State v. Rarden
Lonnie Rarden, pro se.
O P I N I O N
BYRNE, P.J.
{¶ 1} Lonnie Rarden appeals from the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, which denied his pro se motion for resentencing. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court‘s decision.
{¶ 2} In 2006, Rarden was indicted and charged with several felonies and misdemeanors, including one count of felony escape, two counts of felony complicity to perjury, and one count of felony complicity to tampering with evidence. A jury found Rarden guilty of all charges and the trial court sentenced him to 26 and one-half years in prison. This court affirmed Rarden‘s conviction and sentence on direct appeal and the Ohio Supreme Court declined review. State v. Rarden, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-03-077 (Apr. 21, 2008) (Accelerated Calendar Judgment Entry); 05/05/2010 Case Announcements, 2010-Ohio-1893.
{¶ 3} In the intervening years, Rarden has filed numerous postconviction motions with the trial court seeking various relief. We summarized those efforts in a 2018 opinion. State v. Rarden, 2018-Ohio-4487, ¶ 2-7 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 4} With relevance to this appeal, in March 2010, Rarden moved the court to resentence him pursuant to
{¶ 5} In his motion, Rarden argued that, at sentencing in 2006, the trial court informed him it would impose postrelease control, but it failed to inform him of the consequences for violating postrelease control.
{¶ 6} On April 14, 2010, finding merit to Rarden‘s argument, the trial court held a resentencing hearing limited to providing Rarden with the proper advisement and imposition of postrelease control. On April 26, 2010, the court issued “re-sentencing judgment of conviction” entries.
{¶ 7} Rarden appealed from those entries, arguing that the trial court erred by confining the “re-sentencing” hearing solely to correcting the prior incorrect imposition of postrelease control. This court overruled Rarden‘s assignment of error and affirmed the trial court‘s decision and the Ohio Supreme Court declined review. State v. Rarden, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2010-04-095, CA2010-05-106, and CA2010-05-126 (Feb. 7, 2011) (Accelerated Calendar Judgment Entry); 12/21/2011 Case Announcements, 2011-Ohio-6556. Accord Rarden, 2018-Ohio-4487, ¶ 4. In our accelerated calendar judgment entry, we noted Ohio Supreme Court precedent at the time, which held that when a court improperly imposes postrelease control, only that portion of the sentence is void and therefore only that portion is subject to vacation or amendment. Id. at ¶ 2. Thus, we held, the trial court did not err in limiting the hearing to the proper imposition of postrelease control. Id.
{¶ 8} Thirteen years later, in December 2024, Rarden filed the motion to resentence at issue in this appeal. Rarden asked the trial court to resentence him de novo, arguing that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when it resentenced him in 2010. He based this argument on his interpretation of two Ohio Supreme Court cases: State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, and State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784. Those cases address whether sentencing errors render a sentence void or voidable. The gist of Rarden‘s argument was that the error in imposing postrelease control in his original sentence made that sentence voidable, not void, and any error in imposing postrelease control could only be raised and addressed through a direct appeal. Since Rarden had not raised this issue in his direct appeal, he argued, his sentence was final once that appeal was resolved and therefore the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hold the resentencing hearing that he requested in March 2010 and that the trial court held in
{¶ 9} After Rarden‘s December 2024 motion for resentencing was fully briefed, the common pleas court issued a decision denying Rarden‘s motion. The common pleas court found that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the corrected sentence in 2010 pursuant to the same statutory authority that Rarden cited in his March 2010 motion, i.e.,
{¶ 10} Rarden appealed, pro se, raising two assignments of error.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Jurisdiction to Modify Sentence
{¶ 11} Rarden‘s first assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO MODIFY DEFENDANT‘S SENTENCES TWO YEARS AFTER HIS DIRECT APPEAL BECAME FINAL.
{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, Rarden argues that the trial court erred in denying his December 2024 motion for resentencing and argues that two Ohio Supreme Court cases—Harper and Henderson—compel the conclusion that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in April 2010 when it corrected the postrelease control portion of his sentence.
{¶ 13} In Harper, the Ohio Supreme Court realigned it precedent in cases involving the erroneous imposition of postrelease control with the traditional understanding of what
{¶ 14} In Henderson, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Harper was not limited to cases involving the imposition of postrelease control. 2020-Ohio-4784 at ¶ 27. The court held that any error in sentencing by a court that has jurisdiction over the case and the person is voidable, not void, and that neither the state nor the defendant can challenge a voidable sentence through a postconviction motion. Id. at ¶ 43.
{¶ 15} Neither Harper nor Henderson addressed a scenario where a court corrects the erroneous imposition of postrelease control pursuant to
{¶ 16} In March 2010, Rarden moved the court for resentencing under
{¶ 17} Upon review, we conclude that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to hold the April 2010 resentencing hearing and issue corrected judgment entries, nunc pro tunc, by virtue of the statutory authority granted in
{¶ 18} In a lengthy analysis, the First District Court of Appeals concluded that
{¶ 19} In Bates, the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged
{¶ 20} Furthermore, the First District stated:
This court cannot simply ignore the statute or declare it inoperative. The General Assembly‘s role is to enact legislation. See In re Estate of Centorbi, 129 Ohio St.3d 78, 2011-Ohio-2267, 950 N.E.2d 505, ¶ 11. The judiciary does not share the responsibility of establishing legislative policies or second-guessing those policies. Courts are charged with determining the constitutionality of statutes enacted by the legislature. Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., LLC, 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 35; State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). “The judgment of the judiciary is not to be substituted for that of the legislature when an issue is fairly debatable so that reasonable minds can differ.” Cent. Motors Corp. v. Pepper Pike, 73 Ohio St.3d 581, 586-587, 653 N.E.2d 639 (1995), quoting Gerijo v. Fairfield, 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 229, 638 N.E.2d 533 (1994).
The legislature enacted
R.C. 2929.191 in response to the Ohio Supreme Court‘s cases holding that the failure of the trial court to properly impose postrelease control rendered that part of the sentence void. That line of cases has now been overruled, but the statute is still in place. The legislature has not amended or repealed it, and the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed its continued viability, noting instead only that the procedure was not properly followed in Bates. We conclude thatR.C. 2929.191 remains viable, allowing the court to address the issue of postrelease control postsentence.We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the legislature.
{¶ 22} Rarden argues, however, that the common pleas court did not hold a hearing under
{¶ 23} In support of the proposition that the trial court denied his
{¶ 24} Regardless, in a filing made subsequent to the court‘s June 9, 2010 entry, Rarden admitted that the court granted his March 2010 motion brought under
On March 26, 2010, Defendant filed a pro se motion requesting that this Court re-sentence him pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section §2929.191. This Court granted that motion and conducted a re-sentencing hearing on April 14, 2010.
(Emphasis added.). Rarden asked the court to correct its June 9, 2010 mistake so that the record “speaks the truth.” Accordingly, Rarden‘s own filing contradicts his current argument that the trial court did not “resentence” him under
{¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction to hold the April 2010
B. Language Regarding Fines
{¶ 26} Rarden‘s second assignment of error states:
FAILURE TO INCORPORATE MANDATORY LANGUAGE INTO ITS ORIGINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY REGARDING FINES, RENDERS JUDGMENT ENTRY NOT A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER PURSUANT TO §2505.02.
{¶ 27} In Rarden‘s second assignment of error he presents an argument in anticipation of an argument he assumes that the state would present if we agreed with his argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him under
{¶ 28} As to the finality argument, Rarden contends that the trial court‘s alleged failure to impose a fine upon him in his sentencing entries, where a fine was an option, resulted in the entries not being final appealable orders. Ultimately, Rarden is asking this court to order the trial court to conduct a de novo sentencing hearing.
{¶ 29} However, based on our disposition of Rarden‘s first assignment of error,
{¶ 30} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL and SIEBERT, JJ., concur.
J U D G M E N T E N T R Y
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon or disregarded as moot, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge
/s/ M. Powell, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge