State v. BurtonState v. Burton
The State appeals the trial court‘s suppression of custodial statements 16-year-old Jeffrey Burton made during a video-taped interview with law enforcement officers who had arrested Burton for the murder of George Akins, Jr. The State contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Burton clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent and that the State failed to show that Burton knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). For the reasons explained below, we do not decide whether the trial court erred in concluding that Burton clearly invoked his right to remain silent. However, we conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that the State failed to meet its
1. Background
(a) Factual Background
Viewing the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual findings and to the judgment of the trial court, see Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 332, 336 (862 SE2d 542) (2021), the evidence shows the following. On October 23, 2017, when Burton was 16 years old, he was taken into custody for a murder that occurred two days earlier when someone exited a vehicle and shot into a group of people in a McDonald‘s parking lot. Detectives conducted a custodial interview of Burton that was video-recorded. Prior to trial, Burton filed a “Motion to Suppress All Statements Made by Mr. Burton to Police on October 23, 2017, and Fruits Thereof.” On November 10, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Burton‘s motion. The video recording of Burton‘s interview, along
At the time of his interview, Burton was a junior in high school. During the interview, one of Burton‘s wrists was handcuffed to a railing in the interview room, which was usually kept at a temperature around 68 degrees. After the detectives entered the interview room and introduced themselves, Detective Dobbs asked some preliminary questions about Burton‘s contact and other identifying information, and about his age and education. She also asked whether he was under the influence of any intoxicants, and she asked if he had any medical or mental issues that would prevent him from being able to speak to them. Detective Dobbs then advised
After Detective Dobbs explained Burton‘s rights to him, Burton confirmed that he understood them, and the following exchange occurred:
DETECTIVE DOBBS: And having these rights in mind, are you willing to talk to us now?
BURTON: Yeah, I don‘t want to.2
DETECTIVE DOBBS: It‘s up to you.
BURTON: [brief, unintelligible response3]
DETECTIVE DOBBS: Okay. Um, if you will just, um, I‘ll have to check those boxes ‘yes,’ and if you‘ll initial right there for me, and then just sign right there.
At that point, Detective Dobbs slid a waiver-of-rights form in front of Burton, Burton signed and initialed it4, and the interview began.
During the interview, Burton admitted to being with Trevon Jean-Baptiste, who was later charged with Akins‘s murder as Burton‘s co-defendant. Burton stated that he and Jean-Baptiste gave a ride to another person named “T” who allegedly got out of the car and shot into a group of people near McDonald‘s, but Burton denied any involvement in the shooting. Detective Ross later informed Burton that he was being charged with murder. Soon after that, Detective Ross leaned in close to Burton and raised his voice, saying, “this ain‘t no little kid s**t. This is f*****g for real. . . . So this . . . is bulls**t. . . . You need to f*****g tell me who the hell T is . . . .”
(b) The Trial Court‘s Order
On November 22, the trial court entered an order granting Burton‘s motion in part and suppressing all of the statements
[w]hile the State focuses on the ‘Yeah’ to suggest that [Burton] was agreeing to speak to police, the Court takes this word to be more of an affectation of speech or a conversation filler rather than an affirmative response to Det[ective] Dobbs‘s question. Moreover, the Court cannot ignore what followed—an unambiguous ‘I don‘t want to.’
With respect to Burton‘s later response to Detective Dobbs‘s statement of “It‘s up to you,” the court found that Burton‘s “verbal response . . . is unintelligible to the Court, even after multiple re-listenings“; that Detective Ross “did not recall what [Burton] said, nor could he make it out upon listening to the recording“; and that Burton “appeared to shrug at the time he made the unclear utterance, and his body language was not that of an individual who seemed open to conversation.” Given that Detective Dobbs “did not make any further attempts to gain clarity on whether [Burton] wished to speak with them, but rather pushed the constitutional rights form toward [Burton] to get him to agree to waive his rights,” the trial court then moved to an analysis of whether Burton voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda after he invoked his right to silence.
“(1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the charge . . . and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interrogation; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date.”
Riley, 237 Ga. at 128 (quoting West v. United States, 399 F2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968)). The court added that “‘[i]n the specific context of evaluating whether a juvenile defendant‘s rights were knowingly and voluntarily waived, the inquiry depends on the totality of the circumstances and the state has a heavy burden in showing that the juvenile did understand and waive his rights.‘” Lester v. State, 310 Ga. 81, 85 (849 SE2d 425) (2020) (citation omitted).
The State did not appeal the trial court‘s ruling when it was issued and instead proceeded to a jury trial the following week, which was held from November 29 to December 6, and which resulted in a hung jury and mistrial. After entry of the mistrial order on December 8 (nunc pro tunc to December 6), and within the 30 days to appeal provided for by
“Generally, when reviewing a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court must accept the trial court‘s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous,” and then independently apply the law to those facts to determine if the trial court erred in its suppression ruling. Dozier v. State, 306 Ga. 29, 33 (829 SE2d 131) (2019). See also State v. Rodriguez, 274 Ga. 728, 728 (559 SE2d 435) (2002). In assessing the trial court‘s suppression ruling, therefore, “‘an appellate court must construe the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial court.‘” Walker, 312 Ga. at 336 (quoting State v. Clark, 301 Ga. 7, 8 (799 SE2d 192) (2017)). In so doing, however, we may “‘consider facts that definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility such as facts indisputably discernible from a videotape.‘” Walker, 312 Ga. at 336 (quoting Clark, 301 Ga. at 8). “On the other hand, to the extent that legally significant facts were proved by evidence other than the video recording, the trial court as fact-finder
With respect to a defendant‘s invocation of his right to remain silent, “[w]e have explained that ‘when a person in the custody of law enforcement officers unambiguously and unequivocally invokes his right to remain silent in connection with their interrogation, the interrogation must cease immediately.‘” Walker, 312 Ga. at 335 (citation omitted). “‘Whether an invocation is unambiguous and unequivocal depends on whether the accused articulated a desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.‘” Id. at 335 (quoting Davidson v. State, 304 Ga. 460, 469-470 (819 SE2d 452) (2018)) (punctuation omitted).
Finally, in evaluating whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda, the State bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that under
3. The State contends that the trial court erred in finding that Burton clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent. The State specifically argues that when Detective Dobbs read Burton his rights under Miranda and then asked Burton if he was willing to talk, Burton‘s response of, “Yeah, I don‘t want to,” along with his “equivocal” body language, was not an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of his right to silence. The State further argues that because a reasonable officer would
Burton, on the other hand, contends that the trial court correctly concluded that he unambiguously and unequivocally invoked his right to silence when he responded, “Yeah, I don‘t want to,” when Detective Dobbs asked whether he was willing to talk, and that his invocation of that right was not honored when the detectives did not cease questioning him immediately. Burton also disputes the State‘s claim that he replied “Yeah,” in response to Detective Dobbs‘s follow-up statement, “It‘s up to you,” pointing out that the trial court found Burton‘s reply “unintelligible.”
Although there is a significant dispute between the parties
4. The State contends that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court erred in concluding that the State failed to show that Burton knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda. As noted above, before concluding that the State failed to meet its burden, the trial court set forth the nine Riley
In support of its contention that Burton‘s waiver was knowing and voluntary, the State argues the following: Burton was almost 17 years old at the time of his interview; was in the eleventh grade; appeared to listen attentively to Detective Dobbs and confirmed that he understood his rights; responded, when asked, that he would talk to Detective Dobbs; indicated on the waiver form that he waived his rights, and then answered the detectives’ questions without objection; knew that police wanted to talk to him about a murder (irrespective of whether he understood at first that he was a suspect); was told that he could have a parent present; and was
The detailed factual findings set forth in the trial court‘s order reveal that it did not rely exclusively on the videotape of Burton‘s custodial interview in making its findings. Rather, it also considered other evidence presented at the hearing on Burton‘s motion to suppress, such as Detective Ross‘s testimony, the standard waiver-of-rights form given to Burton that was not specifically tailored for juveniles, records related to Burton‘s delinquency history and previous interactions with law enforcement, search warrant applications, and Burton‘s birth certificate. Indeed, the trial court specifically stated at the hearing that “I‘ve still got to look at all the other factors and the totality of the circumstances to find out whether this was voluntary. And I think that gets done . . . by listening to the statement as a whole and considering the factors of detention and the evidence in front of me right now about when he
Evidence presented at the hearing on Burton‘s motion to suppress—including but not limited to the video recording of the interview—supported the trial court‘s factual findings as to each of the nine Riley factors. To that end, the State does not dispute the trial court‘s finding regarding the first Riley factor—that Burton was 16 years old—which was supported by a photograph of Burton‘s birth certificate that the State admitted as Exhibit Five at the motion-to-suppress hearing and was one of the specific findings that the court noted “in particular” in reaching its conclusion that the State failed to meet its burden of showing that Burton knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under Miranda. Nor does the
Regarding the fourth factor, the trial court‘s finding that Burton did not consult with a parent or relative and that Detective Ross did not contact Burton‘s parents was based, at least in part, on Detective Ross‘s testimony that he did not notify Burton‘s parents that their son was in custody or why he was in custody “[a]t any point in time during that day.” See Oubre v. Woldemichael, 301 Ga. 299, 305-306 (800 SE2d 518) (2017) (noting, in analyzing the Riley factors in the context of due process voluntariness, that “[a]lthough a parent‘s absence or presence is not dispositive of the question of whether a juvenile‘s confession is admissible, it is a significant factor
As for the fifth factor, the trial court found that an arrest warrant had been obtained before the interview began, even though there was some inconsistency in the evidence on this point. But the trial court was authorized to weigh search warrant applications indicating that Burton‘s arrest warrant was obtained “[d]uring the interview” against Detective Ross‘s statement to Burton at the end of the video-recorded-interview that Burton was “being charged” and “[t]hat happened before you even got here,” and also to credit Detective Ross‘s testimony acknowledging that Burton was not “actually informed of [the arrest warrant‘s] existence” until “the end of the interview” and that “up until then he wouldn‘t have known about it,” which appears to acknowledge that the arrest warrant had
With respect to the sixth factor, the trial court expressly credited Detective Ross‘s testimony in determining that the “techniques employed during the interview were somewhat misleading and deceptive,” even though they “were not particularly abusive or coercive.” The trial court noted, however, that Burton was “shackled to a railing in the interview room” during his interview, a finding that was supported by the video recording of Burton‘s interview and also by Detective Ross‘s testimony. Moreover, in finding that the interview room was “very cold“—the type of factual finding that we generally review with “substantial deference,” Abbott, 303 Ga. at 302—the trial court expressly considered Detective Ross‘s testimony about the room‘s temperature and also pointed to the video recording‘s depiction of Burton pulling his arms into his shirt and sitting in a way that appears to indicate he was trying to stay warm. As for the seventh factor, Detective Ross testified that Burton was held in the interview room for “a good
With respect to the eighth factor, even apart from the trial court‘s ultimate determination that Burton “invoked his right to silence“—a conclusion we expressly decline to evaluate today—the court also found as part of its Riley analysis that Burton “clearly indicated that he did not wish to speak to police.” And that point was consonant with the trial court‘s earlier findings that Burton “shook his head” while saying, “Yeah, I don‘t want to,” and that after Burton responded to Detective Dobbs after she advised Burton of his rights under Miranda, Burton “appeared to shrug . . . and his body language was not that of an individual who seemed open to conversation.” Moreover, the trial court also found with respect to the eighth factor that “[t]he record is devoid of evidence as to whether [Burton] declined to give[] any statements on earlier occasions,” suggesting that it was not persuaded by evidence the State presented about Burton‘s delinquency history and prior
And regarding the ninth factor, the trial court‘s finding that Burton had not repudiated the custodial statements he made to the detectives, while also acknowledging that Burton had pleaded not guilty to the charges against him, was an accurate recitation of what had happened in the case at that point in time. See Daniels, 313 Ga. at 415 (rejecting defendant‘s assertion that entering a plea of not guilty constituted a repudiation of his statements).
The record thus shows that the trial court reviewed and weighed the evidence presented at the motion-to-suppress hearing, and that it also made factual and credibility determinations in reaching its ultimate conclusion that, considering all of the Riley factors, the State failed to meet its burden of establishing that Burton knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda. Moreover, in considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court placed great weight “in particular” on the factors of Burton‘s
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J., who concurs in judgment only, and LaGrua, J., who dissents.
I agree with the majority opinion‘s ultimate conclusion that the trial court did not err in granting Burton‘s motion to suppress his custodial statement. However, because the trial court made express findings that Burton unequivocally invoked his right to silence, and that the record contained no credible evidence that could show officers scrupulously honored that invocation or that Burton reinitiated contact with the detectives, Burton‘s custodial statement was inadmissible. For these reasons, I see no need to analyze the voluntariness of Burton‘s statement. Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment of the Court.
It is well established that, “[a] person being subjected to custodial interrogation may at any time express his or her desire to remain silent and, thereby, end the interrogation.” Green v. State, 275 Ga. 569, 571-572 (2) (570 SE2d 207) (2002). “An accused will be found to have unambiguously and unequivocally asserted his right to remain silent where he declares that he is finished talking or otherwise expresses the clear desire for police questioning to cease.”
Here, the trial court found, based upon all of the evidence admitted at the Jackson-Denno hearing, that Burton unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent. That ruling was not clearly erroneous. The record shows, and the parties do not dispute, that Detective Dobbs asked Burton, “[with] these rights in mind, are you willing to talk to us?” Burton replied, “Yeah, I don‘t want to.” The trial court determined that Burton shook his head “no” while making that statement. These facts are materially indistinguishable
Next, the State had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that (1) the detectives “scrupulously honored” the invocation of the right or (2) Burton “voluntarily waived that right by reinitiating contact with the detective[s].” State v. Hinton, 309 Ga. 457, 461 (2) (847 SE2d 188) (2020). See also State v. Pauldo, 309 Ga. 130, 133 (2) (844 SE2d 829) (2020) (listing factors trial courts consider when determining if a defendant‘s right to remain silent was scrupulously honored by officers). Here, the trial court
That left the trial court with the video recording of the interview to determine what occurred between Burton‘s invocation of his right to remain silent and his subsequent waiver of his rights. Based on its own review of the video recording, the trial court found that Burton‘s post-invocation exchange with Detective Dobbs was “unintelligible.” Although we generally defer to a “trial court‘s findings on disputed facts unless clearly erroneous,” Mack v. State, 296 Ga. 239, 241 (765 SE2d 896) (2014), we afford “less deference to the trial court . . . to the extent that material facts definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility,” Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 n.5 (770 SE2d 636) (2015). Based on the peculiar facts of this case, it makes no difference whether we afford deference to the trial court‘s findings about the video recording or review the matter de novo. The trial court‘s finding that the
Aside from Detective Ross‘s testimony and the video recording, there was no record evidence that could clarify what occurred during the post-invocation exchange. Because the court did not clearly err in disregarding Detective Ross‘s testimony on the matter or err (clearly or otherwise) in finding the recording of the exchange “unintelligible,” the only permissible legal conclusion was that the State failed to carry its burden by a preponderance of the evidence to show that officers scrupulously honored Burton‘s invocation or that Burton reinitiated contact after invoking his right to remain silent. Accordingly, Burton‘s custodial statement was inadmissible.
Because Burton‘s statement was inadmissible, I see no reason to analyze, as the majority opinion does, whether the statement was voluntary. I therefore concur only in the judgment of the Court.
As the Court notes, some members of our Court have recently expressed “doubts” about the juvenile-specific test the trial court applied in this case, which comes from Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 (226 SE2d 922) (1976). Daniels v. State, 313 Ga. 400, 418 (870 SE2d 409) (2022) (Nahmias, C.J., concurring specially in part). Count me as a doubter, too. Even putting to one side any concerns with requiring “a trial court . . . to make, and an appellate court . . . to review, a ruling based on a nine-factor” test, id., Riley appears to be out of step with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (99 SCt 2560, 61 LEd 2d 197) (1979), the Court held that the test for whether a person has waived his rights under Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), is the same for juveniles as it is for adults, and it requires a “totality-of-the-circumstances approach” that “includes,” but is not limited to, “evaluation of the juvenile‘s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth
I have found no explanation for why we apply Riley instead of Fare, but the best guess is some combination of happenstance and inertia. Riley was decided in 1976, which happened to be three years before Fare squarely explained how to assess whether a juvenile‘s waiver of rights under Miranda was knowing and voluntary. Lacking that guidance, we instead borrowed a test from a 1968
For now, Riley is the test the great weight of our precedent required the trial court to apply,13 and the Court‘s opinion rightly concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying it under the specific facts and circumstances of this case. So I concur fully. But in an appropriate case, we should consider whether a course correction, or at least a clarification, is warranted. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Boggs, Justice Warren, Justice Bethel, and Justice McMillian join in this concurrence.
I respectfully dissent in this case because, even affording the trial court a high level of deference, the evidence does not support the trial court‘s determination that Burton‘s invocation was unequivocal and unambiguous, see Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 332, 336 (2) (b) (862 SE2d 542) (2021). However, I need not go into a step by step analysis of the Riley factors, see Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 (226 SE2d 922) (1976), because I believe Riley is inconsistent with United States Supreme Court precedent as applied in this case, see Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 (III) (99 SCt 2560, 61 LE2d 197) (1979) (concluding that the “totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved” and discerning “no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so“), and we should reexamine Riley in the appropriate case.