State v. Suazo
35,508
| N.M. | Jan 26, 2017Background
- On May 21, 2013, after a day of drinking and roughhousing, Marcos Suazo pointed a shotgun at his friend Matthew Vigil; Vigil put the barrel in his mouth, Suazo fired, killing Vigil and seriously injuring Roger Gage, who stood behind Vigil.
- Key factual dispute at trial: whether Suazo knew the shotgun was loaded when he pulled the trigger.
- After the shooting, Suazo made statements (about an hour later) to two witnesses that he had not known the gun was loaded; the district court excluded those statements as hearsay (relevant exceptions claimed: excited utterance and present sense impression).
- At trial the prosecution successfully substituted New Mexico’s uniform second-degree murder jury instruction language "knew" with "knew or should have known;" the jury convicted Suazo of second-degree murder and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon.
- On appeal (case certified from the Court of Appeals), the Supreme Court considered (1) whether excluding Suazo’s post-shooting statements was an abuse of discretion and (2) whether modifying the mens rea element of the second-degree murder instruction to include "should have known" misstated the law and required reversal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Suazo’s post-shooting statements (excited utterance / present sense impression) | State: statements were hearsay and not within the exceptions because they were not contemporaneous/spontaneous. | Suazo: statements were excited utterances or present sense impressions and therefore admissible. | Court affirmed exclusion: one hour’s lapse plus intervening actions/statements undermined spontaneity and contemporaneity; exclusion not an abuse of discretion. |
| Proper mens rea for second-degree murder ("knew" v. "should have known") | State: instruction may include objective "should have known" standard; Brown dicta and some commentary support objective knowledge. | Suazo: statute requires subjective knowledge that acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm; "should have known" lowers mens rea to negligence and is inconsistent with statute and homicide scheme. | Court reversed: statute and uniform instruction require that defendant "knew" the strong probability of death or great bodily harm; inserting "should have known" misstated an essential element and was reversible error. |
| Whether instructional error was harmless given aggravated-battery conviction | State/Dissent: aggravated-battery conviction (intent to injure) irrefutably shows requisite mens rea for murder; error harmless. | Majority: aggravated-battery finding does not necessarily prove defendant knew the gun was loaded; prosecutor’s statements possibly conflated standards; cannot be certain jury found the required subjective knowledge. | Court held error was not harmless: misstatement could have allowed conviction on negligence standard; reversal and new trial required for second-degree murder. |
| Double jeopardy / sufficiency for retrial | State: retrial permissible if sufficient evidence supports elements under correct standard. | Suazo: (implicitly) retrial barred only if insufficient evidence. | Court found sufficient evidence (viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict) to support retrial on second-degree murder. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Dowling, 257 P.3d 930 (N.M. 2011) (facially erroneous jury instructions require reversal)
- State v. Brown, 931 P.2d 69 (N.M. 1996) (discussed subjective vs. objective knowledge in murder contexts; dicta regarding second-degree murder)
- State v. McCrary, 675 P.2d 120 (N.M. 1984) (treatment of knowledge standards distinguishing depraved mind murder and second-degree murder)
- Santillanes v. State, 849 P.2d 358 (N.M. 1993) (instructional error may be harmless where omitted element is indisputably established)
- State v. Orosco, 833 P.2d 1146 (N.M. 1992) (appellate review of entire case after certification; discussion of when misinstruction may be harmless)
- State v. Reed, 120 P.3d 447 (N.M. 2005) (further clarifies differences between depraved mind murder and second-degree murder)
