State v. WadeState v. Wade
The defendant, who previously had been convicted of the crimes of sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent, possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent and manslaughter in the first degree, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. In a prior direct appeal from his conviction, this court reversed the defendant’s conviction of manslaughter in the first degree and remanded the case with direction to reflect a conviction of manslaughter in the second degree, and to resentence the defendant in accordance with that conviction. On remand, the trial court vacated the sentences imposed on all counts, modified the judgment to reflect a conviction of manslaughter in the second degree, and resentenced the defendant on all counts. In his motion to correct an illegal sentence, the defendant claimed that the trial court, in resentencing him on all counts, violated the prohibition against double jeopardy by altering the sentences on the narcotics related offenses, which had not been reversed. Held that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence and rejected his double jeopardy claim, as this court previously has rejected a similar double jeopardy claim in State v. LaFleur (156 Conn. App. 289), and that case was controlling precedent with respect to the defendant’s double jeopardy claim: even if the defendant had raised claims in his direct appeal that challenged only some of the counts under which he had been convicted, the fact that he exercised his right to an appeal undermined his argument that he had an expectation of finality in the sentence originally imposed for the narcotics offenses that were not reversed on appeal, as the legal consequence of his successful challenge to his manslaughter conviction resulted in a resentencing proceeding in which the trial court properly resentenced him pursuant to the remand order, and it is well established that resentencing a defendant does not trigger double jeopardy concerns when the original sentence was illegal or erroneous; moreover, when a defendant successfully challenges one portion of a sentencing package, a trial court may resentence a defendant on his conviction of the other crimes under the aggregate package theory without offending the double jeopardy clause, and the resentencing court is free to restructure the defendant’s entire sentencing package, even for those components assigned to convictions that have been fully served, as long as the overall term has not expired, without offending double jeopardy.
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with two counts each of the crimes of sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent and possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, and with the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree and manslaughter in the second degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain and tried to the jury before D’Addabbo, J.; verdict of guilty of two counts each of sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent and possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, and manslaughter in the first degree; thereafter, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to the charge of manslaughter in the second degree, and the
KELLER, J. The defendant, Sidney Wade, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that his resentencing did not give rise to a double jeopardy violation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following procedural history is relevant to the present claim. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of
In a direct appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that the evidence did not support the conviction for manslaughter in the first degree and that the trial court improperly had instructed the jury with respect to the state’s burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. See State v. Wade, 106 Conn. App. 467, 469, 490–91, 942 A.2d 1085, cert. granted, 287 Conn. 908, 950 A.2d 1286 (2008) (appeal withdrawn June 12, 2008). The latter claim pertained to all of the offenses of which he was convicted. A detailed recitation of the facts underlying the judgment is set forth in that opinion.1 Id., 469–75. This court rejected the claim of instructional error, but agreed with the claim of evidentiary insufficiency. Id., 492–93. Accordingly, this court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court. Id. Specifically, this court concluded that the conviction of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of
In compliance with this court’s remand, the trial court, D’Addabbo, J., held a resentencing hearing. The trial court vacated the sentences it had imposed on all
Following his resentencing, the defendant appealed to this court. Our Supreme Court transferred the appeal to itself pursuant to
In February, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Although he raised additional arguments that he later abandoned before the trial court, he argued that the newly imposed sentence was illegal because (1) the court violated his right to due process as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions by altering the sentences on the narcotics related counts without the statutory authority to do so; (2) the court violated the prohibition against double jeopardy enshrined in the federal and state constitutions by altering the sentences on the narcotics related offenses without the statutory authority to do so; and (3) the court altered the sentences on the narcotics related offenses in the absence of factual findings as required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013). The court, Alander, J., rejected these three claims on their merits and denied the motion to
In the present appeal, the defendant challenges only that part of the court’s decision in which it rejected his double jeopardy claim. In its memorandum of decision, the court addressed the double jeopardy claim as follows: ‘‘The defendant’s second claim is that the reopening of his drug convictions for purposes of resentencing violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States constitution and the Connecticut constitution. This claim lacks merit for the simple reason that the Appellate Court in State v. LaFleur, 156 Conn. App. 289, 308–11, [113 A.3d 472, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 906, 114 A.3d 1221 (2015),] previously rejected such a claim. In LaFleur, the defendant appealed his convictions in two cases consolidated for trial. The convictions in one of the cases were reversed by our Supreme Court which vacated the entire sentence in both cases and remanded the cases for resentencing. Just as the defendant does here, the defendant in LaFleur claimed that his subsequent sentence violated the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense because he had an expectation of finality in the original sentence [with respect to the convictions that were not reversed on appeal]. The Appellate Court disagreed. ‘Even if the defendant had raised claims that challenged only some of the counts under which he had been convicted, the fact that he exercised his right to an appeal undermines his argument to an expectation of finality in the sentence originally imposed. The defendant was successful in undermining a portion of a sentencing package, and the legal consequence of doing so resulted in a resentencing proceeding in which the trial court properly resentenced him pursuant to the remand order.’ Id., 309–10. ‘It is well established that resentencing a defendant does not trigger double jeopardy concerns when the original sentence was illegal or erroneous.’ Id., 310. ‘In the specific context of a remand for resentencing when a defendant successfully challenges one portion of a sentencing ‘‘package,’’ the United States Supreme Court has held that a trial court may resentence a defendant on his conviction of the other crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause of the United States constitution. Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28, 29–30, 106 S. Ct. 353, 88 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1985). Indeed, the resentencing court is free to restructure the defendant’s entire sentencing package, even for those components assigned to convictions that have been fully served, as long as the overall term has not expired, without offending double jeopardy.’ State v. Tabone, 292 Conn. 417, 441, [973 A.2d 74 (2009)]. As in LaFleur and Tabone, the trial court’s resentencing of the defendant upon remand after his successful appeal does not conflict with principles of double jeopardy.’’
Before the trial court, the defendant argued that the resentencing court violated his double jeopardy rights
In his brief before this court, the defendant reiterates his belief that it was improper for the court to have reopened and resentenced him with respect to the narcotics related charges. He argues that he had an ‘‘expectation of finality in the sentences imposed on the narcotics convictions when those convictions were affirmed and the state had no authority to seek further review of those convictions or sentences.’’ The defendant does not attempt to distinguish LaFleur or Tabone in any meaningful way,3 and acknowledges that ‘‘the courts of this state have otherwise been fairly consistent in finding that no double jeopardy problem exists with respect to the aggregate package theory of sentencing.’’ Rather than attempting to demonstrate that the court either misinterpreted or misapplied the law, the defendant devotes much of his analysis to reviewing what he believes are relevant decisions of the United States Supreme Court, yet he acknowledges that there is support in that body of law ‘‘for the proposition that an aggregate package theory of sentencing does not violate double jeopardy.’’4
In exercising our plenary review, we, like the trial court, view LaFleur to be controlling precedent with respect to the defendant’s double jeopardy claim. Our Supreme Court has already rejected the defendant’s claim that the resentencing court improperly sentenced him under the aggregate package theory. See State v. Wade, supra, 297 Conn. 268–78. We will neither reevaluate nor reconsider that settled issue. As the trial court recognized correctly, this court’s analysis in LaFleur is dispositive of the double jeopardy claim raised in the present case. See State v. LaFleur, supra, 156 Conn. App. 308–11. Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly denied the motion to correct.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
We disagree with the defendant’s narrow interpretation of Tabone. As the defendant acknowledges, immediately following the language on which he relies, the court in Tabone quoted State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. 129, for the following proposition: ‘‘[T]he defendant, in appealing his conviction and punishment, has voluntarily called into play the validity of the entire sentencing package, and, thus, the proper remedy is to vacate it in its entirety.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) This language dispels the alleged ambiguity in the defendant’s interpretation of Tabone.
The defendant’s argument is not persuasive. Where, as here, a defendant has challenged the validity of his multicount conviction on direct appeal, he is unable thereafter to claim an expectation of finality in the sentences imposed. Consistent with overwhelming federal authority, our courts have recognized that, in such circumstances, ‘‘the defendant, in appealing his conviction and punishment, has voluntarily called into play the validity of the entire sentencing package . . . .’’ State v. Raucci, 21 Conn. App. 557, 562, 575 A.2d 234, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 817, 576 A.2d 546 (1990); see also State v. Wade, supra, 297 Conn. 269–70 (same); State v. Tabone, supra, 292 Conn. 427–28 (same); State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. 129 (same).