STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. TYLER D. RITCHEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 1-15-80
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY
May 9, 2016
[Cite as State v. Ritchey, 2016-Ohio-2878.]
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR20150244
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: May 9, 2016
APPEARANCES:
Kenneth J. Rexford for Appellant
Terri L. Kohlrieser for Appellee
{1} Defendant-Appellant, Tyler Ritchey, appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County convicting him of one count of sexual battery and sentencing him to 30 months in prison. On appeal, Ritchey argues that the trial court erred by declaring Ohio‘s sex offender registration statute constitutional as applied to the crime of sexual battery, specifically
{2} On June 16, 2015, a criminal complaint was filed in the Lima Municipal Court charging Ritchey with one count of rape in violation of
{3} Plea negotiations ensued, and on October 28, 2015, Ritchey agreed to plead guilty to one count of sexual battery in violation of
{4} Prior to sentencing, Ritchey filed a motion to declare Ohio‘s sex offender registration statutes unconstitutional. Specifically, Ritchey argued that the registration requirements, as applied to those convicted under
{5} A sentencing hearing was held on December 14, 2015. Both sides were given an opportunity to present an argument regarding Ritchey‘s pending motion. After both parties presented their arguments, the trial court found that Ohio‘s sex offender registration statutes did not violate either the separation of powers doctrine or due process and found that the statutes were constitutional. Thus, Ritchey‘s motion was denied.
{6} The court sentenced Ritchey to 30 months in prison and classified Ritchey as a Tier III sex offender.
{7} An entry memorializing the court‘s denial of Ritchey‘s motion, as well as an entry memorializing Ritchey‘s sentence, was filed on December 14, 2015.
{8} Ritchey filed this timely appeal, presenting the following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPECIFIC OFFENSE OF
{9} In his sole assignment of error, Ritchey argues that the trial court erred by finding Ohio‘s sex offender registration statutes to be constitutional. Specifically, Ritchey argues that Ohio‘s sex offender registration statues violate the separation of powers doctrine and due process as applied to people convicted of violating
{10} It is well established that “[a] properly enacted statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality.” Thompson v. Bagley, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-04-12, 2005-Ohio-1921, ¶ 14, citing Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 352 (1994). “Therefore, it is incumbent upon the party challenging the statute to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates a constitutional provision.” Id. Moreover, “[W]here there is more than one possible interpretation of a statute, a court will construe the statute so as to save it from constitutional infirmities.” State v. Haskell, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-03-45, 2004-Ohio-3345, ¶ 21.
{11} In 1996, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 180, which came to be known as “Megan‘s Law.” Megan‘s Law created three different categories of sex offenders: sexually oriented offenders, habitual sex offenders, and sexual predators. If a person was convicted of a sexually oriented offense, then he was subject to annual reporting requirements for a ten year period. If the sentencing court found that the offender had a previous conviction for a sexually oriented offense, then Megan‘s Law required the court to find that the offender was a habitual sex offender, which carried twenty years of reporting requirements. Finally, if an offender was labeled a sexual predator, then he must report every 90 days for the rest of his life, unless the court removed the sexual predator classification.
{12} Under Megan‘s Law, sex offenders had to register with the sheriff in the county where they resided or were domiciled for more than seven days, provide a current residential address, provide the name and address of an employer, a current photograph, and any other information required by the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. Finally, all sex offenders had to provide the license plate number of any motor vehicle that was owned by the offender and registered in his name.
{14} The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed and reversed the Second District‘s decision. Id. at 588. In doing so, the court found that the factors provided by Megan‘s Law were mere guidelines and that the trial court retained discretion to classify the offender as a sexual predator. Id. at 587-588. Because the General Assembly‘s enactment of Megan‘s Law [did] not “encroach upon the trial court in its fact-finding authority, it did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.” Id. at 588.
{15} In 2003, Megan‘s Law was amended by the enactment of S.B. 5. Megan‘s Law now required a sex offender to register with the sheriff of the county
{16} In response to Congress‘s enactment of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (“Adam Walsh Act“),
{17} In accordance with the Adam Walsh Act and SORNA, Ohio‘s prior sex offender classification system was replaced by a three-tiered scheme, which came to be referred to as Ohio‘s Adam Walsh Act (“the Act“). Further, offenders were classified strictly based on the offense of conviction. The lowest level of offenders was classified as Tier I, which required Tier I offenders to register annually for a 15 year period.
{18} Like its predecessor, the Act has faced many challenges. Two of those challenges were in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, and State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374.
{19} In Bodyke, three sex offenders challenged the constitutionality of the Act as violating the separation of powers doctrine. 2010-Ohio-2424 at ¶ 29-31. Under the Act at the time, the attorney general‘s office was charged with reclassifying sex offenders originally classified under Megan‘s Law, with no involvement by the court system. Id. at ¶ 22. “As a result, the trial court [was] stripped of any power to engage in independent fact-finding * * * ” Id.
{20} The Supreme Court of Ohio found that this power granted to the executive branch violated the separation of powers doctrine in two ways. First, “the reclassification scheme vest[ed] the executive branch with authority to review judicial decisions, and it interfere[d] with the judicial power by requiring the reopening of final judgments.” Id. at ¶ 55. Once the cases were reopened, the court found that the Act vested sole authority in the attorney general to reclassify offenders that were previously classified under Megan‘s Law. Id. at ¶ 59. Second,
{21} In Williams, the appellant, Williams, was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in November 2007. 2011-Ohio-3374 at ¶ 1. At sentencing, Williams moved to be sentenced under Megan‘s Law because his crime was committed prior to the enactment of the Act. Id. at ¶ 2. The trial court denied Williams‘s motion and classified him according to the Act, which required that Williams be classified a Tier II sex offender. Id. at ¶ 3. On appeal, Williams argued that the Act cannot be applied to anyone whose offense was committed prior to July 1, 2007 as being an unconstitutional retroactive law. Id. at ¶ 4. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed.
{22} Williams appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which reversed the appellate court‘s decision. In doing so, the court noted that prior to the enactment of the Act, Megan‘s Law and Ohio‘s prior sex offender registration requirements were always considered remedial or civil in nature and not punitive. Id. at ¶ 10, citing State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, ¶ 29. Over the years, however, several amendments occurred, including S.B. 5 and the Act, which had severely changed the nature of Ohio‘s sex offender registration requirements. For
{23} The Williams court‘s decision that the Act was punitive was recently reinforced in the court‘s decision in State v. Blankenship, -- Ohio St.3d --, 2015-Ohio-4624, ¶ 9, 38, in which the court found that Ohio‘s sex offender registration requirements did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Separation of Powers
{24} Although not explicitly stated in Ohio‘s Constitution, “The separation-of-powers doctrine implicitly arises from our tripartite democratic form of government and recognizes that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government have their own unique powers and duties that are separate and apart from the others.” Thompson, 92 Ohio St.3d at 586, citing City of Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., 63 Ohio St. 442 (1900), paragraph one of the syllabus. The doctrine creates a system of checks and balances so that no single branch overpowers the others and that all three can work together collectively. Id.
{25} Under Ohio‘s Constitution, the legislative power resides with the General Assembly.
{26} In this case, we are asked to determine if the Act is unconstitutional, as applied to those convicted of sexual battery in violation of
{27} Our finding is guided by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s decisions in Thompson, Bodyke, and Williams. Before the court‘s decision in Williams, Ohio‘s sex offender registration requirements were considered remedial in nature. Thus, Megan‘s Law did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because it did not remove the fact-finding authority from the judiciary. Thompson, 92 Ohio St.3d at 588. However, as noted by the court in Bodyke, the trial court‘s discretionary
{28} However, the Act was declared punitive in Williams, and it is widely established that the General Assembly is vested with the power to define offenses and assign punishments. Williams, 2011-Ohio-3374 at ¶ 22; Bodyke at ¶ 48. Requiring that offenders convicted of sexual battery in violation of
{29} Accordingly, the Act, as applied to those convicted of sexual battery in violation of
{30} “When reviewing a statute on due-process grounds, [an appellate court applies] a rational-basis test unless the statute restricts the exercise of fundamental rights.” Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, ¶ 49, citing Morris v. Savoy, 61 Ohio St.3d 684, 688-689 (1991). In this case, the Act does not infringe upon a recognized fundamental right, therefore rational basis review is appropriate. “Under rational-basis review, a statute survives if it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.” State ex rel. O‘Brien v. Heimlich, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-521, 2009-Ohio-1550, ¶ 25, citing Am. Assoc. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 58 (1999).
{31} The Act‘s language lays out the General Assembly‘s purpose in enacting the law. Specifically,
The general assembly further declares that it is the policy of this state to require the exchange in accordance with this chapter of relevant information about sex offenders and child-victim offenders among public agencies and officials and to authorize the release in accordance with this chapter of necessary and relevant information about sex offenders and child-victim offenders to members of the general public as a means of assuring public protection * * *
{32} Having sex offenders register with their local sheriff‘s office and having their information being of public record is related to the overall goal of protecting the public by keeping the public informed of the whereabouts of convicted sex offenders. “While some may question whether the registration requirements are the best way to further public safety, questions concerning the wisdom of legislation are for the legislature.” Blankenship, 2015-Ohio-4624 at ¶ 37. “‘[W]hether the court agrees with it in that particular or not is of no consequence. * * * If the legislature has the constitutional power to enact a law, no matter whether the law be wise or otherwise it is of no concern of the court.‘” Butler v. Jordan, 92 Ohio St.3d 354, 376 (2001), quoting State Bd. of Health v. City of Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 20 (1912). The General Assembly, as being vested with the sole power to make laws, is “‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy.‘” Arbino at ¶ 21, citing State ex rel. E. Cleveland Fire Fighters’ Assn., Local 500, Internatl. Assn. of Fire Fighters v. Jenkins, 96 Ohio St.3d 68, 2002-Ohio-3527, ¶ 12.
{33} Accordingly, the Act, as applied to offenders convicted of sexual battery in violation of
{34} Therefore, we overrule Ritchey‘s sole assignment of error.
{35} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
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