State v. TorresState v. Torres
DANIELS, Justice.
{1} Defendant Noe Torres appeals his convictions of multiple offenses arising from a shooting into a home that missed the intended victim but resulted in the killing of a young boy. Among other questions he raises are several issues regarding the scope of constitutional double jeopardy protections against multiple punishments for the same offense. With regard to those double jeopardy issues, we hold that:
(1) Conviction and punishment for both attempted murder of an intended victim and a resulting murder of a different but unintended victim when the two crimes causing harm to the separate victims arise from the same act does not violate the double jeopardy clause;
(2) The double jeopardy clause does protect against multiple punishments for causing death or great bodily harm to a victim by shooting at a dwelling and for first-degree murder of the same victim when the same shooting caused the great bodily harm and the resulting death; and
(3) The double jeopardy clause also protects against multiple conspiracy convictions for entering into a single criminal conspiracy with objectives to commit more than one criminal offense.
{2} We reject Defendant’s other claims relating to alleged trial errors.
{3} In the early hours of September 15, 2005, nine shots were fired through a bedroom window of an apartment in Clovis, killing ten-year-old Carlos Perez. Carlos had been sleeping in the bedroom he shared with his older brother, the intended victim, seventeen-year-old Ruben Perez.
{4} That night there were two distinct groups of actors involved in the shooting: one group in a Suburban and the other in a Camry. The two groups converged at the apartment complex where the shooting took place. The Suburban group included Orlando Salas, Demetrio Salas, David Griego, and Melissa Sanchez. The Camry group included Defendant, Edward Salas, Krystal Anson, and Ashley Garcia.
{5} The day before the shooting, an altercation between Orlando Salas and Ruben Perez took place at their high school. Later that night, in the early hours of September 15, Orlando and his older brother Demetrio picked up two friends, Melissa Sanchez and David Griego, in the Salas’s blue and white Suburban. They pulled into an alleyway near the Gatewood Apartments where Ruben lived. Orlando and Demetrio said they wanted to get that “sewer rat,” referring to Ruben.
{6} Demetrio then drove to the house of a friend, Eric Gutierrez, that was near the Gatewood Apartments and dropped off Melissa and Orlando. Demetrio said he and
{7} On September 14, 2005, Defendant was with Krystal Anson, Ashley Garcia, and Edward Salas, the older brother of Demetrio and Orlando. Later, in the early hours of September 15, Defendant, Krystal, Ashley, and Edward drove to the Gatewood Apartments in Krystal’s white Camry. They parked the Camry on the street near the apartments. Defendant and Edward got out and ordered Krystal and Ashley to stay in the car.
{8} The Salas Suburban was parked down the street from the Camry. Two people got out of the Suburban and met Defendant and Edward at the apartment complex. Defendant, Edward, and the two from the Suburban shook hands and then disappeared from the sight of the Camry occupants.
{9} Krystal and Ashley got out of the Camry and walked to a nearby park. The girls
{10} The next day, Defendant went to the house of a girl he was dating. They packed bags and hurriedly left for Mexico. Two days after the murder, police obtained an arrest warrant for Defendant. Defendant was arrested more than six years later in Chihuahua, Mexico, and after another six months was brought back to New Mexico for trial.
{11} At Defendant’s March 2015 trial, a crime scene expert testified that a shooter fired nine rounds into the bedroom window of the Perez residence and estimated that the shooter’s position was two to three feet from the window. Additionally, a ballistics expert testified that the smell of gunpowder is similar to the smell of burned matches.
{12} The jury found Defendant guilty of shooting at a dwelling resulting in death or great bodily harm to Carlos, first-degree murder of Carlos, attempted first-degree murder of Ruben, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to shoot at a dwelling, transportation of a firearm by a felon, and intimidation of a witness. At sentencing, the district court found Defendant to be a habitual offender and increased his sentence by three years. Defendant was sentenced to a total penitentiary term of life imprisonment plus thirty-one and one-half years.
{13} Defendant appealed his convictions to this Court. See
A. Double Jeopardy Challenges
{14} We first address Defendant’s arguments that the following combinations of convictions constitute impermissible double jeopardy: (1) first-degree murder of Carlos and shooting at a dwelling resulting in death or great bodily harm to Carlos, (2) first-degree murder of Carlos and attempted first-degree murder of Ruben, and (3) conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit shooting at a dwelling.
{15} The double jeopardy protections of the United States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution guarantee that a state may not compel a person to be “twice put in jeopardy” for the same criminal offense.
{16} As to the third of those categories, there are two ways in which double jeopardy protections can be violated by multiple punishments. State v. Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 644, 146 P.3d 289. One is where a defendant suffers multiple punishments under the same statute for the same conduct, which presents a unit-of-prosecution issue. Id. The other is where a defendant is convicted under different statutes but the same criminal conduct is the basis underlying the multiple charges. Id. ¶¶ 7, 10. This latter category, termed a double-description violation, id., is relevant to the issues we address in this case.
{17} A double jeopardy challenge presents a question of constitutional law, which we review de novo. Gallegos, 2011-NMSC-027, ¶ 51.
1. The Double Jeopardy Clause Prohibits Multiple Punishments for Both Causing Death or Great Bodily Harm by Shooting into a Dwelling and First-Degree Murder for the Same Death
{18} In reviewing a double-description double jeopardy challenge, where a defendant’s conduct violates more than one statute, we must first determine whether the defendant’s conduct was unitary, requiring an analysis of whether or not a defendant’s acts are separated by sufficient “indicia of distinctness.” State v. DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶¶ 26-27, 139 N.M. 211, 131 P.3d 61. If the conduct is not unitary, then there is no double jeopardy violation. State v. Silvas, 2015-NMSC-006, ¶ 9, 343 P.3d 616. If the conduct is unitary, we must determine whether the Legislature intended multiple punishments for the unitary action. Id.
{19} When determining whether a defendant’s conduct is unitary “we have looked for an identifiable point at which one of the charged crimes had been completed and the other not yet committed. We have also looked for an event that intervened between the initial use of force and the acts that caused death.” DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 27 (citations omitted).
{20} The State concedes that Defendant’s conduct was unitary with respect to the crimes of first-degree murder and shooting at a dwelling. Defendant’s convictions arose from only one act, shooting through the Perez window. There was no identifiable point in time or intervening event between the completion of the shooting and the act causing the killing; they were one and the same. See State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 30, 306 P.3d 426 (“[The d]efendant’s act of shooting the driver of the [vehicle] was the common factual basis for both the shooting into the motor vehicle and the voluntary manslaughter convictions, and his culpable conduct was therefore ‘unitary.’” (citation omitted)); State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 2, 54, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d 1024 (holding that the defendant’s conduct underlying the convictions of both armed robbery and unlawful taking of a motor vehicle was unitary because both convictions were based on the conduct of stealing a car).
{21} When unitary conduct is the basis for multiple convictions, we must attempt to determine whether “the Legislature[] inten[ded] to punish the crimes separately.” State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 11, 279 P.3d 747. “In analyzing legislative intent, we first look to the language of the statute itself.” Id. If the Legislature clearly authorized multiple punishments the analysis is over, and there is no double jeopardy violation. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 50. If the statutory language does not explicitly allow for multiple punishments, we apply canons of construction to determine legislative intent. Swafford v. State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 12-13, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223 (discussing various canons of construction to determine legislative intent in a double jeopardy analysis, looking to the language, structure, and legislative history of the statutes and the social evils sought to be addressed by the statutes). If “the legislative intent remains ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires us to presume that the Legislature did not intend multiple punishments for the same conduct.” Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 13.
{22} The statute criminalizing shooting at a dwelling and causing great bodily harm
{23} Because the statutes at issue in this case do not explicitly address allowance for multiple punishments when the conduct is unitary, we must apply canons of construction to try to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.
{24} One of the canons of construction is what has been referred to in our jurisprudence as a modified Blockburger test, which originated with Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (announcing a simple test to determine whether there are single or multiple offenses: whether each criminal statute “requires proof of a fact which the other does not”). See Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 31
{25} In New Mexico, we now apply a modified Blockburger test to not only the defining statutes in the abstract but also to the State’s theory of the particular case, because our law does not permit an application of Blockburger that is “so mechanical that it is enough for two statutes to have different elements.” Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 21 (explaining and applying the modified Blockburger test).
{26} In Montoya we held that convictions for causing great bodily harm to a person by shooting at a motor vehicle and the resulting homicide of the same person constituted double jeopardy when both convictions were based on the unitary conduct of shooting at a person in a motor vehicle. See 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 54. While Montoya specifically addressed the shooting at a motor vehicle provision rather than the shooting at a dwelling provision at issue in the present case, these analogous subsections of the same statute,
{27} This case is conceptually indistinguishable from Montoya. Because the crime of causing great bodily harm or death by shooting at a dwelling and the crime of murder are directed at punishing the same social evil, causing death or bodily harm to a person, we conclude for the reasons we set out in Montoya that the Legislature
{28} When double jeopardy protections require one of two otherwise valid convictions to be vacated, we vacate the conviction carrying the shorter sentence. See Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 55-56 (avoiding violation of double jeopardy protections by vacating the conviction carrying the shorter sentence); Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 31 (same). Because first-degree murder carries a life sentence, see
2. Defendant’s First-Degree-Murder and Attempted-First-Degree-Murder Convictions Related to Different Victims Did Not Constitute Double Jeopardy
{30} “The doctrine of transferred intent is a legal fiction that is used to hold a defendant criminally liable to the full extent of his or her criminal culpability . . . where a defendant, while intending to kill one person, accidentally kills an innocent bystander or another unintended victim.” State v. Fekete, 1995-NMSC-049, ¶ 21, 120 N.M. 290, 901 P.2d 708 (citation omitted). “Contrary to what its name implies, the transferred intent doctrine does not refer to any actual intent that is capable of being used up.” People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1113 (Cal. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The New Mexico murder statute incorporates the doctrine of transferred intent by not requiring proof of intent to kill a specific person. See
{32} Gillette is instructive. If one of the friends in Gillette had died, the defendant could have been convicted on one count of first-degree murder, predicated on transferred intent, and two counts of attempted murder for the victims who survived. Based on the reasoning in Gillette, a defendant can be convicted of attempted murder for the attempt to kill the intended victim and convicted of murder of additional victims who were actually killed, based on a theory of transferred intent.
{33} In reviewing a unit-of-prosecution double jeopardy challenge, where an
{34} Here we need not get past the first step in the unit-of-prosecution analysis because the murder statute is clear regarding the unit of prosecution. See
3. Multiple Convictions of Conspiracy to Commit First-Degree Murder and Conspiracy to Shoot at a Dwelling Based on a Single Conspiratorial Agreement Constitute Double Jeopardy
{35} Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and conspiracy to shoot at a dwelling in an attempt to commit the murder. The district court merged these two conspiracy convictions by imposing one sentence for the two. Defendant argues that his multiple conspiracy convictions constitute double jeopardy because the State failed to prove two separate conspiracies and contends that the district court’s merging of the sentences did not cure the double jeopardy violation. Defendant is correct.
{36} In Gallegos, 2011-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 1, 34, we addressed the problem of splitting
{37} To avoid imposing multiple punishments for what in reality is often one criminal conspiratorial agreement with multiple objectives, we held in Gallegos that “[t]he Legislature established . . . a rebuttable presumption that multiple crimes are the object of only one, overarching, conspiratorial agreement subject to one, severe punishment set at the highest crime conspired to be committed.” Id. ¶ 55. “[T]he state has an opportunity to overcome the Legislature’s presumption of singularity, but doing so requires the state to carry a heavy burden.” Id.
{38} In Gallegos, the defendant was convicted of three conspiracy charges: conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit aggravated arson, and conspiracy to commit kidnaping. Id. ¶ 27. All the conspiracy convictions arose from attempts by the defendant and several others to kill the victim. Id. ¶¶ 8-14, 57. The evidence that the crimes were committed in a relatively short period of time, were
{39} In the present case, the State presented no evidence to rebut the presumption that the agreement to murder Ruben Perez and the agreement to shoot at a dwelling to accomplish that goal were the objects contemplated by one conspiratorial crime. Accordingly, the State has conceded on appeal that Defendant should be convicted of one conspiracy, rather than two. We agree that the evidence supports the conclusion that there was only one conspiracy, the conspiracy to murder Ruben Perez by shooting into his bedroom.
{40} New Mexico law is also clear that a double jeopardy violation is not cured by merging multiple convictions for concurrent sentencing. See id. ¶ 64 (“[D]ouble jeopardy problems are not cured by the trial court imposing concurrent sentences for the multiple convictions . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “[T]he appropriate remedy is to vacate [the d]efendant’s redundant convictions with punishment imposed on the single remaining conspiracy at the level of the highest crime conspired to be committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Challenges
{41} Defendant contends that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence. We address sufficiency of the evidence for the convictions that we have not already determined should be vacated on double jeopardy grounds.
{42} In reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine “whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rinker v. State Corp. Comm‘n, 1973-NMSC-021, ¶ 5, 84 N.M. 626, 506 P.2d 783. “[W]e must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.” State v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176.
1. Sufficient Evidence Supports Defendant‘s Convictions of Attempted First-Degree Murder of Ruben Perez and First-Degree Murder of Carlos Perez
{43} We address Defendant‘s contention that there is insufficient evidence to prove
{44} “In New Mexico, [a] person may be charged with and convicted of the crime as an accessory if he procures, counsels, aids or abets in its commission . . . although he d[oes] not directly commit the crime . . . .” State v. Carrasco, 1997-NMSC-047, ¶ 6, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A person who is an accessory to a crime is equally culpable and subject to the same punishment as the principal actor. Id. “The evidence of aiding and abetting may be as broad and varied as are the means of communicating thought from one individual to another; by acts, conduct, words, signs, or by any means sufficient to incite, encourage or instigate commission of the offense.” State v. Ochoa, 1937-NMSC-051, ¶ 31, 41 N.M. 589, 72 P.2d 609. A defendant‘s “mere presence without some outward manifestation of approval is insufficient” to uphold a conviction on a theory of
{45} Defendant argues that his case is controlled by State v. Vigil, where we held that the defendant‘s first-degree murder conviction was not supported by substantial evidence. See 2010-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 1, 4, 147 N.M. 537, 226 P.3d 636. In Vigil, the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder on a theory of accessory liability. Id. ¶ 1. The victim owed the defendant‘s cousin money, which precipitated an altercation between the defendant and the victim. Id. ¶ 6. Later that day, the victim and the defendant showed up in separate vehicles at the residence of the defendant‘s girlfriend. Id. ¶¶ 7-9. The defendant, angered that the victim was at his girlfriend‘s residence, got out of his vehicle in a rage and punched the victim twice through the open window of the victim‘s car. Id. ¶ 10. The victim shot the defendant and sped off.
{46} In this case the record contains sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that Defendant had the deliberate intent to kill Ruben and that he helped in the planning of the crime. Defendant spent the day before the murder with Edward, who had a motive to kill Ruben. See State v. Motes, 1994-NMSC-115, ¶¶ 12, 14-15, 118 N.M. 727, 885 P.2d 648 (considering motive in assessing whether the defendant had the deliberate intent to kill). Defendant secured for himself and Edward a ride in the Camry to the apartment complex where Ruben lived where the two got out of the Camry, shook hands with those in the Suburban group in front of the apartment building, and disappeared from sight with the other two shortly before gunshots were heard. From this, a jury could reasonably infer that Defendant aided and abetted in
{47} There also was sufficient evidence that Defendant actively participated in the actual attempt to kill Ruben. The lethal weapon was fired two to three feet from Ruben‘s bedroom window, and after the shots were fired Defendant returned to the Camry in an excited state, smelling like burned matches. From this evidence the jury could draw a reasoned inference that Defendant had been involved in the shooting, had been outside the bedroom window in very close physical proximity to the murder weapon, and had shared the deliberate intent to murder Ruben. See State v. Griffin, 1993-NMSC-071, ¶ 25, 116 N.M. 689, 866 P.2d 1156 (holding that evidence of the defendant shooting the victim at close range supported the jury‘s finding that the defendant had the deliberate intent to murder the victim); see also State v. Treadway, 2006-NMSC-008, ¶ 10, 139 N.M. 167, 130 P.3d 746 (same).
{48} Once in the Camry, Edward said to Defendant after receiving a phone call, “We didn‘t get him. We got the little boy.” Defendant replied, “Are you sure it was the little boy?” The exchange between Edward and Defendant provides further support for the jury‘s finding that Defendant shared the deliberate intent to murder Ruben.
{49} Because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury‘s finding that Defendant had the requisite deliberate intent to kill required for his convictions of
2. Sufficient Evidence Supports Defendant‘s Conviction of Conspiracy to Commit First-Degree Murder
{50} Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. “Conspiracy consists of knowingly combining with another for the purpose of committing a felony.”
{51} There is sufficient evidence to support the jury‘s finding that Defendant conspired with others to commit murder. In this case, the evidence that supports Defendant‘s conviction of first-degree murder also supports the jury‘s finding that Defendant was part of a conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Defendant was
3. Sufficient Evidence Supports Defendant‘s Conviction of Unlawful Transportation of a Firearm
{52} Defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence that he was in unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of
{53} Defendant overlooks the fact that the statute also prohibits a felon from transporting a firearm. See
{54} There is sufficient evidence that Defendant knowingly transported a firearm. Although Defendant‘s trial version of the day of the offenses varies greatly from the other witnesses’ versions, he acknowledged in his trial testimony that on September 14, 2005, he was driving Edward around town and was aware that Edward had brought a gun into the car. Because of Defendant‘s admission alone, there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Defendant transported a firearm. See Dunsmore, 1995-NMCA-012, ¶ 8 (upholding a conviction for a felon unlawfully transporting a firearm when the defendant transported a person he knew to be in possession of a gun). Accordingly, we affirm Defendant‘s conviction for transporting a firearm.
C. The District Court‘s Disallowing Impeachment of a Witness Regarding a Prior Bad Act Is Not Grounds for Reversal
{55} Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied Defendant the opportunity to cross-examine a State‘s witness, Keith Farkas, regarding a prior bad
{56} Farkas had been a detective with the Clovis Police Department and conducted the crime scene investigation on the Camry and the Suburban. In 2006, Farkas was accused of stealing a work computer. Criminal charges were brought and later dropped, but because of the criminal charges he was dismissed from the Clovis Police Department. Defendant wanted to cross-examine Farkas regarding this alleged theft and argued that the evidence was admissible because it went to Farkas’ credibility and trustworthiness. The State argued that the impeachment should be precluded for its lack of substantial probative value under the discretion afforded a trial court by
{57} Under
{58} While Rule 11-608 specifically allows the court to permit cross-examination on prior specific acts relating to a witness‘s character for truthfulness, the language in the rule is permissive, not mandatory. See
{59} On this record, there is no showing the district court abused the judicial discretion provided by either Rule 11-608 or 11-403. Farkas‘s credibility was not probative of any important issue in the case. Farkas testified only that the evidence
{60} Because the district court did not abuse its discretion and because Defendant was not prejudiced in any material respect by the district court‘s exclusion of the minimally relevant impeachment evidence, the district court‘s ruling does not warrant reversal.
D. Shackling Defendant During Trial Was Not Fundamental Error
{61} We address Defendant‘s contention that he was denied a fair trial because he was “chained to the table” throughout his trial without a hearing to determine whether shackling was appropriate. Defendant neither objected to the shackling in the district court nor requested a hearing to consider whether shackling was justified.
{62} Because Defendant did not preserve this issue for appeal, we review for fundamental error. State v. Johnson, 2010-NMSC-016, ¶ 25, 148 N.M. 50, 229 P.3d 523 (holding that because the defendant did not object to the use of leg irons during trial, this Court reviewed the issue for fundamental error). Fundamental error “goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant‘s rights or . . . take[s] from the defendant a
{63} In Johnson we recognized that “‘the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial[,]‘” including security concerns. Johnson, 2010-NMSC-016, ¶ 26 (alteration in original) (quoting Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005)). But we pointed out that “where a defendant is restrained in a manner not visible to the jury, prejudice is not presumed.” Johnson, 2010-NMSC-016, ¶ 28.
{64} In this case, there is nothing in the record that reflects that the shackles could be seen by the jury. There were only three instances when defense counsel even mentioned Defendant‘s shackles to the judge, and in none of those instances did defense counsel indicate that the shackles could be seen by the jury. First, defense counsel noted during a whispered sidebar conference that Defendant was shackled and could not attend. Second, after the jury was released for lunch, defense counsel asked if Defendant could be unshackled during the lunch break so he could make
{65} Because there was no fundamental error in shackling Defendant in a manner not visible to the jury, we have no need to address the question whether Defendant‘s history of flight to avoid prosecution or any other particular considerations would have supported the court‘s exercise of discretion in ordering leg restraints during trial.
E. Defendant Was Not Denied a Fair Trial by the Court‘s Refusal to Permit Him to Join His Counsel at Sidebar Conferences
{66} Defendant argues that his shackling made it impossible for him to attend sidebar conferences during trial and suggests that this violated his constitutional right to counsel by preventing him from communicating with his lawyer. Defendant cites
{67} Defendant was represented by his attorney at all sidebar conferences. See United States v. McCoy, 8 F.3d 495, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the defendant‘s interests were adequately protected by his counsel‘s presence at the conference and that the defendant‘s “absence from the conferences did not detract from his defense or in any other way affect the fundamental fairness of his trial“). Defendant alleges no specific time when the shackles prevented him from communicating with counsel.
{69} The only sidebar conference when defense counsel actually objected to Defendant‘s absence was called to address defense counsel‘s objection on foundational grounds to admission of a gun offered as an evidentiary exhibit. The
{70} We conclude that Defendant has failed to establish that his inability to join his counsel at routine sidebar conferences adversely affected his right to a fair trial or any other constitutional rights.
F. The District Court Erred in Enhancing Defendant‘s Sentence Pursuant to the Habitual Offender Statute When More Than Ten Years Had Elapsed Between Defendant‘s Discharge on the Earlier Offense and the Date of Actual Conviction of the Current Offense
{71} Defendant argues that his sentence should not have been enhanced pursuant to the habitual offender statute because more than ten years had elapsed between Defendant‘s discharge from probation for his prior felony conviction and the date of conviction in the current case. The State concedes that the district court erred in application of the habitual offender statute,
{72} The habitual offender statute defines “prior felony conviction” as “a conviction, when less than ten years have passed prior to the instant felony conviction since the person completed serving his sentence or period of probation or parole for
{73} Looking at the relevant dates in this case, Defendant‘s probation for his prior felony expired on September 25, 2004, by a court‘s order of unsatisfactory discharge. The date of the conviction in this case was March 13, 2015. Because Defendant completed his probation for the prior felony conviction more than ten years before the date of conviction in the current case, we agree with the State‘s concession that the district court erred in using the prior felony conviction as a predicate felony to enhance Defendant‘s sentence. Accordingly, we vacate the three-year sentence
III. CONCLUSION
{74} We affirm Defendant‘s convictions of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. We reverse his convictions for shooting at a dwelling and conspiring to shoot at a dwelling, and we vacate the habitual offender enhancement of his sentence. We remand this case to the district court for entry of an amended judgment and sentence in accordance with this opinion.
{75} IT IS SO ORDERED.
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
WE CONCUR:
JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Chief Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice