07 and3701-53-08 of the OAC for issuance of the operator access card sought as is required by3701-53-09(E) .
{¶7} In its response, the State asserted that Williams‘s two identified issues are not relevant. The State argued that the two issues cite the regulations applicable to operator access cards, which are required to administer tests using the Intoxilyzer 8000, but are not required to administer tests using the BAC DataMaster. The State noted that Williams‘s case did not involve the Intoxilyzer 8000, but instead, involved the BAC DataMaster. The State thus claimed that the two issues are completely irrеlevant in Williams‘s case.
{¶8} On November 21, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. The parties initially clarified that the case did not involve the Intoxilyzer 8000. The trial court advised the parties that it would consider the State‘s argument that the provisions Williams cited are inapplicable to the BAC DataMaster and that if it did consider Williams‘s argument, it would consider whether the officers met “the qualifications or did have proficiency exams.” The State indicated that it intended “to provide evidence of certification, sufficient to operate the BAC DataMaster, not the I-8000.”
{¶10} During cross-examination, Knowlton stated that he hаs held a senior operator permit since early 2005. He further explained the proficiency examination that he completed. He testified that ODH representatives are present during the test and that they collect the results after the test is complete. Knowlton stated that his examination involved both a written test and a simulated breath-alcohol content test using a sample containing a known alcohol content. Knowlton indicated that he did not use any “subject samples” (i.e., samples received from individuals) during his proficiency testing.
{¶11} Belpre Police Sergeant Tyler Heddleston testified that he holds a seniоr operator permit from the Ohio Department of Health. He explained that he checked the BAC DataMaster during the week of Williams‘s test and found it to be in proper working order. Sergeant Heddleston further stated that he is a high school graduate and a certified law enforcement officer. He additionally indicated that he successfully completed a senior operator upgrade or conversion training course for the BAC DataMaster, as well as a proficiency examination in breath testing.
{¶12} On cross-examination, Sergeant Heddleston explained his proficiency examination consisted of a written test and a practical test during which he had to demonstrate
{¶13} On February 21, 2017, the trial court granted Williams‘s motion to suppress. The court found that both Sergeants Knowlton and Heddleston hold senior operator permits and that both passed their proficiency examinations. However, the court pointed out that they did not complete the practical portion of the proficiency test in the same manner. The court noted that Sergeant Knowlton used a known alcohol sample, while Sergeant Heddleston used a live subject sample.
{¶14} The court classified the question before it as “whether the Court accepts Sgt. Knowlton‘s renewal permit as a Senior Operator as valid despite the fact that Defendant questioned compliance with the requirement for a proficiency exam.” The court found that the two sergeants “testified to different procedures for demonstrating practical competency during the proficiency tеsting.” The court found that the procedure Sergeant Knowlton described “appears to be the instrument check described in
II. Assignments of Error
{¶15} The State raises seven assignments of error.
First Assignment of Error:
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Defendant-Appellee‘s citation to rules concerning renewal of Operator Access Cards for the Intoxilyzer 8000 placed into issue the legal basis for decision concerning a Senior Operator Permit for the BAC Datamaster.
Second Assignment of Error:
Whether the trial court erred in deciding the case on the basis of legal issues as to which fair notice was not given.
Third Assignment of Error:
Whether the trial court erred, in view of the trial court‘s findings of fact, in implicitly finding that suppression theories 21 and 22 were relevant to the case.
Fourth Assignment of Error:
Whether the trial court erred in holding that Defendant-Appellee‘s motion to suppress and supporting memorandum were sufficiently specific to raise the City‘s burden of proof from “fairly slight” to a specific burden requiring particularized testimony.
Fifth Assignment of Error:
Whether the trial court erred in suggesting that Defendant-Appellee raised the City‘s burdеn through cross-examination.
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Plaintiff-Appellant‘s evidence failed to satisfy Plaintiff-Appellant‘s burden under
R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) .
Seventh Assignment of Error:
Whether the trial court erred by denying due deference to the Department of Health‘s power to interpret its own regulations in the issuance and renewal of permits.
III. Law and Analysis
{¶16} Although the State presents seven assignments of error, we find the sixth dispositive. In its sixth assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by suppressing Williams‘s BAC DataMaster test results. Specifically, the State asserts that the trial court incorrectly determined that Sergeant Knowlton did not hold a valid permit at thе time he administered the BAC DataMaster test to Williams.
A. Standard of Review
{¶17} Appellate review of a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress is “a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of the trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006–Ohio–3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 100, citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992). Consequently, in its review, an appellate court must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Belton, --- Ohio St.3d ---, 2016-Ohio-1581, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 100; State v. Landrum, 137 Ohio App.3d 718, 722, 739 N.E.2d 1159 (4th Dist.2000). However,
B. Alcohol Test Challenges
{¶18} A defendant who wants to challenge the validity of an alcohol test result must first file a motion to suppress. State v. Baker, 146 Ohio St.3d 456, 2016-Ohio-451, 58 N.E.3d 1114, ¶ 23; Burnside at ¶ 24. If the defendant challenges the validity of an alcohol test, the State bears the burden to establish that the testing procedures substantially complied with the applicable ODH regulations. Baker at ¶ 23; Burnside at ¶ 24. The substantial compliance standard is limited “to excusing only errors that are clearly de minimis,” i.e., irregularities amounting to ” ‘minor procedural deviations.’ ” Burnside at ¶ 34, quoting State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 426, 732 N.E.2d 952 (2000). Once the State shows substantial compliance with thе regulations, the test result is presumptively admissible. Baker at ¶ 23; Burnside at ¶ 24. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show prejudice resulting from “anything less than strict compliance.” Burnside at ¶ 24. Prejudice, in this context, means “that the failure to strictly comply may have caused an unreliable test result that does not properly measure alcohol content in the specimen.” Baker at ¶ 27.
C. Alcohol Test Admissibility
{¶19}
{¶20} Our focus in the case at bar is whether the trial court properly concluded that (1) Sergeant Knowlton lacked a valid permit that the ODH issued under
{¶21} The State argues that the trial court erred by determining that Sergeant Knowlton lacked a valid permit. The State contends that it presented unrefuted evidence that Sergeant Knowlton possesses a valid permit. The State introduced into evidence a written certificate issued by the ODH that licenses Sergeant Knowlton to perform tests using the BAC DataMaster. The State asserts that this evidence, by itself, demonstrates that Sergeant Knowlton‘s permit is valid.
D. Statutory and Regulatory Interpretation
{¶23} Courts interpret administrative rules in the same manner as statutes. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgt. of Am., Inc., 126 Ohio St.3d 183, 2010-Ohio-2744, 931 N.E.2d 1069, ¶ 27, citing State ex rel. Brilliant Elec. Sign Co. v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio St.2d 51, 54, 386 N.E.2d 1107 (1979) (stating that the “ordinary meaning rule” of statutory construction applies equally to administrative rules). The correct interpretation of statutes and administrative rules presents a question of law that we review independently and without deference to the trial court. E.g., State v. Vanzandt, 142 Ohio St.3d 223, 2015-Ohio-236, 28 N.E.3d 1267, ¶ 6; State v. Bundy, 2012-Ohio-3934, 974 N.E.2d 139, ¶ 46 (4th Dist.); see also Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54, 2010–Ohio–4505, 936 N.E.2d 481, ¶ 29, citing MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 38 Ohio St.3d 266, 268, 527 N.E.2d 777 (1988) (stating that appellate courts have “complete and independent power of review as to all questions of law“).
{¶24} ” ‘It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the statute should be applied without interpretation.’ ” Wilson v. Lawrence, --- Ohio St.3d ---, 2017-Ohio-1410, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 11, quoting Wingate v. Hordge, 60 Ohio St.2d 55, 58, 396 N.E.2d 770 (1979), citing Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 304 N.E.2d 378 (1973). Accordingly, a court‘s first step when considering the meaning of an administrative rule (or statute) “is always to determine whether the [rule or] statute is ‘plain and unambiguous.’ ” Jacobson v. Kaforey, — Ohio St.3d —, 2016-Ohio-8434, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Hurd, 89 Ohio St.3d 616, 618, 734 N.E.2d 365 (2000); see also State ex rel. Cordray v. Midway Motor Sales, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 234, 2009-Ohio-2610, 910 N.E.2d 432, ¶ 15, quoting Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus (stating that if words used in statute or administrative rule ” ‘be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law making body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation’ “). If the language is plain and unambiguous, courts must apply it as written. Wilson at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 13 (” ‘If [the statute or rule] is not ambiguous, then we need not interpret it; we must simply apply it.’ “). When the language used in a statute or rule ” ‘is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the [legislative body or rule-making authority] has said.’ ” Id., quoting Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12, citing Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000). Additionally, courts must “give effect only to the words the legislature used, making neither additions to, nor deletions from, the statutory language.” Id., citing Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122, 2008-Ohio-511, 882 N.E.2d 400, ¶ 19. Furthermore, ” ‘[t]he interpretation of statutes and administrative rules should follow the principle that neither is to be construed in any way other than as the words demand.’ ” State ex rel. Baroni v. Colletti, 130 Ohio St.3d 208, 2011-Ohio-5351, 957 N.E.2d 13, ¶ 18, quoting Morning View Care Ctr.–Fulton v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 148 Ohio App.3d 518, 2002-Ohio-2878, 774 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.).
{¶25} Thus, when interpreting an administrative rule, courts first look to the text of the rule, “reading words and phrases in context and construing them according to the rules of
{¶26} A statute or rule is ambiguous when the language “is ‘capable of bearing more than one meaning.’ ” Jacobson at ¶ 8, quoting Dunbar v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, 992 N.E.2d 1111, ¶ 16. A court that is reviewing a statute or administrative rule for ambiguity should direct its ” ‘attention * * * beyond single phrases, and * * * should consider, in proper context, all words used by the [rule-making body] in drafting [the regulation] with a view to its place in the overall [regulatory] scheme.’ ” Gonzales at ¶ 5, quoting D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 96 Ohio St.3d 250, 2002-Ohio-4172, 773 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 19. “Without ‘an initial finding’ of ambiguity, ‘inquiry into legislative intent, legislative history, public policy, the consequences of an interpretation, or any other factors identified in
{¶27} Moreover, related provisions must be read in pari materia. Midway Motor Sales, supra, at ¶ 25, citing Maxfield v. Brooks, 110 Ohio St. 566, 144 N.E. 725 (1924), paragraph two of the syllabus. In reading statutes and administrative rules in pari materia, “court[s] must give a reasonable construction that provides the proper effect to each * * *.” Id. “All provisions * * * bearing upon the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously unless they are irreconcilable.” Id., citing Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio St. 458, 461, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950).
{¶28} In the case at bar, therefore, we first review the language contained in the applicable statutes and administrative rules to ascertain whether they plainly and unambiguously
E. Valid Permit
{¶29} Neither
{¶30} A “valid permit” thus generally means a document of legal efficacy or force, executed with proper legal authority and formalities that grants a person the right do something. Within the context of
{¶32} The next question concerns whether Sergeant Knowlton‘s permit was “valid” at the time he administered Williams‘s breath test. Thus, we must examine whether Sergeant Knowlton‘s permit had legal efficacy or force and was issued with the appropriate legal authority and formalities.
{¶33} Sergeant Knowlton‘s permit cоntains language indicating that it had legal efficacy or force and was issued with the appropriate legal authority. The permit states that Sergeant Knowlton “qualified for” the BAC DataMaster senior operator‘s permit; that he was issued the permit under the authority of
F. BAC DataMaster Qualifications
{¶35}
{¶36} A person who wishes to function as a senior operator or an operator of a BAC DataMaster must apply to the ODH for a permit.
{¶37}
- Being a high school graduate or having passed the “General Education Development Test“;
- Being a certified law enforcement officer sworn to enforce sections
4511.19 and/or1547.11 of the Revised Code , or any other equivalent statute or local ordinance prescribing a defined or prohibited breath alcohol concentration, or a certified corrections officer, and; Having demonstrated that he or she can properly care for, maintain, perform instrument checks upon and operate the evidential breath testing instrument by having successfully completed a basic senior operator, upgrade or conversion training course for the type of approved evidential breath testing instrument for which he or she seeks a permit.
{¶38} A BAC DataMaster senior operator‘s permit “shall expire one year from the effective date, unless revoked or voluntarily surrendered” before the expiration date.
{¶39}
To qualify for renewal of a permit under paragraph (A) or (B) of this rule:
(1) A permit holder shall present evidence satisfactory to the directоr that he or she continues to meet the qualifications established by the applicable provisions of rule
3701-53-07 of the Administrative Code for issuance of the type of permit sought.* * * *
{¶40} In addition to the initial application and renewal procedures,
G. Interpretation
{¶41} The plain language of the administrative rules does not support a conclusion that a valid permit renewal requires a BAC DataMaster senior operator to undergo a proficiency examination.
{¶43} Therefore, we disagree with the trial court‘s conclusion that
{¶44} Consequently, we agree with the State that the trial court misconstrued the applicable administrative regulations to require a BAC DataMaster senior operator permit holder seeking a renewal to complete a proficiency examination as contemplated in
IV. Conclusion
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS REVERSED AND CAUSE IS REMANDED. Appellee shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Marietta Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for а period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Harsha, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion. McFarland, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
For the Court,
By:
Marie Hoover, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.