State v. MooreState v. Moore
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Deandre Moore, appeals his conviction, raising two assignments of error for our review:
I. The mandatory transfer/bindover of defendant-appellant violated his right to due process and equal protection.
II. The trial court failed to comply with the mandates of Criminal Rule 11.
{¶2} Finding no merit to his appeal, we affirm.
I. Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶3} On August 11, 2010, Hong Zheng and Bingrong Zheng, husband and wife, were delivering food to a private residence in Cleveland, Ohio. As the Zhengs parked their car, Moore and his cousin approached and fired multiple gunshots into the vehicle. The shots hit both Mr. and Mrs. Zheng, killing Mr. Zheng and breaking Mrs. Zheng’s arm.
{¶4} On October 29, 2010, Moore, a juvenile, was subject to mandatory bindover to the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury for several counts, including two counts of aggravated murder, four counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted murder, and two counts of felonious assault. After initially pleading not guilty to those counts, Moore agreed to enter a guilty plea to murder with a firearm specification, and the state agreed to nolle the remaining counts.1
{¶5} At the plea hearing, the state recited the amended charge and the potential penalty for the charge and its accompanying firearm specification. Moore and his counsel confirmed that they agreed with and understood the state’s explanation. Subsequently, the court engaged in a
{¶6} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an indefinite prison term of 15 years to life for Moore’s murder charge and a consecutive and prior to mandatory three-year prison term for the firearm specification.
{¶7} Moore subsequently appealed, contesting the validity of both the mandatory transfer of his case to the General Division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court and his plea.
II. Mandatory Bindover
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Moore argues that he was entitled to an amenability hearing before the juvenile court judge prior to his case’s transfer to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court under the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 463, 2016-Ohio-8278 (“Aalim I”). At the time it filed its brief, the state argued that Aalim I was stayed pending reconsideration, and
{¶9} In Aalim I, written by Justice Lanzinger, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the mandatory transfer of juveniles to adult court without a discretionary determination by the juvenile court at an amenability hearing violated juveniles’ due process rights. Aalim I at ¶ 28. In reaching that conclusion, the court explained that “juvenile courts ‘occupy a unique place in our legal system’” and were created to “promot[e] social welfare and eschew[] traditional, objective criminal standards and retributive notions of justice.” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177. Noting that “[s]ince its origin, the juvenile justice system has emphasized individual assessment, the best interest of the child, treatment, and rehabilitation, with a goal of reintegrating juveniles back into society[,]” the court agreed with Aalim that “juvenile court judges are in the best position to evaluate each juvenile’s suitability for juvenile or adult court,” and they “must be allowed the discretion that the General Assembly permits[,]” including the ability “to distinguish between those children who should be treated as adults and those who should not.” Id. at ¶ 20, 25. Considering the juvenile justice system’s unique purposes and juveniles’ special status within the criminal justice system, the court held that “[a]ll children are entitled to fundamental fairness in the procedures by which they may be transferred out of juvenile court for criminal
{¶10} Nevertheless, as noted by the state’s notice of supplemental authority, the Ohio Supreme Court reconsidered Aalim I in Aalim II. The reconsidered majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, rejected Aalim I’s holding and found that the mandatory-bindover procedures for juveniles, which do not require a juvenile judge’s discretionary review at an amenability hearing, comply with due process and equal protection standards. Id. at ¶ 27, 37. In its reconsidered opinion rejecting Aalim’s due process argument, the court stated, “The General Assembly determines the jurisdiction of the juvenile court[,]” and “has determined that [under]
{¶11} Moore argues that his due process and equal protection rights were violated because he was not afforded an amenability hearing at the juvenile court level. Based on
{¶12} Moore’s first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Crim.R. 11
{¶13} In his second assignment of error, Moore argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered because the trial court did not explain the nature of the charges, the maximum penalties involved, his ineligibility for probation, or the effects of his plea. In response, the state argues that the court substantially complied with
{¶14} We review whether the trial court accepted Moore’s plea in compliance with
{¶15} Before a defendant waives his constitutional rights, “‘a trial court must inform the defendant that he is waiving his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to jury trial [sic], his right to confront his accusers, and his right of compulsory process of witnesses.’” State v. Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-Ohio-6093, 877 N.E.2d 677, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). “When a trial court fails to strictly comply with this duty, the defendant’s plea is invalid.” State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, syllabus.
{¶16} A trial court must also make findings and disclosures concerning a defendant’s nonconstitutional rights. Specifically, a trial court must
[d]etermin[e] that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing [and] [i]nform[] the defendant of and determin[e] that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
{¶17} In addition to showing noncompliance, “a defendant must show prejudice before a plea will be vacated for a trial court’s error involving
A. Nature of the Charge
{¶18} Moore first argues that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made because the trial court failed to explain the nature of the charge to him. Because the right to be informed of the nature of the charges is a nonconstitutional right, we review the proceedings for substantial compliance. See State v. Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 92600 and 92601, 2010-Ohio-244, ¶ 8, citing State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91567, 2009-Ohio-3088.
{¶19} A trial court may “ascertain whether a defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and the consequences of a guilty plea through an oral dialogue with the
{¶20} Further, the record shows that Moore was advised of the nature of the charges multiple times throughout the plea hearing. At the beginning of the plea hearing, the prosecutor explained the plea agreement, identifying that Moore was pleading guilty to murder with a firearm specification. Moore’s trial counsel repeated the plea agreement, once again indicating that Moore would plead to murder. The trial court then asked Moore a number of questions concerning his age and level of education, whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and whether he understood the constitutional rights that he was waiving. After Moore appropriately responded to each question, the trial court asked,
How do you plead to the charge of murder in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2903.02, which states on or about August 11, 2010, you did purposely cause the death of another, in this case Hong V. Zhang and further that you had a firearm on or about your person or under your control while committing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm or indicated that you possessed the firearm or used it to facilitate the
offense?
In response, Moore pleaded guilty.
{¶21} Because the totality of the circumstances shows that Moore understood the charge, the trial court had no obligation to inquire or explain further. See Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91567, 2009-Ohio-3088, at ¶ 8 (“This court has held that ‘courts are not required to explain the elements of each offense, or even to specifically ask the defendant whether he understands the charges, unless the totality of the circumstances shows that the defendant does not understand the charges.’”). Moore fails to specify how the court neglected to meet the substantial compliance standard in light of the evidence from the record or, even more, how this alleged failure prejudiced him. Therefore, we find that the trial court substantially complied with its duty to inform Moore of the nature of the charge against him.
B. Maximum Penalty
{¶22} Next, Moore argues that the trial court failed to advise him of the maximum penalty that he faced for his murder charge. The state argues that even if the court failed to notify Moore of the maximum penalty, he did not suffer prejudice. We agree with the state’s position.
{¶23} The right to be advised of the maximum penalties that a defendant faces is a nonconstitutional right, and therefore, we review the record for substantial compliance. Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 92600 and 92601, 2010-Ohio-244, at ¶ 8, citing Johnson.
[t]o reiterate, it is the best practice for the trial judge to advise the defendant of the maximum sentence, including postrelease control.
Crim.R. 11 specifically requires the trial court to personally address the defendant and advise the defendant of his constitutional and nonconstitutional rights prior to accepting a guilty plea. Deviating fromCrim.R. 11 makes an appearance that the trial court is abdicating its duties to the prosecutor when accepting a defendant’s guilty plea.
State v. Evans, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100151, 2014-Ohio-3584, ¶ 9.
{¶25} In the instant case, Moore pleaded guilty to murder, which is punishable by an indefinite prison term of 15 years to life pursuant to
[I]t’s my understanding the defendant would be pleading guilty to a three-year firearm specification. That being said, he would plead guilty to murder, which carries with it the possibility of 15 years to life in prison as well as the three-year firearm specification, which would be served prior to and consecutive to the sentence on the murder count.
When asked by the trial court, Moore stated that he understood the prosecutor’s
{¶26} While we are mindful of the trial court’s failure to personally address Moore concerning the maximum penalty he faced — especially considering it would be the trial court, not the prosecutor, actually determining Moore’s sentence, we agree with the state that to establish a violation of
C. Ineligibility for Community Control Sanctions
{¶27} Also in support of his second assignment of error, Moore argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily enter into his plea because the trial court failed to inform him that he was not eligible for probation, which is known as “community control sanctions.” Again, the state argues that even if the trial court failed to directly address Moore’s ineligibility for community control sanctions, he did not suffer any prejudice. This argument concerns a nonconstitutional right, and we therefore review the trial court’s actions for substantial compliance. Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 92600 and 92601, 2010-Ohio-244, ¶ 8, citing Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91567, 2009-Ohio-3088.
{¶28} Moore incorrectly suggests that the trial court had an obligation to inform him that he was not eligible for community control sanctions. “Although the judge must specifically determine whether a defendant understands that he is not eligible for probation, the rule does not require him to personally inform a defendant of this fact in every circumstance.” State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 76085, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4044, *12-13 (Sept. 7, 2000). In State v. Rembert, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99707, 2014-Ohio-300, a case nearly identical to the instant one, the appellant argued that the trial court’s failure to inform him that he was not eligible for community control sanctions rendered his plea to aggravated murder and aggravated robbery invalid.
{¶29} This case is no different. Moore pleaded guilty to murder, carrying with it a sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment, with a mandatory three-year firearm specification. There is no evidence that Moore was promised community control for his plea, and any internal hope by Moore that he would be entitled to community control in return for his plea would have simply defied logic. Based on the discussion between the prosecutor, Moore, and the trial court, the record shows that the trial court determined that Moore entered into his plea with the understanding that he was not eligible for community control sanctions. Therefore, we find that the trial court substantially complied with its obligations under
D. Effects of Plea
{¶30} Finally, Moore argues the trial court failed to comply with
{¶31} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a trial court must inform a defendant that a plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt, as stated in
{¶33} Here, during the plea hearing, the trial court asked, “Do you understand if you plead guilty, you are waiving your trial rights and obviously you are admitting the truth of the charge to which you are pleading?” Moore responded, “Yes, sir,” and subsequently pleaded guilty after the trial court recited the facts underlying his charge and asked for his plea. While not the precise language in
{¶34} Further, Moore did not assert his actual innocence at the plea hearing, and like Jones, he is presumed to have understood that his guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt. Moore offers no support to contest that presumption or to show that he would not have entered into the guilty plea had the court precisely informed him that his plea was a complete admission of his guilt. Therefore, he suffered no prejudice as a result of the trial court’s failure to state the appropriate language under
{¶35} Moore’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶36} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR