State v. TaylorState v. Taylor
{¶1} A complaint filed in the juvenile division charged 16-year-old defendant-appellant Elijah Taylor with committing acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute felony offenses of aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and having a weapon while under disability. All three сounts of the complaint contained firearm specifications. After finding probable cause to believe that Taylor committed the acts as charged, the juvenile court transferred the сase to the general division. Taylor pleaded guilty to a single count of aggravated robbery with a one-year firearm specification. In this appeal, he complains that the victim‘s uncеrtainty in identifying him meant that the juvenile court‘s probable cause finding was not supported by sufficient evidence. He also complains that the juvenile court erred by finding that he was subject to mandatory bindоver to be tried as an adult.
I. Probable Cause
{¶2} Taylor first argues that the court erred by finding probable cause to believe that he committed the charged acts. He maintains that the state failed to present credible identification evidence to prove that he committed the charged acts because the victim admitted that he did not see his robber‘s face. Taylor also maintains that an in-court identification made by the victim was unduly suggestive because Taylor was the only alleged delinquent child in the courtroom.
{¶4} In the context of mandatory-bindover proceedings, the probable cause determination involvеs questions of both fact and law: we defer to findings based on the credibility of a witness, but review de novo whether the state presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the acts charged. In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 51. The “probable” component of the probable cause determination means that the state must produce evidence thаt “raises more than a mere suspicion of guilt, but need not provide evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at ¶ 42, citing State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 93, 752 N.E.2d 937 (2001).
{¶5} The victim testified that he used an automated teller machine locatеd inside a gas station to withdraw $20 and make a small purchase. As he walked home, two males — one short and the other tall — confronted him. The tall male had a firearm and told the victim “don‘t move.” Knowing that hе was being robbed, the victim pulled out the money left over from his store purchase. The smaller male took the money, and both males fled. The victim testified that he saw “the bigger guy‘s face just like I‘m looking at yоu.”
{¶7} Taylor argues that the victim‘s identification was suspect because the victim testifiеd that he could not identify his assailants’ clothing (apart from saying that one of them wore a hoodie) and testified that the man presented in the cold stand was not one of the persons who robbed him.
II. Mandatory Bindover
{¶12} In State v. Moore, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105240, 2017-Ohio-8483, we rejected an argument similar to the one made by Taylor. Moore was convicted in 2011 following a mandatory bindover from juvenile court. In 2016, following the release of Aalim I, we granted Moore a delayed appeal to argue that the mandatory bindover was unconstitutional. Before the appeal was decided, the Supreme Court vacated Aalim I on reconsideration and issued Aalim II. Given that Aalim I had been vacated, we rejected Moоre‘s claim that he was denied due process and equal protection of the law because he was not given an amenability hearing. Moore at ¶ 11. Another appellate district has reached a similаr conclusion. See State v. Ferguson, 2017-Ohio-7930, 98 N.E.3d 987, ¶ 2 (2d Dist.), fn. 1.
{¶13} These cases convince us that Taylor cannot show any error that affects a substantial right. Moreover, even had Taylor shown error, Aalim II makes it clear that the mandatory bindover statute is not unconstitutional, so no miscarriage of justice would occur if he were denied the application of Aalim I, a case that has since been vacated.
{¶14} Our finding that no miscarriage of justice exists disposes of Taylor‘s third assignment of error and his claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on grounds that counsel should have objected to mandatory bindover. Importantly, at the time the court conducted the probable cause hearing in this case, the Supreme Court had stayed the execution of judgment in Aalim I. See State v. Aalim, 148 Ohio St.3d 1407, 2017-Ohio-573, 69 N.E.3d 748. So even if Aalim I had not yet been vacated at the time the court ordered mandatory bindover, the stay of the decision meant that it was no longer binding on the court. See State v. Baker, 2017-Ohio-7795, 97 N.E.3d 981, ¶ 29 (7th Dist.). So regardless of whether counsel had the obligation to request an amenability hearing — an issue that we do not consider — no prejudice resulted because the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the constitutional challenge to the mandatory bindover statute. Taylor thus failed to establish the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because there is no reasonable probability that the court would have conducted an amenability hearing had counsel requested one. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
{¶15} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered thаt appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issuе out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
MELODY J. STEWART, PRESIDING JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR