STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SAMUEL M.
SC 19578
Supreme Court of Connecticut
December 27, 2016
Rоgers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald and Robinson, Js.
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Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state‘s attornеy, with whom, on the brief, were Patricia M. Froehlich, former state‘s attorney, and Andrew J. Slitt, assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellant (state).
Bryan P. Fiengo, for the appellee (defendant).
ROGERS, C. J. In this certified appeal, we are asked to determine whether the state has satisfied its burden to prove that a defendant whose case was automatically transferred from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court was at least fourteen years of age at the time he allegedly engaged in the criminal conduct underlying the charged offenses. The defendant, Samuel M., was charged by juvenile information with the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of
On the basis of the evidence, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant and the victim are first cousins. At all relevant times, the defendant, the victim, and their grandparents lived in houses on the same street in close proximity to each other. The defendant was born on September 17, 1994. The victim was born on December 31, 1998.
In June, 2009, when the victim attended middle school, he would go to his grandparents’ house on Tuesday and Thursday afternoons after school until one of his parents arrived home. On those days, the defendant was also frequently at their grandparents’ house. On one occasion, the victim and the defendant went into the woods behind the defendant‘s home where they stopped near a rock. The defendant forced the victim to remove his clothing and engage in oral sex. The defendant threatenеd to beat the victim with a baseball bat if he did not comply.
The victim testified that these incidents, and the five other alleged incidents for which the defendant was not convicted, occurred when the victim was “nine or ten” years old. He further testified that the incidents began in the autumn of the year he was in fourth grade and occurred over a period of time with each incident approximately one month apart. The victim testified that in the fall of 2013, the year of the trial, he would be entering his sophomore year of high school.
The victim‘s mother testified that during the second half of June, 2009, she discovered a photograph of the victim‘s penis on her cell phone. When she confronted the victim about the photograph, he disclosed to her that he had had sexual contact with the defendant. After he made this disclosure in June, 2009, the victim and the defendant were never left alone together.
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. After the Connecticut State Police conducted an investigation in 2010, which included a forensic interview of the victim, the state obtained a juvenile arrest warrant for the defendant based on allegations of seven incidents of sexual assault. In the juvenile information/arrest warrant, the defendant was charged with juvenile delinquency on the basis of committing sexual assault in the first degree in violation of
During trial, the victim testified in detail regarding seven alleged incidents, each of which formed the basis for violations of both
The defendant thereafter moved for a judgment of acquittal on the four counts of which he was convicted, and also moved to dismiss the amended information and to transfer his case to the juvenile docket. The trial court granted the defendant‘s motion for judgment of acquittal on the sexual assault alleged in count two on the ground that the testimony at trial was insufficient to prove that the incident, which the victim had testified was the first of the seven alleged incidents, оccurred “on or about June, 2009,” when the defendant unquestionably was fourteen years old. The court found, however, that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, reasonably permitted a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the incidents forming the bases of counts six, ten, and fifteen alleging, respectively, two counts of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child, occurred “on or about June, 2009,” and therefore, the court denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal on those counts. The court also denied the defendant‘s motion to dismiss counts six, ten, and fifteen of the amended information without further analysis. Subsequently, the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of five years of incarceration followed by five years of special parole.
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of any of the charged offenses due to inconsistencies in the victim‘s testimony at trial and also that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss based on the state‘s failure to prove that he committed any of the offenses of which he was convicted after attaining the age of fourteen. State v. Samuel M., supra, 159 Conn. App. 245. The Appellate Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction, but that the trial court had improperly denied the defendant‘s motion to dismiss. Id., 245-46. Specifically, the Appellate Court held that “if the statutory age criteria defining the grounds for transfer under
This court granted the state‘s petition for certification to appeal. State v. Samuel M., 319 Conn. 955, 125 A.3d 534 (2015). The state asks this court to determine: “1. Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that in [cases] automatically transferred from the juvenile docket of the Superior Court to the regular docket of the Superior Court pursuant to [
At oral argument before this court, the state conceded that, during the course of the prosecution, if the defendant properly raises and challenges his age at the time of the offense, then the state bears the burden to make a prima facie case that satisfies the statutory elements necessary for transfer. The state claims that it satisfied its burden to prove that the defendant wаs at least fourteen years old at the time of the conduct forming the basis for his convictions, by either a preponderance of the evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant asserts that the Appellate Court properly held that the state failed to prove, either beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was at least fourteen years old at the time of the conduct underlying his convictions. We
We initially address the standard of review for a trial court‘s denial of a motion to dismiss. “Because a motion to dismiss effectively challenges the jurisdiction of the court, asserting that the state, as a matter of law and fact, cannot state a proper cause of action against the defendant, our review of the court‘s legal conclusions and resulting denial of the defendant‘s motion to dismiss is de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ward, 306 Conn. 698, 707, 52 A.3d 591 (2012). “Factual findings underlying the court‘s decision, however, will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . The applicable legal standard of review for the denial of a motion to dismiss, therefore, generally turns on whether the appellant seeks to challenge the legal conclusions of the trial court or its factual determinations.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Golodner, 305 Conn. 330, 338-39, 46 A.3d 71 (2012). The determination of whether the defendant was fourteen years of age at the time of the criminal conduct is a factual determination subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. Insofar as the Appellate Court stated that the standard of review for underlying factual determinations was de novo; State v. Samuel M., supra, 159 Conn. App. 268; we disagree.
“The juvenile transfer statutes establish a detailed plan for transferring a case to the regular criminal docket.” State v. Torres, supra, 206 Conn. 356.
After a case has been transferred from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket, a defendant challenging the statutory criteria for transfer may move to dismiss the case pursuant to
Once the defendant challenges the ability of the court to convict and sentence him as an adult based upon his age at the time of the underlying criminal conduct for which the jury returned a guilty verdict, we hold that the state bears the burden to prove the defendant‘s age. The state is clearly in the best position to prove the date of the alleged conduct, particularly because in any given case the defendant is most likely going to deny that he engaged in any illegal conduct. Assuming, without dеciding, that a preponderance of the evidence
The defendant‘s motion to dismiss was submitted to the trial court after the jury returned its verdict. The state filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that a reasonable jury could have found, based on the evidence admitted at trial, that the defendant was fourteen years of age at the time of the criminal conduct underlying the guilty vеrdicts. Therefore, we evaluate the evidence presented at trial to determine whether the state satisfied its burden to prove that the defendant was fourteen years of age.
The victim testified that he was born on December 31, 1998. The arresting police officer testified that at the time of his arrest the defendant stated to the officer that his date of birth was September 17, 1994. On September 17, 2008, when the defendant turned fourteen years old, the victim was nine years and eight and one-half months old. Therefore, to establish that the defendаnt was fourteen years of age at the time of the criminal conduct, the state was required to prove either that the conduct occurred at any period in time when the victim was at least ten years old or that the conduct occurred when the victim was only nine years old, but the date of the conduct was on or after September 17, 2008, the defendant‘s fourteenth birthday.
The victim testified that the alleged incidents occurred when he was nine or ten years old, and the incidents occurred over a period of time with approximately one month between each successive incident. Accordingly, if the first incident occurred when the victim first turned nine years old, on December 31, 2007, then all of the incidents could have occurred prior to the defendant‘s fourteenth birthday on September 17, 2008.
The victim testified that the first incident was the one “behind the barn,” which was the offense charged in counts one and two. Other than the fact that the remaining six incidents occurred after this initial incident, the victim did not testify as to any specific time period for those six incidents or provide еvidence from which a finder of fact could make a reasonable inference as to the timing thereof or the defendant‘s age.
The victim‘s mother testified that she discovered the photograph of the victim‘s penis on her cell phone and confronted him about it in June of 2009, but there was no evidence introduced at trial regarding when the photograph was taken in relation to either its discovery or the last incident of sexual assault. We agree with the Appellate Court that, in the absence of any testimony as to when thе photograph was taken or the proximity of the taking of the photograph to any of the alleged incidents, no finder of fact could use the discovery of the photograph to make a reasonable inference that the
In the absence of any testimony as to the order or the specific timе period of the individual incidents, a finder of fact could not reasonably infer that the specific incidents alleged in counts six and ten, or any of the conduct that could have supported count fifteen, occurred after the defendant‘s fourteenth birthday. Therefore, in ruling on the defendant‘s motion to dismiss, there was no evidence that the trial court could have relied on to find that the criminal conduct underlying counts six, ten, and fifteen occurred on or after September 17, 2008, the date of the defendant‘s fourteenth birthday.8
In sum, once the defendant challenged the transfer of his case to the regular criminal docket on the basis of his age, the state did not establish, by any burden of proof, that the defendant was at least fourteen years of age at the time of the criminal conduct underlying the jury‘s verdict of guilt.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed with respect to vacating the defendant‘s conviction and remanding the case to the trial court with direction to grant the defendant‘s motion to dismiss and to transfer the case to the juvenile docket, and the case is remanded for a new trial on counts six, ten, and fifteen in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim‘s identity may be ascertained. See