STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RAEON A.*
(SC 21028)
Mullins, C. J., and D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.
Argued April 8—officially released June 23, 2026
* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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Convicted of risk of injury to a child and sexual assault in the first degree in connection with the sexual abuse of the minor victim, R, the defendant appealed to this court. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had violated his federal constitutional rights to due process and to a fair trial by instructing the jury, in accordance with this court’s directive in State v. Daniel W. E. (322 Conn. 593), that it was not to consider R’s delayed reporting of the alleged incidents of sexual abuse in evaluating R’s credibility. Held:
This court declined to review the defendant’s unpreserved claim of instructional error under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as the defendant failed to demonstrate that his claim was of constitutional magnitude and, therefore, failed to satisfy the second prong of Golding.
The defendant’s contention that the challenged instruction in the present case violated his federal constitutional rights to due process and to a fair trial insofar as it usurped the jury’s role as the sole trier of fact and diluted the state’s burden of proof was inconsistent with this court’s holding in State v. Adam P. (351 Conn. 213), in which this court concluded that a similar claim by the defendant in that case was not of constitutional magnitude.
Moreover, this court declined the defendant’s invitation to reconsider its conclusion in Adam P., as this court had only recently decided Adam P., the defendant did not present any sound reason for this court to reconsider its analysis therein, and Adam P. was consistent with a long line of appellate cases holding that alleged errors in constancy of accusation instructions are not of constitutional magnitude.
Furthermore, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had committed plain error when it instructed the jury not to consider R’s delay in reporting the alleged sexual abuse, as the court’s instruction was consistent with Daniel W. E., which was the governing law at the time
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with two counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child and one count of the crime of sexual assault in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford and tried to the jury before Hall, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of one count each of risk of injury to a child and sexual assault in the first degree, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Naomi T. Fetterman, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Kevin M. Black, Jr., assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Rebecca R. Zeuschner, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Margaret E. Kelley, state’s attorney, and Amy Bepko, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
MULLINS, C. J. The defendant, Raeon A., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of
We conclude that the defendant’s claim of instructional error is unavailing. His claim is not reviewable under Golding because, as we have held previously, the challenged constancy of accusation instruction does not implicate a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., State v. Adam P., 351 Conn. 213, 224, 231–33, 330 A.3d 73 (2025). Moreover, we decline to invoke the plain error doctrine because the instruction provided was consistent with our decision in State v. Daniel W. E.,
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. When R was about five or six years old, she stopped living in a shelter with her mother and began to live with the defendant, who is her biological father. The defendant and R lived together for the next several years, until R was nearly ten years old, and, during most of that time, they resided in a house in Derby that belonged to the defendant’s parents. This house had two floors and a basement suite. The defendant’s parents, brother, and sister lived on the first and second floors, while the defendant and R occupied the basement.
While they lived together, the defendant sexually assaulted R “[a]lmost every day.” When the defendant helped R shower, he would touch her genitals with a washcloth and his fingers. In other parts of the basement, the defendant subjected R to various other forms of sexual contact. On one occasion, after R fell asleep in the defendant’s bed while watching television, R awoke to the defendant touching her vagina, breasts, and buttocks, and he then attempted to engage in vaginal-penile intercourse.
On May 15, 2016, when she was nine years old, R disclosed the defendant’s sexual abuse to her friend, Tiara, who then relayed the allegations to her mother, Priya Young. The next morning, on May 16, 2016, Young conveyed the disclosed sexual abuse to Jennifer Olson, the principal of Irving School, an elementary school in Derby where R was a student. In compliance with her responsibilities as a mandated reporter, Olson reported the allegations of sexual abuse to the Department of
Trial began on February 14, 2024, nearly eight years after R’s initial disclosure to Tiara. During her testimony at trial, R recounted the defendant’s sexual abuse, including incidents of sexual abuse involving sex toys that she had not previously disclosed. The prosecutor also presented the expert testimony of Monica Vedro Madigan, a licensed clinical social worker and forensic interviewer, who explained the general characteristics regarding the disclosure of sexual abuse by children. Specifically, Madigan explained that “most children delay in disclosing sexual abuse,” sometimes for months or even years after its occurrence, and she described disclosure as “a process” in which a sexually abused child “may not give all of the details at once” or in chronological order.
The defendant’s principal theory of defense at trial was that the alleged instances of abuse did not occur. In support of that defense, the defendant primarily sought to challenge the adequacy of the investigations into R’s allegations, to highlight the lack of corroborative physical evidence, and to demonstrate his insufficient opportunity to assault R. During his closing argument, defense counsel argued to the jury that R’s testimony regarding the incidents of sexual abuse involving sex toys was a recent fabrication because she had never disclosed those incidents before.
In its charge to the jury, the trial court provided a constancy of accusation instruction consistent with our decision in Daniel W. E. (Daniel W. E. instruction). See State v. Daniel W. E., supra, 322 Conn. 629. Specifically, the trial court provided the jury with the following instruction: “There was evidence in this case that [R] delayed in making an official report of the alleged sexual assault. There are many reasons why sexual assault
Following trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child by having contact with the intimate parts of R in a sexual and indecent manner. The jury found the defendant not guilty of another count of risk of injury to a child, in which the state alleged that he had subjected R to contact with his intimate parts. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years of imprisonment, fifteen years of which constituted a mandatory minimum, followed by ten years of special parole, and ordered that he comply with the lifetime sex offender registration requirements. This direct appeal followed. See
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly provided the jury with a Daniel W. E. instruction. Not having preserved this claim at trial, the defendant seeks review pursuant to Golding.3 In response, the state argues that the defendant is not entitled to Golding review because his claim is not of constitutional magnitude.4 We agree with the state and, therefore, conclude that the defendant’s claim is unreviewable under the second prong of Golding.
The defendant argues that his challenge to the Daniel W. E. instruction is of constitutional magnitude because the trial court, in instructing the jury not to consider any delay by R in reporting the defendant’s sexual abuse when evaluating her credibility, precluded the jury from drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence before it. Doing so, the defendant contends, violated his rights to due process and a fair trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution by usurping the jury’s role as the sole trier of fact and credibility, and by reducing the state’s burden of proof.
We are not persuaded by the defendant’s attempt to frame his instructional claim as one of constitutional magnitude. In Adam P., we addressed a virtually identical argument to that of the defendant in the present case and concluded that the Daniel W. E. instruction does not implicate the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. See State v. Adam P., supra, 351 Conn.
Even though we ultimately determined that the Daniel W. E. instruction was so confusing as to warrant its abandonment, we rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court had violated his right to due process by giving the charge. See id., 215, 220, 224–25, 229, 231–33. In doing so, we relied on our previous recognition “that general credibility instructions regarding constancy of accusation testimony are nonconstitutional in nature . . . .” Id., 231. We further explained that this court had “previously . . . considered an instructional impropriety to be of constitutional dimension only when it has gone to the elements of the charged offense, the burden of proof or the presumption of innocence . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Accordingly, because “neither delay nor credibility is an element of the charged offenses,” “shift[s] the state’s burden of proof to the defendant,” or “implicate[s] the defendant’s presumption of innocence,” we concluded that the alleged error in the Daniel W. E. instruction was not of constitutional dimension. Id., 232–33.
The defendant requests that we reconsider our conclusion in Adam P. concerning the nonconstitutional nature of the Daniel W. E. instruction. We decided Adam P. a little more than one year ago, and the defendant has not presented any sound reason for reconsideration of our reasoning therein. Moreover, Adam P. is consistent with the long line of appellate cases holding that alleged errors in constancy of accusation instructions are not
The defendant also claims that the trial court committed plain error when it provided the Daniel W. E. instruction.6 The present case, however, does not merit reversal under the plain error doctrine. As we explained previously, the instruction the trial court gave in this case is consistent with Daniel W. E., which was the governing law at the time of the defendant’s trial. “It is axiomatic that the trial court’s proper application of the law existing at the time of trial cannot constitute reversible error under the plain error doctrine.” State v. Diaz, 302 Conn. 93, 104 n.8, 25 A.3d 594 (2011); see, e.g., State v. Adam P., supra, 351 Conn. 235 n.4 (there was noplain error when trial court “laudably undertook its best efforts to faithfully implement the direction that this court provided in Daniel W. E.,” which was law existing at time of trial). Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s claim of plain error.7
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.