STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCOS SUAZO, Defendant-Appellant.
NO. S-1-SC-35508
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
January 26, 2017
Jeff F. McElroy, District Judge
CERTIFICATION FROM THE NEW MEXICO COURT OF APPEALS
William A. O‘Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
CHÁVEZ, Justice.
{1} Defendant Marcos Suazo became agitated while roughhousing with his friend Matthew Vigil. Suazo retrieved his shotgun and pointed it at Vigil. Vigil grabbed the shotgun and placed the barrel in his mouth. Suazo pulled the trigger, killing Vigil and severely injuring his friend Roger Gage, who was standing behind Vigil. A key contested issue in this case was whether Suazo knew the shotgun was loaded when he pulled the trigger.
{2} Two potentially reversible errors occurred during trial. First, at trial Suazo sought to introduce testimony from two witnesses who saw him approximately one hour after the shooting and heard him claim that he did not know the shotgun was loaded. The district court excluded the testimony as inadmissible hearsay. Second, over Suazo‘s objection, the prosecution persuaded the court to depart from the uniform jury instruction regarding second-degree murder, which has existed since 1981,1 by modifying the mens rea element. Instead of requiring the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that “[Suazo] knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm,” the modified instruction changed the mens
{3} Among other crimes, Suazo was convicted of second-degree murder and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. He appealed his second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeals, contending that the district court erred by excluding the witness testimony and by modifying the uniform jury instruction for second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals certified his case to this Court pursuant to Rule 12-606 NMRA and
{4} First, we affirm the district court‘s exclusion of the hearsay evidence because the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Suazo‘s statements, which were overheard one hour after the shooting, were neither excited utterances nor present sense impressions. Second, we hold that the district court erred by modifying the uniform jury instruction for second-degree murder because in 1980 the Legislature amended the definition of second-degree murder to specifically require proof that the accused knew that his or her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 1980 N.M. Laws, ch. 21; see
I. BACKGROUND
{5} Suazo had spent most of the day drinking and visiting with his longtime friends, Vigil and Gage, at the trailer where he lived and in other locations in and around Talpa, New Mexico. Vigil and Suazo were roughhousing throughout most of the day. The two friends often wrestled this way when they were together.
{6} Sometime in the early afternoon, Vigil remarked that Suazo had a nice shotgun, and Gage asked to see it. When Suazo brought out the shotgun, Gage opened it to make sure that it was not loaded. At Gage‘s request, Suazo disassembled and reassembled the gun. When they finished with the gun, Gage saw Suazo place it against the wall near the back door of the trailer. Gage was certain that the gun was not loaded at that point.
{7} Later that afternoon, Suazo and Vigil were wrestling outside again. Suazo told Vigil not to mess with him because he had just lost his brother. The roughhousing
II. DISCUSSION
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding certain statements by Suazo as hearsay
{8} Suazo sought to elicit testimony from two witnesses at trial regarding statements he made approximately an hour after the shooting, between 4:40 and 5:00 p.m. Elaine Medina and Rosemary Cruz, Suazo‘s stepmother, testified that Suazo told them he had killed his best friend, he did not know the gun was loaded, and he did not understand what had happened. Medina testified that when Suazo made these statements he was curled up in a ball and crying hard, and she had never seen him cry
{9} Although the Court of Appeals only certified the jury instruction issue to this Court, we take this opportunity to resolve Suazo‘s claim that the district court erroneously excluded the witness testimony about statements that he made after the shooting. See State v. Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006, ¶ 2 n.2, 113 N.M. 780, 833 P.2d 1146 (stating that this Court has jurisdiction over the entire case following acceptance of certification). “We examine the admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion, and the trial court‘s determination will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Stanley, 2001-NMSC-037, ¶ 5, 131 N.M. 368, 37 P.3d 85. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by its ruling unless we can characterize [the ruling] as clearly untenable or not justified by reason.” State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 41, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in this case.
{10} There is no doubt that Suazo‘s anguished statements to Medina and Cruz were hearsay because they were out-of-court statements offered to prove what they asserted—that Suazo did not realize the shotgun was loaded and he did not mean to kill Vigil. See Rule 11-801 NMRA (defining as hearsay out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of what they assert). Such statements are inadmissible unless an exception applies. Rule 11-802 NMRA.
{11} A statement that would otherwise be hearsay can be admitted under the excited utterance exception when it “relat[es] to a startling event or condition” and is “made while . . . under the stress or excitement” caused by that event or condition. Rule 11-803(2). “[T]he theory underlying the excited utterance exception is that the exciting event induced the declarant‘s surprise, shock, or nervous excitement which temporarily stills capacity for conscious fabrication and makes it unlikely that the speaker would relate other than the truth.” State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 47, 147 N.M. 542, 226 P.3d 641 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, “to constitute an excited utterance, the declaration should be spontaneous, made before there is time for fabrication, and made under the stress of the moment.” Id.
consider a variety of factors in order to assess the degree of reflection or spontaneity underlying the statement. These factors include, but are not limited to, how much time passed between the startling event and the statement, and whether, in that time, the declarant had an opportunity for reflection and fabrication; how much pain, confusion, nervousness, or emotional strife the declarant was experiencing at the time of the statement; whether the statement was self-serving[; and whether the statement was] made in response to an inquiry[.]
State v. Balderama, 2004-NMSC-008, ¶ 51, 135 N.M. 329, 88 P.3d 845 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
{12} Under the totality of the circumstances, in this case the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding testimony regarding Suazo‘s statements to Medina and Cruz after the shooting. Prior to making the statements, Suazo drove away from the crime scene with his girlfriend and asked her to take the batteries out of his phone. He told her during the drive that he was “gonna go away for a long time.” He made several stops, including at his stepmother‘s house, where he hid the shotgun. The approximately one hour that elapsed between the shooting and the statements, coupled with Suazo‘s intervening actions and statements, could reasonably be interpreted to indicate that he reflected on what had happened and the gravity of his
{13} We likewise reject Suazo‘s claim that it was error for the district court not to admit the statements under the present sense impression hearsay exception. The present sense impression exception applies to statements “describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.” Rule 11-803(1). Again, given the length of time and Suazo‘s intervening actions between the shooting and the statements, the district court properly exercised its discretion to refuse to apply this exception and exclude the testimony as hearsay. See Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 51-53 (explaining that the contemporaneity of the event with the timing of the statement is the critical consideration in analyzing whether a hearsay statement qualifies as a present sense impression).
B. The district court erred by including “should have known” in the jury instruction for second-degree murder
{14} At the conclusion of Suazo‘s trial, the State tendered a modified jury instruction for second-degree murder. New Mexico‘s uniform jury instruction for second-degree murder would require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Suazo “knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm” to Vigil or another. UJI 14-210. The State‘s modified jury instruction in this case
{15} We review the jury instruction in this case for reversible error because Suazo preserved his objection at trial. State v. Cabezuela, 2011-NMSC-041, ¶ 21, 150 N.M. 654, 265 P.3d 705. We conclude that there is reversible error when the jury instructions, taken as a whole, cause juror confusion by “fail[ing] to provide the juror[s] with an accurate rendition of the relevant law.” Id. ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Rule 5-608(A) NMRA (“The court must instruct the jury upon all questions of law essential for a conviction of any crime submitted to the jury.“). “When a jury instruction is facially erroneous, as when it directs the
{16} We begin with the plain language of the statute, which is “[t]he primary indicator of legislative intent.” State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863. Pursuant to
Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, a person who kills another human being without lawful justification or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in performing the acts which cause the death he [or she] knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another.
(Emphasis added.) Under the statute, a defendant must know that his or her acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm; there is no express requirement that a defendant “should have known.” Id.; see also UJI 14-210
{17} We are not persuaded by the State‘s reliance on State v. Brown as a source of ambiguity in the statute that requires us to read the statutory term “knows” to encompass an objective knowledge of the risk through a “should have known” standard. 1996-NMSC-073, ¶ 16, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69. In Brown, this Court determined that a jury may consider evidence of intoxication when a defendant has been charged with first-degree depraved mind murder because the defendant‘s “subjective or actual knowledge of the high degree of risk involved in his conduct” is an essential element of that offense. Id. ¶¶ 13, 19, 35. As part of our analysis in
{18} Our differentiation between a defendant‘s subjective and objective knowledge of the risk was intended to draw a principled distinction between first-degree depraved mind murder and second-degree murder. See id. ¶ 16. This issue has vexed New Mexico courts since 1980, when New Mexico‘s current statutory definitions of the mens reas for murder in the first- and second-degree were enacted. 1980 N.M. Laws, ch. 21. The amended statute changed the mens rea for second-degree murder from “malice aforethought” to knowledge that a defendant‘s acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. Compare id. with
{19} This Court first grappled with this thorny distinction in State v. McCrary, which was decided more than a decade prior to Brown. McCrary, 1984-NMSC-005, 100 N.M. 671, 675 P.2d 120. In McCrary we determined that first-degree depraved mind murder required proof of the defendant‘s subjective knowledge that his or her act was greatly dangerous to the lives of others. Id. ¶¶ 8-10. We relied on the committee commentary to the uniform jury instruction on first-degree depraved mind murder which existed at that time, which asserted that second-degree murder required an objective test of a defendant‘s knowledge, presumably implying that a “should
{20} However, the committee commentary to a jury instruction is only persuasive to the extent that it correctly states the law. See State v. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 16, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233 (disapproving of a uniform jury instruction and its commentary because it was a “misstatement of [the] law“), holding limited on other grounds by State v. Sims, 2010-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 31-32, 148 N.M. 330, 236 P.3d 642. The passage in the commentary relied on by the McCrary Court is “doubtful authority” that objective knowledge is sufficient for second-degree murder. Romero, supra, at 65; see
{21} To further confuse matters, a little over a year after McCrary was decided, we held in State v. Beach that second-degree murder contained a specific “element of subjective knowledge.” 1985-NMSC-043, ¶ 12, 102 N.M. 642, 699 P.2d 115. Beach was later overruled in Brown “[t]o the extent that . . . Beach . . . holds that second-degree murder contains the same ‘subjective knowledge’ element as [first-degree] depraved mind murder.” Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, ¶ 16.
{22} The Brown Court overruled Beach in dicta, which likely explains why since Brown was decided, neither our case law nor our uniform jury instructions have applied the Brown dicta to second-degree murder cases. But cf. State v. Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, ¶ 81, 138 N.M. 365, 120 P.3d 447 (Serna, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (advocating for a “should have known” standard to be incorporated into the uniform jury instruction for second-degree murder based on Brown in a case
{23} This Court‘s hesitancy to adopt the mens rea for second-degree murder advocated by the Brown dicta is commensurate with our consistent statements that a negligent or accidental killing could not satisfy the elements of second-degree murder. See, e.g., State v. Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084, ¶ 25, 112 N.M. 554, 817 P.2d 1196 (holding that an “unintentional or accidental killing will not suffice” to establish the mens rea element of second-degree murder), abrogation recognized on other grounds by State v. Marquez, 2016-NMSC-025, ¶ 14, 376 P.3d 815; State v. Campos, 1996-NMSC-043, ¶ 18, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266 (“[A] negligent or accidental killing would not constitute second-degree murder . . . .“); see also State v. McGruder, 1997-NMSC-023, ¶ 21, 123 N.M. 302, 940 P.2d 150 (same), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, ¶ 26, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891. Our longstanding refusal to endorse a theory of negligent murder forecloses the implication in Brown that to convict of second-degree murder it would be sufficient for the jury to find that a defendant should have known of the risk of his or her
{24} Further, if we were to adopt a “should have known” standard for second-degree murder, we would render inconsistent the culpability requirements under New Mexico‘s various homicide statutes. For example, the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter requires that a defendant have acted “without due caution and circumspection.”
{25} We detect no ambiguity in
C. The district court‘s misstatement of the essential mens rea element is reversible error requiring a new trial
{26} “[I]f an instruction is facially erroneous it presents an incurable problem and mandates reversal.” State v. Parish, 1994-NMSC-073, ¶ 4, 118 N.M. 39, 878 P.2d 988; see also State v. Ellis, 2008-NMSC-032, ¶ 14, 144 N.M. 253, 186 P.3d 245 (“A jury instruction which does not instruct the jury upon all questions of law essential for a conviction of any crime submitted to the jury is reversible error.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
{27} Our rules require lawyers to object to erroneous instructions, as defense counsel did in this case.
{28} The State argues that we should not reverse because the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Suazo “intended to injure Roger Gage or another,” which the State contends no reasonable juror would have found while also finding that Suazo did not know of the strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Vigil. Indeed, in a prior case we held that a failure to instruct on an essential element of an offense does not warrant reversal under a reversible error standard “[w]hen there can be no dispute that the essential element was established.” Santillanes, 1993-NMSC-012, ¶ 32 (concluding that in conducting its analysis, a court must consider whether there is some evidence, no matter how slight, or a reasonable inference from such evidence, that proves the element in issue) (citing Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 10-12)).
{29} In Santillanes we upheld the defendant‘s conviction for child abuse under a reversible error standard despite a jury instruction erroneously requiring the jurors to find a civil negligence mens rea rather than the requisite statutory mens rea of
{30} According to the dissent and the State, we should view this case similarly because the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Suazo intended to injure Gage or another by shooting a shotgun in Vigil‘s mouth, which the State contends was
{31} It is tempting to agree with the dissent and the State that the intent to injure element of aggravated battery satisfies the mens rea requirement for second-degree murder because New Mexico criminalizes intent-to-injure battery, see State v. Vasquez, 1971-NMCA-182, ¶ 12, 83 N.M. 388, 492 P.2d 1005 (recognizing that
If you believe that [Suazo] committed second-degree murder, and that he knew or should have known that his actions created great bodily harm or death, towards Matthew Vigil, injuring Matthew Vigil, and as a result he injures Roger Gage, that‘s transferred intent. That‘s where we get to that element on Roger Gage.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, not only did the prosecution—perhaps negligently—mislead the district court into issuing an erroneous instruction, the prosecution also misled the jury into believing that the erroneous mens rea element for second-degree murder—negligence—was sufficient to support a finding of aggravated battery. We
{32} Having concluded that the error in this case mandates reversal, to avoid double jeopardy concerns, we must examine whether sufficient evidence in this case supports retrying Suazo. Dowling, 2011-NMSC-016, ¶ 18. Under a sufficiency of the evidence test, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and draw all inferences in favor of the verdict to determine “whether substantial evidence
{33} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to a guilty verdict, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable jury‘s conclusion that the mens rea and lack of sufficient provocation elements were met in this case. First, the jury could have reasonably inferred from Suazo‘s statements, the ambiguous evidence regarding who loaded the gun and when it was loaded, and the steps Suazo took after the crime to conceal evidence, that Suazo knew the gun was loaded and knew that pulling the trigger would cause great bodily harm or death to Vigil.
III. CONCLUSION
{34} Suazo‘s evidentiary arguments lack merit. The second-degree murder instruction misstated the mens rea element for second-degree murder, and it therefore requires reversal. We reverse Suazo‘s conviction for second-degree murder and remand for a new trial.
{35} IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________________________
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
___________________________________
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice
___________________________________
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
___________________________________
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice
JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part
{36} This case is destined for the criminal law treatises. A shoots C. B is standing between A and C. In order for A to shoot C, A must fire through B‘s head. If we accept these facts as true, what must A have known were the likely consequences for B of A‘s shooting C? There can be only one conclusion: A must have known that there was a strong probability B would die. These, of course, are the facts of this case.
{37} Suazo pointed the shotgun at Vigil, and Vigil inexplicably placed the barrel of the shotgun into his mouth. Gage was standing behind Vigil. When Suazo pulled the trigger and fired the shotgun, the shotgun pellets exploded from the cartridge, fired out of the barrel of the shotgun, traveled into Vigil‘s mouth, passed through Vigil‘s head killing him, and entered Gage‘s body causing Gage serious injuries. For perpetrating this act against Gage, Suazo was convicted of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. Suazo did not challenge the propriety of either the aggravated battery instruction or his conviction for aggravated battery.
{38} At trial, the jury was instructed that
For you to find [Suazo] guilty of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon . . . the [S]tate must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:
[Suazo] touched or applied force to Roger Gage by shooting at him with a firearm. [Suazo] used a 12 gauge shotgun. - [Suazo] intended to injure Roger Gage or another;
- This happened in New Mexico on or about the 21st day of May, 2013.
This instruction mirrors the uniform instruction. See
{39} Aggravated battery is a specific intent crime. State v. Crespin, 1974-NMCA-104, ¶ 8, 86 N.M. 689, 526 P.2d 1282. “Specific intent to injure a person is an essential element of the crime. The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly committed an aggravated battery, purposely intending to violate the law.” Id. (citation omitted). A firearm is a deadly weapon.
{40} I agree with the majority that the instruction submitted to Suazo‘s jury on
{41} The jury‘s decision to convict Suazo of aggravated battery against Gage indisputably establishes that the jury must also have found that Suazo acted with the required mens rea for second-degree murder. Suazo necessarily knew that, if he committed aggravated battery against Gage with the shotgun, then Vigil would almost certainly die. This must be true because, in order to commit aggravated battery against Gage, Suazo had to fire the shotgun into Vigil‘s mouth and through his head. Because Suazo necessarily acted with the mens rea required to convict him of second-degree murder, the error in the second-degree murder instruction was not reversible. Santillanes does not compel a different result.
{43} As the majority observes, Maj. op. ¶ 29, we expressly noted in Santillanes that the defendant “did not argue that he inadvertently caused the boy‘s throat to be cut.” 1993-NMSC-012 ¶ 33. According to the majority, this indicates that the mens rea element of the offense for which the defendant in Santillanes was convicted was not contested. Maj. op. ¶¶ 29-30. By contrast, Suazo maintained at trial that he did not know the gun he fired into Vigil‘s mouth and through his head was loaded, which was an attempt to show he did not possess the necessary mens rea for second-degree murder. For the majority, this distinction is crucial. Id. ¶ 29. The majority contends that Suazo‘s trial theory sufficiently distinguishes his case from Santillanes and precludes this Court from resolving “whether the jury found that Suazo knew the
{44} Unlike in Santillanes, Suazo was convicted of multiple offenses. Suazo‘s jury was correctly instructed that it had to find that the aggravated battery was intentionally committed, and it so found. Therefore, the jury necessarily rejected Suazo‘s theory of the case. Only one shot was fired; it killed Vigil and grievously injured Gage. That single shot could not be both intentional and accidental. Thus, if Suazo intentionally fired the shot which injured Gage, he could not have accidentally shot Vigil. Because Suazo‘s jury found that Suazo intentionally fired the shot that injured Gage, the jury necessarily rejected Suazo‘s claim that he accidentally killed Vigil.
{45} Lastly, I see no reason to conclude that the erroneous second-degree murder instruction somehow infected the jury‘s deliberation with respect to aggravated battery. Maj op. ¶ 31 n.3. The district court properly instructed the jury on aggravated battery. See State v. Privett, 1986-NMSC-025, ¶ 9, 104 N.M. 79, 717 P.2d 55 (instructing district courts to use uniform instructions when they exist). “The jury is presumed to follow the court‘s instructions.” State v. Gonzales, 1992-NMSC-003, ¶ 35, 113 N.M. 221, 824 P.2d 1023, overruled on other grounds by State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, 306 P.3d 426. And as noted, Suazo did not challenge the propriety of the aggravated-battery instruction or his conviction for that offense. Nor am I persuaded that the prosecution‘s statement about transferred intent misled the jury. Maj op. ¶ 31. Suazo did not object to the prosecutor‘s statement and the issue was not argued on appeal. Moreover, instruction number one informed Suazo‘s jury that “[t]he law governing this case is contained in instructions that I am about to give you. It is your duty to follow the law as contained in these instructions.” If misdirection occurred, it was cured by proper instructions.
{46} For the reasons set out above, I would affirm Suazo‘s second-degree murder conviction. I concur that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the statements Suazo made after the shooting.
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JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice