STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Jeffrey Charles SALT, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20130071-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 26, 2015.
2015 UT App 72
Sean D. Reyes and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee.
Judge STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which Judges J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred.
Opinion
ROTH, Judge:
¶ 1 Jeffrey Charles Salt appeals from his conviction for aggravated assault, a third degree felony. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 Shortly after Salt began dating his girlfriend (J.G.), she bought a home in Salt Lake City.2 Salt suggested that she hire him to complete some renovations, and she agreed. J.G. moved in with Salt in April 2006 when her house became unlivable during the remodeling. Over the next couple of years, the renovations became the source of frequent conflict between the two. J.G. moved out of Salt‘s residence in February 2008 and hired another contractor to finish the work on her homе. At that point, Salt ended their relationship. But between February and April 2008, the two continued to see each other and came to a sort of reconciliation. At the end of April, however, J.G. told Salt “this isn‘t going to work out” and attempted to end their relationship permanently.
¶ 3 Salt continued to contact J.G., eventually convincing her to meet him at his home in early June to talk things through and help him move past their breakup. When J.G. arrived at the scheduled meeting, Salt told her he wanted to “set some ground rules.” He asked J.G. to agree not to leave even if “the questioning got tough.” For nearly an hour, Salt asked her questions about their relationship and her decision to end it. When J.G. eventually told Salt she wanted to leave, he responded with misogynistic verbal abuse and then grabbed J.G. and twisted her head. The two ended up on the ground, and Salt grabbed a piece of pottery from a shelf and hit J.G. on the head with it multiple times. J.G. grabbed a phone from the floor and attempted to call 911, but she misdialed,
¶ 4 Salt then grabbed what J.G. thought was a metal pipe and hit her above her eye, drawing blood, before pinning her to the ground. When the two eventually stopped struggling, Salt allowed J.G. to get up. At that point, she saw blood all over the floor and could feel that her head was covered with blood as well. J.G. attempted to leave, but Salt blocked the exit. J.G. said, “[N]o, no, no, just let me out,” and then either she pushed her way past him or hе stepped aside. Feeling faint, J.G. lay down on the cement walkway in front of Salt‘s residence where a passerby stopped to give her aid and called 911. At the hospital, J.G. received sixty-five staples in her scalp to close lacerations that totaled roughly eleven inches in length. She continued to suffer back pain for years and, at the time of trial, still had a “lump on the side of [her] head” that felt as if there was “a little piece of the clay in [it].” Salt was charged with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and damage to a communication device.
¶ 5 The case was tried to a jury. Salt claimed he acted in self-defense. He admitted using derogatory names to describe J.G. but testified that in response to the name-calling she landed the first blow, hitting him in the left eye. He testified he then put her in a headlock to keep her from further attacking him, and they fell to the ground wrestling. According to Salt, J.G. tried “to gouge [his] face” and then bit his finger and would not let go. In response, he repeatedly struck her head against a bookshelf until she released his finger. He testified that he never hit her with pottery or a metal pipe and that any action he took against J.G. was to protect himself from her attempts to gouge his face, her blows with a phone receiver, and her biting. He said that he was “in fear for [his] safety and [his] life” after J.G. hit him in the face and bit him. Salt also testified that a few months before the incident, J.G. had come to his house to collect some of her belongings. Then, as she was leaving, she “drove her car in reverse and hit [his] car.” He then testified, “And I was in the path of that vehicle and I had to move out of the way to avoid being assaulted by the vehicle.”
¶ 6 The defense called a physician friend of Salt‘s who practiced emergency medicine as an expert witness. Based on his review of J.G.‘s medical records, the physician testified that the nature of her injuries did not support a claim that she had suffered direct blows from a metal pipe or a ceramic object. Rather, in his opinion, J.G.‘s injuries were most likely caused by a “glancing blow” rather than a “direct blow” from an object he did not attempt to describe. The defense also cross-examined law enforcement officers who had responded to thе scene. They observed blood all over the apartment, but they neither found a metal pipe nor recovered any pieces of pottery.
¶ 7 The jury convicted Salt of aggravated assault involving domestic violence but acquitted him of two other charges involving domestic violence—aggravated kidnapping and damage to a communication device. Salt moved to arrest judgment and filed an alternative motion to have his conviction reduced to a class A misdemeanor. The trial court denied his motions. After sentencing, Salt moved for a new trial. The court also denied that motion. Salt appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶ 8 First, Salt argues that the aggravated assault jury instruction was incomplete. “[W]e review jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law.” State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ¶ 18, 132 P.3d 703 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law presents a question of law which we review for correctness.” State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, ¶ 11, 62 P.3d 444.
¶ 9 Second, Salt argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to reduce his sentence to a class A misdemeanor. We review a trial court‘s denial of a motion to reduce the degree of a conviction for abuse of discretion. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ¶ 31, 25 P.3d 985.
¶ 11 Fourth, Salt contends that the definition of “cohabitant” as used in the Cohabitant Abuse Act is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Constitutional challenges are matters of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Pullman, 2013 UT App 168, ¶ 6, 306 P.3d 827.
¶ 12 Finally, Salt argues that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request an additional element in the jury instruction related to self-defense. We consider claims оf ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal as questions of law. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162.
ANALYSIS
I. The Aggravated Assault Jury Instruction
¶ 13 At trial, the jury was instructed that to find Salt guilty of aggravated assault, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he used a dangerous weapon or “other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury” in the course of acting “with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.” Salt contends that this instruction was erroneous because it failed to “require the jury to find that he acted with intent, or knowledge, or recklessness with respect to the result of his conduct.” Instead, Salt argues, the instruction required the jury to find only that he used means likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. In other words, Salt argues that the instruction was missing a “vital” mens rea element, i.e., that he must have specifically intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, not simply that he used means likely to do so.
¶ 14 In support of his argument, Salt relies on State v. O‘Bannon, 2012 UT App 71, 274 P.3d 992. We held in O‘Bannon that the State was required to prove that the defendant acted with intent to cause the victim serious physical injury before a jury could convict him of second degree felony child abuse. Id. ¶ 31. We determined that it was not enough “to prove only that [the defendant] intended to be, or knew that he was, engaged in certain conduct without the requisite intent or knowledge that a serious physical injury would likely result.” Id. Salt argues that we should come to the same conclusion in this case because the aggravated assault instruction did not require jurors to determine that he intended to cause serious bodily injury, but to determine only that his actions were “likely to produce death or serious bodily injury” without ever taking his specific intent into account as he claims O‘Bannon requires. We conclude that O‘Bannon does not apply here because our holding in that case was based on a different crime requiring a different mens rea.
¶ 15 O‘Bannon involved a charge of second degree felony child abuse, not third degree felony aggravated assault. Id. ¶¶ 1, 24. Under the child abuse statute, a person is guilty of second degree felony child abuse if that person inflicts “serious physical injury” and does so “intentionally or knowingly.”
¶ 16 In contrast, the crime of third degree felony aggravated assault does not require that a person act with the intent to cause a specific level of harm. Compare
¶ 17 We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined that the third degree felony aggravated assault instruction correctly stated the law and for that reason refused to arrest judgment or grant a new trial.
II. Motion to Reduce Degree of Conviction
¶ 18 Prior to sentencing, Salt moved to have his conviction reduced from third degree felony aggravated assault to class A misdemeanor assault under section
¶ 19 Salt argues on appeal that a reduction of his sentence is required under the Shondel doctrine. The Shondel doctrine establishes that “where two statutes define exactly the same penal offense, a defendant can be sentenced only under the statute requiring the lesser penalty.” State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶ 33, 52 P.3d 1210 (citing State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146, 147-48 (1969)). Salt argues that “[t]here is no meaningful distinction” between the acts required to commit the two crimes because in either case the actual result could be the same—substantial bodily injury, the kind of injury that Salt inflicted here.
¶ 21 Salt also argues that the rule of lenity requires that his conviction be reduced. He contends that the statutory scheme surrounding the varying degrees of assault is ambiguous because “there are no standards assisting a trial court in distinguishing” between the types of bodily injury that determine whether the assault will result in a misdemeanor or felony conviction for the defendant. He argues that “the determination is [thus] left to the arbitrary conclusions of the prosecution” and renders the statutes unconstitutionally vague.
¶ 22 “[L]enity is an ancient rule of statutory construction that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the government ... and in favor of the persons on whom such penalties are sought to be imposed.” State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, ¶ 31, 299 P.3d 625 (omission in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. granted, 308 P.3d 536 (Utah 2013). In other words, lenity serves “as an aid for resolving an ambiguity” in a statute. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 342, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981). We noted in State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, 299 P.3d 625, that “our Legislature appears to have rejected the rule of lenity as a permissible canon of statutory construction.” Id. ¶ 31. But in Rasabout we determined that even if the rule of lenity were applicable, there was no ambiguity in the pertinent statute. Id. ¶ 32. We come to the same conclusion here.
¶ 23 Assault and aggravated assault, the statutory crimes that Salt claims are ambiguous and unconstitutionally vague, employ varying levels of bodily injury to differentiate degrees of criminal assault. For example, class B misdemeanor assault proscribes the infliction or creation of a substantial risk of “bodily injury“—or an attempt or a threat to inflict it. See
¶ 24 Salt provides no analysis or explanation аs to how the statutory definitions of the pertinent degrees of bodily injury are so indistinguishable from one another as to be ambiguous. Ambiguity is defined as “[a]n uncertainty of meaning or intention.” Black‘s Law Dictionary 93 (9th ed.2009). Here, there is no uncertainty as to the meaning or definitions of the terms with which Salt finds fault, as the legislature has specifically defined each term. As a result, the “rule of lenity,” even if available as a canon of statutory construction, is not applicable here.
¶ 25 For the same reason, Salt‘s related claim that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague is unavailing. As long as a statute “is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited” we will not find it unconstitutionally vague. State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ¶ 14, 84 P.3d 1171 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, if the meaning of a statute is “reаdily ascertainable,” it “does not encourage or facilitate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. ¶ 14. Having already found that the ambiguity Salt urges does not exist, we conclude that the statutes at issue here are “sufficiently explicit.” See id. ¶ 14 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed, the statutes provide specific definitions for each of the degrees of bodily injury that accompany the various degrees of assault. We therefore conclude that the meaning of the statutes is “readily ascertainable.” See id. ¶ 14.
¶ 26 Finally, Salt‘s contention that the trial court‘s refusal to reduce his conviction to a class A misdemeanor was “unduly harsh” is unpersuasive. Under section
III. Conflicting Verdicts
¶ 27 Salt contends that hе was entitled to a new trial because “the verdict acquitting him of aggravated kidnapping necessarily conflicted with his conviction of aggravated assault and therefore he should have been acquitted of the aggravated assault as well.”
¶ 28 We considered a similar argument in State v. LoPrinzi, 2014 UT App 256, 338 P.3d 253, petition cert. filed, Dec. 24, 2014 (No. 20141168), where the defendant was convicted of two counts of unlawful sexual activity with a minor and acquitted of a third count. Id. ¶ 29. There, the defendant argued that all three counts “involved the same witnesses, same parties, same allegations, and same evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, she argued that “the jury would have [to] either convict on all Counts, or acquit on all Counts.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded, however, that “[w]e are under no duty” to reconcile seemingly inconsistent acquittals and convictions because the jury is free to determine “that the evidence only supported one conviction.” Id. ¶ 31 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, a “claim of inconsistency alone is not sufficient to overturn [the] conviction; rather, [t]here must be additional error beyond a showing of
¶ 29 Salt argues that such additional error exists here because the aggravating factor the prosecution alleged for the aggravated kidnapping charge was essentially the assault for which he was convicted and thus the jury must have decided he did not commit the assault when it acquitted him of the aggravated kidnapping charge. As we noted in LoPrinzi, “so long as sufficient evidence supports each of the guilty verdicts, state courts generally have upheld the convictions.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether the evidence is sufficient, “we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and will not overturn a jury‘s verdict of criminal conviction unless reasonable minds could not rationally have arrived at the verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the law and on the evidence presented.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the version of the evidence most favorable to the jury‘s vеrdict was that Salt assaulted J.G. and hit her with a metal pipe, a piece of pottery, or both, causing her significant head injuries and lingering residual pain in her back. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have determined that Salt assaulted J.G. with a dangerous weapon or “other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.” See
¶ 30 We therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated assault conviction and that the trial court did not err when it refused to grant a new trial on the basis of inconsistent verdicts.
IV. Constitutionality of the Cohabitant Abuse Act
¶ 31 Salt contends that the term “cohabitant,” as used in the Cohabitant Abuse Act, is both unconstitutionally overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. As a result, he argues the domestic violence designations attached to his charges were inappropriate and that “the jury should not have been instructed with regard to finding such a status.” The Cohabitant Abuse Act provides that a second or subsequent conviction for certain domestic violence offenses is subject to enhanced penalties.
A. Unconstitutional Overbreadth
¶ 32 Salt refers us to Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct.App.1997), where we determined that “[s]tatutory language is overbroad if its language proscribes both harmful and innocuous behavior.” Id. at 1263 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 08, 322 P.3d 728. In Lopez, we determined that a “statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad unless it renders unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.” Id. We noted, however, that “[t]he overbreadth doctrine has not been recognized outside the limits of the First Amendment.” Id. Salt contends that the definition of “cohabitant” rеstricts a person‘s right to freedom of association under the First Amendment by “criminalizing entirely innocent behavior, the mere act of residing with one another.”
¶ 33 “In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court‘s
¶ 34 The Cohabitant Abuse Act does not penalize a person for choosing to reside with another person, as Salt claims, nor does it inhibit any protected form of expression. Instead, the act only prohibits criminal conduct against a cohabitant that “involv[es] violence or physical harm or threat of violence or physical harm.” See
B. Unconstitutional Vagueness
¶ 35 Salt also claims that the definition of “cohabitant” is unconstitutionally vague. He argues that “[n]o evidence exists that he was put on notice or was otherwise aware that he had somehow permanently attained the status of ‘cohabitant’ simply because he once resided with” J.G. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits” or if it “authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ¶ 42, 100 P.3d 231 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The burden of showing that a statute is unconstitutionally vague is a heavy one because “a defendant has the burden of proving that the statute is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” Id. ¶ 44 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, a defendant who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 36 Our “primary objective” when interpreting statutory language “is to give effect to the legislature‘s intent” as expressed in the text of the statute. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 195, 299 P.3d 892 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, we will consider the plain language and also the purpose of the statute. Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, ¶ 9, 234 P.3d 1147. Our decision in Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App 37, 107 P.3d 693, is instructive here. In Keene, we considered the “resides or has
¶ 37 Salt‘s conduct in the context of his relationship with J.G. falls well within the scope of the statute‘s definition and purpose. See Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ¶ 44, 100 P.3d 231. Here, Salt and J.G. lived together in an intimate relationship in Salt‘s permanent home for nearly two years. And it was only about two months after J.G. moved out that Salt violently assaulted her during a discussion directly related to their prior romantic relationship. Salt‘s behavior is exactly the type contemplated by statutes like the act which are aimed at protecting those in “a variety of significant relationships” from the increased vulnerability to abuse that those relationships may create, even after they end. See Keene, 2005 UT App 37, ¶ 15, 107 P.3d 693 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because we conclude that the kind of relationship Salt had with J.G. fell well within the central focus of the act‘s definition of “cohabitant,” and because that definition “provide[s] people of ordinary intelligence” fair notice, Salt‘s unconstitutional vagueness claim fails. See Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ¶ 42, 100 P.3d 231 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 38 Salt‘s final claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the court include an additional factor for the jury‘s consideration in one of the self-defense jury instructions. Under Utah law, “[a] person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that force ... is necessary to defend the person ... against another person‘s imminent use of unlawful force.”
the trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors: (a) the nature of the danger; (b) the immediacy of the danger; (c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily injury; (d) the other‘s prior violent acts or violent propensities; [and] (e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties’ relationship.
¶ 39 To estаblish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate (1) “that counsel‘s performance was deficient” and (2) “that the deficient performance prej-
¶ 40 We conclude that Salt has not shown that counsel‘s failure to object to the jury instruction prejudiced his case. Even if the “prior violent acts or prior violent propensities” factor had been included, Salt has failed to show a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different. Salt argues he was prejudiced because the missing factor deprived him of the opportunity to argue his theory of self-defense and the jury of the ability to consider it. Put another way, Salt contends counsel was prevented from arguing that Salt reacted to J.G. both reasonably and in self-defense in light of the parties’ history and that had counsel been able to do so, Salt would not have been convicted. We disagree.
¶ 41 First, Jury Instruction No. 20 clearly stated that the jury was “not limited” only to the factors listed in the instruction. The jury was therefore free to consider Salt‘s testimony that his actions were a justified response to J.G. hitting him in the eye because J.G. had previously tried to hit him with a car. And just as the missing factor did not prevent the jury from considering any evidence presented to it related to self-defense, neither did it prevent counsel from arguing a theory of self-defense to the jury during closing arguments. Indeed, while counsel did not specifically mention the alleged prior incident of attempted vehicular assault, he did focus several of his closing remarks on the allegation that J.G. struck Salt first. And counsel also characterized J.G. as a person who initiates violence, refuting Salt‘s claim that the missing factor precluded him from making an argument about J.G.‘s alleged propensity. Counsel argued to the jury, “She started this by hitting him the eye, she was the aggressor,” and, “[H]e‘s got the bruise on his eye to prove [it].” Counsel also told the jury, “If someone comes up to you and punches you in the eye, ... in Utah, you don‘t have to run away, you can stand your ground and defend yourself and especially when you‘re in your own home.” And counsel further told the jury that Salt was reasonable in his response because “he‘s entitled to defend himself however he needs to make sure that [the attack] doesn‘t get worse.”
¶ 42 It is worth noting that Salt does not argue trial counsel was somehow deficient in his arguments because he did not call the jury‘s attention to the incident involving J.G.‘s car during closing arguments. Salt only argues that he was prejudiced by the missing factor in the jury instruction because its absence prevented counsel from arguing it and the jury from considering it. So the question of whether counsel was ineffective for failing to include the incident in his jury arguments related to Salt‘s theory of self-defense is not before us. Instead, we need only determine whether, as Salt contends, counsel was actually prohibited from making such an argument had hе chosen to. We are not persuaded that the missing jury instruction prevented counsel from presenting for the jury‘s consideration any legitimate arguments related to Salt‘s theory of self-defense or that it influenced the trial‘s outcome in the way that Salt claims. Accordingly, Salt‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
CONCLUSION
¶ 43 We conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied Salt‘s motions to
STEPHEN L. ROTH
JUDGE