STATE OF UTAH, Petitioner, v. LANDON SISNEROS, Respondent.
No. 20200455-SC
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
February 10, 2022
2022 UT 7
Heard October 18, 2021.
Attorneys:
Emily Adams, Cherise Bacalski, Freya Johnson, Bountiful, for respondent
JUSTICE HIMONAS authored the opinion of the Court in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE PEARCE, and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE filed a separate opinion concurring in party and concurring in the judgment.
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT filed a concurring opinion.
JUSTICE HIMONAS, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a defendant from being subjected to multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Utah extends this protection even further—protecting, by statute, a defendant from multiple prosecutions for different offenses committed as part of a single criminal episode. See
¶2 In this case, we are asked to interpret the confines of Utah‘s Single Criminal Episode Statute as they relate to the multiple prosecutions of defendant Landon Sisneros for the robbery and theft of a used car. Sisneros argues that the State violated the Single Criminal Episode Statute by prosecuting him in Weber County for aggravated robbery after he had already been convicted of theft by receiving in Utah County for conduct arising under the same criminal episode. The court of appeals agreed and dismissed the Weber County charge.
¶3 The State now appeals, arguing that Sisneros‘s offenses were not part of a single criminal episode because they involved different victims, and, in any event, the Single Criminal Episode Statute does not apply because the district court in Utah County did not have jurisdiction to hear both offenses. We reject the State‘s arguments, and we affirm the court of appeals’ decision to dismiss the Weber County charge of aggravated robbery against Sisneros.
¶4 It is difficult to imagine a more obvious single criminal episode than stealing a car and driving away with it. While the offenses for which Sisneros was charged may have involved separate victims, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the overarching criminal objective behind Sisneros‘s conduct was the same: namely, to steal a car. Likewise, even though Sisneros committed the theft offense across multiple jurisdictions, the clear terms of the Single Criminal Episode Statute dictate that the State should have brought the charges in a court with jurisdiction over both offenses. Neither party disputes that the district courts in Weber County had jurisdiction over both offenses in question. Accordingly, we find that the conviction of Sisneros in Utah County for theft by receiving barred the State‘s subsequent prosecution of Sisneros in Weber County for aggravated robbery.
BACKGROUND
¶5 The following facts are undisputed. On August 11, 2017, Sisneros stole a used car in Weber County. The owner of the car (the Son) had arranged for Sisneros to meet the Son‘s father (the Father) for a test drive. After the test drive, Sisneros decided to keep the car without paying for it. The Father chased Sisneros and jumped on the hood of the car, yelling at Sisneros not to take the car. Sisneros motioned for the Father to get out of the way, revved the engine, and then hit the Father with the car—bruising the Father‘s knee. Sisneros then drove the car off to Utah County.
¶6 The next day, the Orem Police Department found the car in Utah County—abandoned, empty, and locked. The Orem Police arrested Sisneros and informed the police in Weber County of the arrest. Sisneros admitted to the Orem Police that he stole the Son‘s car and that he threw the car‘s keys out the window near a highway overpass.
¶7 On August 16, 2017, the Utah County Attorney‘s Office charged Sisneros with theft by receiving stolen property and obstruction of justice. On August 22, 2017, the Weber County Attorney‘s Office charged Sisneros with aggravated robbery. Sisneros pleaded guilty to the felony theft by receiving and
¶8 Nearly one year later, Weber County prosecutors chose to move forward with a second prosecution of Sisneros for aggravated robbery in Weber County‘s Second District Court. Sisneros moved to dismiss this charge on the ground that it was barred by the Single Criminal Episode Statute. The district court denied Sisneros‘s motion. After the district court‘s ruling, Sisneros entered a conditional guilty plea to aggravated robbery, reserving his right to appeal pursuant to
¶9 The court of appeals reversed the district court‘s denial of Sisneros‘s motion to dismiss, finding that the Weber County charge of aggravated robbery was, in fact, barred by the Single Criminal Episode Statute. State v. Sisneros, 2020 UT App 60, ¶ 1, 464 P.3d 180. The State appealed, and we granted certiorari to consider the merits of the State‘s position.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 On certiorari, “we review the decision of the court of appeals and not that of the district court.” State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 25, 63 P.3d 650 (citation omitted). We review “the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law.” State v. Marquina, 2020 UT 66, ¶¶ 24, 478 P.3d 37 (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
¶11 The Single Criminal Episode Statute bars the State from subjecting a defendant to “separate trials for multiple offenses” that arise “under a single criminal episode” when “[t]he offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court” and “are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.”
¶12 In other words, for Sisneros to succeed in his motion to dismiss his criminal charge on the grounds that it is barred by his prior prosecution under the Single Criminal Episode Statute, he must establish:
- The prior prosecution and subsequent charge arose under a “single criminal episode,”
id. § 76-1-401 ; - The prior charge and subsequent charge were “within the jurisdiction of a single court,”
id. § 76-1-402(2)(a) ; - At the time of his arraignment on the prior charge, the prosecuting attorney knew of the other potential charge,
id. § 76-1-402(2)(b) ; and - The prior charge resulted in a conviction,1
id. § 76-1-403(1)(b)(ii) .
¶13 The court of appeals dismissed the State‘s subsequent charge of aggravated robbery against Sisneros based upon findings that all four of these conditions were satisfied. On certiorari, the State challenges the court of appeals’ findings on the first two conditions only—namely, whether the two offenses for which Sisneros was charged arose under a “single criminal episode” and whether they were “within the jurisdiction of a single court.” As explained further below, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals and find that both offenses arose from a single criminal episode and that both offenses were within the jurisdiction of a single court.
I. BOTH OFFENSES AROSE FROM A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE
¶14 The Single Criminal Episode Statute sets forth a two-prong definition of “single
¶15 On the first prong, there is no question, and the parties do not dispute, that both offenses were “closely related in time.” Sisneros intended to deprive the Son of the used car the moment he took it from the Father in Weber County. In so doing, Sisneros committed the theft by receiving offense at the exact same time as the aggravated robbery offenses. See
¶16 On the second prong, whether Sisneros‘s theft by receiving and aggravated robbery offenses were both “incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective” is a question of fact that must be viewed under the totality of the circumstances.2 See State v. Rushton, 2017 UT 21, ¶¶ 10, 12, 395 P.3d 92.
; see also State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, ¶ 26, 294 P.3d 617 (“Whether or not there is a single criminal objective depends on the specific facts of the case viewed under . . . the totality of the circumstances.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In Rushton, we articulated several non-exhaustive factors our courts have utilized to analyze whether a defendant‘s conduct was “incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.” Rushton, 2017 UT 21, ¶¶ 1, 3. In particular, we instructed courts to examine “the location where the crimes were committed, the nature of the offenses . . . , whether the crimes involved different victims, and whether the defendant had the opportunity to deliberately engage in the next-in-time offense.”
¶18 The State urges us to defy this inevitable conclusion and instead hold that the theft and robbery offenses cannot be considered part of the same criminal objective because each offense had a different victim. The State points to the underlying criminal statutes for both offenses to make this point. In the State‘s view, the Father was the victim of the aggravated robbery offense because Sisneros used “means of force or fear” against the Father in order to take the car from his immediate possession, see
¶19 Furthermore, the State argues that the court of appeals used the incorrect definition of “victim” when it analyzed whether the theft and robbery offenses were incident to a single criminal objective. The court of appeals found that the Son was a common victim to both offenses because, under the Crime Victims Restitution Act, a “victim” includes “any person or entity . . . who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant‘s criminal activities.” See State v. Sisneros, 2020 UT App 60, ¶ 24, 464 P.3d 180 (citing
¶20 We do not consider the disagreement over the definition of “victim” to be material for purposes of determining whether Sisneros‘s conduct had a single criminal objective. Courts can—and should—consider multiple ways in which individuals can be considered a victim of a defendant‘s conduct when analyzing whether certain offenses arise under a single criminal objective. Here, the fact that there were different victims under the charging statutes weighs against finding a single criminal objective, but the fact that the Son was a common victim to both offenses under the Restitution Act weighs in favor of finding a single criminal objective.
¶21 Importantly, even if we were to agree with the State that the victims of Sisneros‘s offenses were necessarily different, we would still hold that both offenses were part of a single criminal objective. While multiple victims can sometimes indicate distinct criminal objectives, this is not always the case. For example, in State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983), we held that a defendant‘s theft-related offenses were both part of a single criminal episode even though the stolen property belonged to multiple victims because the defendant
¶22 In summary, both offenses for which Sisneros was charged were “closely related in time.” See
II. BOTH OFFENSES WERE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF A SINGLE COURT
¶23 After finding that the theft by receiving and aggravated robbery offenses
¶24 When tasked with questions of statutory interpretation, “we first look to the plain language of the statute and give effect to that language unless it is ambiguous.” State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, ¶ 7, 217 P.3d 265 (citation omitted). “Thus, a statutory provision should be read literally, unless it would result in an unreasonable or inoperable result.” Id. Utah Code section 76-1-403 bars the State from subjecting a defendant to “a subsequent prosecution for . . . a different offense arising out of the same criminal episode” when “the subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution.”
¶25 Under the plain language of these statutory provisions, both the theft by receiving and the aggravated robbery offenses were “within the jurisdiction of a single court” because both offenses could have been heard by the district courts in Weber County. All district courts in Utah have original jurisdiction to hear criminal matters. See
¶26 The State contends that the charges against Sisneros could not have been brought in a single court because Sisneros was first prosecuted in Utah County where he had only committed the theft by receiving offense. The State cites our opinion in State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979), to argue that the Single Criminal Episode Statute is “strictly procedural in nature” and requires only that “when a defendant is brought before a court, all offenses arising from a single incident which are triable before that court be charged at the same time.” Id. at 345 (emphasis added). Here, the Utah County prosecutors charged Sisneros with all offenses that could have been tried before the district court in Utah County, as that court did not enjoy venue to hear the aggravated robbery offense.
¶27 Nevertheless, the State‘s interpretation of our holding in Sosa is incorrect. In Sosa, we held that the Single Criminal Episode Statute did not bar the separate prosecutions of a defendant charged with misdemeanor
¶28 Moreover, the language in Sosa stating that “[t]he single criminal episode statute is strictly procedural in nature” is strictly dicta and, with respect to the current version of the statutes in play, is incorrect. The legislature does not have the constitutional power to “adopt rules of procedure.” Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶ 17, 387 P.3d 1040; see
¶29 Finally, the State argues that it should not have been required to join the prosecution of Sisneros in Weber County because this “unduly intrudes on county and district attorney‘s prosecutorial decisions” since “[e]ach county has a vested interest in prosecuting the crimes that occur within its jurisdiction.” Notwithstanding this “vested interest,” when a county prosecutor chooses to prosecute a defendant for crimes under the Utah Criminal Code, that prosecutor acts “on behalf of the state.” See
CONCLUSION
¶30 We find that Sisneros‘s theft by receiving and aggravated robbery offenses both
LEE, A.C.J., concurring
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
¶31 I concur in the court‘s conclusion that the aggravated robbery charge against Landon Sisneros is barred under Utah Code section 76-1-402(2). I also concur in the majority opinion on one element of the statutory analysis—the determination that the theft by receiving and aggravated robbery charges were offenses “‘within the jurisdiction of a single court’ because both offenses could have been heard by the district courts in Weber County.” Supra ¶ 25. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority opinion‘s analysis of the other element of the statutory inquiry—the conclusion that these offenses were incident to an attempt or accomplishment of the “criminal objective of stealing [a] car” under a multi-factor “totality of the circumstances” test. See supra ¶¶ 16-17, 22.
¶32 The majority applies a standard first established in State v. Rushton, 2017 UT 21, 395 P.3d 92—a multi-factor balancing framework imported from United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1995). See Rushton, 2017 UT 21, ¶¶ 12, 36-39 (citing Letterlough, 63 F.3d at 335). But the Rushton standard is riddled with vagueness and imprecision. The factors themselves call for discretionary judgment calls on a series of ill-defined gray scales—on the degree or extent of (1) distance between the “geographic locations” in which the offenses arose, (2) difference in the substantive “nature” of the offenses, (3) difference in the identity of “victims” of the offenses, and (4) time or opportunity to make a conscious decision to commit the later of the two offenses. See Rushton, 2017 UT 21, ¶¶ 36-39. The standard is further obscured by the lack of any rubric defining the interplay among the factors, as by an indication of the factors’ relative weight. And the problem is highlighted by the lack of any connection between the Rushton factors and the operative language of the governing statute.
¶33 These and other points of imprecision are lurking beneath the surface in this case. A key question presented goes to the definition of the “victims” of a crime under the third Rushton factor. Another is whether any difference in the identity of the victims is enough to outweigh other factors cutting in the other direction. But the court stops short of resolving these questions. See supra ¶¶ 20-21 (concluding that any “disagreement” on the meaning of “victim” is not “material” to its decision);
¶34 This holding perpetuates the indeterminacy of our law in a field in which “predictability is at a premium.” Rushton, 2017 UT 21, ¶ 71 (Lee, A.C.J., joined by Durrant, C.J., concurring in the judgment). Both prosecutors and defendants need to be able to anticipate the preclusive effect of a criminal prosecution. And Rushton makes it difficult if not impossible for them to do so.
¶35 The Rushton standard would be defensible nonetheless if it were rooted in the governing language of the statute. But the Rushton framework bears no connection to the statutory text. See id. ¶ 53 (making this point). It is based on a standard under a
¶36 I raised these and other concerns in my separate opinion in Rushton. And I remain convinced of the position I developed there. We should resolve the “single criminal episode” question on the basis of the controlling text of the statute—not under a case-by-case balancing of factors under a “totality of the circumstances.” See id. ¶¶ 47-48.
¶37 By statute, a “‘single criminal episode’ means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.”
¶38 The starting point is the identification of the relevant “criminal objective.” This is not a reference to a “hazy nefarious purpose” of wrongdoing. Id. It is a reference to an “objective” to commit a specific crime as defined in our law. See id. ¶ 52 (explaining that “‘single criminal objective’ cannot be defined in the abstract,” to encompass any broad, nefarious purpose, as that “would eviscerate the permissive joinder statute,
¶39 The second step is the identification of the relationship between the two crimes at issue. Each crime must be based on conduct that is “closely related in time.” And one of the crimes must be “incident to an attempt or an accomplishment” of another crime.
¶40 “The words ‘attempt’ and ‘accomplishment’ have well-defined meanings in the criminal law.” Id. ¶ 58. And the statutory text carries forward those meanings—in a standard that requires joinder of any criminal offense that is “incident to” an “attempt” to commit another crime or to the “accomplishment” of such crime. Id.
¶41 That standard is easily established here. The conduct giving rise to the charge of aggravated robbery furthered the “accomplishment” of the “criminal objective” of the crime of theft by retention of property. This is clear from the fact that both crimes have as their subject the exact same piece of personal property—the car that was stolen by Sisneros.
¶42 I would resolve the “single criminal episode” inquiry on this basis. And I would thereby avoid extending the imprecision and indeterminacy introduced into our law in Rushton.
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, concurring:
¶43 I concur fully in the majority opinion. It properly applies the Rushton factors to the case at hand and correctly determines that the theft by receiving and aggravated robbery offenses were part of a single criminal episode. I also agree with the majority‘s conclusions that both offenses were “within the jurisdiction of a single court” for purposes of the Single Criminal Episode Statute.
¶44 I write separately to note that while I agree substantively with the view Associate Chief Justice Lee has so ably articulated both in this case and in Rushton, I have decided to join the majority because Rushton now controls. Once a case has been decided, we should accord it precedential weight and “give [it] a full and fair application to the facts before us,” regardless of (and often despite) our personal views on whether the case was correctly decided.9 This principle is particularly applicable in situations—such as this one—where neither party has asked us to overrule the controlling precedent10 and
Notes
Moreover, Justice Lee‘s proposed test would, in many instances, broaden the reach of the Single Criminal Episode Statute impermissibly. For example, suppose Sisneros had recklessly run over and killed an innocent bystander in his attempt to get away with the stolen car. Under Justice Lee‘s proposed test, this conduct would arguably be incident to the single criminal objective of theft by receiving, and the State would be barred from prosecuting Sisneros for vehicular manslaughter in a separate trial. Under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, however, the State would not be so constrained because (1) vehicular manslaughter is fundamentally different in nature than theft by receiving, (2) the victims of this crime would be separate under any definition, and (3) there likely would have been sufficient time for Sisneros to consciously make the decision to avoid running over the innocent bystander. Indeed, this fact pattern is roughly similar to the facts of State v. Ireland where we implicitly relied on a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis in order to find that aggravated kidnapping was not part of the same criminal objective as aggravated robbery even though the kidnapping was incident to, and arguably necessary for, the successful aggravated robbery. See Ireland, 570 P.2d at 1207.