State v. NkoyiState v. Nkoyi
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and John Heinkel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Neal D. Schuett, for appellant.
S. POWELL, P.J.
{1} Appellant, Lambert Nkoyi Nkoyi, appeals his conviction in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas after a jury found him guilty of single counts of kidnapping and rape, both first-degree felonies, for which the trial court sentenced him to serve an aggregate, indefinite sentence of 12 to 16 years in prison. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm Nkoyi‘s conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
{2} On March 29, 2023, the Butler County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Nkoyi with single counts of first-degree felony kidnapping in violation of
{3} On June 12, 2023, the state filed a motion requesting the trial court determine the admissibility of ten video recorded excerpts of Alice‘s statements made to Cecilia Hicks, a licensed independent social worker and forensic interviewer, while being interviewed at the Mayerson Center for Safe & Healthy Children at Cincinnati Children‘s Hospital on December 22, 2022.3 The trial court held a hearing on the state‘s motion on August 2, 2023. During this hearing, the trial court noted that it was its understanding that after Nkoyi‘s trial counsel had an opportunity to review a disc containing those ten video excerpts that counsel, “on behalf of Mr. Nkoyi, would be stipulating to the admissibility of those” video clips at trial under
Your Honor, that is my understanding as well. I had an opportunity to review said clips and the case law, and have no objection to their admissibility under the current format, but reserve the right to object at trial if they‘re at all modified. Altered may have been the more appropriate term.
Given the parties’ stipulation, the trial court thereafter issued an order granting the state‘s motion finding the aforementioned ten video excerpts were admissible at trial pursuant to
{4} On October 24 through October 26, 2023, a three-day jury trial was held on the matter. During that trial, the jury heard testimony from a total of seven witnesses. This included the jury hearing testimony from both the alleged victim, Alice, and the defendant, Nkoyi. This also included the jury hearing testimony from Alice‘s 12-year-old younger sister, Beth, as well as from Hicks, the social worker who interviewed Alice at the Mayerson Center on December 22, 2022.4
{5} Alice, then a 14-year-old freshman in high school, testified that Nkoyi was a close family friend whom she and her five siblings considered to be like an uncle given their shared connections to the Congo in Africa. Alice testified that she and her younger sister, Beth, had in fact lived with Nkoyi and his wife for several months in their neighboring apartment across the street as a favor to help Nkoyi and his wife with their three children. Alice testified that the rest of her family, her parents and five other siblings, had also briefly lived with Nkoyi and his wife after a fire broke out in their apartment that left her family without a place to stay for several weeks.
{6} Given their families’ close relationship, Alice testified that on the day in question, November 22, 2022, Nkoyi came over to her family‘s apartment to take a shower. Alice testified that it was just her and four of her siblings who were home when Nkoyi came over to shower that day, as her mother was at work and her father and older brother were out of town in Louisville, Kentucky. Alice testified that Nkoyi coming to her family‘s apartment to shower was “normal” at that time because the bathtub at his and his wife‘s apartment “wasn‘t working” properly. Alice testified that it was unusual, however, that it was just Nkoyi who came to the apartment to take a shower that day. This is because, according to Alice, it was usually both Nkoyi and his wife who came to their apartment together when they needed to take a shower.
{7} Alice testified that after Nkoyi was done showering he went into the living room and told her younger sister, Beth, to go get her so that she could “[c]lose the door after him.” Alice testified that she then came out to the living room to see Nkoyi out of the apartment when he “told [her] to give him a kiss before he left.” To this, Alice testified that she gave Nkoyi a kiss on the cheek. Alice testified that Nkoyi then told her, “no, on the lips.” Alice testified that Nkoyi then proceeded to kiss her on the lips with his hands on her waist. Alice testified that Nkoyi then grabbed her around the wrist and “guided” her into one
{8} Alice testified that after Nkoyi locked the bathroom door that he then took off her dress, pulled down her underwear, and “started touching” the “inside” of her “vagina” and her “boobs” with his hands. Alice testified that she felt “weird” when Nkoyi touched the inside of her vagina and that, while Nkoyi was touching her, that she was looking “[a]way, like, anywhere but him.” Alice testified that Nkoyi then stopped, exited from the bathroom, and left the apartment, telling her that “he‘d be back” later that night at around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. Alice also testified that Nkoyi promised her that “if [she] kept it a secret, he would get [her] a phone.”
{9} Alice testified that after Nkoyi left the apartment she went and told Beth what had just happened to her. Beth testified and confirmed that shortly after Nkoyi left the apartment that Alice came into the bedroom where she was watching TV visibly upset and crying and said, “he kissed her, and he—he was touching her,” and that “he said he was coming back” a few hours later. Alice testified that Nkoyi then did, in fact, come back to the apartment a few hours later. Alice testified that once there, Nkoyi proceeded to knock on the apartment‘s front door, as well as on her bedroom window, calling out her name, but that neither she nor any of her siblings opened the door to let him in. Alice testified that this occurred at approximately 6:00 p.m., which, according to Alice, was “earlier than he was supposed to come.”
{10} Alice testified that later that night, upon her mother returning home from work, she told her mother what Nkoyi had done to her. Alice also testified that prior to her mother returning home from work that she and her siblings “were all sleeping in one bedroom, the bedroom [that she] slept in” because they were “scared.” Alice testified that 9-1-1 was then called and that, a short time later, two police officers arrived at the apartment to speak with her. When asked what she told the responding officers, Alice testified that she told them “what happened,” which included her telling the officers that Nkoyi had “touched” her “inappropriately.” Nkoyi testified and denied Alice‘s allegations levied against him. This included Nkoyi testifying that he was never alone with Alice and that he never touched Alice inappropriately as she had alleged.
{11} Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Nkoyi guilty of the kidnapping and rape offenses. After the jury issued its verdict, the trial court then scheduled the matter for sentencing and ordered a presentence-investigative report to be completed. Just over one month later, on November 27 and 30, 2023, the trial court held a sentencing hearing on the matter. At this hearing, the trial court sentenced Nkoyi to serve an aggregate, indefinite sentence of 12 to 16 years in prison, less 234 days of jail-time credit. The trial court also classified Nkoyi as a Tier III sex offender and notified Nkoyi of his duties to enroll as a violent offender. Approximately two weeks later, on December 13, 2023, Nkoyi filed his notice of appeal. Following briefing, Nkoyi‘s appeal was submitted to this court for consideration on July 10, 2024. Nkoyi‘s appeal now properly before this court for decision, Nkoyi has raised five assignments of error for review.
Assignment of Error No. 1:
{12} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT BY ADMITTING INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
{13} In his first assignment of error, Nkoyi argues the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain “inadmissible”
Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review
{14} “The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Singh, 2022-Ohio-3385, ¶ 31 (12th Dist.). “We review a trial court‘s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of [that] discretion.” State v. Napier, 2017-Ohio-246, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.). An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies the trial court‘s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Grindstaff, 2014-Ohio-2581, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.). Most cases where an abuse of discretion is asserted are claims alleging the trial court‘s decision was unreasonable. State v. Cast, 2022-Ohio-3967, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.). “A decision is unreasonable where a sound reasoning process does not support it.” State v. Miller, 2016-Ohio-7360, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.). “When applying the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” State v. Williams, 2021-Ohio-2717, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.). “Therefore, absent an abuse of discretion that has resulted in material prejudice, this court will not reverse a trial court‘s evidentiary decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence at trial.” State v. Edwards, 2023-Ohio-2632, ¶ 34 (12th Dist.).
Nkoyi‘s First Argument: State‘s Exhibit 30
{15} Nkoyi initially argues the trial court erred by admitting into evidence state‘s Exhibit 30, the aforementioned disc containing the ten video recorded excerpts of the statements that Alice had made during her interview with Hicks conducted at the Mayerson Center on December 22, 2022. To support this claim, Nkoyi argues that the trial court‘s admission of that disc into evidence allowed the state to introduce “forensic statements” at trial in violation of
{16} It is equally well established that “a party may not ‘take advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced.‘” State v. Drain, 2022-Ohio-3697, ¶ 66, quoting State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 324, 2000-Ohio-183. Therefore, even assuming there was some merit to Nkoyi‘s argument, which, as discussed more fully below, there is not, because Nkoyi‘s trial counsel stipulated to the admissibility of state‘s Exhibit 30 into evidence at trial, Nkoyi invited any error that may have occurred by the trial court admitting that exhibit into evidence. The invited error doctrine does not permit Nkoyi to stipulate to the admission of state‘s Exhibit 30 at trial only for him to then turn around and argue as part of his appeal that the trial court erred by admitting that same exhibit into evidence. State v. Harvey, 2020-Ohio-329, ¶ 55 (3d Dist.) (“[t]he doctrine of invited
Nkoyi‘s Second Argument: Hicks’ Testimony
{17} Nkoyi next argues the trial court erred by allowing Hicks to testify and describe what Alice told her during the December 22, 2022 interview about what Nkoyi had done to her sexually. Specifically, by allowing Hicks to testify in response to the state asking Hicks to describe what Alice told her had happened to her sexually, the following:
[Alice] described to me that [Nkoyi], who had come into her house to take a shower because his plumbing wasn‘t working, when he was leaving, he told her to give him a kiss, so she kissed him on the cheek. And then he said no and pointed to his lips.
And then—and she just stood there, she said. And then he proceeded to kiss her with his lips and his tongue, and then took her into the bathroom and lifted her skirt and pulled her underwear down and touched her vagina with his hand, and then inserted his finger in her vagina, and also put his hands in her shirt or dress. I don‘t remember which one but underneath her bra and touched her on her boobs.
{18} Just as with his first argument set forth above, Nkoyi argues that by allowing Hicks to offer this testimony at trial, the trial court permitted the state to introduce “forensic statements” into evidence in violation of
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
{19} The Ohio Supreme Court has considered the admissibility of statements like those testified to by Hicks in this case. State v. Arnold, 2010-Ohio-2742.5 In Arnold,
{20} In this case, other than Hicks briefly mentioning that Alice told her Nkoyi had lifted her skirt and pulled down her underwear prior to him raping her, the statements that Hicks attributed to Alice in this case are essentially the same as those discussed and found admissible by the Ohio Supreme Court in Arnold. “That the statements were made to a social worker does not mean that the statements were not reliable or inadmissible under
{21} “[T]he admission of hearsay evidence is harmless error where it is merely cumulative.” State v. Robinson, 2015-Ohio-4533, ¶ 30 (12th Dist.). Thus, “[a]n admission is harmless when the declarant is examined at trial on the same matters as the hearsay and the erroneous evidence is cumulative in nature.” State v. Villani, 2019-Ohio-1831, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.). That is to say, “in those cases ‘where a declarant is examined on the same matters as contained in impermissible hearsay statements and where admission is essentially cumulative, such admission is harmless.‘” State v. Sims, 2009-Ohio-550, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Tomlinson, 33 Ohio App.3d 278, 281 (12th Dist.1986). That is exactly what occurred here. Therefore, because Alice took the stand and testified consistent with the statements attributed to her by Hicks, any error the trial court may have made would constitute, at worst, harmless error. See, e.g., State v. Chisenhall, 2024-Ohio-1918, ¶ 20 (12th Dist.) (similarly holding that “because [the child-victim] took the stand and testified consistent with the statements attributed to her by her forensic interviewer, her high school friend, and her mother, any error the trial court may have made by admitting the challenged testimony elicited from those three witnesses would constitute, at worst, harmless error“). Accordingly, Nkoyi‘s second argument also lacks merit.
Nkoyi‘s Third Argument: Beth‘s Testimony
{22} Nkoyi lastly argues the trial court erred by allowing Alice‘s 12-year-old younger sister, Beth, to testify as to what Alice told her just after Nkoyi left their apartment as an excited utterance under
{23} “An out-of-court statement qualifies as an excited utterance if ‘(1) the statement was made in reaction to a startling event; (2) the statement was made under the stress of excitement caused by the event; and (3) the statement relates to the event.‘” State v. Cooperstein, 2019-Ohio-4724, ¶ 86 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Nitz, 2004-Ohio-6478, ¶ 20 (12th Dist.). The statement Alice made to Beth shortly after Nkoyi left their apartment claiming Nkoyi had just “kissed her, and he—he was touching her” falls squarely within that definition. See, e.g., State v. Haskell, 2015-Ohio-3095 (3d Dist.) (finding a teenaged child-victim‘s statement that appellant “touched her in her private area” made shortly after the touching was alleged to have occurred was an excited utterance admissible under
Assignment of Error No. 2:
{24} MR. NKOYI‘S CONVICTIONS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
{25} In his second assignment of error, Nkoyi argues the jury‘s verdicts finding him guilty of kidnapping and raping Alice were not supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree.
Sufficiency of the Evidence Standard
{26} A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence invokes a due process concern that raises the question of whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury‘s verdict as a matter of law. State v. Clinton, 2017-Ohio-9423, ¶ 165, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 1997-Ohio-52. Such a challenge “requires a determination as to whether the state has met its burden of production at trial.” State v. Boles, 2013-Ohio-5202, ¶ 34 (12th Dist.). “The relevant inquiry is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
Kidnapping and Rape in Violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) and 2907.02(A)(2)
{27} As noted above, the jury found Nkoyi guilty of first-degree felony kidnapping in violation of
{28} The jury also found Nkoyi guilty of first-degree felony rape in violation of
{29} The term “sexual conduct” is defined by
{30} The Ohio Revised Code does not define “vaginal opening” as that term is used in
Nkoyi‘s Argument and Analysis
{31} To support this assignment of error, Nkoyi argues the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he either kidnapped or raped Alice as she had alleged. Nkoyi claims that this must be the case when considering the state did not present any “forensic, video, or audio evidence” to corroborate Alice‘s trial testimony, nor did the state offer any “evidence or testimony” to rebut the testimony that Nkoyi provided to the jury upon taking the stand and proclaiming his innocence.
{32} However, based on a simple review of the record, we find Alice‘s testimony, if believed, presents sufficient evidence to support the jury‘s verdict finding Nkoyi guilty of both kidnapping and rape offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Dandridge, 2021-Ohio-3355, ¶ 99 (8th Dist.) (finding teenaged child-victim‘s testimony that appellant locked her in a bedroom, forced her to lay down, and tried to “use” a vibrator on her, if believed, presented sufficient evidence that appellant “used force in restraining [the victim‘s] liberty to engage in sexual activity, particularly in light of the age difference” and relationship with the victim so as to support the jury‘s verdict finding appellant guilty of kidnapping in violation of
{33} Alice‘s testimony, if believed, establishes that after Nkoyi kissed Alice on the lips, Nkoyi then grabbed Alice by the wrist and forced her into one of the two bathrooms located within her family‘s apartment and locked the door behind him. Alice‘s testimony also establishes that, after forcing Alice into the bathroom and locking the bathroom door, Nkoyi then
{34} In so holding, we note that, “In rape cases such as this, ‘courts have consistently held that the testimony of the victim, if believed, is sufficient to support a conviction, even without further corroboration.‘” State v. Hernandez, 2011-Ohio-3765, ¶ 40 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Dunn, 2005-Ohio-1270, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). Therefore, contrary to Nkoyi‘s claim, neither forensic nor physical evidence is required to corroborate Alice‘s allegations before the jury could find him guilty of kidnapping and rape beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Timmons, 2014-Ohio-3520, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.). The fact that Nkoyi took the stand in his own defense and denied any wrongdoing does not change this fact. This is because, as discussed more fully below, “the decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses is within the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard the witness.” State v. Bedsole, 2022-Ohio-3693, ¶ 35 (12th Dist.). Accordingly, finding the state satisfied its burden of production at trial, thereby establishing Nkoyi‘s conviction for kidnapping and raping Alice was supported by sufficient evidence, Nkoyi‘s second assignment of error also lacks merit and is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. 3:
{35} MR. NKOYI‘S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{36} In his third assignment of error, Nkoyi argues the jury‘s verdict finding him guilty of kidnapping and raping Alice was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We again disagree.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence Standard
{37} “[A] manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review applies to the state‘s burden of persuasion.” State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26. “To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, this court must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Lewis, 2020-Ohio-3762, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Wilks, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 168. But, even then, a determination regarding the witnesses’ credibility is primarily for the trier of fact to decide. State v. Baker, 2020-Ohio-2882, ¶ 30 (12th Dist.), citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Therefore, given that it is primarily the trier of fact who decides a witness’ credibility, this court will overturn a conviction on manifest-weight grounds “only in extraordinary circumstances when the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of acquittal.” State v. Kaufhold, 2020-Ohio-3835, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). When
Nkoyi‘s Argument and Analysis
{38} To support this assignment of error, Nkoyi argues the jury‘s verdict finding him guilty of kidnapping and raping Alice was against the manifest weight of the evidence because certain aspects of the trial testimony elicited from Alice, Beth, and Hicks were inconsistent and contradictory. These contradictions included, among others, a dispute between Alice‘s and Beth‘s trial testimony as to what room three of their other siblings were located in when Nkoyi arrived at their family‘s apartment to take a shower. Nkoyi argues that these inconsistencies “harm[ed] the weight of the evidence” offered by the state and effectively prevented the state from meeting its burden of persuasion. Nkoyi argues that this is especially concerning in this case because, rather than three ancillary witnesses to the alleged crimes, this was the testimony of the victim, Alice, which was “substantially undermined.”
{39} However, although there were some inconsistencies in the testimony elicited from Alice, Beth, and Hicks at trial, it is well established that “[i]nconsistencies in the evidence alone do not mean that a decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Gregory, 2023-Ohio-1700, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.). This is particularly true here when considering the inconsistencies in the testimony offered by these three witnesses were relatively minor, thus falling well short of what it would take to render their testimony inherently unworthy of belief. See, e.g., State v. Freeman, 2023-Ohio-3745, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.) (finding “the inconsistencies in the testimony offered by the state‘s two crucial witnesses was minor, thus falling well short of what it would take to render either of those two witnesses’ testimony inherently unworthy of belief“); and State v. Berry, 2004-Ohio-6027, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.) (noting “the inconsistencies in the testimony of the state‘s witnesses were minor, and they did not render their testimony inherently unworthy of belief“).
{40} Moreover, even assuming the inconsistencies in the testimony elicited from Alice, Beth, and Hicks were something more than just minor contradictions, which the record indicates that they predominantly were not, it is primarily the trier of fact who decides a witness’ credibility. Kaufhold, 2020-Ohio-3835 at ¶ 10. “We must defer to the jury‘s determinations of the witnesses’ credibility.” State v. Reed, 2023-Ohio-878, ¶ 42 (12th Dist.). This is because it is the jury, and not this court on appeal, which is in the best position to judge the credibility of the testimony elicited from each witness who was called to the stand to testify at a trial. State v. Ndubueze, 2024-Ohio-1414, ¶ 24 (12th Dist.). This includes, of course, when Nkoyi himself took the stand in his own defense to proclaim his innocence. This is why a conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the jury chose to believe the testimony and evidence presented by the state as opposed to what was presented by the accused. State v. Sheldon, 2023-Ohio-2998, ¶ 33 (12th Dist.).
{41} Rather, as stated previously, it is only in extraordinary circumstances where the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of acquittal will
Assignment of Error No. 4:
{42} THE APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO A COUNSEL THROUGH INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
{43} In his fourth assignment of error, Nkoyi argues his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance. To support this claim, Nkoyi argues his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) not making a
{44} However, given this court‘s decisions set forth above overruling Nkoyi‘s second and third assignments of error finding the jury‘s verdict finding him guilty of both kidnapping and rape offenses, Nkoyi‘s trial counsel making a
{45} Additionally, this court‘s decision overruling Nkoyi‘s first assignment of error wherein he challenged the trial court‘s admission of certain alleged hearsay evidence also demonstrates that Nkoyi‘s trial
{46} “Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” State v. Burns, 2014-Ohio-4625, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.). Given this presumption, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). State v. Ford, 2021-Ohio-782, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). “[U]nder Strickland, in order to prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective, a criminal defendant must show (1) that his counsel‘s performance was deficient and (2) that that performance prejudiced him.” State v. Simpson, 2020-Ohio-6719, ¶ 18, citing Strickland at 687. Therefore, to establish his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this case, Nkoyi was required to show that his trial counsel‘s performance was deficient, and that his counsel‘s deficient performance subjected him to be prejudiced as a result. See State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-879, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.). Nkoyi failed to establish either of those two prongs. Accordingly, because the failure to make an adequate showing on either prong is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, see State v. Jewell, 2022-Ohio-2727, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.), Nkoyi‘s fourth assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. 5:
{47} THE APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL THROUGH CUMULATIVE ERROR.
{48} In his fifth assignment of error, Nkoyi argues the cumulative error doctrine requires his conviction be reversed and this matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. However, for the cumulative error doctrine to apply, “an appellate court must find that multiple errors, none of which individually rose to the level of prejudicial error, actually occurred in the trial court.” State v. Cramer, 2004-Ohio-1712, ¶ 67 (12th Dist.), citing State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191, 197 (1987); State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 398, 2000-Ohio-448 (noting that “in order even to consider whether ‘cumulative’ error is present, we would first have to find that multiple errors were committed in this case“). Given this court‘s decisions set forth above related to Nkoyi‘s first four assignments of error, Nkoyi failed to establish that the trial court committed any single error, let alone multiple errors, which would trigger the application of the cumulative error doctrine to this case. Therefore, finding the cumulative error doctrine inapplicable to the case at bar, Nkoyi‘s fifth assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
{49} Judgment affirmed.
PIPER and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.