STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Bobbie Jo Nadine RIRIE, Appellant.
No. 20120638
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 20, 2015.
2015 UT 37
¶ 29 The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that
[t]o the extent that the board has suggested ... that a future discharge must be “certain” before a resignation to avoid the discharge can qualify as good cause, such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the “reasonable and prudent person” standard in place.... [T]he fact that a threatened discharge is less than certain to occur ... [is not] dispositive....
Id. at 730 n. 9. Instead, the court concluded that good cause to quit depends “on whether a reasonable person facing that prospect of discharge would consider the prospеct so grave a circumstance that resigning was the only reasonable option.” Id. at 730; see also Madisonville Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Emp‘t Comm‘n, 821 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Tex.Ct.App.1991) (a teacher may quit with good cause if the teacher has “good reason to believe that he will imminently be discharged ... unless he chooses to resign“). This “objective inquiry depends on what [the] claimant in fact knew and reasonably should have known when he made his decision, not on an assessment of how events in fact would have played out.” McDowell, 236 P.3d at 730.
¶ 30 We similarly hold that the administrative judge and appeals board erred by concluding that the possibility that Ms. Sawyer could have retained her job was sufficient to defeat her employment benefits claim. Good cause to quit is measured by the objective standard of whether “a reasonably prudent person would be justified in quitting under similar circumstances.” Hurst v. Indus. Comm‘n, 723 P.2d 416, 419 (Utah 1986). This assessment should be based on the information that the worker knew or should have known at the time of the resignation. McDowell, 236 P.3d at 730. Reasonably prudent persons, of course, must often make decisions based upon an assessment of potеntial consequences rather than in the context of certain outcomes. Little in life is guaranteed. In evaluating whether a reasonably prudent employee would quit in order to avoid a potential termination, administrative law judges and courts should consider (1) the likelihood of termination, in spite of the employee‘s reasonable efforts to remain employed, and (2) the degree to which termination will negatively affect future employment.
CONCLUSION
¶ 31 Because the administrative law judge and appeals board did not assess whether a reasonable person in Ms. Sawyer‘s shoes would have quit, but rather whether there was some possibility that she could have retained her job, we conclude that an incorrect legal standard was applied to the facts of this case. We therefore reverse and remand Ms. Sawyer‘s unemployment benefits claim to the administrative law judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Natalie Skibine, Jessica A. Jacobs, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Associate Chief Justice LEE authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice DURHAM, Justice PARRISH, and Judge LAWRENCE joined. Justice NEHRING did not participate herein; District Judge BARRY G. LAWRENCE sat.
Associate Chief Justice LEE, opinion of the Court:
¶ 1 In this case we are asked to interpret the terms of
¶ 2 We deem this provision inapplicable in the circumstances of this case, which involves an initial charge arising out of a citation filed by a police officer in justice court and subsequent charges on an information filed by a prosecutor in district court. Appellant‘s payment of her justice court fine resulted in a “conviction” on her justice court charge, and that conviction barred any subsequent prosecution on the same offense as a matter of double jeopardy. But there was no “information or indictment” on that first offense, and accordingly there was no “prosecuting attorney” involved. We find the preclusion principle in section 403 inapplicable on that basis, and thus affirm the district court‘s denial of appellant‘s motion to dismiss the subsequent charges in the district court.
I
¶ 3 In early November of 2011, a police officer pulled over Bobbie Jo Nadine Ririe on suspicion of drunk driving. During the stop the officer noticed an open can of beer in the car. After performing an intoxilyzer test—which indicated a blood-alcohol level of .216—the officer issued Ririe a citation for an open container offense.1 Pursuant to statute, the officer then filed the citation in justice court—thereby initiating a criminal case against Ririe.
¶ 4 After Ririe failed to appear or forfeit bail on her open container charge in justice court, prosecutors filed an information in Third District Court charging her with DUI, an аlcohol-restricted driver offense, and an open container violation. When Ririe failed to appear at her arraignment in the district court a few weeks later, a warrant was issued for her arrest. The day after the warrant issued, however, Ririe paid her justice court fine online; in so doing she forfeited bail and accepted a conviction in justice court on the open container offense.
¶ 5 Despite the justice court conviction, prosecutors moved forward on the information filed in the district court, and Ririe then moved to dismiss. She made two principal arguments in support of her motion. First, Ririe argued that the Double Jeopardy Clausе prohibited a serial prosecution on the open container charge. And second, she contended that the DUI and alcohol-restricted driver charges were precluded by
¶ 6 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution insulates a defendant from multiple prosecutions or multiple sentences for the same offense. See State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 30, 274 P.3d 919. The single criminal episode statute,
¶ 7 Under
¶ 8 Together, these provisions impose a one-bite-at-the-apple rule for multiple offenses arising out of a single criminal episode. But the limiting tеrms of these statutes are significant. Our code does not prescribe a universal bar on multiple prosecutions arising out of a single criminal episode. It limits this bar to cases falling within its terms—to multiple cases “within the jurisdiction of a single court” in circumstances where the offense(s) in question were “known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.”
¶ 9 The question presented is whether these limiting conditions are satisfied here. We conclude that they are not. In so doing we first acknowledge a point advanced by Ririe: There is a sense in which the citation and bail forfeiture scheme resulting in Ririe‘s conviction on the open container charge may be characterized as a “prosecution.” This scheme may not represent the traditional method of filing and pursuing a criminal charge under Utah law. See State v. Sommerville, 2013 UT App 40, ¶ 12, 297 P.3d 665. But it is a method authorized by our law—and the method that was invoked and pressed here. Ririe in fact has a conviction on the open cоntainer charge on her record, and she would doubtless be surprised to hear that she was never subject to “prosecution” on that offense. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1341 (9th ed.2009) (defining “prosecute” as “[t]o institute and pursue a criminal action against a person“). But see Sommerville, 2013 UT App 40, ¶ 14 (“[I]f a citation is disposed of by voluntary forfeiture of bail, no information is filed and, thеrefore, no prosecution is initiated.“).
¶ 10 Yet the mere fact of a prior prosecution of some nature is insufficient to trigger the claim-preclusion principles of
¶ 11 First, no “prosecuting attorney” was formally involved in the process leading to Ririe‘s conviction on the open container violation in justice court. That charge was initiated by the mere issuance of a citation by a police officer. And although that citation ultimatеly resulted in a conviction, that result came about—by statutory design—without the need of any involvement of an attorney. By statute the payment of a fine on an eligible citation, such as Ririe‘s, results in a
¶ 12 On this point, Ririe argues at some length about the possible knowledge some prosecutor may have had of the various offenses at issue. And she seeks to challenge the district court‘s finding that no prosecutor had actual knowledge of the citation issued in this case. But these assertions arе ultimately beside the point under the statute as written. Under the standard in section 402 (incorporated in section 403), a prosecutor‘s knowledge alone is insufficient; the statute is limited to prosecutions involving a “prosecuting attorney,” and the absence of such an attorney renders the knowledge question immaterial.
¶ 13 Second, and similаrly, the justice court charge did not involve an “arraign[ment]” on an “information or indictment.”
¶ 14 Based on these two features of the single criminal episode statute—the requirement of a “prosecuting attorney” and thе use of an “information or indictment“—we affirm the district court‘s denial of Ririe‘s motion to dismiss. We construe those terms as limiting conditions and decline to extend the statute‘s principle of claim preclusion beyond its text.
¶ 15 In so doing, we acknowledge a policy basis for Ririe‘s position. As Ririe indicates, sections 402 and 403 appear to be aimed at advancing the policies of economy and efficiency that are at the heart of the doctrine of res judicata. And, if the legislature were focused single-mindedly on those policies, perhaps it would make sense to adopt a universal rule of criminal claim preclusion—to require the government to bring any and all known charges arising out of a single criminal episode in a single case (whether or not the case involves a prosecuting attorney or a formal charge in an information).
¶ 16 As we have noted repeatedly, however, the legislature rarely acts single-mindedly. More often its enactments are aimed at balancing competing policy positions.2 That appears to be the case here. Sections 402 and 403 partially advance interests of judicial economy. But they also preserve discretion for the prosecution to advance separate charges where law enforcement has pursued minor charges through informal mеans.