State v. BakerState v. Baker
OPINION
ROBB, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Nathaniel Baker appeals from his drug convictions entered in Columbiana County Common Pleas Court. Appellant contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him because the case was directly filed in the general division of the common pleas court rather than being filed in and then transferred from juvenile court. This argument has merit. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is reversed, Appellant's convictions are vacated, and the case is remanded with orders to transfer the case to juvenile court.
{¶ 2} Appellant also asks for application of the Ohio Supreme Court's 2016 Aalim case which severed the statutory requirements of mandatory transfer and held that children are constitutionally entitled to an amenability hearing. As the cited case (which is now known as " Aalim I ") was vacated on reconsideration by the Supreme Court, this argument fails. Appellant's alternative argument about his waiver of his right to discovery is moot.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
{¶ 3} On May 12, 2016, multiple heroin overdoses occurred in a matter of hours in the East Liverpool area. One of the heroin addicts who overdosed admitted to police where he obtained the drugs. A confidential informant went to the suspected house
{¶ 4} Appellant was arrested; he was 17 years old (dob 8/14/98). Two complaints were filed against him in the East Liverpool Municipal Court on May 17, 2016. In 16CRA983, he was charged with felony drug possession. In 16CRB983, he was charged with the misdemeanor offense of falsification. According to a police report attached to the complaints, Appellant was placed in the local juvenile detention facility where he informed an officer he was considered an adult due to a prior court case. Also filed in the municipal court case was a copy of an October 16, 2014 journal entry wherein the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court ordered a discretionary transfer of a prior case against Appellant to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court.
{¶ 5} On May 18, 2016, Appellant appeared and counsel was appointed for his preliminary hearing to be held the next day. At the preliminary hearing, he appeared with counsel and waived his right to a preliminary hearing. The municipal court bound over the felony case to the common pleas court and transferred the misdemeanor case pursuant to
{¶ 6} At the August 1-2, 2016 jury trial, Appellant testified in his own defense. In response, the state submitted a July 7, 2015 judgment entry from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court sentencing Appellant upon his guilty pleas to amended charges of attempted criminal gang activity, attempted robbery, extortion, and misdemeanor assault. See State's Exhibit No. 22.
{¶ 7} Appellant sets forth four assignments of error. The following three assignments of error (one, two, and four) deal with the lack of a transfer from juvenile court: (1)(a) the general division of the common pleas court ("criminal court") lacked jurisdiction due to the statutory requirement of transfer (aka bindover) by the juvenile court, and (b) Aalim I eliminated mandatory transfer and imposed discretionary transfer procedures for cases which were previously subject to mandatory transfer; (2) the defendant did not waive his right (under Aalim I ) to an amenability hearing; and (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the criminal court's exercise of jurisdiction over a juvenile without a juvenile court transfer (or without an amenability hearing per Aalim I ). See
LACKING JUVENILE COURT TRANSFER: Statutory Violation
{¶ 8} Appellant's first assignment of error contends:
"The Columbiana County Common Pleas Court lacked jurisdiction to enter a conviction because Nathaniel Baker's case was required to be initiated in Columbiana County Juvenile Court, in violation ofR.C. 2152.12(A)(2)(a) ; Article I, Section 16, Ohio Constitution ; and, State v. Aalim , Slip Opinion No. [] 150 Ohio St.3d 463 [ 2016-Ohio-8278 ]." 83 N.E.3d 862
{¶ 9} This assignment of error is divided into two distinct arguments: statutory and constitutional. The first issue presented for review asks: "Did the common pleas court err as a matter of statutory law when it entered a conviction against Nathaniel Baker when the juvenile court never transferred jurisdiction to the adult, criminal court?"
{¶ 10} Appellant's threshold argument contends the state was not permitted to directly file an adult criminal action against him merely because he was subject to
{¶ 11}
The juvenile court also shall transfer a case in the circumstances described in division (C)(5) ofsection 2152.02 of the Revised Code or if either of the following applies:
(a) A complaint is filed against a child who is eligible for a discretionary transfer undersection 2152.10 of the Revised Code and who previously was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony in a case that was transferred to a criminal court.
(b) A complaint is filed against a child who is domiciled in another state [with laws that do not require transfer by the juvenile court].
(Emphasis added.) R.C 2152.12(A)(2). It is the initial emphasized portion said to be applicable here (rather than the subdivisions, which are provided for context).
{¶ 12} Initially, division (C) of
Any person whose case is transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant tosection 2152.12 of the Revised Code and who subsequently is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony in that case , unless a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence is imposed on the child for that offense under division (B)(2) or (3) of section 2152.121 of the Revised Code and the adult portion of that sentence is not invoked pursuant to section 2152.14 of the Revised Code, and any person who is adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an act, who has a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence imposed for the act pursuant to section 2152.13 of the Revised Code, and whose adult portion of the dispositional sentence is invoked pursuant to section 2152.14 of the Revised Code, shall be deemed after the conviction, plea, or invocation not to be a child in any case in which a complaint is filed against the person .
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 13} Although
{¶ 14} Regardless,
No person, either before or after reaching eighteen years of age, shall be prosecuted as an adult for an offense committed prior to becoming eighteen years of age, unless the person has been transferred as provided in division (A) or (B) of this section or unless division (J) of this section applies. Any prosecution that is had in a criminal court on the mistaken belief that the person who is the subject of the case was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense shall be deemed a nullity, and the person shallnot be considered to have been in jeopardy on the offense.
As Appellant points out, division (H) uses the word "person" rather than "child."
{¶ 15} Division (H) requires a transfer under (A) or (B) before an adult prosecution can occur, except where division (J) applies. Between division (A) and (B), the pertinent specific subsection is (A)(2) of
If a person under eighteen years of age allegedly commits an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult and if the person is not taken into custody or apprehended for that act until after the person attains twenty-one years of age, the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction to hear or determine any portion of the case charging the person with committing that act. In those circumstances, divisions (A) and (B) of this section do not apply regarding the act, and the case charging the person with committing the act shall be a criminal prosecution commenced and heard in the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense as if the person had been eighteen years of age or older when the person committed the act. All proceedings pertaining to the act shall be within the jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the offense, and that court has all the authority and duties in the case as it has in other criminal cases in that court.
This is the only exception to the requirement of a transfer from juvenile court before prosecution can occur in criminal court if the person committed the act prior to becoming 18 years old.
{¶ 16} Two appellate cases have interpreted
{¶ 17} First, the cases emphasize how the word "shall" (in the phrase "shall be deemed * * * not to be a child") is mandatory. Wyerick ,
{¶ 18} Division (C)(5) of 2152.02 (the definition statute) must be read in the context of the statutory scheme, most notably divisions (A)(2) and (H) of 2152.12. The language "shall be deemed * * * not to be a child in any case in which a complaint is filed against the person" is a definition to be used when a juvenile court ascertains whether a transfer is mandatory under
{¶ 19} In other words, it is the juvenile court's duty to ascertain whether the person's prior case was transferred for criminal prosecution under
{¶ 20} In sum, this court concludes the language of
{¶ 21} Appellant's fourth assignment of error raises ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing counsel should have objected to the criminal court's exercise of jurisdiction in the absence of the juvenile court transfer of jurisdiction to which Appellant was statutorily entitled. Appellant did not raise the issue below. However, plain error is an option for review. See
{¶ 22} More importantly, the transfer from juvenile court, whether mandatory or discretionary, is the relinquishment of the exclusive jurisdiction statutorily-bestowed upon the juvenile court. The matter is one of subject matter jurisdiction. See
{¶ 23} In Wilson , the case against the juvenile was improperly initiated in the criminal court. See Wilson ,
{¶ 24} Thereafter, the Supreme Court found a common pleas court conviction to be void ab initio as the juvenile court failed to ensure a physical examination was performed before bindover (as formerly required by statute). State v. Golphin ,
{¶ 25} In sum, Appellant's convictions are vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions for the trial court to vacate the convictions and to transfer the case to the juvenile court under
Entitlement to Amenability Hearing under Supreme Court's Aalim I case & Supreme Court's Subsequent Vacation of Aalim I
{¶ 26} The second issue presented under Appellant's first assignment of error presents
{¶ 27} On December 22, 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court (by a 4-3 vote) found the mandatory transfer of a juvenile to the common pleas court violates the juvenile's right to due process under Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. State v. Aalim ,
{¶ 28} The Supreme Court then applied Aalim I without regard to the defendant's waiver of the issue in the trial court. See State v. D.B. ,
{¶ 29} On February 22, 2017, the Supreme Court (with two new justices) stayed execution of judgment in Aalim I due to a pending motion to reconsider. On May 25, 2017, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its reconsideration decision in Aalim II , vacating its prior Aalim I decision and concluding the mandatory transfer of juveniles under the statutory scheme is not unconstitutional. State v. Aalim ,
{¶ 30} The Court held the mandatory transfer statutes were not violative of Ohio's Constitution because Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution grants exclusive authority to the General Assembly to determine the subject matter to be allocated to the exclusive original jurisdiction of specified divisions of the courts of common pleas. Id. at ¶ 1-2. The Court concluded: "mandatory bindover of certain juveniles to adult court under
{¶ 31} In sum, Appellant's brief asks this court to apply the holding in Aalim I to conclude he is entitled to an amenability hearing on remand. However, as the decision relied upon by Appellant was vacated by the Supreme Court on reconsideration, a person subject to a mandatory transfer statute is not entitled to an amenability hearing. Consequently, Appellant's arguments about the right to an amenability hearing (presented under the vacated Aalim I decision) are overruled as they are
{¶ 32} Lastly, Appellant's third assignment of error claims the trial court did not ensure he knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waived his right to discovery before trial. This assignment of error is moot due to our decision under prior assignments of error. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment is reversed, Appellant's convictions are vacated, and the case is remanded with orders to transfer the case to juvenile court.
Donofrio, J., concurs.
DeGenaro, J., concurs.
Notes
The Cuyahoga Common Pleas Court sentenced him to 12 months in jail for the attempted robbery and six months for the misdemeanor (with credit for 233 days). He was given 48 months of community control and was notified a violation could result in a sentence of 36 months on the felonies to run consecutive for a total of 72 months in prison. An August 17, 2015 nunc pro tunc entry added an order to transport the defendant to the Ohio Department of Youth Services to serve the remainder of a juvenile sentence and to be returned to the county jail to serve the remainder of the adult sentence before beginning the 48 months of community control.
Division (A)(1)(a) deals with the mandatory transfer criteria for category one offenses, and division (A)(1)(b) deals with the mandatory transfer criteria for category two offenses; both begin, "After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child * * * the juvenile court at a hearing shall transfer the case if * * *."