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State v. Arnold
2010 Ohio 2742
Ohio
2010
Check Treatment

*1 Leffler, Attorney, appellee. for Prosecuting County Huron Russell V. Wiedemann, Gamso; Hiltz, Gamso, Jeffrey M. and & Hoolahan and Helmick Allton, Co., L.P.A., appellants. D. for and John Allton & Koch for Chaiten, reversal urging A. Radigan, and Louis Elizabeth C. Day, Jones Assault, for the Treat- Association Against Sexual Iowa Coalition amici curiae Center, A. Detective Robert Abusers, Wetterling Resource Jacob ment Sexual Assault, Against Texas Association Against Sexual Shilling, Coalition California Assault, to End Violence. and National Alliance Sexual Sexual Defender, T. and Tobik, Martin Public and John Cuyahoga County L. Robert Defenders, amicus curiae reversal for urging Public Sweeney, Assistant Cullen County Public Defender. Cuyahoga Friedman, Assoc., L.L.C., urging Ian reversal and N.

Ian N. Friedman & Lawyers. of Defense amicus curiae Ohio Association A. Defender, K. and Katherine Kelly Curtis Young, Ohio Public Timothy curiae Ohio Public Defenders, reversal for amicus Szudy, urging Public Assistant Defender. Mason, H. Prosecuting Attorney, Mary Cuyahoga County D.

William curiae McGrath, Attorney, affirmance for amicus Prosecuting urging Assistant County Prosecuting Attorney. Cuyahoga O’Brien, Attorney, Taylor, Franklin L. County Prosecuting and Steven

Ron affirmance for amicus curiae state Attorney, urging Prosecuting Assistant Ohio. General, General, Mizer, Benjamin C. Solicitor Cordray, Attorney

Richard General, Lieberman, Schimmer, M. Solicitor David Deputy Alexandra T. Chief Solicitor, A. Solicitor, Conomy, P. Assistant James Deputy Christopher Attorney affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio General. Hogan, urging Appellant. Arnold, Ohio, Appellee, The State Arnold, 290, 2010-Ohio-2742.] [Cite as State v. 126 Ohio St.3d *2 (No. 2010.) September 2008-1693—Submitted 2009—Decided June O’Connor, J. Arnold, Appellant, Michael his appeals raping conviction for his four-

year-old daughter, M.A. Arnold argues statements that M.A. made to social worker Kerri Marshall at the Center for Child and Family Advocacy at Nation- (“CCFA”) wide Children’s Hospital were contrary rights admitted to his under the Confrontation of Clause the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu- tion and Section Article I of the Ohio Constitution. The court appeals conviction, affirmed Arnold’s that Marshall holding agent did not act as an police when she questioned M.A. and that during M.A.’s statements the interview were nontestimonial. In CCFA, M.A. at interviewing Marshall occupied capacities: dual

she was both a forensic collecting interviewer information for use by and a medical eliciting interviewer information necessary diagnosis treatment. We hold statements made to interviewers at child-advocacy centers that are made for medical diagnosis and treatment are nontestimonial Thus, and are admissible without offending the Confrontation Clause. we affirm judgment the court of appeals the extent that M.A.’s statements to Marshall for the medical treatment and properly admitted. We further hold that statements made to interviewers at child- advocacy centers that serve primarily forensic or investigative purpose are Clause. We the Confrontation pursuant and are inadmissible

testimonial admitting the forensic the trial court erred with Arnold that agree insofar as it held that the court of appeals and reverse by M.A. Marshall made However, because the court of statements were admissible. these forensic of M.A.’s forensic statement whether the admission did consider appeals harmless, case to the court of consider appeals we remand this Marshall issue. this Background

Relevant Hilliard, together in Wendy lived Arnold and Otto December 3}{¶ awakening upon one Ohio, young their children. Otto testified two M.A., were four-year-old daughter, their she discovered Arnold and night, door, unlock the and when he that Arnold in bedroom. Otto demanded locked *3 Otto observed that did, halfway his boxer were off. also she observed that shorts abuse, sexual demand- suspected around ankles. She underwear was her M.A.’s immediately. called Arnold left premises, Arnold the 9-1-1. ed that leave arrived, present. were M.A. told paramedics many police time officers By the in her private Fritz that she had been touched Charles firefighter-paramedic area. Hospital, where took Otto and M.A. Nationwide Children’s Paramedics

4}{¶ was advised to hospital, for a kit was While the Otto evidence collected. rape this the next The record is unclear whether advice day. take M.A. to CCFA personnel, or some other source. At police, paramedics, hospital from the came that was point night, M.A. released. some part The is morning, The Otto took M.A. the CCFA. CCFA next

5} {¶ from the main At Hospital hospital. and is across street located Children’s CCFA, Marshall, interviewed Hospital employee, a Nationwide Children’s indicated that she had been questions M.A.’s to Marshall’s responses M.A. interview at the heart of Arnold’s Confrontation Clause sexually abused. This claim. For variety example, of relevant information. yielded The interview

{¶ 6} Arnold’s “pee-pee” “pee-pee” stated Arnold’s went inside M.A. necessary for M.A.’s “pee-pee.” touched her These statements mouth questions But M.A. also answered evaluation and treatment. investigation. response For to Marshall’s example, to the ongoing related and locked the bedroom door before M.A. that Arnold closed stated questions, her and that Arnold removed her underwear. raping Marshall, by examined physically M.A. was After the interview 7} Horner, worked in employee Gail who hospital nurse pediatric practitioner, concluded had hymen, to M.A.’s which she Horner found two abrasions CCFA. trauma, likely been acute from within by penetration, previous caused 72 hours. Horner testified that the sexual “diagnostic” abrasions were abuse. information, including testimony, Based on this and other Otto’s Arnold was on two rape indicted counts of violation of R.C. 2907.02. The first count intercourse; charged rape by vaginal by charged rape cunnilingus. second trial, At the court testify. determined M.A. was unavailable to After Marshall, the DVD watching recording M.A.’s interview with the court determined that statements had been for the of medical made 803(4). hearsay and were admissible under Evid.R. The court also that the by determined statements were not barred Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, DVD played jury. intercourse, jury guilty by found of rape vaginal Arnold but not

guilty of rape cunnilingus. R.C. 2907.02. Arnold was sentenced life in prison. On the Tenth District appeal, affirmed Arnold’s conviction. State v.

Arnold, 07AP-789, App. 2008-Ohio-3471, Franklin No. 2698885. WL We accepted appeal whether, Arnold’s in a discretionary determine criminal prosecution, out-of-court statements made child to an interviewer employed by a center child-advocacy right violates the to confront witnesses provided by the Sixth to the Amendment United States Constitution and Section Arnold, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. State v. 2008- Ohio-6813, N.E.2d

Analysis *4 Clause Confrontation “The that, Sixth Amendment’s provides Confrontation Clause all ‘[i]n * * * prosecutions, criminal the accused shall enjoy right the to be confronted with the against witnesses him.’ We have that procedural held this bedrock guarantee Texas, to both applies federal and state v. prosecutions. Pointer 380 400, 406, 1065, (1965).” U.S. 85 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 13 923 v. Washington Crawford (2004), 36, 42,124 1354,158 10, U.S. S.Ct. 177. L.Ed.2d “Section Article I [of the Ohio provides greater no right Constitution] confrontation than the Sixth (1990), 73, Amendment.” State v. 79, 56 Ohio St.3d 564 N.E.2d 446. Self Crawford, In the the Supreme Court of United States considered whether hearsay the introduction of a statement under admissible state law violated a defendant’s Sixth right Amendment to confront against the witnesses him. The held court that out-of-court statements violate the Sixth Amendment when they are testimonial and the defendant has had no to opportunity cross- 68,124 1354,158 examine the declarant. at 541 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 177. See also Siler, 39, State v. 2007-Ohio-5637, 534, 876 N.E.2d 21-26. The class that core but stated not define “testimonial” comprehensively court did “ ‘that made circum- statements were under includes of testimonial statements to that objective reasonably witness believe which lead an stances would ” 52, at Crawford, at a later trial.’ U.S. available for use statement would be 177, National Brief of Amicus Curiae 1354, quoting 158 L.Ed.2d 124 S.Ct. Stahl, v. 111 Ohio Lawyers 3. Accord State Defense Association Criminal 2006-Ohio-5482, 834, The 186, syllabus. one of paragraph St.3d one of many possible that the test was but emphasized objective-witness court stated, testimonial, and it expressly a statement to determine whether ways day out definition any spell comprehensive leave for another effort to “We ” 1354, 68, 124 S.Ct. 158 L.Ed.2d Crawford, 541 U.S. ‘testimonial.’ later, Washington 547 U.S. years Two in Davis to responses court whether a caller’s 165 L.Ed.2d considered S.Ct. testimo- during telephone a 9-1-1 conversation were dispatcher’s interrogation (1) that failed at trial. The court stated appear testify nial when the caller they happening, opposed were as the statements described the events as (2) any that had that reasonable listener happened past, events explaining ongoing face of an that the statements were made would conclude (3) necessary that the was to resolve emergency, interrogation objectively (4) informal it was interrogation that was because ongoing emergency, while phone provided frantically conducted over the and the answers were The that the Id. at 827. court concluded circumstances unsafe environment. surrounding interrogation primary indicate its was “objectively [that] police simply assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. [The caller] to enable sic.) witness; at 828. testifying.” (Emphasis not as a she was not Id. acting was that were not Accordingly, hearsay the court concluded the caller’s therefore, and, not barred the Sixth Amendment. testimonial Id. at 829. in which a the court also considered second case domestic- did at trial. Id. at officer appear

violence 819-820. complainant the victim at the of the incident and who witnessed who interviewed scene an affidavit the abuse testified trial in order complete sign concerning (1) Id. at 820. The court determined authenticate the affidavit. not what interrogation sought happened, happening, determine what had (3) (2) interrogation was not emergency, there was no ongoing (4) “formal interrogation *5 an that was emergency, needed resolve in a from the enough” separate complainant’s that it was conducted room entirely at that clear from “[i]t husband. Id. 830. The court concluded an investigation possibly that the was into interrogation part circumstances as, indeed, acknowledged.” officer past testifying expressly criminal conduct— hearsay that Accordingly, at 829. the court concluded evidence Id. Id. at therefore, Amendment. and, by that it was barred Sixth testimonial 834. when made are nontestimonial held that “[statements The court that the objectively indicating under circumstances police interrogation

course of assistance to meet is to enable interrogation of the primary purpose objectively circumstances are testimonial when the emergency. They ongoing primary purpose and that the ongoing emergency, that is no such indicate there relevant to past potentially events interrogation prove is to establish Siler, 39, 2007- Accord 116 Ohio St.3d criminal Id. at 822. prosecution.” later Ohio-5637, syllabus. N.E.2d one of the paragraph Muttart,

Stahl, and Siler Stahl, by rape statements hearsay In this court considered whether at a hospital a medical examination DOVE1 practitioner during victim to a nurse Stahl, at trial. testify unit admissible when the victim was not available ¶ 186, 2006-Ohio-5482, 834, at 1. The defendant 855 N.E.2d Ohio St.3d to confront right that the statements violated his Sixth Amendment argued ¶ stating: “They involve distinguished witnesses. Id. at 9. This court officers, made to law-enforcement while the statement issue here statements for professional facility primary covers one made to a medical at a medical investigating past medical treatment and not events receiving proper ¶ sic.) related to criminal Id. at 25. We concluded prosecution.” (Emphasis treatment, of the examination was to receive medical not to events, objective-witness Crawford, test outlined investigate past applied ¶ 47, were nontestimonial. Id. at 48. challenged and held Muttart, 5, 2007-Ohio-5267, 944, a 875 N.E.2d State Ohio St.3d at a child- child victim of sexual abuse was interviewed social worker ¶ now, Id., the social worker advocacy center. 14-15. As the case before us ¶ Id., During a doctor. interviewed the child before she was examined interview, put to the social worker that her father had his the child disclosed “ ” ¶ Id., pee-pee pee-pee.’ mouth and had his in her 16. The penis ‘put “ conduct had ‘a whole bunch of happened child also disclosed similar ” statements were nontestimonial because times.’ Id. We held the child’s or treatment personnel purposes diagnosis made to medical for “[s]tatements ¶ Id., 63. This is true because state- are inadmissible under Crawford.” to the remotely ments for medical and treatment “are not even related designed that the Clause was to avoid.” Id. evils Confrontation Stahl, Options Emergencies.” “Developing 1. “DOVE” stands for Violent 2006-Ohio-5482, specializes in for victims of 2. The unit health-care services assault and domestic disturbances. Id. sexual *6 296 Siler, by considered whether statements made child to we Siler, interrogation in the course of a were testimonial. deputy police

sheriffs 39, 2007-Ohio-5637, 534, 876 N.E.2d at 2. We concluded that “the sheriff were testimonial because the circum- deputy statements made to the that no existed and that objectively ongoing emergency stances indicate was to establish events police interrogation past potential- in ly prosecution.” relevant to a later criminal Id. We held courts Ohio in apply primary-purpose should test set forth Davis to determine “whether a police interrogation child declarant’s statement made the course of is testimo- nial paragraph syllabus, citing or nontestimonial.” Id. one 547 821-822, 2266, 126 165 L.Ed.2d 224. U.S. S.Ct. Supreme

Other State Comi Decisions Crawford, many Since state courts have supreme considered whether centers, by during child-advocacy statements made children interviews at or their equivalent, functional are testimonial and whether statements child victims of sexual abuse for medical and treatment are testimonial. that a recognize We number of those decisions held that statements by victims at child-advocacy

child-sexual-abuse centers their functional equivalent and, therefore, are testimonial inadmissible pursuant the Confrontation Clause opportunity when the defendant has no to cross-examine victim Crawford See, (Fla.2008), 896; at trial. v. e.g., State Contreras 979 So.2d v. Hooper State (2007), 139, 911; (2008), 145 13, Idaho 176 P.3d In re Rolandis G. 232 Ill.2d 327 (Iowa 479, 600; 2007), 296; Ill.Dec. v. Bentley State 739 N.W.2d State (2007), 267, 776; v. Kan. Henderson 284 160 P.3d State v. Snowden 385 314; (Mo.2006), 872; Blue, Md. 867 A.2d State Justus 205 S.W.3d State v. cases, 2006 ND N.W.2d 558. But in each of these the interviews were solely conducted purposes. forensic The situation we are presented with this case is distinct from those considered the above-cited cases. Here we are asked to determine whether statements that contain distinct forensic and medical diagnostic information. and were during made to social worker one interview Contreras, implicate the Confrontation example, Clause. For the Florida that a Supreme Court held statement taken the coordinator of a “child (“CPT”) protection team” was testimonial. Id. at 905. The interview was violence, conducted and at a videotaped shelter for victims of domestic and a officer was connected electronically the CPT coordinator in order to Id. There no suggest questions. was evidence the child received medical treatment based on the interview. court if primary, held “the not the sole, purpose of the CPT interview to investigate was whether the crime of child occurred, sexual abuse had and to establish facts relevant to a potentially later criminal prosecution.” Id. in a statements made Court excluded Similarly, Supreme the Illinois * * * “absolutely [the] no indication interview when there was

forensic * * * rather than conducted, degree, for treatment to substantial interview G., Ill.Dec. 232 Ill.2d at In re Rolandis investigative purposes.” *7 him to case, perform that an older child forced stating 600. In that after N.E.2d fellatio, center and was interviewed child-advocacy a was taken to a six-year-old recorded and observed at 19. The interview was video by a child advocate. Id. Contreras, no there was one-way a mirror. Id. As with by through a detective on the a medical evaluation or treatment based indication that the child received place that “the interview took The Illinois Court concluded Supreme interview. sexual alleged that a more detailed account of the at the behest of the so videotape” and memorialized on by could be obtained a trained interviewer abuse testimonial. Id. at 32. and held that the child’s statements were in a video- Supreme In the Idaho Court excluded statements Hooper, Response at a Trauma Abuse Center recorded forensic interview taken Sexual (“STAR”). 141,176 case, to the P.3d 911. In that a child was taken 145 Idaho child and her father locked STAR center after her mother discovered the arrival at the Upon sexual abuse. Id. at 140. STAR suspected bathroom center, with a the doctor conducted a sexual-abuse the child met doctor and examination, examination. Id. at 141. After the medical a forensic interviewer child, conducted video-recorded interview with the which a detective observed via a occurred after the child system. closed-circuit Id. Because the interview by met with and was examined interview served a physician, subsequent forensic, treatment-oriented, not a or purpose. vein, In the same that a child’s Supreme Kansas Court held worker, during by

statements interview conducted detective and social Unit, Exploited Missing both members of the Children were testimonial. Henderson, Henderson, 294, In 284 Kan. at 160 P.3d 776. a mother took her to a medical clinic after from the three-year-old daughter noticing discharge child’s and after the child that her hurt. Id. at vagina complained “potty place” that gonorrhea. learning 269. Test results revealed the child had Id. After results, child, about the test the detective and social worker interviewed the who ”way.’ disclosed that her had “touched her in a bad boyfriend ‘potty mother’s Again, Id. at 270. This interview was video and audio recorded. Id. there is no on the indication the child received additional medical treatment based interview. proposition These cases that stand for the the admission of during equivalents

statements obtained interviews at CACs or their functional when the declarant is unavailable result violations of the Confrontation Clause solely at trial arise from scenarios which the statements issue were than for ones. purposes, therapeutic forensic rather ameliorative made category, the latter our sister courts hold for the of medical and treatment are purpose child-sexual-abuse victims and, therefore, not testimonial do not the Confrontation even if implicate Clause (2008), subsequently by Seely are used the state v. State prosecution. (holding 373 Ark. 282 S.W.3d 778 that a child’s statements about abuse to a at a hospital social worker children’s before the child was examined a doctor nontestimonial); v. Arroyo State 284 Conn. 935 A.2d 975 (holding statements made to a social worker were nontestimonial because the child); of the interview was to provide medical assistance (Minn.2007), Krasky State v. that a (holding N.W.2d 636 child’s statements to a nurse sexual abuse alleging primary were nontestimonial because the nurse’s welfare); was to and protect assess the child’s health and State v. 339 Mont. 2007 MT Spencer, (holding 169 P.3d 384 that statements to a *8 (Colo. nontestimonial); counselor sexual regarding People Vigil abuse were 2006), 127 P.3d 916 (holding responses questions by to a doctor as of a part nontestimonial); sexual-assault examination were Commonwealth v. DeOliveira (2006), 56, 447 Mass. 849 N.E.2d 218 (holding physician statements to a made for purposes the of medical evaluation and treatment and were not testimonial); (Miss.2006), Hobgood v. State (holding 926 So.2d 847 that a child’s of description sexual abuse to his doctor was not for given purpose the of testimonial); prosecuting (2004), the accused and was not Vaught State v. 316, Neb. that a (holding N.W.2d 284 child’s statements to an emergency- nontestimonial). room physician identifying the of sexual perpetrator assault were mind, background With this we turn to whether M.A.’s statements to {¶ 27} Marshall were testimonial. Stahl, Muttart, Siler, Pursuant and to determine whether M.A.’s testimonial,

statements to Marshall were identify primary we must the of purpose the statements. Statements made for the of purpose diagnosis and Muttart, 5, 2007-Ohio-5267, treatment are nontestimonial. 116 Ohio St.3d ¶ However, N.E.2d 63. agents statements made to for the Siler, primary purpose of forensic are investigation testimonial.

39, 2007-Ohio-5637, Child-Advocacy Centers and the CCFA objective of a child-advocacy center like the CCFA is neither exclusively medical solely and treatment nor forensic investigation. “ purpose Advocacy ‘The of a Children’s a provide comprehensive, Center is culturally competent, multidisciplinary response allegations of child abuse a ” dedicated, Chandler, friendly setting.’ Nancy child Advocacy Children’s Cen- & 28 Hamline J.Pub.L. Child a Time ters: a Difference One Making Alliance, Guidelines Accreditation National Children’s Policy quoting (2004)5. Advocacy Centers Children’s model, Advocacy Center the of the Children’s development “Prior to child subject(ed) multiple the investigations often ‘traditional child abuse ” Snell, Stop Advocacy Lisa Child Centers: One Id. at quoting

interviews.’ 2003) (June 1. A child- Child Protection on the Road to Performance-Based “ ” a trauma to child-abuse goal’ one is to reduce advocacy center’s ‘number professionals multiple include from by coordinating the interview to victim turn, and which, number of interviews needed can reduce the agencies, the recommendation investigation, diagnosis, and improve quality “ avoid trauma Additionally, ‘[t]hey help at 323. children for treatment. Id. ” path.’ Id. story stops along legal judicial at various repeating their professionals, prose- These teams often include law-enforcement interdisciplinary cutors, advocates. at 324. personnel, medical and mental-health child Id. CCFA, Marshall, Nationwide employed At the social worker or suspected physical children who are victims Hospital, Children’s interviews much information as gather sexual abuse. The of the interview is as on a DVD and transmitted to another possible. The interview is both recorded doctor, a nurse Typically, practitioner room via closed-circuit television. caseworker, children’s watch representative services law-enforcement that the separate interview from a room. Marshall does inform child interview, team are but does tell him or that he or she watching members be or nurse the interview. will examined doctor after child, she or nurse After Marshall interviews meets with doctor to review child’s perform who will the medical examination practitioner *9 appropriate statements. The nurse or doctor conducts the medical examination or during based on child’s statements the interview. The nurse doctor relies the obtained interview to determine what examina- during on information Marshall’s example, identity and For information the of regarding tion tests are needed. alleged, perpetrator, age perpetrator, type of the of abuse frame the doctor nurse to to test time of the abuse allows or determine whether child sexually for transmitted infections. Capacity

The Interviewer’s Dual Child-advocacy are unique. Multidisciplinary cooperate centers teams story that the and will not have to retell the only so child interviewed once autonomy. Neither multiple times. Most members team retain their However, of other. agents nor medical become police personnel officers interview, the only the child victim one interviewer goes through ensure that in a possible single elicit much information from child as interview must as gather and must Thus, information needed each team member. (1) interview serves dual purposes: gather forensic information to investigate (2) potentially prosecute defendant for the offense and to elicit information necessary diagnosis treatment of the victim. The interviewer acts as an of each agent member of the multidisciplinary team. Certainly, some of the statements that M.A. made to Marshall primarily

served forensic or investigative purpose. Those statements include M.A.’s assertion that Arnold shut her; and locked the bedroom door before raping descriptions of where her mother and brother were while she was the bedroom Arnold, shorts, of Arnold’s boxer them, of him removing and of what like; Arnold’s “pee-pee” looked and her statement that Arnold removed her underwear. These likely were not necessary for medical Rather, treatment. they related primarily to the state’s investigation. Marshall effectively acted as an of agent police for the of obtaining these statements. Because Marshall acted an agent as in obtaining these statements, Siler, pursuant to Davis and employ we must the primary-purpose “

test to determine whether the primary purpose of the interrogation was ‘to ” enable police assistance to meet an ongoing Siler, emergency.’ 39, 2007-Ohio-5637, at paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting U.S. at 126 S.Ct. 165 L.Ed.2d 224. We hold that it was not. First, the statements involved a description past events. The alleged abuse occurred the previous evening, and the questioning specifically attempted to obtain a description Second, of the abuse. a reasonable observer would not perceive an ongoing emergency the time of questioning. patient had been discharged from the hospital the previous At evening. oral argument, counsel conceded that no medical emergency existed at the time of Marshall’s interview. Third, the questioning was not objectively necessary to an resolve emergency because there was no ongoing emergency. Finally, the interview was rather formal, more akin to the videotaped, planned interview of than to the Crawford frantic 9-1-1 call or the sequestered spur-of-the-moment but interview recounted in Davis. The primary purpose of that portion the interview was not to meet but,

ongoing emergency rather, to further the state’s forensic investigation. *10 Thus, these statements were testimonial in nature and their admission without prior opportunity for cross-examination prohibited by the Confrontation Clause. Crawford, 68,124 1354,158 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 177. interview of M.A. Marshall’s during the statements obtained Although thus and are testimonial investigation forensic to the state’s primarily

that related that information provided other statements Crawford, pursuant inadmissible during history obtained treat M.A. The medically necessary diagnose was an to make practitioner or nurse for the doctor important interview is are neces- and treatment what evaluation and to determine diagnosis accurate to toe” examination conducts “head nurse example, practitioner For sary. disclose sexual area of who children, genital patients only all but examines injury sustained trauma or identify any exam is to portion That of the abuse. alleged abuse. during performed, acts that Arnold that described the M.A.’s statements inside Arnold’s went “pee-pee” “pee-pee,” that Arnold touched her

including “butt,” that Arnold’s hand her Arnold’s touched “pee-pee” “pee-pee,” thus were “pee-pee” Arnold’s mouth touched her and that “pee-pee,” touched her treatment of M.A. diagnosis medical necessary proper for the troubled our dissent, states that he is In Justice Pfeifer his had necessary because M.A. medically conclusion that these statements However, although M.A. rape. of the hospital night at the on the been examined only establishes rape, of the the record night taken to the on the hospital was was examined for she performed, that a examination was rape-kit further to the CCFA for M.A. was referred diagnosis or treated. nurse also contends that the Pfeifer medical examination and treatment. Justice all medical- interview would have asked who examined M.A. after the practitioner history This is not true. during the examination. ly questions relevant practitioner for the nurse necessary interview was during obtained Marshall’s necessary. to determine what treatment diagnosis make an accurate M.A., that the “forensic Horner, examined testified practitioner the nurse who I or not need to test in that it lets me know whether guides my interview exam instance, that a says if a child infection. For sexually the child for transmitted me that I need to test to make sure vagina, touched their it means to penis sexually transmitted infection.” get child didn’t statements, Marshall acted as medically necessary eliciting these M.A., investigating police not of the nurse who examined

agent practitioner of the obtaining act as an agent Marshall did not officers. Because Stahl, 111 Ohio statements, to Davis. pursuant are not inadmissible these ¶ 2006-Ohio-5482, 834, N.E.2d St.3d are nontestimoni- and treatment made for medical Statements no 2007-Ohio-5267, 63. There is Muttart, al. *11 302

basis in the law for concluding capacity Marshall’s dual renders statements made M.A. for the of medical purpose diagnosis and treatment inadmissible Davis, pursuant Indeed, to the Confrontation in Clause. the United States Supreme Court that the acknowledged interrogation same interview or might Davis, produce both testimonial and nontestimonial statements. 547 U.S. at 828- Davis, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 224. As the court stated “This presents great problem.” no Id. at 829. recognize courts will the point “[TJrial which, for Sixth purposes, Amendment response interroga- tions become testimonial. Through in limine procedure, they should redact or exclude the portions any testimonial, do, statement that have become as for example, unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise admissible evidence.” Id. reliance on Davis Both dissents criticize our of our support conclusion

that although M.A.’s forensic testimonial, statements to Marshall were statements for the purpose diagnosis medical and treatment were properly Davis, First, admitted. Justice Pfeifer argues pursuant to when evidence statements, includes testimonial and nontestimonial the testimonial statements must be redacted or excluded violating to avoid right defendant’s to confront witnesses him. against agree We that M.A.’s testimonial statements should have excluded, been and we remand the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the admission of M.A.’s testimonial statements was harmless error. Next, both dissents reliance on Davis is erroneous because we that our argue examine the statements on a question-by-question basis and the testimonial and nontestimonial statements were interspersed, rather than being obtained in separate and distinct portions of the interview. Justice Pfeifer argues that this will make it difficult to distinguish the statements that should be redacted from may those that properly However, be admitted. our guiding consideration is the made, for which the statements are not the order in which they are obtained. Finally, both note that unlike in there was no ongoing dissents and, emergency therefore, in this case there nowas occasion for the questioning in this case to evolve from nontestimonial to testimonial. Our decision is not based on statements, the evolution of M.A.’s but on fact that the statements were made for different purposes. The fact that Davis involved an evolution from nontestimonial to testimonial preclude statements does not application its instances in which an interview simultaneously serves dual purposes. Further, the fact that police officers watched the interview and that it

was recorded change does not the fact that the statements were necessary for M.A.’s diagnosis medical and treatment. Similarly, the fact that information for gathered medical purposes subsequently used the state does not change the fact that the statements were made for diagnosis medical and treatment. Muttart, 5, 2007-Ohio-5267, Ohio St.3d 62. M.A.’s state- nontestimo- and treatment were necessary ments that Clause Arnold’s Confrontation violating without properly nial and were admitted rights.

Conclusion CCFA, occupied dual M.A. at the she Marshall interviewed When *12 for use collecting by information interviewer capacities: she was both a forensic diagnosis necessary for information eliciting and a medical interviewer child-advocacy made to interviewers and We hold that statements treatment. and treatment are nontestimonial diagnosis are made for medical centers that Thus, we affirm offending the Clause. and are admissible without Confrontation statements to the extent M.A.’s appeals of court of to judgment properly and were purpose Marshall for the of treatment made interviewers child- We further hold statements admitted. or are primarily investigative that serve a forensic advocacy centers when the pursuant and are to the Confrontation Clause testimonial inadmissible trial. with Arnold agree cross-examination at declarant is unavailable for We by made M.A. to admitting court the forensic statements the trial erred it held that appeal’s judgment reverse insofar as these Marshall and the court However, appeals court of did were admissible. because the forensic statements forensic statement to Marshall was not consider whether the admission M.A.’s v. 214, 2006-Ohio-791, Conway, see State harmless, consider issue. to the court of this appeals we remand case in part affirmed

Judgment in part, and reversed and cause remanded. JJ., Lundberg concur. Stratton, Lanzinger, Cupp, JJ., dissent. O’Donnell, Pfeifer J., not participating. C.

Brown, J., dissenting.

Pfeifer, in reaching case law majority opinion applicable The misconstrues the I cannot be both testimonial its conclusion. conclude that forensic interview right violating Sixth Amendment and nontestimonial without defendant’s witnesses him. against confront the law of Amendment’s majority ably explains the Sixth opinion The

{¶ I will not cases. Confrontation Clause as elucidated various federal Ohio fairly characterizes case majority also opinion redescribe these cases. The law from states that it summarizes in section titled “Other State other dissent, Supreme majority opinion’s Decisions.” I on the Court based law, majority applies of the understanding way opinion but because law to this case. majority many opinion acknowledges questions The asked interviewer, Marshall, “to gather

the forensic Kerri were asked forensic informa- are, therefore, In Washington tion” and testimonial. Davis U.S. 813, 828-829, 126 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d the court held that statements of a witness who is unavailable for cross-examination should be or redacted excluded violating right avoid the defendant’s to confront witnesses him. against Furthermore, testimonial statements this case were not redacted excluded. the testimonial statements in this case are different from those discussed Davis. the testimonial statements were made after a series of interrogator nontestimonial statements had concluded. Id. The in that case had police meeting elicited statements assist the ongoing emergency: those nontestimonial, and their as permissible. admission evidence was *13 statements, Id. eliciting After the initial interrogator the asked series of questions attempting alleged elicit information crime. Id. at about 828. The court “no great found problem” approach this because the nontestimoni- al separate statements were and distinct from the testimonial statements. Id. at 829. The court stated that from an questioning addressing could evolve emer- gency eliciting forensic According information. Id. at 828. to the Supreme Court, may testimonial not if they statements be introduced as evidence are document, part transcript must other Id. at 829. redacted. majority opinion First, makes creative of the opinion. use Davis it the concept concludes that of nontestimonial evolving statements into testimonial statements when an dual applies interrogator has a Davis purpose. does not support this interrogator conclusion. The Davis did not dual purposes: have separate she had two purposes. completed questions She regarding the ongoing emergency then moved on to elicit information that be could used as questions, elicited, evidence. Marshall’s which opinion in the of the majority, statements, both testimonial nontestimonial were interspersed, rendering it difficult distinguish those should that be redacted from those that need not be Second, in redacted. this there was ongoing emergency. case no The emergency before, night occurred the so there was no questioning occasion to evolve Third, from nontestimonial eliciting eliciting statements to testimonial ones. case, exist, testimonial statements in which majority opinion this concedes majority were not redacted. The opinion relies on but to the extent only that its purposes. Davis suits of appeals the court cause to enable remanding the Although harmless, we it finding than is harmless is better whether the error

determine was not in this case record that the error It is clear from the do neither. should 2006-Ohio-791, N.E.2d St.3d Conway, 108 Ohio harmless. State ¶ error is a constitutional 996, 78, of whether we stated that the determination remaining evidence. sufficiency inquiry into the simply harmless “is not possibility is a reasonable Instead, is whether there question It is patently to the conviction.” have contributed might complained evidence contributed to “might case have this that the testimonial obvious the conviction.” conclusion majority opinion implicit is its troubling aspect of the Another I Although concede medically necessary. questions Marshall’s First, a doctor had necessary. not they were

they may helpful, have been done and asked That doctor would have evening. the previous examined M.A. (2007), 145 v. Hooper M.A. at that time. See State necessary to treat everything states, “Because 139, 141, majority opinion about which the Idaho 176 P.3d and was examined after the child met with occurred interview forensic, not a medical or treatment- interview served a subsequent physician, below, Second, oriented, as discussed Majority opinion purpose.” would have She questioning. examined M.A. after Marshall’s practitioner nurse during her examination. medically questions asked all relevant redacted nor in this case were neither The testimonial statements Nevertheless, the testimonial majority opinion concludes harmless. I witnesses. will now right the defendant’s to confront statements do violate Marshall were I that all of the statements elicited why believe explain therefore, and, admitted into evidence. improperly testimonial M.A.

Marshall’s Interview with by CCFA as employed Marshall is a licensed social worker Kerri *14 job interviewing duties as interviewer. Marshall described medical forensic abuse. She testified physical to be victims of sexual or alleged children who are that she customarily observe the interviews personnel law-enforcement being are observed. and that the children are not aware conducts to another contemporaneously with M.A. was broadcast Marshall’s interview television, by people, several where it was viewed room over closed-circuit on a DVD. detective. It was also recorded including police M.A., about many questions with Marshall asked During her interview were not relevant questions Some of the previous evening. the events of the Marshall example, or to medical treatment. For emergency ongoing touch M.A., daddy’s pee-pee off?” “Did your get “How did underwear asked pee- daddy played or when you laying sitting up down your pee-pee?” and “Were 306

pees you?” interview, Marshall subsequently prepared report of the entitled “Medical Forensic Interview In Summary.” report, this Marshall noted that Arnold “fled the by stealing home and her car” purse [Otto’s] after Otto confronted him. Marshall recommended that M.A. be from “protected any contact with alleged perpetrator as this investigation continues.” made in police interrogation

Statement the course of a case, Siler, The issue this it as was Stahl and is to determine whether hearsay by were offered the prosecution and that the defendant argued right violated his under the Sixth Amendment to confront a however, witness are testimonial. A question, threshold is whether the state- Davis, ments were made in the a police course of interrogation. See at U.S. 822, 2266, 224; Siler, 126 S.Ct. 39, 165 L.Ed.2d 2007-Ohio-5637, 116 Ohio St.3d ¶ 534, N.E.2d 30-31. “police What constitutes interrogation” purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis has not been addressed the United States Supreme 823, Court. See Davis at fn. 2. is, course, It plainly obvious that a police officer did not conduct

interrogation case; in this social worker Kerri Marshall conducted the interroga- tion. The question becomes: was Marshall an agent of law enforcement when she conducted the interrogation? follow, Id. For the reasons that I conclude that she was. Although the state argues apply only Davis when Crawford officer,

interviewer is a law-enforcement the cases do not such a support narrow interpretation. I am persuaded that and Davis define broader Crawford constitutional protection from out-of-court statements that are obtained primarily to assist in a prosecution, criminal regardless of whether the interrogator is a police agent officer or an police. 822-823, 547 U.S. at 126 S.Ct. 2266, 224; 51-53, 165 L.Ed.2d Crawford, 1354, U.S. 124 S.Ct. 158 L.Ed.2d (the 177. See at 50 evil at principal which the Confrontation Clause Crawford was directed was the civil-lawmode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use accused). parte ex examinations as evidence against the Siler, we stated that courts consistently have applied the primary- purpose test to statements that a child declarant made to those Siler, determined to police agents. be 2007-Ohio-5637, ¶ cases, N.E.2d at 29. In one of those Supreme Court of North Dakota stated. “In cases Crawford, since other states with the functional equivalent (‘CAC’) Advocacy Children’s Center involved in this case have held that similar statements made a child with police involvement inevitably are testimonial.” State Blue 199 N.D. 717 N.W.2d A Florida court of appeals has considered four factors to determine whether the interroga- *15 tion at issue was “the functional equivalent of a police interrogation. These four

307 the (1) establishment pertinent the Florida statutes the effect of factors are (2) CAC], and a the nature of equivalent the CPT Florida functioning [the and of of child [the in the examination the law involvement of enforcement extent (3) performed the the of examination hospital], purpose at practitioner] [the nurse (4) CPT, and the a of the capacity in her as member practitioner] nurse by [the nurse conducted practitioner] [the at time any ongoing emergency of absence v. the child.” Hernandez State (Fla.App.2007), So.2d her examination of test, helpful factors are 1270,1280. I this Although adopt four-part would not she police as of the when acting agent was an determining whether Marshall interrogated M.A. of First, creation CACs statutory that authorized the scheme link and enforcement. between the CACs law provisions

contains establish Second, police 2151.427. See Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-33-26. R.C. 2151.426 and and interrogation happening interrogation as it was watched detective Third, on issues that were focusing primarily saved to a DVD. was recorded and medical, as a “Medical Forensic Interview not interview was memorialized forensic, Fourth, not there that the was medical. Summary,” purpose suggesting emergency no while the interview was conducted. ongoing Furthermore, job title professional; Marshall is a medical “Forensic” means in or suitable courts “[u]sed “medical forensic interviewer.” (9th Ed.2009) 721. The Dictionary law Black’s Law public of debate.” goal of a of Human has stated forensic Michigan Department “[t]he Services * * * accurate support from a child that will interview is obtain statement justice systems,” fair in the criminal and child welfare decision-making of process.” Michigan, is not of a treatment State part that “the interview Protocol, Interviewing http://www.michigan.gov/documents/dhs/DHS- at Forensic 2010). (accessed 25,May PUB-0779_211637_7.pdf police an of the when she conducted agent I conclude Marshall was Blue, 558, 14-16, 134, ND 717 N.W.2d of M.A. See her forensic interview therein; 593, 101 State Mack 337 Or. P.3d cases cited proxy police). of caseworker was a (Department Human Services Application primary-purpose test primary step is to determine whether The next ongoing emergency. to meet an was to enable assistance interrogation Siler, 39, 2007-Ohio-5637, one of the paragraph First, 165 L.Ed.2d 547 U.S. at S.Ct. syllabus, quoting had The abuse past alleged events. description the interview involved specifically attempted evening, questioning and the previous occurred the Second, would not a reasonable observer of the abuse. description obtain a patient been questioning. had emergency time perceive ongoing *16 308 At the oral

discharged hospital previous evening. argument, from the counsel no time of emergency conceded that medical existed the Marshall’s interview. Third, to an questioning necessary emergency the was resolve because there formal, was no interview was rather more akin ongoing emergency. Finally, the to to 9-1-1 videotaped, planned the interview of than the frantic call or Crawford sequestered spur-of-the-moment the but interview recounted in Davis. Each factor independently suggests that there was no ongoing emergency; collectively, the is conclusion manifest. primary purpose Because the of the Marshall interview not to was meet

an emergency, the next to ongoing step entirety evaluate of the factual surrounding circumstances interview establish whether its primary pur pose past was “to establish or events relevant later prove potentially criminal Davis, 822, 126 prosecution.” 2266, 165 547 U.S. at S.Ct. L.Ed.2d only A CAC can agency, be established a services law children’s enforcement, or a prosecutor, and the CAC is responsible assembling a 2151.427(A). team. multidisciplinary R.C. 2151.426 and multidisciplinary The team must include law enforcement and prosecuting attorneys as members. Id. statutory connection between suggests CACs law enforcement CACs solely are not medical-treatment providers and that CAC interviewer can an agent be the police. The circumstances the interview indicate its

was “to establish or prove past potentially events relevant to later criminal Davis, 822, 126 prosecution.” 2266, 165 Siler, 547 atU.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 224. See 39, 2007-Ohio-5637, Ohio St.3d paragraph syllabus. one of the interview, Police observed the which customary the state concedes is a practice. A recording DVD preserved, the interview was strong indication purpose of the interview was obtain evidence for use I prosecution. am unaware of doctors videotaping patient interviews to assist them medical treatments or of allowing police routinely doctors officers to observe them when they patients. their examine Furthermore, many of the questions asked were investigatory nature

and similar to the questions asked in a in judicial proceed- direct examination ing. See U.S. S.Ct. 165 L.Ed.2d 224. For example, questions removed, so, about how the underwear was did who and the specific positions standing up lying down—in which alleged abuse occurred — represent an attempt gain specific past details of If questions events. have a it is purpose, secondary purpose. to their I investigatory might view differently nurse, Stahl, Marshall’s if questions she were as she but is not. Furthermore, practitioner nurse would have all inquiries made relevant to medical treatment after during physical examination the social worker interview that Marshall’s practitioner That stated M.A. the nurse questioned are practitioners But nurse degree. is no doubt true some my exam” “guides opinion, intermediary. my do not need highly professionals; educated evidence, not to assist forensic interjected in order to elicit intermediary in the medical examination. questions from record that Marshall asked apparent It is objectively are quite this case The circumstances of investigation.

to assist *17 2007-Ohio-5267, 944, Muttart, 5, v. 116 Ohio from St.3d different State ¶ personnel in the course 62, by medical hearsay in which statements obtained Muttart, In not police did challenge. a Amendment treatment survived Sixth videotaped. argues The state and the interview was observe interview for future helped M.A. to assess need that Marshall asked questions if occurred. Even it had counseling counseling any but fails show whether alone to estab- occurred, a for would be insufficient counseling recommendation purposes. for medical primarily lish that the interview was report, something in this is Marshall’s The critical evidence case “allega “perpetrator” It uses the words majority opinion does not address. list, not found in a medical typically report. tions” and a witness an item includes “alleged have no contact with the patient The states that should report report as indicates that Marshall perpetrator investigation this continues.” assisting ongoing investigation targeting particular was an believed she in an participants criminal When themselves to be suspect. interviewers believe suspect, they pre that has criminal conduct investigation targeted particular cisely type parte protects of ex examinations that the Confrontation Clause 50-53, 124 1354, 158 at against. 541 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 177. Crawford, U.S. by Conclusions reached sister states decided, have addressed many supreme Since was state courts Crawford cases, In concluded eight supreme the issue before us. at least state courts have by non-law- that out-of-court statements child sexual-assault victims various (2008), 141, v. Ark. personnel Seely enforcement were nontestimonial. State 373 916; (2007), 778; (Colo.2006),127 v. People Vigil Arroyo 282 v. P.3d State S.W.3d (2006), 597, 975; 56, v. 447 Mass. 284 Conn. 935 A.2d Commonwealth DeOliveira 636; 218; (Minn.2007), 736 v. Krasky Hobgood N.E.2d v. N.W.2d State 849 State 227, 245, (Miss.2006), 847; (2007), 2007 MT Spencer So.2d State v. 339 Mont. 926 (2004), 316, 384; Each of Vaught 169 v. 268 Neb. 682 N.W.2d 284. P.3d State are not in this case. present these cases turned on factual determinations that (the See, 156, of an 373 Ark. at 282 778 e.g., Seely, S.W.3d treatment”); 127 P.3d by Vigil, “was medical interview conducted social worker (statements diagnosis); Hobgood, of medical purposes at 927 doctor were (statements working who “were not people were made to 926 So.2d 852 310 police”

connection with the or were made for the seeking medical treatment). supreme At least nine state courts have concluded that out-of-court by child victims to personnel sexual-assault non-law-enforcement are (Fla.2008), 896; v. 139,

testimonial. State Contreras 979 145 Idaho Hooper, So.2d G., 911; 13, 479, 600; 176 re P.3d Rolandis 232 Ill.2d Ill.Dec. N.E.2d 327 902 (Iowa 2007), 296; (2007), State v. Bentley 739 N.W.2d State v. Henderson 284 267, 776; 64, 314; Kan. 160 P.3d Snowden 385 State v. Md. 867 A.2d State (Mo.2006), 872; Blue, 134, 558; Mack, Justus 205 ND S.W.3d 2006 717 N.W.2d 337 Or. 101 P.3d 349. Each of these cases involves interviewer who performed See, substantially circumstances similar the facts us. e.g., before Blue, (a ND N.W.2d 2-3 forensic interviewer conducted the watched; a police interview while officer officer given videotaped interview); Contreras, (interview recording at 905 by So.2d child- protection-team recorded); coordinator by was watched officer police Bent (interview ley, 739 by N.W.2d counselor at child-protection center was officers, them). watched took copy who videotaped interview My conclusion in this case is bolstered fact that majority of our sister *18 courts that substantially have considered the same issue have reached the same conclusion that I reach.

Conclusion I conclude that of Marshall’s forensic interview {¶ 70} to prove past establish or potentially events relevant to later criminal prosecution. conclude, therefore, I the statements were testimonial and that their admission violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States I Constitution. would reverse decision of the court of appeals. I dissent. J.,

O’Donnell, dissenting. The issue this case concerns whether the trial court violated Michael Arnold’s right constitutional to confront the witnesses him against when it hearsay admitted four-year-old M.A., statements that Arnold’s daughter, made to Marshall, Kerri a medical forensic interviewer at the Center for Child and Family Advocacy at Nationwide Hospital, Children’s who part interviewed M.A. as of investigation allegations into of sexual agree abuse. I majority Marshall as an agent acted of law enforcement when she interviewed M.A. because Marshall had to collect information for the police. use However, majority simultaneously because the also decides Marshall acted as an of medical agent professionals, rendering M.A.’s statements relevant nontestimonial, diagnosis and treatment Marshall’s notwithstanding primary pur- pose to collect that same information for the I dissent. police, respectfully History

Facts Procedural Michael Wendy Arnold and Otto married their teens and had two M.A., case, girl, years children: a who was four old the time relevant to this M.S.A., a boy, who was five. The had a volatile which couple relationship, violence, physical included accusations of infidelity, and an unsubstantiated claim mother, that Arnold had abused M.S.A. According Wendy Arnold’s had made stories up involving get the children to back at Arnold for on cheating her. After Wendy July However, filed for divorce in Arnold moved to Ohio. the two reconciled, and November she him followed to Ohio. 7, 2005, the evening Wendy On of December fell asleep living M.S.A., her,

room with but noises upstairs woke and she went to the bedroom Arnold, however, investigate. door, had locked the bedroom and she for yelled did, him it. open Once he she saw his halfway “boxers off on his side” and M.A. on lying couple’s air mattress. pulled She blanket off of M.A. and daughter’s discovered her underwear around her ankles. At that point, she told Wendy Arnold to leave. He told that nothing happened, but he left the house when she called 9-1-1. responded, Paramedics and officers and M.A. told firefighter-paramedic Fritz Charles that someone touched private area. Fritz took Wendy and both children to emergency room at Children’s where Hospital, performed authorities a rape-kit examination on M.A. Wendy received instructions take M.A. to the Center Child and (the “CCFA”)

Family Advocacy at Hospital Children’s morning. the next 2151.425(A) center, CCFA is a child-advocacy which is defined R.C. to mean “a * * * center operated by participating entities to perform functions and activities * * * * * * and provide services regarding reports alleged sexual of a abuse *19 child or type 2151.426(A), another of abuse of a child.” Pursuant to R.C. participating operating entities a child-advocacy may center include children’s services, enforcement, law prosecuting attorney. and the The Columbus Police Department, prosecutor, and children’s all in services have offices the CCFA building. Marshall, Kerri a CCFA, medical forensic working interviewer for the

interviews children when there are allegations physical sexual or abuse. These interviews are recorded on DVD and on observed closed-circuit television examination, nurse or doctor perform enforcement, who will a physical law caseworker, children’s services and sometimes a prosecutor. According to Mar- shall, her interview is for purposes of medical and treatment. Howev- detectives, nurses, children’s doctors, having

er, purpose explained she also all “Before we were the interview: caseworkers, watch prosecutors services I would know, process. do the same we would You building. in same We would exam done. their medical would have They children. interview the have to services, They will law enforcement. on to medical reports forward our way in this we the child. So have to interview may law enforcement review [ ]— child won’t have interview. The through one go child will have upit so the set having the other —the really that’s story again. So to relive the Thus, goal the interview had watching the interview.” there people other not have to reinterview would that law enforcement information so enough obtain child. Nommay, police Horner, a Monte case, practitioner, nurse In this Gail Dunn, advocate, a children’s and Vanise detective, Nielson, a victim Joelle M.A. in a Marshall interviewed caseworker, the interview. observed services ask that she would explained to M.A. with DVD cameras. She room separate attempted and she check-up, her a give and that a nurse would some questions however, quickly the interview introductory questions; rapport build events: prior night’s focused on the you? care of

“And who takes dad. My my

“A. mom and care— your mom and dad take “Q. Your my not at home. my “A. But dad’s come? your not at home? How

“Q. Your dad’s jail. got “A. Because he jail? daddy him What did got How come

“Q. jail. Okay. Him got do? just jail.” Nothing. got

“A. He jail, and M.A. why gone Arnold had asking continued M.A. Marshall fighting. had Wendy been something that he had done explained door and that neither she had locked the bedroom stated that Arnold M.A. also room, M.A. revealed questioning, further upon were in the but Wendy nor sleeping Arnold on the bed. in the bedroom with she had been stalled, M.A. whether she Marshall asked questioning that line of When “Today.” When check-up. responded, for a M.A. to a doctor had ever been did said, hurting.” Marshall my legs “Because why, M.A. Marshall asked returned the focus but instead complaint, of M.A.’smedical the source explore arrest: to Arnold’s *20 Now, legs hurting? Okay. daddy you daddy

“Your when said — home, jail jail? to him at to daddy went who took Cops. “A.

“ * * *

“Q. cops? Who called the My

“A. mom.

“Q. call Why cops? did she

“A. Because them fighting.” why Marshall asked had to call police, Otto and continued: “I your don’t understand what mom and dad were about. fighting Were they fighting about to I something happened you? Okay. just Yeah? want truth, you to tell the that’s all I want you Okay. any to do. You are not Okay? truth, [M.A.], trouble. I am going you you tell and I want to tell me the truth. Okay? your your So mom and dad were fighting something about happened you.

“A. I say can’t—I can’t it.”

Marshall then out a brought picture girl identity and had M.A. of her parts body. She then continued M.A.: questioning would if you do someone touched of your private parts?

“[W]hat one you What would do? get

“A. You in trouble.

“Q. gets Who trouble?

“A. Him.”

Upon further questioning, M.A. denied that anyone put had touched or anything private parts. Marshall anyone then asked whether had asked her to keep secret: your

“Has mom you ever told a secret? keep “A. Yeah.

“Q. What secret did mom your you keep? tell (Inaudible.) “A.

“Q. your How about dad? Did your you keep dad ever tell a secret? “A. No.

“Q. anyone you No? Has ever told not to tell?

“A. No.

“Q. Well, I No? don’t understand how cops your come there were house last and how night you go come had to to the doctor’s across the street.

“A. Because.

“ * * * locked when the door was the bedroom

“Q. mommy Did ever come ever in? Did mom come you sleeping? and dad were when Oh, yeah. “A. she in? did mom see when came

“Q. Yeah. What off. My “A. underwear was underwear off? Okay. your get off? How did

“Q. Your underwear was off. my took them “A. Because dad dad Oh, happened your your when took okay. And then what

“Q. what really my happened? it fast ear you say Do want to underwear off? underwear off? your After dad took (Inaudible) My

“A. dad-— off? And then what? “Q. your Took underwear (Inaudible) and with me. “A. pee-pee your pee-pee? off and touched

“Q. daddy your Your took underwear doing pee-pees. And was “A. No. what?

“Q. And was doing pee-pees But he was touching my pee-pee. “A. Him was jail.” why got me. he That’s “pee-pee” Arnold’s went explained further M.A. questioning,

On hand, her with his that he “pee-pee” inside he had touched “pee-pee,” her had while that his touched pee-pees,” “pee-pee” of her top “playing had been on “butt,” “pee-pee.”2 mouth had her Once her and that his touched outside of information, any ask other instances of did not M.A. about Marshall had this she abusers, on rather remained focused Arnold and other but any potential abuse or of abuse. specific reconfirmed this instance Horner, nurse, for a physical exam. then took M.A.

Marshall would have head-to-toe exami- testimony, Horner’s she conducted According to questions, answers to Marshall’s but she regardless nation of M.A.’s of M.A. my in that it lets me know guides “that forensic interview exam explained sexually transmitted infection.” The I to test the child for whether or not need “butt,” green, touched “pee-pee” that his needle 2. M.A. that Arnold’s “butt” also said “[M.A.], responded, this stuff is “pee-pee,” touched her to which Marshall and that his ears important.” consistent with hymen on the of M.A. revealed abrasions exam physical injury. penetrating two counts of interview, charged state Arnold with on this Based trial court found M.A. be objection, the in violation of R.C. 2907.02. Over

rape nontesti- to Marshall were hearsay and that her unavailable for trial the interview for recording the video played monial and admissible. The state Tenth rape. guilty vaginal which found Arnold jury, subsequently and that affirmed, agent was not an holding District Marshall were not testimonial. M.A.’s statements *22 inter- to determine whether Marshall’s accepted appeal We Arnold’s

{¶ 131} subject to Clause. elicited testimonial statements the Confrontation view The Clause Confrontation provides that The Amendment to the United States Constitution Sixth {¶ 132} * * * enjoy right shall to be prosecutions, all criminal the accused “[i]n 2004, Supreme him.” Prior to Court of against confronted with the witnesses the state to interpreted permit had the Confrontation Clause the United States at trial if the appear statements of a declarant who did not hearsay use if it hearsay exception” within “a rooted or otherwise bore hearsay firmly fell See, (1980), v. Roberts “particularized guarantees e.g., of trustworthiness.” Ohio 56, Thus, 66, 2531, 597. statements made for 448 U.S. 100 S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d notwithstanding treatment admissible purposes of medical (1992), v. Illinois inability of the accused to cross-examine the declarant. White 346, 356-357, 736, 848, 112 116 L.Ed.2d and fn. 8. 502 U.S. S.Ct. 36, 1354, (2004), 124 v. 541 U.S. S.Ct. 158 Washington Crawford 177, however, that of the Sixth recognized interpretation

L.Ed.2d the court reconciled with the historical Amendment articulated Roberts could be It held that the Sixth Amendment underpinnings of the Confrontation Clause. reliable, “commands, reliability that be [hearsay] not that evidence be but in a manner: in the crucible of cross-examination.” particular by testing assessed right at the accused’s guarantees 61. Because the Sixth Amendment Crawford admission of testimony,” confront those who “bear the Confrontation Clause bars or, if is unless the witness at trial the witness appears testimonial statements unavailable, at 51. opportunity the accused had a for cross-examination. Id. prior covers, it explained [‘testimonial’] The court else the term “[w]hatever grand at a before a prior testimony preliminary hearing, at a minimum to applies trial; at interrogations.” or at a and to Id. 68. jury, police former Washington v. The Court revisited the issue Davis Supreme held, 813, 2266, court are 165 L.Ed.2d “Statements 547 U.S. S.Ct. under circum- police interrogation when made in the course of nontestimonial interrogation is to indicating primary objectively stances They are testimonial emergency. an ongoing to meet assistance police enable ongoing is no such there objectively indicate circumstances when the to establish or interrogation that the emergency, and at Davis prosecution.” to later criminal relevant potentially events prove past during police made operator to a 9-1-1 that statements court held 822. The nontestimonial; are ongoing emergency to an response conducted interrogation had ended are testimoni- emergency however, made to after police al. Muttart,

Stahl, and Siler Davis to determine applied has previously This court Crawford or nontestimonial. at trial were testimonial admitted whether statements 2006-Ohio-5482, 834, N.E.2d Stahl, In State nurse victim to DOVE-unit by rape statements made we considered whether There, “adopt[ed] we officer were testimonial. presence in the a testimonial purposes, For Confrontation Clause ‘objective witness’ test Ohio. objective circumstances which would lead one made ‘under statement includes available for use at a that the statement would be reasonably to believe witness ” 124 S.Ct. Crawford, 541 U.S. quoting trial.’ Id. later to the nurse were the victim’s statements L.Ed.2d 177. We concluded *23 repeating have assumed that reasonably victim could nontestimonial because the police information to provided the same professional to a nurse or other medical investigation. from the criminal purpose a and distinct medical separate served ¶at 46. Id. 2007-Ohio-5267, Muttart, Stahl, in v. 116 Ohio St.3d Following State

{¶ a child’s statements to social we examined the issue whether 875 N.E.2d in Toledo Mercy Hospital Children’s at the Maltreatment Clinic worker Child personnel made to medical We held “[statements were testimonial. Crawford, under because or treatment are not inadmissible of purposes that the Clause was related to the evils Confrontation remotely are not even ¶ fact the also noted that “[t]he avoid.” Id. at 63. We designed to subsequently in this case was personnel the medical gathered by information not made for the fact that the statements were change state does not used the however, law had not been Notably, enforcement use.” Id. the state’s or examination. involved in the interview Siler, 39, 2007- distinguished court Stahl State 534, and, primary-purpose held that the

Ohio-5637, relying on determined police made to or those to a child declarant’s statements applies test “ when the circumstances are testimonial agents: ‘[Statements] be * * * and that the ongoing emergency, no there is objectively indicate interrogation past of the is to or events prove establish ” ¶ 30, prosecution.’ quoting relevant to later criminal Id. at Davis v. potentially Washington, 547 U.S. at 126 S.Ct. 165 L.Ed.2d 224. The court of a of rejected argument understanding because child’s limited the criminal justice, of child his or system reasonably expect could not trial, therefore, used at a be later and the child’s statements to police interrogators are nontestimonial under the test. primary-purpose cases Davis applying recognize Our thus use of Crawford agent different standards when the interviewer is an of law enforcement questioner when the interviewer is an of a medical agent provider. When is enforcement, court, Siler, agent of law accordance looks whether primary purpose interrogation past is to establish or events prove potentially prosecution. questioner relevant later criminal When the is enforcement, professional court, Stahl, to law following related objective-witness applies test determines whether the circumstances lead an objective reasonably would witness that the believe statement would be available for use at later trial.

The Majority’s Dual-Capacity Test however, Today’s majority, charts a course from the different Confron- jurisprudence tation Clause Supreme of the of the Court United States and adopts its own dual-capacity test which interrogation is examined on a question-by-question basis to determine whether interviewer acted as an of law agent agent enforcement or as an entity some other when eliciting test, particular statement. Applying this it that testimonial and finds nontestimo- nial interspersed throughout statements are Marshall’s and that Mar- interview variously shall acted as an of law agent enforcement and a medical as examiner. This analysis contrary to United States Court Supreme jurisprudence, which directs that we should look primary to the interrogation, not the secondary tertiary purpose. Here, Marshall as an agent acted law enforcement when she *24 141} M.A.,

interviewed as she of questions asked on behalf the in the police absence of ongoing an to or emergency prove establish events relevant to later past criminal prosecution. solely The interview she conducted on confirming single focused the instance of sexual abuse that Wendy had accused Arnold of committing: the history child’s medical night before, went no further than Marshall did not any ask M.A. prior experienced, about instances of sexual she abuse had and Marshall it did not evaluate would to return to whether be safe the child live with Wendy. Further, as majority explains, formal, “the interview rather akin more to the videotaped, planned interview of than to the frantic 9- Crawford in interview recounted but sequestered spur-of-the-moment call or the 1-1 ¶at 35. Majority opinion Davis.” that that M.A.’s statement holds majority properly therefore where her inside, descriptions of door with her her locked the bedroom

Arnold and looked “pee-pee” and what Arnold’s boxer shorts and were mother brother his underwear had both and her like, that Arnold removed and her statements for medical necessary were likely “[t]hese are testimonial because investiga- to the Rather, primarily related state’s or treatment. diagnosis ¶at 34. Majority opinion tion.” an acted as of medical agent determines that Marshall majority Yet the 143}

{¶ way diagnosis in to medical and questions any when relevant she asked providers that treatment, performed, that “described the acts Arnold so that the statements went inside ‘pee-pee’ that Arnold’s ‘pee-pee,’ that Arnold touched her including ‘butt,’ Arnold’s touched her that hand ‘pee-pee’ that Arnold’s ‘pee-pee,’ her were that mouth touched her thus ‘pee-pee,’ her and Arnold’s ‘pee-pee,’ touched According and to medical treatment M.A.” necessary proper diagnosis for the statements, acted medically necessary these Marshall majority, eliciting “[i]n M.A., not of investigating who practitioner an of the nurse examined agent as Majority opinion at 40. officers.” police view, that relevant for my enough it is not these statements were 144}

{¶ rather, the circum- totality is whether diagnosis; question of the interview was to indicate that the objectively stances or prove and it was establish facilitate medical treatment whether criminal potentially prosecution. events relevant to later past allega- questions sought It is confirm manifest Marshall’s would relevant at a proving past and that these events be tions of sexual abuse of the circumstances totality and indicates prosecution, criminal investigative prosecutorial purpose. primarily interview whole served questions asking why to a Notably, response M.A. the abuse series revealed house, why had her Arnold why the come to parents fighting, her her doing pee-pees” that Arnold jail, had and M.A. stated “was gone jail.” got he why “[t]hat’s live, Thus, in- functionally M.A.’s recorded statements “are identical ” on testimony, a witness does direct examination.’ doing ‘precisely court what — 2532, U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts L.Ed.2d 224. 126 S.Ct. quoting L.Ed.2d U.S. “ state- ‘striking the same resemblance’ Her statements share Crawford court Davis: recognized examinations” parte ment to civil-law ex from mother for the interview but not separated M.A. Marshall recounted, exam, police questioning, “deliberately response M.A. physical

319 potentially past criminal and and the interview began progressed,” how events 830. any exigencies occurred after the incident and had ended. Davis at related Further, the CCFA the interview for trial. perpetuated the for questions may The fact that answers to Marshall’s also be used a nontestimonial does not mean that M.A.’s statements are not testimoni purpose that precedence. al or As the purpose Eighth nontestimonial takes Circuit (C.A.8, of Appeals 2005), Court v. explained United States Bordeaux 400 F.3d 548, 556, “That may child’s] statements have also had a medical does purpose [the change testimonial, not the fact that were because does not Crawford indicate, dictate, not that be logic multi-purpose does statements cannot (2007), 267, 293, testimonial.” Accord v. 284 Kan. 160 State Henderson P.3d (“while one purpose of interview was enable some assistance to child [the victim], the of objectively circumstances this case indicate that its primary purpose past was to establish to a potentially events relevant later criminal Henderson”); of prosecution State ex rel. Juvenile v. Dept. Cty. Multnomah 592, 624, S.P. 346 Or. 215 (recognizing P.3d 847 that statements to a child- abuse-evaluation team served dual purposes providing treatment the victim accused, obtaining against that holding evidence but “statements in formal setting, response questions events” past structured about asked testimonial). enforcement, who persons were for law proxies assertion, Contrary to the majority’s Davis does support 148} {¶ is no proposition concluding basis in the law for dual “[t]here Marshall’s capacity renders statements made for by M.A. of medical and treatment pursuant inadmissible to the Majority Confrontation Clause.” Rather, at 41. opinion Supreme United States Court Davis emphasized it had not “a held that conversation which as an begins interrogation cannot, determine the need emergency assistance as the Indiana Supreme it put State], Court [in Hammon ‘evolve into testimonial statements’ N.E.2d, added.) once that purpose has been achieved.” (Emphasis U.S. S.Ct. 165 L.Ed.2d 224. However, majority’s reckoning, the converse occurred here: interrogation (i.e., testimonial eliciting statements that Arnold locked the door underwear) down pulled M.A.’s into a evolved conversation obtain medical (i.e., child). ly necessary Further, raped Arnold the United Supreme States Court in Davis perform question-by-question analysis did not case; rather, that the majority undertakes this the court focused on whether totality circumstances indicate “the interrogation prove to establish or events relevant past potentially to later 822, 126 prosecution.” 2266, 165 criminal Davis at S.Ct. L.Ed.2d *26 questioning was to view, of Marshall’s my Accordingly, it. M.A.’s and who had done done M.A. what had been establish opportuni- a prior and admission at trial without are their testimonial against right to confront witnesses M.A. violated Arnold’s to cross-examine ty him. cooperating elicited interviewers this view that statements Tellingly, authority supported by weight testimonial is law enforcement are Bordeaux, 556; See, People 400 F.3d e.g., similar circumstances.

addressing 753; 1396, 1402, v. (2004), Cal.Rptr.3d 13 State 118 Cal.App.4th v. Sisavath (2008), (2007), 139, 146, 911; 232 176 P.3d In re Rolandis G 145 Idaho Hooper (Iowa 2007), 32-33, 479, 600; v. 13, Bentley Ill.Dec. State 327 Ill.2d 267, 293, 776; 296, (2007), Kan. 160 P.3d 302; v. Henderson 284 State 739 N.W.2d 239, 245; v. State Justus (Ky.2009), v. S.W.3d Commonwealth Hartsfield 872; Blue, at 17- (Mo.2006), State v. ND N.W.2d S.W.3d 586, 593, 101 (2004), 18; v. Mack 337 Or. P.3d State against that “evidence admitted Clause ensures Confrontation testing that is the norm subject rigorous is to the adversarial accused reliable and Craig 497 U.S. proceedings.” Maryland criminal Anglo-American 845-846, evil at principal 111 L.Ed.2d 666. Because 110 S.Ct. parte of ex examinations as the Confrontation Clause is directed the use which case, I accused such as occurred in this would reverse the against evidence appeals. of the court of judgment O’Brien, Bond, and Prosecuting Attorney, Kimberly Franklin County

Ron Attorney, Prosecuting appellee. Assistant for Defender, Venters, Strait, and L. County R. Franklin Public David

Yeura Defender, Public for appellant. Assistant Sater, L.L.P., Reisz, Pease, and Melissa J.

Vorys, Seymour & Lisa Pierce Mitchell, for urging Hospital affirmance amici curiae Nationwide Children’s and Family Advocacy. for the Center Child Mizer, General, General, Benjamin Attorney

Richard C. Solicitor Cordray, Thomas, Solicitor, Solicitor, A. and Rebecca L. Assistant Long, Deputy Elisabeth Attorney amicus General of Ohio. affirmance for curiae urging Curtis, Defender, K. Public Kelly Public Assistant Timothy Young, Ohio Defender, curiae Ohio Public Defender. urging reversal amicus Nemecek, Associates, Friedman, Eric C. urging & Ian N.

Ian N. Friedman Lawyers. of Criminal Defense for amicus curiae Ohio Association reversal

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Arnold
Court Name: Ohio Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 17, 2010
Citation: 2010 Ohio 2742
Docket Number: 2008-1693
Court Abbreviation: Ohio
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