*1 337 ILLINOIS v. ALLEN No. 606. Argued February 24, 1970 Decided 31, March *2 Illinois, of Attorney General Flaum, Assistant M. Joel the briefs on him With petitioner. for cause the argued R. James General, and Attorney Scott, J. William were Immel, J. Thomas Friedman, and E. Morton Thompson, Attorneys General. Assistant a brief filed cause the argued Harris Reed
H. respondent. the Court. of opinion the delivered Black
Mr. Justice
Amendment
Sixth
of the
Clause
Confrontation
The
all
“In
that:
provides
Constitution
States
the United
enjoy
shall
accused
prosecutions,
criminal
against
witnesses
confronted
...
right
Amend-
Fourteenth
held
haveWe
him
obligatory
clause
this
of
guarantees
makes
ment
(1965).
400
S.
Texas,
U.
380
v.
Pointer
States.
upon
by
guaranteed
rights
basic
most
One
right
the accused’s
is
Clause
Confrontation
v.
Lewis
trial.
every stage
at
courtroom
in
pre-
question
The
(1892).
370
S.
States,
U.
146
United
claim
can
an accused
whether
is
case
this
sented
court-
in the
remain
right
constitutional
benefit
speech
engages
time
same
while
room
disruptive
disorderly,
noisy,
is so
which
conduct
carry
impossible
wholly
or
difficult
exceedingly
it
trial.
on
respondent,
The
way.
following
in the
arose
issue
robbery
armed
jury
Illinois
convicted
Allen, was
Illinois
years
to10
serve
sentenced
showed
him
against
evidence
Penitentiary.
State
that on August 12, 1956, he entered a tavern in Illinois
and, after ordering a drink, took $200 from the bartender
at gunpoint. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed his
conviction, People v. Allen, 37 Ill. 2d 167, 226 N. E. 2d 1
(1967), and this Court denied certiorari.
The facts surrounding Allen’s expulsion from the court- room are set out in the Court of Appeals’ opinion sus- taining Allen’s contention: “After his indictment and during the pretrial
stage, the petitioner [Allen] refused court-appointed counsel and indicated to the trial court on several occasions that he wished to conduct his own de- fense. After considerable argument by the peti- tioner, the trial judge told him, Til you let your be own lawyer, but I’ll ask Mr. Kelly [court-appointed counsel] sit [to] in and protect the record for you, insofar as possible.’
“The trial began on September 9, 1957. After the State’s Attorney had accepted the first four jurors following their voir dire examination, the petitioner began examining the juror first and con- tinued at great length. Finally, the trial judge in- terrupted the petitioner, requesting him to confine his questions solely to matters relating to the pros- pective juror’s qualifications. At that point, the petitioner started to argue with the judge in a most abusive and disrespectful manner. At last, and seemingly in desperation, the judge asked appointed examination proceed to counsel proclaim- talk, to continued petitioner The jurors. to going not attorney was appointed ing remarks his terminated He lawyer. his as act [the you’re lunchtime, out goI 'When saying, point At here.’ corpse be a to going judge] threw and attorney had which file tore thereupon judge trial The floor. on papers outbreak more 'One petitioner, to stated This courtroom.’ from you remove I’ll sort con- He petitioner. on effect no had warning ‘There’s saying, judge, to back talk tinued sit going I’m either. trial, no going not bring can you talk going you’re here them put jacket straight out shackles your good no do will it but mouth, my tape andme on After trial.’ no going there’s because trial petitioner, by the remarks abusive more petitioner’s proceed ordered judge removed petitioner absence. con- then examination dire voir *4 courtroom. the absence selected was jury the tinued petitioner. the was jury before recess noon “After appear- petitioner, courtroom, the into brought fairness about complained judge, before ing also He attorney. appointed his during court he wanted said peti- said judge reply, In trial. court- to remain permitted would tioner inter- and [did] [himself] ‘behaved if ^xroom jury case.’ introduction fere peti- for the Counsel seated. in and brought witnesses exclude moved then tioner effort protested [petitioner] courtroom.
on the part of his attorney, saying: ‘There is going to be no proceeding. I’m going start talking I’m going to keep on all talking through the trial. There’s not going to be no trial like this. I want my sister and my friends here in court to testify for me.’ The trial judge thereupon ordered the petitioner removed from the courtroom.” 413 F. 2d, at 233-234. After this second removal, Allen remained out of the courtroom during the presentation of the State’s case-in- chief, except that he was brought in on several occasions for purposes of identification. During one of these latter appearances, Allen responded to one of the judge’s ques- tions with vile and abusive language. After the prose- cution’s case had been presented, the trial judge reiter- ated his promise to Allen that he could return to the courtroom whenever he agreed to conduct himself prop- erly. Allen gave some assurances of proper conduct and was permitted to be present through the remainder of the trial, principally his defense, which was conducted by his appointed counsel. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that
Supreme Court of Illinois was wrong in ruling that Allen had by his conduct relinquished his constitutional right to be present, declaring that:
“No may conditions be imposed on the absolute right of a criminal defendant to be present at all stages of the proceeding. The insistence of a that he exercise this right under unrea- sonable conditions does not amount to a waiver. Such conditions, if insisted upon, should and must *5 be dealt with in a manner that does not compel the relinquishment of his right.
“In light of the decision in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574 . . . (1884) and Shields v. United States, 273 342 constitutional the as well as (1927), .. . 583
S.U. view the of we are amendment, sixth the of mandate excluded been have should defendant the that dis- his despite trial his during courtroom the from proper The conduct. disrespectful ruptive restrained have towas judge trial course even necessary, means by whatever defendant shackled being his included means those if 235. 2d, at F. 413 gagged.” Sixth defendant’s that felt Appeals of Court sowas trial own his at right
Amendment disruptive unruly or how matter no that, “absolute” held never could he be, might conduct defendant’s insist continued as long so right that lost have Court Therefore clearly did. Allen as it, upon expel never could judge trial a that concluded Appeals ulti- judge’s trial own his defendant a obstreperous faced when remedy mate impossible trial make determines who Allen like agree cannot We him.1 gag to bind is Court which upon cases Amendment, Sixth handi- so Court this cases any other or relied, Appeals trial. criminal a conducting in judge trial a cap United v. Lewis Utah, supra, Hopt v. in dicta broad con- never can trial a (1892), 370 S. States, U. 146 expressly been have absence defendant’s tinue (1912). 442 S. States, U. 223 United v. Diaz rejected. Cardozo Mr. Justice statement instead accept We Massachusetts, v. Snyder Court for the who, speaking privilege “No doubt said: (1934), 106 97, S.U. lost may be witnesses] confronting personally [of referred also Appeals Court footnote In II of Part discussed subject This power. contempt judge’s Infra, 344-345. opinion. *6 consent or at times even by misconduct.”2 Although mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable pre- sumption against the loss constitutional rights, John- son v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938), we explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.3 Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respectInherent in the concept of courts judicial proceedings.
It is essential to the proper administration of crim- justice inal that dignity, order, and decorum be the hall- marks of all court proceedings our country. . flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary stand- ards of proper conduct should not and cannot be toler- ated. We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining the appro- priate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situa- tions. We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstrep-
2Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides prosecutions “[i]n for offenses punishable not by death, the defendant’s voluntary absence after the trial has been com menced in presence shall prevent continuing the trial and including the return of the verdict.” 3See Murray, The Power to Expel a Criminal Defendant From His Own Trial: A Comparative View, 36 U. Colo. L. Rev. 171-175 (1964); Goldin, Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of the Verdict in Felony Cases, 16 Col. L. Rev. 18-31 (1916). *7 thereby- him, gag and (1) bind Allen: like defendant
erous (3) contempt; for him cite (2) present; him keeping to promises he until courtroom the of out him take properly. himself conduct
I bound sits while crime a defendant a Trying extent an to would jury and judge the before gagged and pur- Amendment’s Sixth the of part that with comply con- to opportunity an defendant the accords that poses contem- to even But trial. the at witnesses front feeling a arouses it, see less much technique, a such plate gagged and shackled while tried be should person no that that possible is it only Not resort. last a- as except effect significant a have might gags of shackles sight of use but defendant, about feelings jury’s on the very to affront something of is itself technique proceedings judicial of decorum dignity de- of Moreover, one uphold. seeking is judge at present being of advantages primary fendant’s is counsel, his with communicate ability his trial, of condition in a is defendant when reduced greatly in- these of because part inis It restraint. physical total of method in this limitations disadvantages herent decline we defendants disorderly with dealing cannot a defendant Appeals Court hold deprived be circumstances possible any under situa- in some However, trial. right binding foresee, attempt need we which tions reason- most fairest possibly might gagging did Allen as acts who a handle toway able here. II pos- suggested Appeals Court footnote a In remedy aas court contempt availability
sible true is it trial, and robbery in his behave Allen make that citing or threatening to cite a contumacious de- fendant for criminal contempt might in itself be suffi- cient to make a defendant stop interrupting trial. If so, the problem would be solved easily, and the defendant could remain in the courtroom. Of course, if the de- fendant is determined to prevent trial, any then a court in attempting to try the defendant for contempt still confronted with the identical dilemma that Illinois court faced in this case. And criminal contempt *8 has obvious limitations as a sanction when the defendant is charged with a crime so serious that a very severe sentence such as death or life imprisonment is likely to be imposed. In such a case the defendant might not be affected by a mere contempt sentence when he ulti- mately faces a far more serious sanction. Nevertheless, the contempt remedy should be borne in mind by a judge in the circumstances of this case.
Another aspect of the contempt remedy is the judge's power, when exercised consistently with state and fed- eral law, to imprison an unruly defendant such as Allen for civil contempt and discontinue the trial until such time as the defendant promises to behave himself. This procedure is consistent with the defendant’s right be present at trial, and yet it avoids the serious short- comings of the use of shackles and gags. It must be recognized, however, that a defendant might conceiv- ably, as a matter of calculated strategy, elect to spend a prolonged period in confinement for contempt in the hope that adverse witnesses might be unavailable after a lapse of time. A court must guard against allowing a to profit from his own wrong in this way.
Ill The trial in court this case decided under the cir- cumstances to remove the defendant from the court- room and to continue his trial in his absence until and manner in a himself conduct promised he unless we earlier, said weAs courtroom. American an befitting procedure. about unconstitutional nothing find extreme an such clearly was behavior Allen’s from removal his either justify toas nature aggravated Prior restraint. physical total his or the courtroom judge trial by the warned repeatedly was he removal his he if courtroom removed would he that Hastings Judge as and, conduct, unruly his persisted demon- record opinion, dissenting his observed dissuaded all been have would Allen strates powers. contempt criminal his use judge’s trial by return could he informed constantly Allen himself conduct agree would when hold we circumstances these Under manner. orderly the Sixth guaranteed right his lost Allen throughout Amendments Fourteenth trial.
IV Allen respondent *9 hold to pleasant not It is his part for a court from banished properly they as liberty palladiums courts, our But trial. own impunity. with disrespectfully treated cannot are, con- disruptive by permitted accused can Nor charges on tried being avoid to indefinitely duct country our degrade | would It him. against brought ibe courts our permit system judicial our and < orderly their and humiliated and insulted, bullied, brought,.J defendants by obstructed and thwarted progress guardians As crimes. charged them before systems judicial federal and state our welfare, public rich justice equal administer strive born foreign native bad, the good poor, manned Being religion. nationality, race, every bound are perfect are courts humans, what remain are courts if our But, errors. some make the Founders intended, the citadels of justice, their pro- ceedings cannot and must not be infected with the sort of scurrilous, abusive language and conduct paraded before the Illinois trial judge in this case. The record shows that the Illinois judge at all times conducted himself with that dignity, decorum, and patience that befit a judge. Even in holding that the trial judge had erred, the Court of Appeals praised his “commendable patience under severe provocation.” We do not hold that removing this defendant his own trial was the only way the Illinois judge could have constitutionally solved the problem he had. We do hold, however, that there is nothing whatever in this record to show that the judge did not act completely within his discretion. Deplorable as it is to remove a man from his own trial, even for a short time, we hold the judge did not commit legal error in doing what he did.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring. The safeguards that the Constitution accords to crim-
inal defendants presuppose that government has a sov- ereign prerogative to put on trial those accused in good faith of violating valid laws. Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of “ordered liberty” and prerequisite to social justice and peace. History has known the breakdown of lawful penal authority —the feud, the vendetta, and the terror *10 of penalties meted out by mobs or roving bands of vigi- lantes. It has known, too, the perversion of that au- thority. In some societies the penal arm of the state has reached individual men through secret denunciation followed by summary punishment. In others the solemn power of condemnation has been confided to the caprice echoed have history of corridors the Down tyrants. of irrational other by convicted men innocent of cries the alterna- the of some are These procedures. arbitrary or our by adopted procedure the offers history tives trial —to aof right The Constitution. people by our cherished been long jury by trial —has govern- authority of penal the on restraint vital aas our under that doubted been never has it And ment. accordance in trial traditions constitutional government by which mode proper Constitution authority. that exercises liberty in “conceived Nation this said Lincoln created men are all that proposition dedicated and men all society where aof dream Founders’ The equal.” realize. easy to been has equal and free are been has today exists that equality and liberty of degree Much sacrifice. and struggle unceasing of product of institutions very much done—so be remains today, Hence, challenge. under come have society our [this] “whether may ask man time, Lincoln’s inas can dedicated so and conceived so nation any or nation short falls Nation if endure It cannot endure.” long em- equality and justice, liberty, of guarantees on cannot it also But documents. founding our bodied ordered of heritage precious our allow if we endure fury and sound amid apart ripped be liberty to cases individual inif endure cannot It time. our side one on order peace social claims mutually resolved be cannot other liberty on personal If Constitution. by designated forum court ain trial judicial reached be cannot resolution means, by other elsewhere reached bewill it law, equality, liberty, danger grave be will there lost. be will both essential order accused right constitutional Thus context. considered must *11 there can be no doubt whatever the governmental prerogative to proceed with a trial may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial from going forward. Over a half century ago this Court in Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442, 457-458 (1912), approved what I believe is the governing principle. We there quoted from Falk v. United States, 15 App. D. C. 446 (1899), the case of an accused who appeared at his trial but fled the jurisdiction before it was completed. The court proceeded in his absence, and a verdict of guilty was returned. In affirming the conviction over the accused's objection that he could not be convicted in his absence, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said:
“It does not seem to us to be consonant with the dictates of common sense that an accused person . . . should be at liberty, whenever he pleased, ... break up a trial already commenced. The practical result of such a proposition, if allowed to be law, would be prevent any trial whatever until accused person himself should be pleased to permit it. . . . This would be a travesty of justice which could not be tolerated .... [W]e do not think that any rule of law or constitutional principle leads us to any conclusion that would be so disastrous as well to the administration of justice as to the true interests of civil liberty.
“The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused person, placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the safeguards with which the humanity of our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him, can with impunity defy the processes of law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries and turn them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its own *12 of principle the of operation the restrict to safety, civil in nor criminal in Neither liberty. personal advantage take to person a allow law the will cases wrong.” own his of like a defendant of activities disruptive the allow To to him allow is trial his prevent respondent would Constitution The wrong. own his from profit acting from courts the prevented if it us of none protect Constitution the that processes very the preserve prescribes. itself is defendant unruly against action course, no Of fairly and fully been has he after except permissible and intolerable, and wrong is conduct his that informed mis- continued of consequences possible of warned respondent that clear makes record behavior. can there Thus case. in warned and informed so repre- his persisting respondent, that doubt no be at present be right his surrendered conduct, hensible trial. avail- are remedies several out, points Court As dis- on bent defendant a with faced judge able shackled, bound, him have can He trial. his rupting con- criminal or civil him hold can he gagged; on carry him exclude can tempt; devised. be can methods other doubt No absence. Constitu- that agree opinion Court’s join I any adoption prohibit or require not does tion be right constitutional courses. these purpose abused is it if surrendered can require not does process Due trial. frustrating there means presence if his defendant presence agree also I However, all. process orderly no will equally not are methods three these Court de- gagging shackling particular, In acceptable. offends It them. acceptable least surely fendant also but decorum, dignity judicial only respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law. I would add only that when a is excluded
from his trial, the court should make reasonable efforts to enable him to communicate with his attorney and, if possible, to keep apprised of the progress of his trial. Once the court has removed the contumacious defendant, *13 it is not weakness to mitigate the disadvantages of his expulsion as far as technologically possible in the circumstances.
Me. Douglas. Justice I agree with the Court that a criminal trial, in the constitutional sense, cannot take place where the court- room is a bedlam and either the, accused or the judge is hurling epithets at the other. A courtroom is a hallowed place where trials must proceed with dignity and not become occasions for entertainment by the par- ticipants, by extraneous persons, by modern mass media, or otherwise.
My difficulty is not with the basic hypothesis of this decision, but with the use of this case to establish the appropriate guidelines judicial for control. This is a stale case, the trial having taken place nearly 13 years ago. That lapse of time is not necessarily a barrier to a challenge of the constitutionality of a crim- inal conviction. But in this case it should be.
There is more than an intimation in the present record the defendant was a mental case. The passage of time since 1957, the date of the trial, makes it, how- ever, impossible to determine what the mental condi- tion of the defendant was at that time. The fact that a defendant has been found to understand “the nature and object of the proceedings against him” and thus competent to stand trial1 does not answer the difficult questions as to what a trial judge should do with an
1See 5,n. infra. court- a creates who defendant ill mentally otherwise a with do should judge a What disturbance. room volitional be not may antics courtroom whose defendant ex- reach not should we which problem perplexing ais lawyer no had defendant This record. clear aon cept insisted properly judge though one, refused him. represent be bar of member a transpired what lawyer own tried He disgraceful. disgusting as well as pathetic, reverse should but merits reach not should We denial affirm record staleness case is- all, behind After Court. District relief of an exercise corpus habeas writ aof suance ain proceed how question, discretion. informed case, mental aiswho against case criminal record. adequate full aon only resolved should case this lie type problems real Our political are First trials. kinds *14 other but insofar history'2 and in our recur frequently They trials. involving 865, E.N. 1, 12 Ill. 2 122 People, Spies v. From Pullman involving the 564, S.U. Debs, 158 re In riot; Haymarket copper involving 103, S.U. Holohan, 294 Mooney v. strike; E. 369, 151 N. Mass. Sacco, 255 v. 1917; Commonwealth strikes 167, E.N. 12, 158 Mass. 57, 261 E. N. 128, 156 Mass. 839, 259 States, United v. Dennis 20’s; to scare Red involving Marxism. teach agreement involving an 494, U. S. 341 2 Com- case, J. see Spies resulting in riot Haymarket to the As 386 States the United Labour History of Associates, mons Twen- and Constitution Swindler, Court W. (1918); seq. et (1969). and3 Century, cc. tieth Pfeifer, This L. case, see Debs strike Pullman toAs Strike, Pullman The Lindsey, A. (1965); 215-216 Court Honorable 502-508. supra, at Commons, (1942); XIII XII cc. 1922, issue 18, January case, Mooney see toAs (1968). Mooney Case Frost, The R. Republic; New Sacco-Vanzetti Fraenkel, see case Sacco-Vanzetti toAs (1927). Yanzetti of Sacco Case Frankfurter, The Case; F. case, see Dennis in the involved teaching repression toAs (1961). 132-158 Justice Kirchheimer, Political 0. as they place take in federal courts we have broad super-* visory powers over them. That is one setting where the question arises whether the accused has rights of con- frontation that the law invades at its peril.
In Anglo-American law, great injustices have at times been done to unpopular minorities judges, as well as by prosecutors. I refer to London in 1670 when William Penn, the gentle Quaker, was tried for causing a riot when all that he did was to preach a sermon bn Grace Church Street, his church having been closed under the Conventicle Act:
“Penn. I affirm I have broken no law, nor am I Guilty of the indictment that is laid to my charge; and to the end the bench, the jury, and myself, with these that hear us, may have a more direct under- standing of this procedure, I desire you would let me know by what law it is you prosecute me, and upon what you law ground my indictment.
“Rec. Upon the common-law.
“Penn. Where is that common-law? “Rec. You must not think that I am able to run up so many years, and over so many adjudged cases, which we call common-law, to answer your curiosity.
“Penn. This answer I am sure is very short of my question, for if it be common, it should not be so hard to produce.
“Rec. Sir, will you plead to your indictment? *15 “Penn. Shall I plead to an Indictment that hath no foundation in law? If it contain that you law I say have broken, why should you decline to pro- duce that law, since it will be impossible for the jury to determine, or agree to bring in their verdict, who have not the law produced, by which they should measure the truth of this indictment, and the guilt, or contrary of my fact?
354 to speak fellow, saucy a are You
“Rec. Indictment. matter to speak to my place is it say, I “Penn. which liberty, my a prisoner; arraigned amI law; many are you concerned: nowis itself, life to next is be not must I if and me, against ears and mouths sayI hard, is it case, my best make allowed people, me, and shew you unless again, take I shall upon, indictment your ground you law arbitrary. merely are proceedings your granted for it Guilty are you whether is, question
“Rec. Indictment? this Guilty I am not, whether is question “Penn. Indictment whether but Indictment, of this answer, an imperfect general too It is legal. be both knew we unless common-law, it is say law, no is there where For is. it what where not is which law that transgression; no is there no is it common, being from far sois being, at all. law you will fellow, impertinent are You “Rec. scripta,’ non ‘Lex is It is? law what court teach years or studied have many which a you tell tome have you would know, and moment? hard so be law common if Certainly, “Penn. common; very being far is it understood, any Institutes Coke lord if but is Common-Law That us, tells consideration, the Great is Right Common right, common .... Charter-Privileges it fellow, troublesome are you Sir, “Rec. you suffer court honour on. go *16 “Penn. I have asked but one question, and you have not answered me; though the rights priv- ileges of every Englishman be concerned in it.
“Rec. If I should you suffer to ask questions till to-morrow morning, you would be never the wiser.
“Penn. That is according as the answers are. “Rec. Sir, we must not stand to hear you talk all night. “Penn. I design no affront to the court, but
be heard in my just plea: and I must plainly tell you, that if you will deny me Oyer of that law, which you suggest I have broken, you do at once deny me an acknowledged right, and evidence to the whole world your resolution to sacrifice the privileges of Englishmen to your sinister and arbi- trary designs.
“Rec. Take him away. My lord, if you take not some course with this pestilent fellow, to stop his mouth, we shall not be able to do any thing to night. “Mayor. Take him away, take him away, turn him into the bale-dock.” The Trial of William Penn, 6 How. St. Tr. 951, 958-959.
The panel of judges who tried William Penn were sin- cere, law-and-order men of their day. Though Penn was acquitted by the jury, he jailed by the court for his contemptuous conduct. Would we tolerate re- moval of a defendant from the courtroom during a trial because he was insisting on his constitutional albeit vociferously, no matter how obnoxious rights, philos- ophy might have been to bench that...tried him? Would we uphold contempt in that situation? 3At Old Bailey, where the William Penn trial was held (or baledock baildock) was “a small room taken from one of the corners of court, open left top; in which, during the trials, put are some of the malefactors.” Oxford Eng. Diet. *17 356 political of and indictments political of Problems of heart to going questions profound raise
judges is two-sided: compact that For compact. the social within grievances their press to undertake majorities proce- its with in accord Constitution of limits pro- by constitutional abide to agree minorities dures; claims. those resisting in cedures defining the involve problem answer Does involve it or does trials political conducting for procedure putting for methods constitutional designing inadequate singularly is record This to them? end re- enough time will It questions. those answer political a when problems weighty those solve review. for Court reaches destroy the minorities used trials are Second repressive on bring system constitutional existing used historically have left on Radicals measures. calcu- right extreme incite tactics those repression regime a fostering design lated as emerge hope left on radicals which provocateur. is the role The left victor.4 ultimate for instrument anas designed not Constitution The social contest. rough-and-tumble form restraint, tolerance, patience, for room has compact involving that Trials violence. sabotage not but constitutional heart very strike spectacle government. guidelines this case provide try to
I would cases. types of different strikingly two for those without case criminal the classical here presented case involves It overtones. subversive or any political may may or who person sick awas who vis-á-vis Communists strategy of German respects the As 525, 461, 462, Heiden, Fuehrer Der 1930’s, K. see Nazis (1944). 551-552
not have been insane in the classical sense5 but who apparently had a diseased mind. And, as I have said, the record is so stale that it is now much too late to find out what the true facts really were. *18 5In a pretrial sanity hearing, Allen was found tó be
incompetent to stand trial. Approximately year later, however, on 19, October 1957, in a second competency hearing, he was declared sane and competent to stand trial.
Allen’s sister and brother testified in Allen’s behalf at the trial
They recited instances of Alien’s
past
unusual
behavior and stated
that he was confined to a mental institution in 1953, although no
reason for this latter confinement
given.
A doctor
called
prosecution testified that he had examined Allen shortly after the
commission of the crime which
place
took
on August 12, 1956, and
on other subsequent
that,
occasions, and
in his opinion, Allen was
sane at the time of each examination. This evidence was admitted
question
on the
of Allen’s sanity at the time of the offense. The
jury found him sane at time and Supreme
Illinois
Court
affirmed that finding.
People
See
v. Allen,