STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT C. SIMMONS
(SC 20846)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued May 12—officially released July 22, 2025
Mullins, C. J., and D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of murder, home invasion, and burglary in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court had improperly declined to instruct the jury on his third-party culpability defense. Held:
The state presented sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of establishing the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as it was reasonable and logical for the jury to infer that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crimes of which he was convicted on the basis of certain video surveillance footage and forensic evidence presented at trial, as well as certain contradictory statements that he had made during his interviews with the police.
Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, it was of no consequence that the jury could have construed the evidence consistently with a casual visit to the victim’s home, as he had claimed during one of his interviews with the police, because the jury was not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with guilt and was not required to draw only those inferences consistent with innocence.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on the defendant’s third-party culpability defense, which was premised on his argument that a certain DNA profile found on a bloody hammer found near the victim’s body directly connected an unknown male to the crimes. Although a bloody hammer found near the victim’s body was the likely the murder weapon and therefore had a close and proximate relationship to the murder, the video surveillance footage, the results of the police investigation, and the quotidian nature of the hammer led this court to conclude that the totality of the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to infer that a third party was responsible for the victim’s murder.
There was no merit to the defendant’s claim that certain of the prosecutor’s remarks made during closing and rebuttal arguments were improper and deprived him of a fair trial.
With respect to the prosecutor’s comments regarding DNA evidence found on the defendant’s jeans and ‘‘in’’ the victim’s fingernails, and a comment regarding the victim’s fight or struggle with the defendant, the prosecutor did not mischaracterize the facts in evidence or encourage the jury to make unreasonable factual inferences, as those comments were rooted in the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom.
With respect to the prosecutor’s comment during rebuttal argument characterizing defense counsel’s theory of the case as ‘‘deceptive,’’ the prosecutor did not disparage defense counsel personally or his institutional role in the proceedings but, rather, criticized defense counsel’s theory of the case on the ground that it was ‘‘deficient,’’ ‘‘dismissive,’’ and ‘‘deceptive’’ because it did not account for the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, particularly the video surveillance footage and DNA evidence, and the prosecutor’s comment was in direct response to defense counsel’s closing argument, in which he described the state’s case as ‘‘deficient, dismissive, [and] deceptive’’ in the first instance.
Argued May 12—officially released July 22, 2025
Information charging the defendant with the crimes of murder, home invasion, felony murder, and burglary in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the jury before White, J.; verdict of guilty; thereafter, the court, White, J., vacated the conviction of felony murder and rendered judgment of conviction of murder, home invasion, and burglary in the first degree, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Jennifer B. Smith, assistant public defender, with whom, on the brief, were Taryn Henderson and Kaylyn Terry, law student interns, for the appellant (defendant).
Nathan J. Buchok, assistant state’s attorney, with whom were Elizabeth K. Moran, assistant state’s attorney, and, on the brief, Paul J. Ferencek, state’s attorney, and Michelle Manning, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
ECKER, J. On the evening of September 25, 2019, the ninety-three year old victim, Isabella Mehner, was robbed and bludgeoned to death in her own home. The police investigation led to the arrest of the defendant, Robert C. Simmons, who was tried and convicted of the crimes of murder, home invasion, and burglary in the first degree. In this direct appeal,1 the defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court improperly declined his request to instruct the jury on third-party culpability, and (3) the prosecutor committed multiple improprieties during closing and rebuttal arguments, which deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of conviction.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The victim lived by herself in a single-family residence located at the corner of Willowbrook Avenue and Cove Road in Stamford. On September 25, 2019, the victim spoke to her cousin on the telephone at about 3:30 p.m. She was later seen in her garden at 5:15 p.m. By 6 p.m., however, the victim’s daughter, Ellen Blanchard, was unable to reach her by telephone. After repeated calls went unanswered, Blanchard decided to visit the victim to check on her well-being. Blanchard arrived at the victim’s house at 8 p.m., where she was met by her brother and his wife. As they approached the victim’s house via the back door on Willowbrook Avenue, Blanchard was surprised to see that the screen door was unlocked and that the back door was standing wide open—the victim normally kept those doors closed and locked. Blanchard, her brother, and her sister-in-law entered the unlocked house and searched for the victim, eventually finding her lying in a pool of blood at the bottom of the basement stairs.
Blanchard’s brother called 911, and the police arrived soon thereafter. Emergency medical responders found the victim cold to the touch and unresponsive. Attempts to resuscitate the victim were unsuccessful, and she was pronounced dead at the scene at 8:22 p.m.
The police immediately suspected that the victim’s death was not an accident. The amount of blood at the bottom of the stairs and the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries appeared to be inconsistent
An autopsy confirmed that the victim’s death was a homicide. According to the medical examiner, the victim suffered multiple focal impact injuries to the head, many of which were curvilinear in nature, consistent with those that would be caused by the hammer found near the victim’s body.2 Additionally, there were abrasion injuries on her neck, bruising on her legs, and a deep laceration on her left hand.
The police investigated possible avenues of entry and exit from the victim’s home other than the unlocked, open back door. They discovered that there was another door, the front door facing Cove Road, but that door was closed, locked, and showed no signs of forced entry. All of the windows also were closed and locked, except for one broken window in the basement covered in an undisturbed layer of dust and cobwebs. The police inspected the perimeter of the residence, looking for footprints in the dirt, scuff marks, or trampled grass outside of the windows. They found no signs of disturbance.
Video surveillance footage was acquired from surrounding homes and businesses. One business located across the street from the victim’s house, Chelsea Piers, had a camera pointed directly at the intersection of Willowbrook Avenue and Cove Road with a clear view of the premises. The Chelsea Piers video depicts only one person entering the victim’s house between 2:30 and 8 p.m. on the day of the victim’s murder: an older Black man wearing a dark colored hat, a dark sweatshirt, and baggy jeans. The man initially can be seen walking past the victim’s house on Willowbrook Avenue and glancing briefly up her driveway. The man walks out of sight but then returns approximately one minute later, striding up Willowbrook Avenue to the victim’s house. He enters the house via the back door at 5:39 p.m., remains inside for eight minutes, and exits the back door at 5:47 p.m. The man then walks up Willowbrook Avenue, turns left onto Cove Road, and walks out of sight.
The police were able to track the man’s progress up Cove Road through additional video surveillance footage. The man walked to a mini-mart located at 138 Cove Road, where he bought a beverage. The mini-mart video reveals further details regarding the man’s appearance: he had a graying beard, a black bracelet on his left wrist, black shoes, and baggy, cuffed jeans with a distinctive design on the back pockets. The police patrolled the area looking for a suspect matching this description.
On September 27, 2019, Sergeant Christian DiCarlo of the Stamford Police Department saw a man fitting the suspect’s description at the intersection
At the police station, the defendant’s clothing and shoes were seized, and he was provided with a Tyvek suit and booties. The defendant waived his Miranda3 rights and agreed to answer DiCarlo’s questions. During the interview, the defendant denied knowing the victim or being in the area of Cove Road on September 25, 2019. The defendant told the police that he was homeless and had spent the day of the murder on the west side of Stamford at the train station and the soup kitchen. The defendant voluntarily provided a DNA sample at the end of the interview.
The police continued their investigation, learning that the defendant had been employed intermittently for three or four years by the victim’s grandson-in-law, Richard Sachs. Sachs was the owner of a sewer and drain business, and he and the defendant had visited the victim’s house five or six times together to fix the sink and main sewer drain in the victim’s basement. The defendant left Sachs’ employ approximately six months before the burglary, home invasion, and murder. The day after the victim’s death, Sachs texted the defendant a link to a news article about the crimes, asked him if he knew anything about the incident, and offered to pay the defendant money to relay any information that he might learn about the victim’s murder from people on the street.
The defendant returned to the police station on October 2, 2019. He again waived his Miranda rights and consented to a police interview. During his second interview, the defendant admitted that he was on Cove Road on September 25, 2019, and that he knew the victim. The defendant said he knocked on some doors because Sachs had asked him to get information but denied going into anyone’s house or killing anyone. When DiCarlo pointed out that Sachs had asked the defendant to seek out information the day after the victim’s murder, not the day of the victim’s murder, the defendant steadfastly maintained that he never went inside the victim’s house or killed anyone.
In the meantime, the police submitted various items collected from the victim’s home for forensic testing. Four items found near the victim’s body that appeared to be stained with blood were tested: a wallet, a hammer, a heavy ceramic jar, and a mop handle with a flattened end. The wallet, ceramic jar, and mop handle were tested for fingerprints, but no fingerprints were found. The hammer was not tested for fingerprints because DiCarlo was informed that the surface would not yield any identifiable prints. The four items also were tested for DNA. It was determined that the victim’s blood was present on all four items, but no other DNA was found on the ceramic jar or mop handle. The wallet contained a second DNA profile in addition to that of the victim, but there was insufficient data to include or exclude the defendant as a contributor.4 A male
profile was found on a portion of the handle of the hammer that was not stained with blood, but this profile did not belong to the defendant. The jewelry box in the victim’s bedroom also was subject to forensic testing, and there were three different DNA profiles present, one of which was that of a male, but the defendant was excluded as a contributor.
The defendant’s clothing and the victim’s fingernails were submitted for forensic testing, as well. Four small, reddish brown stains were found on the defendant’s jeans, each of which tested positive for the presence of blood via an initial screening test. Two of those stains were submitted for subsequent DNA testing, and both contained the victim’s DNA.5 With respect to the victim’s fingernails, male DNA was found, but there was insufficient data to generate an individualized DNA profile. A ‘‘Yfiler’’ test was performed, which is a specialized DNA test that isolates the Y chromosome in a male DNA sample. The results of the Yfiler test revealed that the DNA from the victim’s fingernails was consistent with that of the defendant.6
On November 20, 2019, the defendant was interviewed for a third time after waiving his Miranda rights. During his third interview, the defendant admitted that he was on Cove Road on the day of the victim’s murder, that he knew the victim, that he knocked on the victim’s door, and that he went inside the victim’s home. According to the defendant, he went to the victim’s home because he hoped that she would give him some money. The defendant explained that the victim invited him inside and that, after exchanging pleasantries, he went downstairs to the basement to ensure that the sink and sewer line were draining properly. In return, the victim gave him $11. After thanking the victim, the defendant left the house, walked to the mini-mart on Cove Road, and purchased a beer and a cigarette. The defendant was adamant that he was in the victim’s home for less than ten minutes and that the victim was alive and well when he left.
The defendant was arrested and charged with felony murder, murder, home invasion, and burglary in the first degree. A jury found the defendant guilty of all charges, but the trial court vacated the felony murder conviction on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction on the remaining charges and sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of eighty-five years of imprisonment. This appeal followed.
I
We first address whether the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the defendant committed the crimes of which he was convicted. The defendant acknowledges that there was abundant evidence placing him at the scene of the crimes at the approximate time of their commission but argues that this evidence failed to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because it was consistent with a casual and uneventful visit to the victim’s house, as described by the defendant in his third police interview. We find no merit to this claim.
‘‘[T]he question of identity of a perpetrator of a crime is a question of fact
We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the individual who invaded the victim’s home and murdered the victim. The Chelsea Piers video clearly depicts an individual, later identified as the defendant, entering the victim’s house at the approximate time that the crimes were committed and exiting the house eight minutes later. The video shows no one else arriving at or leaving the victim’s home during the relevant time period. The police investigation revealed that all of the doors and windows other than the back door and undisturbed basement window were closed and locked and that there were no signs of entry or egress by different means. The defendant’s DNA was found on the fingernails of the victim’s wounded left hand, the same hand from which her wedding rings were stolen, and the jury reasonably could have found that the victim’s blood was present on the defendant’s jeans.7
Additionally, the defendant lied to the police multiple times about his whereabouts on the afternoon of September 25, 2019, his familiarity with the victim, and his presence inside the victim’s home. The foregoing evidence is more than sufficient to fulfill the state’s burden of establishing the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Honsch, 349 Conn. 783, 812–16, 322 A.3d 1019 (2024) (consciousness of guilt evidence and direct physical forensic evidence tying defendant to victim’s body was sufficient to establish defendant’s identity); State v. Abraham, 343 Conn. 470, 477–79, 274 A.3d 849 (2022) (evidence of defendant’s identity was sufficient because defendant’s blood was found at scene of shooting, and he was apprehended nearby suffering from recent gunshot wound).
The defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial was equivocal because it could be construed consistently with a casual visit to the victim’s house, as he described in his third interview. This claim carries no force under the present circumstances. ‘‘That the jury might have drawn other possible inferences from [the] facts is not sufficient to undermine its verdict, since proof of guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, not beyond a possible doubt. . . . [I]n viewing evidence [that] could yield contrary inferences, the jury is not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with guilt and is not required to draw only those inferences consistent with innocence. The rule is that the jury’s function is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Otto, 305 Conn. 51, 74, 43 A.3d 629 (2012). On the basis of the video surveillance footage, the forensic evidence, and the defendant’s contradictory statements to the police, it was reasonable and logical for the jury to infer that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crimes of which he was convicted.
II
The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly declined to give a third-party culpability jury instruction because, in his view, there was forensic evidence directly connecting an unknown male individual to the crimes.
The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. On the last day of evidence, the defendant submitted a request to charge the jury on his third-party culpability defense on the ground that there was unknown male DNA on both the jewelry box located in the victim’s bedroom and the likely murder weapon, the hammer found near the victim’s body.8 The trial court
included the requested charge in its first draft of the jury instructions but reconsidered after the prosecutor objected to the instruction at the charge conference. The prosecutor argued that the hammer was a common household object native to the victim’s home, the unknown male DNA on its handle could have been deposited at any time, and there was no evidence tying the unknown male DNA to the murder, home invasion, or burglary. The prosecutor pointed out that the time period during which the crimes occurred
A trial court’s failure to issue a requested third-party culpability jury instruction generally is reviewed for abuse of discretion.9 See, e.g., State v. Ashby, 336 Conn. 452, 498, 247 A.3d 521 (2020); State v. Schovanec, 326 Conn. 310, 320–23, 163 A.3d 581 (2017); State v. Jackson, 304 Conn. 383, 424, 40 A.3d 290 (2012). A defendant is entitled to a third-party culpability jury instruction if the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to supporting the requested charge, demonstrates that there is a ‘‘direct connection between a third party and the crime with which the defendant has been charged . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Schovanec, supra, 320; see id., 318–19; see also State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597, 610, 935 A.2d 975 (2007) (‘‘if the evidence pointing to a third party’s culpability, taken together and considered in the light most favorable to the defendant, establishes a direct connection between the third party and the charged offense, rather than merely raising a bare suspicion that another could have committed the crime, a trial court has a duty to submit an appropriate charge to the jury’’).
Whether a direct connection exists ‘‘is necessarily a fact intensive inquiry’’ that depends on ‘‘the context of the entire case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Schovanec, supra, 326 Conn. 320. A direct connection requires more ‘‘than merely tenuous evidence of [third-party] culpability [introduced by a defendant] in an attempt to divert from himself the evidence of guilt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 319. Although the evidence of a third party’s commission of the crimes ‘‘need not exonerate the defendant . . . it must provid[e] a credible, alternative theory as to who committed the crime . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Baltas, 311 Conn. 786, 812, 91 A.3d 384 (2014). For example, we have held that there is a direct connection
When it comes to forensic evidence recovered from a crime scene, such as fingerprint or DNA evidence, physical proximity on its own normally is insufficient to merit a jury instruction on third-party culpability. See State v. Ashby, supra, 336 Conn. 503. ‘‘[C]ontext, and not proximity alone, is necessary to establish a direct connection between forensic evidence and a third party to the crime.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id. Compare State v. West, 274 Conn. 605, 626–27, 877 A.2d 787 (unidentified latent finger and palm prints found at periphery of crime scene lacked direct connection to crimes), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1049, 126 S. Ct. 775, 163 L. Ed. 2d 601 (2005), with State v. Cerreta, 260 Conn. 251, 258–62, 796 A.2d 1176 (2002) (hair and fingerprints found on victim’s body and on ligatures used to bind victim’s hands and feet had direct connection to crimes). Often, it is unknown and unknowable when the forensic evidence was deposited, but such evidence nonetheless may have a direct connection to the crimes if the nature and location of that evidence in relation to the other admissible evidence support a reasonable inference that it was left by the perpetrator of the crimes during his commission or flight therefrom. See, e.g., State v. Ashby, supra, 502–504; State v. Cerreta, supra, 260–62.
Our decision in Ashby is instructive. In that case, we addressed whether a defendant was entitled to a third-party culpability instruction on the basis of three types of forensic evidence found at the scene of the victim’s sexual assault and murder: (1) unidentified male DNA from a swab of the victim’s vagina, (2) unidentified male saliva from the victim’s shoulder, and (3) unidentified male DNA in a bloody handprint on the doorframe of the victim’s bedroom.10 See State v. Ashby, supra, 336 Conn. 496–97, 503–504. We held that the unidentified male DNA in the saliva and bloody handprint necessitated a third-party culpability instruction; the unidentified male DNA in the victim’s vagina, by contrast, did not warrant the instruction, even though it was recovered directly from the victim’s body. See id., 503–504. According to the expert testimony adduced at trial, ‘‘the unidentified male DNA found on the victim’s vaginal swab could have lasted for up to three days,’’ and, ‘‘[g]iven this longer timeframe,’’ that evidence, ‘‘in and of itself, would have been insufficient to require a third-party culpability instruction as a matter of law.’’ Id., 503–504. In contrast, the ‘‘male DNA on the victim’s shoulder . . . would have existed for a more limited duration
frame of the victim’s bedroom was recovered from a location that was, undisputedly, covered in the victim’s blood during the commission of the crimes charged.’’ Id. ‘‘Viewing all of the evidence contained in the record in the light most favorable to supporting the proposed charge,’’ we concluded that the jury reasonably could have inferred that the unidentified male DNA found in the saliva on the victim’s shoulder and the bloody handprint on the victim’s doorframe had been deposited by a third-party perpetrator and that ‘‘the trial court abused its discretion by declining to provide such an instruction to the jury.’’ Id., 504–505.
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on the defendant’s third-party culpability defense.11 The issue is a close one because the bloody hammer was the likely murder weapon, and the instrumentality of a crime, like the body of a victim, certainly has a close and proximate relationship to the crime.12 But our precedent clearly
establishes that the connection between the evidence of third-party culpability and the crime charged must rest on grounds beyond mere proximity. When, as here, forensic evidence is offered to supply that connection, its sufficiency must be considered in the context of the entire factual record to determine whether the totality of the circumstances supports a reasonable inference that the evidence at issue was left by the perpetrator of the crimes. In this case, the video surveillance footage, the results of the police investigation, and the quotidian nature of the hammer all lead us to conclude that the totality of the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to infer that a third party was culpable for the commission of the charged crimes.
The defendant was the only person who entered or exited the victim’s home that afternoon, entering through the back door at 5:39 p.m., and leaving through the back door at 5:47 p.m.
Additionally, the hammer did not appear to be new, and there was no indication that it was brought to the crime scene by the assailant. It was a common household item, and there was no reason to believe that the assailant was the sole person to have touched the hammer or to have deposited his DNA on its handle. Under these unique factual circumstances, the unknown male DNA profile on the hammer, standing alone, is insufficient to fulfill the defendant’s burden of providing a credible, alternative theory that a third party committed the charged crimes. See, e.g., State v. Baltas, supra, 311 Conn. 812; State v. Hedge, 297 Conn. 621, 647, 1 A.3d 1051 (2010). The trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s request for a third-party culpability jury instruction.
III
The defendant’s final claim is that the prosecutor made two types of improper remarks during closing and rebuttal arguments that deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. First, the defendant contends that the prosecutor mischaracterized the evidence and urged the jury to draw unreasonable factual inferences from that evidence. Second, the defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel’s theory of the case by characterizing it as ‘‘deceptive.’’ We conclude that the challenged remarks were not improper.
We apply our familiar two step process to evaluate claims of prosecutorial impropriety. ‘‘First, we examine whether an impropriety occurred. . . . If the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, then we move on to the second step and examine whether the impropriety deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. . . . [T]he burden is on the defendant to show, not only that the remarks were improper, but also that, considered in light
A
The defendant claims that the prosecutor mischaracterized the facts in evidence and encouraged the jury to make unreasonable factual inferences by arguing that (1) the victim’s DNA was on all four stains on the defendant’s jeans, (2) the defendant’s DNA was ‘‘in’’ the victim’s fingernails, and (3) the victim fought or struggled with the defendant.14 We reject these claims.
‘‘It is not . . . improper for the prosecutor to comment [on] the evidence presented at trial and to argue the inferences that the jurors might draw therefrom . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Luster, 279 Conn. 414, 435, 902 A.2d 636 (2006). The prosecutor is permitted to argue the reasonable inferences the jury may draw from the evidence without being ‘‘put in the rhetorical straitjacket of always using the passive voice, or continually emphasizing that he [or she] is simply saying I submit to you that this is what the evidence shows, or the like.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ciullo, 314 Conn. 28, 41, 100 A.3d 779 (2014). ‘‘[W]e must give the jury the credit of being able to differentiate between argument on the evidence and attempts to persuade [it] to draw inferences in the state’s favor, on one hand, and improper unsworn testimony, with the suggestion of secret knowledge, on the other hand.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fauci, supra, 282 Conn. 45–46.
The prosecutor’s challenged remarks did not misrepresent the evidence or ask the jury to draw unreasonable factual inferences. With respect to the four, reddish brown stains on the defendant’s jeans, there was evidence before the jury that all four stains had tested positive for the presence of blood pursuant to an initial screening test. Further forensic testing was conducted on two of the four stains, revealing that they both contained human DNA that was 100 billion times more likely to belong to the victim than to an unknown individual. See footnote 7 of this opinion. On the basis of this evidence, it was not improper for the prosecutor to argue the reasonable inference that all four stains derived from the same source containing the victim’s DNA.15
There also was evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant’s DNA was deposited on the victim’s fingernails during a fight or struggle. Stamford police officer Edward Rondano testified that, from the condition of the crime scene, ‘‘there appeared to [have been] a fight’’ between the victim and her assailant. Additionally, DiCarlo testified that the blood patterns at the bottom of the basement stairs led him to conclude that ‘‘the victim had struggled either to get up or [to] fight off somebody . . . .’’ The prosecutor properly relied on this evidence to ask the jurors to use their common sense in determining whether it was more reasonable to believe that the defendant’s DNA ended up on the victim’s left hand ‘‘from a handshake or . . . from a fight . . . .’’ See, e.g., State v. Courtney G., 339 Conn. 328, 347–48, 260 A.3d 1152 (2021) (prosecutor may ‘‘appeal to [the jurors’] common sense in closing remarks, so long as the prosecutor’s arguments are based on evidence presented at trial and reasonable inferences that jurors might draw therefrom’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the prosecutor’s comments were rooted in the evidence and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, they were not improper.
B
Finally, the defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly characterized defense counsel’s theory of the case as ‘‘deceptive.’’ The state ‘‘acknowledges that, under different circumstances, calling defense counsel’s argument ‘deceptive’ multiple times could constitute impropriety’’ but argues that it was not improper in this case for two reasons: (1) the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was directly responsive to defense counsel’s closing argument, and (2) the prosecutor’s comments did not disparage defense counsel or his institutional role in the proceeding. We agree with the state.
The following additional background is pertinent to this claim. During closing argument, defense counsel described the state’s case as ‘‘[d]eficient, dismissive, [and] deceptive,’’ arguing that the police
During rebuttal, the prosecutor responded to defense counsel’s argument utilizing the same ‘‘[d]eficient, dismissive, deceptive’’ framework. The prosecutor argued that ‘‘[t]he defendant’s theories are dismissive of the facts in evidence. They are deficient in that they ignore all of the evidence you have, and they are deceptive in saying that this case isn’t simple, that it isn’t thorough, and that’s not to be confused with that it’s not serious.’’ Concerning the defendant’s DNA on the victim’s fingernails, the prosecutor stated that defense counsel ‘‘pointed out that we don’t know where that swabbing came from, but we do. That’s deceptive. Lana Ramos [a forensic science examiner with the state forensic laboratory who testified at trial] may not have known where it came from because that’s not her job. But . . . Nunez, the one who took the swabs, the one who [clipped] the fingernails, she did. She showed you on her own hand where she takes swabs from, and she told you where that was.’’16 In sum, the prosecutor argued that defense counsel’s theory of defense was ‘‘dismissive of the evidence . . . deficient in argument, and . . . deceptive in light of all of the evidence that we have.’’
It is well established that ‘‘[t]he prosecutor is expected to refrain from impugning, directly or through implication, the integrity or institutional role of defense counsel. . . . There is a distinction [however] between argument that disparages the integrity or role of defense counsel and argument that disparages a theory of defense.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dabate, 351 Conn. 428, 454 n.16, 331 A.3d 1159 (2025). The prosecutor may ‘‘forcefully criticize a defense theory on the permissible bases of the evidence and the common sense of the [jurors] . . . .’’ State v. James, 141 Conn. App. 124, 150, 60 A.3d 1011, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 932, 64 A.3d 331 (2013). In doing so, the prosecutor must abstain from sarcastic, inflammatory, or vituperative language, but ‘‘the limits of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jose R., 338 Conn. 375, 387–88, 258 A.3d 50 (2021). To determine whether a prosecutor’s challenged remarks were improper in the context of the entire trial, we may consider whether they were made ‘‘in direct response to matters raised by defense counsel . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 256 Conn. 291, 309, 772 A.2d 1107 (2001); see also Valentine v. Commissioner of Correction, 219 Conn. App. 276, 303, 295 A.3d 973 (‘‘both [this court] and [the Appellate Court] frequently have considered whether a challenged remark of a prosecutor was responsive to a defense theory or argument in determining whether the remark was improper in the first instance’’), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 913, 303 A.3d 602 (2023).
Viewing the prosecutor’s remarks in context, we conclude that they were not improper. First, the prosecutor did not disparage defense counsel personally or denigrate his institutional role in the proceedings. Instead, the prosecutor criticized defense counsel’s theory of the case, contending that his theory was ‘‘deficient,’’ ‘‘dismissive,’’ and ‘‘deceptive’’ because it did not account for the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, particularly the video surveillance footage, the DNA found on the victim’s fingernails and the defendant’s jeans, and the consciousness of guilt evidence. Second, and significantly in our view, it was defense counsel who first used the ‘‘[d]eficient, dismissive, deceptive’’ framework to critique the state’s theory of the case. Having done so, ‘‘the defendant has no grounds for complaint’’ when the prosecutor uses the same exact turn of phrase in response. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, supra, 256 Conn. 309; see also State v. Thompson, 266 Conn. 440, 469, 832 A.2d 626 (2003) (prosecutor’s challenged remark was not improper because it ‘‘was a reasonable response to one of the primary theories advanced by the defense in the case’’); State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 716 n.22, 793 A.2d 226 (2002) (prosecutor’s challenged ‘‘comment was invited by defense counsel’s argument and, therefore, was not improper’’). We perceive no impropriety.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.