State v. PowellState v. Powell
On February 28, 2019, police officers responded to a shooting where they discovered 15-year-old Paris Powell (hereinafter “Appellee“) standing beside the decedent, Larry “Tre” Bryant. Appellee was interviewed by Detective John Gleason on March 1, March 4, and March 25, 2019, in connection with Bryant‘s death. Powell‘s mother, Tiffany (hereinafter “Ms. Powell“), was present at all relevant times. After a hearing, the trial court found that Appellee was not in custody for any of the interviews and determined that Appellee‘s March 1 and March 4 statements were freely and voluntarily given. However, the trial court partially suppressed Appellee‘s March 25 statement, finding that, under a totality of the circumstances, she did not knowingly and voluntarily make a statement as a matter of constitutional due process. The
1. Procedural History
The record shows that, during the investigation of Bryant‘s death, Appellee was interviewed by detectives on three separate occasions — March 1, March 4, and March 25, 2019. Eventually, Appellee was indicted for two counts of felony murder, one count of armed robbery, and one count of robbery in connection with Bryant‘s murder. Appellee filed a pretrial “Motion to Suppress Custodial Statement,” seeking to suppress all three of her March 2019 interviews and her subsequent written statements. Appellee alleged that all of her statements were induced by an improper hope of benefit in violation of
2. Evidence Presented at the Jackson-Denno Hearing
At the pretrial hearing, the State called Detective Gleason as a witness and introduced into evidence the video recordings of Appellee‘s three interviews and her three written statements. Detective Gleason testified that Appellee was not in custody for any of her interviews and was free to leave, that she was not read her Miranda rights at any time, and that she was never informed that
(a) First Interview — March 1, 2019
Detective Gleason testified that, on March 1, 2019, Appellee arrived at the Henry County Police Department with her mother to speak with him about Bryant‘s death. At that time, detectives believed that Appellee was simply an eyewitness to the shooting. The video recording of the interview is 1 hour and 48 minutes long. The first 25 minutes of the video recording show Appellee sitting alone in the interview room crying. Detective Gleason and Ms. Powell can be heard speaking just outside of the room. At the motion hearing, Detective Gleason confirmed that, during this conversation, “[Ms.] Powell told [him] that she didn‘t want to have [Appellee] talk to anybody without a lawyer.” Detective Gleason explained to Ms. Powell that Appellee was “[my] only witness. The only person that saw this murder, I wish you‘d let me talk to her. I don‘t have any way to get a lawyer up here and it‘s not like we have one sitting in the lobby. She is my witness.” After this exchange, Ms. Powell agreed to let the detective speak with her daughter.
COUNSEL: Mr. Gleason, during these interviews you always spoke to [Ms.] Powell first; is that right?
DET. GLEASON: Yes, ma‘am. I believe so.
COUNSEL: Okay. Did you ever ask [Appellee] if she wanted to talk to you?
DET. GLEASON: No, because I spoke to [Ms. Powell].
COUNSEL: You always spoke to [Ms. Powell]; is that correct?
DET. GLEASON: That‘s correct.
The video shows that, shortly after Detective Gleason and Ms. Powell enter the interview room, the detective tells Appellee, “You‘re not in trouble. You‘re a witness. You‘re the most important witness I‘ve got right now.” At the suppression hearing, Detective Gleason testified that he did not explain to either Appellee or her mother that Appellee “could get in trouble” or that “they could have a lawyer” present during the interview.
For the next 71 minutes of the recorded interview, both Detective Gleason and Ms. Powell questioned Appellee regarding
(b) Second Interview — March 4, 2019
On March 4, 2019, Appellee and her mother returned to the police station for a second interview with Detective Gleason after Ms. Powell reported to the detective that Appellee had additional information about the shooting. This interview lasted approximately 1 hour and 35 minutes. At the outset, Detective Gleason stated:
I felt like at the time [we last spoke] there might be more that you had to tell me, and I‘m not upset with you. I need you to understand that, okay? This is basically just to get to the whole story, okay? So what new information do you have to tell us?
Listen, this is not the first time that people hold back information, ya know? Um, I‘m a little bit disappointed just to be finding out now, but it‘s better now than not at all, ya know? So I‘m not mad at you, I knew you had a little bit more to tell me.
Detective Gleason then confronted Appellee with information he had obtained suggesting that Appellee had “set up” Bryant for the robbery. Both Appellee and her mother adamantly denied this allegation. The video shows that, during the remainder of the interview, Appellee provided additional details about events leading up to Bryant‘s death, while downplaying her own role in the shooting. She also provided a written statement detailing this new information. After the interview, Appellee went home with her
(c) Third Interview — March 25, 2019
On March 25, at the request of Detective Gleason, Appellee and her mother returned to the police station for a third interview. Detective Gleason testified that he asked Appellee and her mother to come back because he had discovered that Appellee “had prior knowledge of what was going on and that she had left out more details.” Detective Gleason confirmed at the suppression hearing that he “knew that during this third interview [he was] going to ask [Appellee] questions that could possibly incriminate her in a crime.” But he testified that he did not advise Appellee of her Miranda rights because she was not in custody and because he did not consider the interview to be an interrogation.
The video recording shows that, at the beginning of the third interview, the following exchange occurred:
MS. POWELL: Look, can I say this before we get started with the questions?
DET. GLEASON: Um, hmm.
MS. POWELL: At the point where we might need a lawyer, you‘re going to do the right thing and say we
might need a lawyer? You‘re not just going to have me come down here and bring her and deliver her up to you if and when something happens? DET. GLEASON: When I told you we hadn‘t taken any warrants, I was serious.
MS. POWELL: I know that, that‘s why I believe you and that‘s why I have been very — but I don‘t want y‘all kicking my door in at 3:00 in the morning or come for her and if anything happens — just verbalize with me so I . . .
DET. GLEASON: I will. I‘ll let you know. I‘ll let you know.
MS. POWELL: I‘m scared to death about what‘s about to happen.
Thereafter, Detective Gleason confronted Appellee regarding her prior dishonesty. Approximately six minutes into the interview, Detective Gleason told Appellee, “I understand why you lied,” to which Ms. Powell responded, “I don‘t.” Detective Gleason explained that he knew Bryant was buying drugs from the men in the car, not selling them. Appellee denied this, and Ms. Powell said, “[T]his just gets worse and worse,” before turning away from her daughter. While Detective Gleason continued to talk, Appellee looked over to her emotional mother a couple times, but Ms. Powell remained turned away.
At approximately seven minutes into the video, the detective
DET. GLEASON: [Ms. Powell] you asked me earlier why she wasn‘t going to tell me — why she kept lying about this?
MS. POWELL: Yeah, I see it. I see now.
DET. GLEASON: Right, but here‘s the other — there‘s two reasons. One reason she lied is, if she admits that they were there buying marijuana, she‘s worried about her probation. But being part of setting up a robbery, where [Bryant] ends up dead, it‘s a whole different situation because now [Bryant‘s] blood is on [Appellee‘s] hands.
MS. POWELL: Oh my god. Do we need a lawyer? Do I need a lawyer?
DET. GLEASON: That‘s entirely up to you [Ms. Powell]2 — but it‘s so important that we get consistent truth here because, no matter what you think of [Bryant‘s mom] right now, and no matter what you think of [Bryant‘s] lifestyle, the young man is dead. And he didn‘t have to be. It‘s not your fault that he‘s dead, let‘s get that straight, it‘s not your fault. But had [Appellee] said “no” [to setting
up the robbery], it might have changed everything. You understand?
The detective testified that, by saying it was “entirely up to you” in response to Ms. Powell‘s question about whether they needed a lawyer, he meant to convey to Ms. Powell that “you‘re her mother, what do you want to do[?]”
Ms. Powell then asked Detective Gleason questions about the evidence he had concerning the crime, including who shot first and if all of the people involved were “underage.” Detective Gleason told Ms. Powell that the other men involved were “not juveniles.” When she asked if Appellee “was considered a juvenile on this,” Detective Gleason responded, “[Y]es.”
Thereafter, the detective asked Appellee more questions about her role in setting up the robbery, and she made many incriminating statements throughout the remaining 30 minutes of the interview. Appellee once again memorialized her statement in writing. Detective Gleason testified that, after this third interview, Appellee became a suspect. However, she was not taken into custody at that
3. Trial Court Order
After the hearing, the trial court issued a written order denying Appellee‘s motion in part, finding that “the State has provided a prima facie showing that the first interview, second interview, and beginning of the third interview were freely and voluntarily given by Defendant without hope of benefit or fear of injury [under
The parties do not challenge the trial court‘s conclusions that Appellee‘s noncustodial March 1 and March 4 verbal and written statements were made freely and voluntarily, that Appellee was not in custody during those interviews for the purposes of Miranda,4 and that those statements were not induced by a hope of benefit or fear of injury pursuant to
4. Analysis
Turning to the trial court‘s order concerning Appellee‘s March 25 verbal and written statements, in analyzing the totality of the circumstances, the trial court considered the many factors set forth in Riley,5 which include:
(1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the charge and the nature of [her] rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interrogations; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date.
Riley, 237 Ga. at 128 (citation and punctuation omitted). “In reviewing a ruling on the admissibility of a defendant‘s statements where the facts are disputed, we accept the trial court‘s factual findings and credibility determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the law to the facts.” State v. Abbott, 303 Ga. 297, 299 (1) (812 SE2d 225) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). See Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 (1) (770 SE2d 636) (2015) (“When the facts material to a motion to suppress
The State argues that the trial court made a clearly erroneous factual finding when it determined that Detective Gleason improperly advised Appellee “that her mother was the only person who could exercise her constitutional right to counsel.” In considering a trial court‘s suppression ruling, “‘an appellate court must construe the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial court.‘” Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 332, 336 (2) (b) (862 SE2d 542) (2021) (quoting State v. Clark, 301 Ga. 7, 8 (799 SE2d 192) (2017)). Viewing the evidence in this light, and giving the trial court‘s factual findings and credibility determinations the proper deference, the State‘s claim fails. The record shows that Detective Gleason did not ask Appellee
The State also argues that the trial court erred because it found that all of the Riley factors were “satisfied” except for one. We disagree with the State‘s characterization of the trial court‘s order as finding that all of the Riley factors favored admission. Moreover, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred with regard to any of its factual findings, as each of them finds support in the record. Finally, we cannot say that the trial court erred in suppressing
Reviewing the nine Riley factors in order, first, the record supports the trial court‘s finding that Appellee was 15 year old when she was interviewed by Detective Gleason. Second, the record is silent as to Appellee‘s education level; however, the trial court found, and the record shows, that Appellee “understood English.” As to the third factor, the trial court found, and the record shows, that Appellee knew she was being interviewed about the shooting that led to Bryant‘s death. However, the record also supports the trial court‘s findings that: Appellee was consistently told that she was merely a witness; no warrants had been issued in the case; Appellee was never informed that her statements could be used against her at trial or that she could “go to jail or lose her freedom” based upon what she told detectives; and that, while Detective Gleason consulted with Ms. Powell prior to each interview, he “[did not] state it was optional for [Appellee] to speak with him.” Further, as discussed above, the record supports the trial court‘s finding that
Regarding the fourth factor, the record supports the trial court‘s finding that Appellee‘s mother was present, and Appellee was allowed to consult with her during the interviews. However, the record also supports the trial court‘s findings that Ms. Powell actively participated in the questioning of her daughter and brought her daughter to the police station on a prior occasion in order to offer more information to detectives. Further, the video recording shows that Ms. Powell was extremely emotional throughout her daughter‘s interviews and, at one point, became so upset that she physically turned away from Appellee while Appellee was implicating herself in a crime.
The trial court made no findings as to the fifth factor; however, it is undisputed that Appellee was interviewed prior to the filing of any formal charges. As to the sixth factor, the record supports the
Though the trial court made no findings with respect to the seventh factor, it is undisputed that all of Appellee‘s interviews were less than two hours long, with the March 25 interview being the shortest in duration. As to the eighth factor, the record supports the trial court‘s findings that Appellee‘s two prior statements were voluntarily given. Finally, the trial court made no findings regarding the ninth factor; however, due to the pre-trial status of this case, there is nothing in the record currently before us to suggest that Appellee has repudiated these statements.
LAGRUA, Justice, dissenting.
Because the trial court applied the wrong standard of law in granting Appellee‘s motion to suppress, and because I believe that, by affirming the trial court‘s ruling, the majority opinion will only perpetuate the confusion surrounding the factors a trial court should consider in determining the admissibility of a juvenile defendant‘s statement at trial, I respectfully dissent.6
As noted in the majority opinion, Appellee was interviewed by Detective Gleason on three different dates in March 2019. Appellee was arrested several days after the third and final interview. In her motion to suppress, Appellee sought to suppress all of the
Following the hearing on Appellee‘s motion to suppress, the trial court issued a written order concluding, among other things, that during and after each interview, Appellee was “not in custody” and “was allowed to leave and go home,” and that Detective Gleason testified that “no threats, promises or hope of benefit” were made to induce Appellee‘s statements during the interviews. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that Detective Gleason‘s response to Ms. Powell‘s questions — “Do we need a lawyer? Do I need a lawyer?” — rendered the remainder of Appellee‘s third interview involuntary,7
and thus, the trial court granted the motion
“In reviewing the trial court‘s grant or denial of a motion to suppress, we apply the well-established principles that the trial court‘s findings as to disputed facts will be upheld unless clearly erroneous and the trial court‘s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review[.]” Moon v. State, 312 Ga. 31, 57 (4) (860 SE2d 519) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). The trial court‘s order reflects that the trial court misapplied the law to be considered in evaluating the voluntariness of a juvenile defendant‘s statement given in a non-custodial interview.
The trial court evaluated the admissibility and voluntariness of Appellee‘s statements through the lens of a custodial
While this Court “has also relied on [the Riley] factors in evaluating more general due process voluntariness cases for juveniles,” Lester, 310 Ga. at 85 (2) n.7, I think this reliance has led to confusion for trial courts in determining what standard and
As set forth in the trial court‘s order, the trial court applied the following legal analysis in evaluating the voluntariness of Appellee‘s statements:
The question of a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of [a defendant‘s] right to counsel depends on the totality of the circumstances, and the State has a heavy burden in showing that the juvenile did understand and waive her rights. . . . In determining whether a juvenile‘s custodial statement was voluntarily and knowingly given, the [trial court] must consider the [factors set forth in Riley, 237 Ga. at 128]. . . . Parental presence or ability to consult with a family member alone does not conclusively
establish a waiver of a juvenile‘s constitutional right to counsel. Only the individual, juvenile or adult, can exercise their constitutional rights.
(Emphasis supplied). The trial court, citing State v. Rodriguez, 274 Ga. 728, 729 (559 SE2d 435) (2002), determined that “[a] critical factor in this case is whether [Appellee] understood her constitutional right to consult with an attorney,” ultimately holding that Detective Gleason‘s response to Ms. Powell‘s question about whether she needed a lawyer “erroneously advised” Appellee that ”her mother was the only person who could exercise her constitutional right to counsel during the third interview.” (Emphasis supplied).
The language of the trial court‘s order recited above demonstrates that, even though the trial court determined that Appellee was not in custody and was free to leave, the court still analyzed Appellee‘s statements as though she was in custody. However, in accordance with the finding that Appellee was not in custody, law enforcement had no obligation to inform Appellee of her constitutional rights under Miranda, and Appellee did not have a Sixth Amendment right to be appointed counsel. See Petty v. State, 283 Ga. 268, 270 (2) (658 SE2d 599) (2008) (holding that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (101 SCt 1880, 68 LE2d 378) (1981), which requires “that all questioning cease after an accused has requested counsel, applies only to custodial interrogation“). Because Appellee‘s “voluntary inculpatory statements” were made “prior to the point at which Miranda warnings were constitutionally required,” the “question of whether [s]he knowingly and intelligently waived h[er] rights [was] not implicated.” Byrum, 282 Ga. at 611 (5) n.2.
To determine the admissibility of Appellee‘s non-custodial statement, the trial court should have evaluated the voluntariness of that statement under a more general totality-of-the-circumstances due process analysis8 by inquiring “into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” including “the juvenile‘s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 725 (III) (99 SCt 2560, 61 LE2d 197) (1979).9 The trial court should have also determined whether, pursuant to
Here, the trial court found that the first interview, second interview, and beginning of the third interview were “freely and voluntarily given by [Appellee] without hope of benefit or fear of injury.” However, the trial court‘s written order is silent as to whether Appellee was coerced by any promises, threats, or hope of benefit during the remainder of the third interview, and accordingly, there was no finding as to whether Appellee‘s statement was rendered involuntary on that basis. See
Motion to suppress. Henry Superior Court. Before Judge Palmer.
Darius Pattillo, District Attorney, Sharon L. Hopkins, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Miller & Key, Suesan A. Miller, Zachary North, for appellee.