THE STATE EX REL. CORDRAY, APPELLEE, v. MIDWAY MOTOR SALES, INC. ET AL.; GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, APPELLANT.
No. 2008-1451
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted April 7, 2009—Decided June 10, 2009.
122 Ohio St.3d 234, 2009-Ohio-2610
{¶ 1} This appeal involves the construction of
{¶ 2} Conversely, appellee, Richard Cordray, attorney general of Ohio,1 contends that
{¶ 3} We hold that
{¶ 4} We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this court‘s opinion.
Relevant Background
{¶ 5} Midway Motor Sales, Inc. purchased vehicles from General Motors Corporation for sale or lease at its dealership.2 General Motors issued the manufacturer‘s certificate of origin in Midway‘s name, thereby making Midway the owner of the vehicles. Midway leased a fleet of these vehicles to Modern Building Supply, Inc. under lease agreements with specified mileage limits, which were typically 30,000 miles.
{¶ 6} GMAC is a financial institution that extends wholesale floor-plan financing to automobile dealers such as Midway. Pursuant to its agreement with GMAC, Midway thereafter assigned the Modern Building Supply lease agreements and sold the leased vehicles to GMAC. GMAC never had possession of the vehicles.
{¶ 7} Unbeknownst to GMAC, Midway and Modern Building Supply had entered into secret lease arrangements allowing Modern Building Supply significantly greater mileage limits than specified in the lease agreements assigned to GMAC. As a result, the leased vehicles had mileage in excess of the 30,000-mile limit at the end of the lease periods. In an apparent effort to conceal the excess mileage from GMAC, Midway retrieved the leased vehicles at the end of the lease periods and altered the odometers on the vehicles.
{¶ 8} Without knowing that the odometers had been tampered with, GMAC sold the vehicles at dealer-only auctions. In order to transfer ownership of each car, GMAC was required to complete an odometer disclosure affidavit to certify the amount of mileage on the vehicle. GMAC completed the required odometer disclosure affidavits for the vehicles by using the mileage amounts disclosed on
{¶ 9} After many of the leased vehicles had been sold at auction, GMAC discovered that Midway had tampered with the odometers. GMAC reported this information to the attorney general. GMAC complied with the attorney general‘s requests for information and assisted in the investigation into Midway‘s conduct. GMAC also implemented a remediation plan and compensated the owners of the affected vehicles by either buying each vehicle back or paying a monetary adjustment for the mileage discrepancy.
{¶ 10} The attorney general commenced this lawsuit in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas against Midway and GMAC pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Consumer Sales Practices Act,
{¶ 11} The attorney general moved for summary judgment against GMAC with regard to his allegation that GMAC had violated
{¶ 12} GMAC appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, and the court affirmed the trial court‘s judgment. State ex rel. Rogers v. Midway Motor Sales, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-744, 2008-Ohio-2799, 2008 WL 2348449. Relying on its own precedent and that from various Ohio appellate courts holding that
{¶ 13} The case is now before us on our acceptance of a discretionary appeal. State ex rel. Rogers v. Midway Motor Sales, Inc., 119 Ohio St.3d 1485, 2008-Ohio-5273, 894 N.E.2d 1243.
Analysis
A. Construction of R.C. 4549.46(A)
{¶ 14} Initially, we are called upon to decide whether
{¶ 15} The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11. In interpreting a statute, this court has held that “the intent of the law-makers is to be sought first of all in the language employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law-making body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.” Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 16} We find that the language of
{¶ 17}
{¶ 18} The affidavit prescribed by the registrar contains the following language:
{¶ 19} “I (we) certify to the best of my (our) knowledge that the odometer now reads [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] miles and is the actual mileage of the vehicle unless one of the following statements is checked.
{¶ 20} “☐ The mileage stated is in excess of the mechanical limits.
{¶ 21} “☐ The odometer reading is not the actual mileage.”
{¶ 22} Thus, the affidavit calls for a knowledge-based certification of the odometer reading. The affidavit is printed on the back of the certificate of title and is the only means available for disclosing an odometer reading. A transferor is required to use the registrar‘s affidavit.
{¶ 23} The odometer disclosure affidavit was created in accordance with the statutory authority bestowed upon the registrar by
{¶ 24} The affidavit complies with the statutory directive. At no time since the inception of the affidavit has the General Assembly repudiated the affidavit by enacting legislation directing the removal of the knowledge element from the form. It is not the judiciary‘s province to nullify the statutorily prescribed affidavit. Therefore, we hold that the affidavit created by the registrar has the force and effect of law and is an extension of
{¶ 25} The odometer disclosure affidavit authorized by
{¶ 26} In construing
{¶ 27} We therefore hold that the plain language of
{¶ 28} This result is consistent with this court‘s precedent analyzing whether a criminal statute imposes strict liability. The General Assembly established the test for determining strict criminal liability in
{¶ 29} In determining whether a statute imposes strict liability, this court holds: “It is not enough that the General Assembly in fact intended imposition of liability without proof of mental culpability. Rather the General Assembly must plainly indicate that intention in the language of the statute.” State v. Collins (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 524, 530, 733 N.E.2d 1118.
{¶ 30} As set forth above,
{¶ 31} For the reasons stated above, we hold that
B. Previous-Owner Exception to Liability Under R.C. 4549.46(A)
{¶ 32} The next issue for our consideration is whether the previous-owner defense in
{¶ 33} An exception to liability under
{¶ 34} “The transferor of a motor vehicle is not in violation of this division requiring a true odometer reading if the odometer reading is incorrect due to a
{¶ 35} The Tenth District admittedly disregarded the plain and ordinary meaning of this exception to liability. State ex rel. Rogers v. Midway Motor Sales, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-744, 2008-Ohio-2799, ¶ 26. The appellate court essentially rewrote the statute based upon its view that the legislature could not have intended the result that a transferor is absolved of liability when a prior owner altered an odometer, but not where a third party altered an odometer, even though in either scenario, the act took place during the transferor‘s ownership. Id. We disagree.
{¶ 36} As noted above, the rule is that “the intent of the law-makers is to be sought first of all in the language employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law-making body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, at paragraph two of the syllabus. The language employed in the previous-owner exception is plain and unambiguous. There is no temporal requirement for a transferor to qualify for the previous-owner exception. Such a requirement plainly does not exist in the statute. Therefore, there is no occasion for the court to resort to other means of interpretation. This court would invade the province of the legislature and violate separation of powers if it rewrote the statute to include a requirement that the previous owner be the owner of the vehicle at the time of the odometer tampering. See Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 21. This court will not engage in such a practice and leaves it to the General Assembly to rewrite the statute if it deems it necessary.
{¶ 37} We therefore hold that the previous-owner exception found in
Conclusion
{¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that
{¶ 39} We further hold that the previous-owner exception found in
{¶ 40} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this court‘s opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor, and David M. Dembinski and Teresa A. Heffernan, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Carpenter, Lipps & Leland, L.L.P., Michael H. Carpenter, Jeffrey A. Lipps, and Angela M. Paul Whitfield, for appellant.
Dreher Tomkies Scheiderer, L.L.P., Darrell L. Dreher, and Vanessa A. Nelson, urging reversal for amici curiae American Financial Services Association, Association of Consumer Vehicle Lessors, National Automobile Dealers Association, and Ohio Automobile Dealers Association.