State v. NeffState v. Neff
Kimberly Kendall Corral, Megan Patituce, and Mallorie Thomas, for appellant.
*****OSOWIK, J.
{1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas, which sentenced appellant to a total prison term of 25 years after a jury convicted him of 27 of 44 felony and misdemeanor offenses. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court.
{2} This appeal originated from 49 felony and misdemeanor theft ring indictments against appellant Rosco G. Neff issued on December 6, 2018, by an Ottawa County Grand Jury that resulted in two jury mistrials, one completed jury trial, guilty verdicts for 27 offenses, and a prison sentence totaling 25 years.
A. First Jury Mistrial
On the morning of trial, appellee, state of Ohio, dismissed five of the 49 charges. The first jury trial commenced on July 15, 2019, and appellee presented to the jury four victim witnesses and four witnesses from law enforcement who investigated the offenses. The trial court admitted into evidence a lengthy set of stipulations of facts for 38 of the 44 offenses deemed to conclusively establish those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. The stipulations included disclosures that each of three codefendants from appellant‘s alleged theft ring were required to provide truthful testimony “in all trials relating to all codefendants” in exchange for individual plea deals. The next day appellant requested, and the trial court granted, a mistrial because the first codefendant to testify was hospitalized the previous night after being severely beaten in the Ottawa County Detention Facility.
B. Second Jury Mistrial
The second jury trial commenced on October 29, 2019, and appellee presented to the jury 13 witnesses: four victim witnesses, four witnesses from law enforcement who investigated the offenses, four witnesses who were codefendant informants, and one
{3} In open court and prior to the trial court declaring the second mistrial, appellee objected to appellant‘s plea offer testimony; appellant‘s trial counsel confirmed he advised his client not to testify about any plea negotiations; and the trial court instructed the jury “to disregard that answer. I know that is hard to do, but you are instructed to do so.” Then the trial court held a sidebar discussion outside of the jury‘s hearing. The trial court considered and rejected, after hearing arguments, whether to make an additional attempt at a curative instruction that “Mr. Neff‘s testimony about the two-year offer is, in fact, inaccurate.” The trial court also considered and rejected, after hearing further arguments, whether to directly question jurors regarding separating appellant‘s testimony from their deliberations while somehow avoiding making it “a too big a deal.”
{4} The sidebar ended, and the jury trial resumed. Appellee moved for a mistrial, arguing appellant disregarded his attorney‘s instruction and referenced
{5} After hearing all arguments in open court, the trial court decided, “Well, a mistrial is going to be the order of the day, and I will find Mr. Neff in direct contempt for speaking out about pre-trial issues that he should not have spoken of and was warned not to speak of them and, in fact, did not properly state even what settlement offer was made. That was inaccurate as well.”
{6} Sentencing for the contempt offense occurred the next day. In its October 31, 2019 judgment entry, the trial court reviewed the misconduct by appellant from the second mistrial and stated, “The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that this Judge personally observed the actions constituting Defendants contempt and that summary action is necessary as Defendant‘s actions pose an imminent threat to the administration of justice.” At the contempt sentencing hearing, appellant stated on his own behalf, “I didn‘t say that in intention to put anything in the jury‘s head. My point was to flat get out that I don‘t care what any kind of plea bargain they were trying to give or anything. That was my point. I felt my innocence was proven, period.” The trial court responded that
Well, my perspective of it was that you were seeing a trial go very bad, you were seeing that witnesses were testifying about you in a very damaging way. I suspect that you saw that you didn‘t have much hope. Your counsel has said that he warned you not to say what you said. You did it in order to get a mistrial. That is my impression. * * * You have seen, I think, by the course of that trial the last two, three days that it is highly likely you are going to be convicted. It is highly likely you are going to spend a lot of time in prison.
C. Third Jury Trial
{7} The third jury trial commenced on December 17, 2019, and continued for three days. Appellee presented to the jury 14 witnesses: four victim witnesses, five witnesses from law enforcement who investigated the offenses, four witnesses who were codefendant informants, and one additional informant who was not a codefendant. The trial court admitted into evidence 18 state exhibits and the stipulations of facts for 38 offenses. After appellee rested its case, appellant moved for acquittal pursuant to
{9} Different combinations of codefendants formed for each theft, and not all codefendants involved in the theft ring testified at appellant‘s trial. In addition, not all codefendants that testified at appellant‘s trial had plea deals.
{10} Cody Brentgartner testified at trial he was a codefendant with a plea deal. Mr. Brentgartner conducted all of the break-ins and thefts with different combinations of codefendants and, on one occasion, with appellant. Mr. Brentgartner also planned the incidents with appellant‘s guidance, such as identifying the victims to target, explaining methods to evade security measures, or commissioning the type of stolen property to acquire. Two victims of the theft ring testified at trial. Mr. Brentgartner also disposed of the stolen items by primarily selling them to appellant who resold them at a substantial markup. In some instances, Mr. Brentgartner sold stolen items to Ron Royster, who then
{11} Dakota Siefke and Jonathan Torres were two codefendants with plea deals and testified at trial. Each participated in some of the break-ins and thefts, and identified the property stolen and the people, including appellant, involved with those theft ring incidents. Taylor Gobmeier was a codefendant without a plea deal who participated in some of the break-ins and thefts as a drop off and getaway driver. Ms. Gobmeier testified at trial and identified the property stolen and the people, including appellant, involved with those theft ring incidents. Dava Neff is appellant‘s sister-in-law and the mother of another codefendant, Zachary Neff, who was convicted for his involvement in the theft ring, but who did not testify at trial. Mrs. Neff testified at appellant‘s trial as to what she heard and saw of appellant‘s participation in the theft ring and influence over her son.
{12} Joseph Leroux, a detective from the Ottawa County Sheriff‘s Office, testified at trial about his investigation of the theft ring. Mr. Brentgartner provided the initial information about appellant‘s involvement as “the leader of the crew * * * [who would] tell them what to target and where to target.” In the course of Detective Leroux‘s investigation, he uncovered the scope of the theft ring and corroborated Mr. Brentgartner‘s information with witnesses who testified at trial and with witnesses who did not. Tiffany Soboslay from the Lorain police department, Matt Scheerer from the Erie County sheriff‘s office, John Gangway from the Catawba Island Township police department, and Joel Scherer from the Ottawa County prosecutor‘s office each testified at
{13} Count 2, complicity to breaking and entering, a violation of
{14} Count 4 is for complicity to breaking and entering, a violation of
{16} Count 7, complicity to breaking and entering, a violation of
{18} Count 11, complicity to breaking and entering, a violation of
{19} Count 13, complicity to breaking and entering, a violation of
{20} Count 17, complicity to breaking and entering, a violation of
{21} Count 34, possession of weapons under disability, a violation of
{22} Count 35, complicity to burglary, a violation of
{23} Count 39, complicity to breaking and entering, a violation of
{24} Counts 41 to 43 concern the same victim: complicity to breaking and entering, a violation of
{25} Count 47 is for complicity to theft, a violation of
{26} Count 48, complicity to breaking and entering, a violation of
D. Sentencing
{27} Sentencing occurred on January 10, 2020, and for sentencing purposes pursuant to
{28} Appellant stated at sentencing, “I am innocent. That is all I got (sic.) to say. I have had enough of this crap.”
{30} Prior to announcing the sentence, the trial court stated, “I have considered your statements here today. I have considered those facts and circumstances learned throughout the course of the trial or trials. I have certainly considered the decision of the jury in their finding of guilt in this matter.” As further mitigation, appellant‘s trial counsel asked the trial court to reconsider imposing consecutive sentences after the trial court determined that consecutive sentences were “necessary to protect the public from future crime or punish the offender, and * * * consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and the danger he poses to the public.”
- Whether defendant-appellant‘s double jeopardy protections were violated when it proceeded to a subsequent trial after a mistrial.
- Defendant-appellant‘s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when trial counsel‘s performance was so deficient as to deny defendant-appellant of his Constitutional rights under the federal and Ohio state constitutions.
- The trial court erred in sentencing defendant-appellant to a twenty-five year term of incarceration.
- The trial court erred when it sentenced defendant-appellant to a term of incarceration grossly disproportionate to the conduct.
- Defendant-appellant‘s conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
- The state failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction against defendant-appellant.
II. Double Jeopardy
{32} In support of his first assignment of error, appellant argues his 27 convictions must be reversed because his federal double jeopardy protections were violated by a third jury trial where appellee failed to show manifest necessity for a mistrial, as required by State v. Gunnell, 132 Ohio St.3d 442, 2012-Ohio-3236, 973 N.E.2d 243, ¶ 25. Appellant argues the trial court failed to adequately reflect on and
{33} “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures that a state may not put a defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Id. The Double Jeopardy Clause “protect[s] against three abuses: (1) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,’ (2) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,’ and (3) ‘multiple punishments for the same offense.‘” State v. Mutter, 150 Ohio St.3d 429, 2017-Ohio-2928, 82 N.E.3d 1141, ¶ 15, quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds. It is undisputed in the record that prior to the commencement of the third trial, appellant had not been acquitted, convicted, or punished on the merits for the same 27 offenses.
A. Waiver
{34} We will first address whether appellant waived his double jeopardy defense. The Ohio Supreme Court “has held many times that the plea of double jeopardy is [a] matter of defense which must be raised in the trial court or it is waived.” Neal v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 201, 202, 192 N.E.2d 782 (1963). Appellant‘s failure to raise before the trial court his double jeopardy defense is subject to plain error review. State v. Body, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109388, 2021-Ohio-703, ¶ 23; see State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836, ¶ 139.
{36} The party asserting plain error has the burden to provide evidence supporting three determinations: (1) an actual error, i.e., a deviation from the legal rule, (2) the error was plain within the meaning of
B. Manifest Necessity or High Degree of Necessity
{38} “The Double Jeopardy Clause deals specifically with the issue whether a defendant may be retried after a trial court has declared a mistrial.” State v. Anderson, 148 Ohio St.3d 74, 2016-Ohio-5791, 68 N.E.3d 790, ¶ 29. The Ohio Supreme Court has found, “the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended when the state seeks to retry a defendant after a series of properly declared mistrials.” Id. at ¶ 46. Double jeopardy will not bar a retrial over a defendant‘s objection to a mistrial if: (1) there was a “manifest necessity” or “high degree” of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) “the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189-90, 429 N.E.2d 1065 (1981). Appellant does not contest the second prong.
{39} We review a trial court‘s determination of “manifest necessity” to declare a mistrial for “sound discretion.” Gunnell, 132 Ohio St.3d 442, 2012-Ohio-3236, 973 N.E.2d 243, at ¶ 26 and 28; State v. Gonzalez, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-99-002, 1999 WL 1101976, *5 (Dec. 3, 1999); State v. Schmidt, 65 Ohio App.2d 239, 244-45, 417 N.E.2d 1264 (6th Dist.1979). The Ohio Supreme Court has determined that a trial court
exercises “sound discretion” if the record demonstrates that “the trial court acted with deliberateness” when reaching its decision to declare a mistrial. Gunnell at ¶ 33.
However, “a trial judge declaring a mistrial is not required to make explicit findings of ‘manifest necessity‘” nor to “articulate on the record all the factors which informed the deliberate exercise of his discretion.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 775, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010), quoting Arizona at 517.
{¶ 40} “Manifest necessity” balances a defendant‘s right to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal with the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present the evidence to an impartial jury. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). Appellee‘s burden to show “manifest necessity” for a mistrial remains even where the problem of possible juror bias was created by the defendant‘s own misconduct. Id. at 510-511; State v. Malloy, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09CA0092, 2011-Ohio-30, ¶ 25; State v. Swanson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 89AP-199, 1989 WL 99410, *1-3 (Aug. 29, 1989).
{¶ 41} We extend great deference to the trial court‘s evaluation of the likelihood that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have been affected by appellant‘s improper testimony because the extent of the possible jury bias cannot be measured. Arizona at 511. However, we recognize that such deference does not end our inquiry under our obligation to determine the trial court exercised “sound discretion” and not acted “irrationally or irresponsibly” when it declared the second mistrial. Id. at 514. A trial court does not act “precipitately in response to the prosecutor‘s request for a
{¶ 42} There is nothing in Gunnell to suggest that an inquiry of jury members was required where, as here, improper evidence or argument was interjected into the trial itself. In those situations, a trial court relies upon its own personal observations of the entire proceeding – including, but not limited to, its personal assessment of the prejudicial impact of the improper evidence or argument -- to determine whether a fair trial is still possible. Although a trial court may conduct an additional inquiry of jury members in those situations, the failure to conduct such an inquiry does not, in and of itself, demonstrate the lack of sound discretion.
{¶ 43} We find the trial court did not act irrationally or irresponsibly just because it failed to conduct an individual inquiry with jury members regarding the prejudicial impact of appellant‘s improper testimony. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the trial court acted rationally, responsibly, and deliberately when it considered appellee‘s motion for mistrial. The trial court listened to the arguments of both sides and considered other plausible alternatives, including the possibility of a curative instruction. The court took a recess and came back on the record. The trial court then allowed the defense counsel and the prosecutor another opportunity to argue their respective positions before making its ruling. We further find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a “manifest necessity” or “high degree” of necessity for the second mistrial.
{¶ 44} Appellant‘s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 45} In support of his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for three reasons: (1) failing to object to the inclusion of a complicity jury instruction, (2) failing to file a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds prior to the third jury trial, and (3) failing to present mitigating circumstances at his sentencing and conceding aggravating factors.
{¶ 46} An ineffective assistance of counsel claim must overcome the strong presumption that a properly licensed Ohio lawyer is competent. State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 155-56, 524 N.E.2d 476 (1988). The record does not show appellant questioned the licensure of his trial counsel, so his competence is presumed.
{¶ 47} To overcome this presumption of competence, appellant has the burden to show both: (1) deficient performance by his trial counsel below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) a reasonable probability of prejudice that but for his trial counsel‘s errors, he would not have been convicted of 27 offenses. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 137, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. Appellate scrutiny of trial counsel‘s performance is highly deferential. Id. at 142. “Debatable trial tactics generally do not constitute a deprivation of effective counsel.” State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 85, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995).
A. Complicity Jury Instruction
{¶ 48} Appellant declares, “In this case, trial counsel‘s failure to object to the inclusion of a complicity jury instruction was ineffective,” but provides no specific
“The testimony of an accomplice does not become inadmissible because of his complicity, moral turpitude, or self-interest, but the admitted or claimed complicity of a witness may affect his credibility and make his testimony subject to grave suspicion, and require that it be weighed with great caution. It is for you, as jurors, in the light of all the facts presented to you from the witness stand, to evaluate such testimony and to determine its quality and worth or its lack of quality and worth.”
{¶ 49} “After arguments are completed, a trial court must fully and completely give the jury all instructions which are relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as the fact finder. (
B. Motion to Dismiss on Double Jeopardy Grounds
{¶ 51} Appellant argues, “The failure to object to the retrial of defendant after the empaneling of a jury, the complete presentation of the state‘s case, and the granting of a mistrial over state‘s objection is, per se, deficient.” Appellant further argues, “Had counsel‘s performance not been so deficient as to deny Appellant of his constitutional rights, the outcome of the case would have necessarily been different.”
{¶ 52} Appellant‘s trial counsel is not required to perform futile acts. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836, at ¶ 125. In light of our decision on appellant‘s first assignment of error, we do not find that appellant‘s trial counsel‘s failure to file a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was ineffective.
C. Sentencing Mitigation
{¶ 53} Appellant argues his trial counsel was ineffective because at sentencing his trial counsel merely acknowledged appellant “could have apologized but did not” and
{¶ 54} The presentation of mitigating evidence at sentencing is a matter of trial strategy based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Taft, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-18-003, 2019-Ohio-1565, ¶ 50. The failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty stage does not in itself constitute proof of ineffective assistance of counsel or deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d at 157, 524 N.E.2d 476.
{¶ 55} The record contains substantial mitigation evidence presented by appellant‘s trial counsel for the trial court‘s consideration for mercy and leniency. We find the record shows the trial court was aware of both appellant‘s age and his prior guilty pleas at the time of sentencing. Even if the trial court was not aware of those factors, “there is no prejudice when the new mitigating evidence ‘would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented’ to the decisionmaker.” Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 954, 130 S.Ct. 3259, 177 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2010), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Appellant‘s speculations do not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Taft at ¶ 51.
{¶ 56} We reviewed the entire record and do not find that appellant‘s trial counsel‘s performance was ineffective. We do not find both deficient performance by his trial counsel below an objective standard of reasonable representation and a reasonable
{¶ 57} Appellant‘s second assignment of error is not well-taken.
IV. Felony Sentencing
{¶ 58} In support of his third and fourth assignments of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in sentencing him to 25 years in prison for three reasons: (1) the trial court impermissibly relied on appellant‘s testimony from the prior mistrial; (2) consecutive sentences were unwarranted by, and inconsistent with, the facts in the record; and (3) the total sentence was “grossly disproportionate” to his conduct.
{¶ 59} We review a challenge to felony sentencing pursuant to
The appellate court‘s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court‘s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
A. Prior Mistrial Testimony
{¶ 61} Appellant argues the trial court erred by relying on testimony from the second mistrial: “In its analysis of
B. Consecutive Sentences
{¶ 62} Appellant argues consecutive sentences were unwarranted by, and inconsistent with, the facts in the record. The jury convicted appellant for one first-degree felony offense, two third-degree felony offenses, six fourth-degree felony offenses, 15 fifth-degree felony offenses, and three first-degree misdemeanor offenses. The trial court merged 23 offenses down to 11 felony offenses for sentencing purposes and ordered each individual prison term to be served consecutively for a total of 25 years. Appellant does not dispute the merger of offenses at sentencing.
{¶ 64}
{¶ 65} We reviewed the record and find clear and convincing evidence supporting the imposition of consecutive sentences pursuant to
{¶ 66} Appellant next argues his 25-year incarceration “does not, in any manner, fit the crime” of non-violent theft offenses of “faux ducks, fishing poles, two sport weapons, and two handguns.” Appellant argues that the “egregiousness of the length of sentence is shocking to common concepts of fundamental fairness” where 25 years is “equivalent to the statutory minimum sentence for aggravated murder with capital specifications.”
{¶ 67} The trial court sentenced appellant to prison terms by following the applicable sentencing statutes for the merged offenses as follows: 10 years for Count 1, a first-degree felony, which is within the statutory range and less than the maximum period pursuant to
{¶ 68} Appellant does not dispute that the sentence for any particular offense is outside of the statutory guidelines, and we do not find any trial court error in adhering to
{¶ 69} We find clear and convincing evidence in the record supporting the felony sentences imposed by the trial court. Appellant‘s third and fourth assignments of error are not well-taken.
V. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶ 70} In support of his fifth assignment of error, appellant argues his complicity convictions should be vacated because the “quality of evidence offered in support of the conviction in this matter is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence here is not credible.” Appellant argues the jury lost its way when it convicted him because the witnesses who testified against him were criminals who received “extreme leniency” in their own criminal cases for the same conduct. “Without their testimony, there is no evidence linking Neff to the property or the thefts.”
{¶ 71} A challenge, based on the manifest weight of the evidence to a jury, questions its effect in inducing belief of appellant‘s guilt; it questions whether the jury could find the inclination of a greater amount of credible evidence was admitted at trial to sustain that decision than not. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Judgments supported by some competent and credible evidence going to all
{¶ 72} This court has repeatedly stated that in determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice as to require a new trial. State v. Reynolds, 2017-Ohio-1478, 89 N.E.3d 235, ¶ 47 (6th Dist.). A conviction will be overturned only in exceptional cases. Id. The unanimous concurrence of all three judges of a court of appeals panel is required to overturn a judgment that results from a jury. Thompkins at 389.
{¶ 73} The crime of complicity is governed by
{¶ 74} The witnesses collectively testified at trial about their individual roles in the theft ring and about the role they saw, heard and knew appellant played in the theft ring. Although appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses because of their plea deals, only 3 of the 14 witnesses who testified at trial had such plea deals, and the jury was instructed pursuant to
{¶ 75} We find the record shows some competent and credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the 27 offenses of which the jury convicted appellant. Despite appellant‘s assertions to the contrary, we do not find the trier of fact clearly lost its way to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice as to require a new trial.
{¶ 76} Appellant‘s fifth assignment of error is not well-taken.
VI. Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶ 77} In support of his sixth assignment of error, appellant argues that when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to appellee, “there was insufficient evidence to prove that Defendant-Appellant Neff committed these offenses or was complicit in the thefts.”
{¶ 79} Appellant‘s
{¶ 80} Appellate courts do not evaluate the credibility of the evidence when determining its sufficiency because our role is to decide whether the evidence, if believed, can sustain the verdict as a matter of law. State v. Myers, 154 Ohio St.3d 405, 2018-Ohio-1903, 114 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 132. “‘The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.‘” (Citation omitted.) McFarland, 162 Ohio St.3d 36, 2020-Ohio-3343, 164 N.E.3d 316, at ¶ 24. All admissible evidence may be considered on a claim of insufficient evidence. State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 80.
{¶ 81} Upon review of all admissible evidence in the record we find appellant‘s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are without merit. We find, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence in the record, if believed by any rational trier of fact, to find the essential elements of the 27 offenses were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and support the verdicts as a matter of law.
{¶ 82} Appellant‘s sixth assignment of error is not well-taken.
VII. Conclusion
{¶ 83} On consideration whereof, we find that substantial justice has been done in this matter. The judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
Christine E. Mayle, J. CONCUR.
JUDGE
JUDGE
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.