THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. JONES ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 2018-0444
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
December 18, 2020
Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6729
O‘CONNOR, C.J.
Submittеd August 4, 2020. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Nos. 103290 and 103302, 2018-Ohio-498.
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-6729
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6729.]
Criminal law—Felony sentencing—Standard of review upon appeal of sentеnce—
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Convictions
{¶ 2} Randy and Carissa Jones adopted T.J. in 2002, when she was nine months old. In 2006, they had T.J. evaluated by a psychologist and a psychiatrist, who diagnosed her with autism, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and an intellectual disability. The psychologist also told the Joneses that T.J. would likely not progress beyond the sixth-grade level in school. The Joneses found that T.J. had difficulty communicating; she had a limited ability to understand what was said to her and an even more limited ability to verbalize a response. They began homeschooling T.J. when she was in the second grade.
{¶ 3} On February 18, 2013, Carissa found that T.J. was not breathing and called 9-1-1. First responders attempted to resuscitate T.J. while taking her to the hospital.
{¶ 4} At the hospital, Dr. Jamil Alarafi immediately noticed that T.J. smelled like “necrotic and decaying flesh, * * * like gangrene.” She also had wounds on her chest and neck, and she was visibly malnourished, with a “distended” belly. Dr. Alarafi also observed severe wounds on T.J.‘s lower extremities, including dying tissue on her feet and abscesses on her ankle and legs. Ultimately, all efforts to save T.J.‘s life were unsuccessful, and she was pronounced dead at the hospital. She was 12 years old.
{¶ 5} Dr. Andrea McCollum of the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner‘s Office conducted an autopsy. She concluded that T.J. died from sepsis and
{¶ 6} The Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services then conducted an investigation into T.J.‘s death. The Joneses told an investigator that T.J. had been sick for a little over a week, but they said they had often been forced to guess what was wrong with her when she was sick because she never complained about anything and she seemed to have a very high tolerance for pain. When the investigator questioned the Joneses about the injuries to T.J.‘s body, they stated that the injuries had been caused by her own self-injurious behavior and that although they had made efforts to stop that bеhavior, such injuries were not unusual.
{¶ 7} After the investigation, Randy and Carissa Jones were each charged with involuntary manslaughter under
B. Sentencing
{¶ 8} The trial court merged all counts and the state elected to proceed to sentencing on the involuntary-manslaughter count for both defendants under former
{¶ 9} The court sentenced both Randy and Carissa Jones to ten years in prison, followed by five years of postrelease control. In doing so, the trial judge stated that she had taken “copious notes” during the long trial and that she had reviewed those notes in preparation for the sentencing. She also said, “I‘ve perhaps given this case more thought than just about any case that I‘ve ever had in my career.” Finally, the trial judge specifically stated that she had considered all the
{¶ 10} The trial judge also made statements concerning the evidence introduced at trial and her view of the Joneses’ conduct. She stated that the photographs of T.J.‘s injuries were among the worst photographs of a child‘s injuries she had ever seen. She also stated that she doubted that the injuries on T.J.‘s body were self-inflicted and that she did not believe Randy Jones‘s clаim that he had not been aware of how severe those injuries were. A large number of people sought to support the Joneses at the sentencing hearing, but the trial judge noted that they had not seen the evidence presented at trial, including the photographs of T.J.‘s injuries, and that their support could not undo the Joneses’ failure to provide care for T.J. The trial judge also noted that she had not observed the Joneses shed a single tear.
C. The Joneses’ Appeals
{¶ 11} The Joneses separately appealed, but their appeals were consolidated. The Eighth District Court of Appeals issued three separate decisions in their cases. The first two are not relevant to this appeal. In State v. Jones, 2016-Ohio-5923, 76 N.E.3d 417 (“Jones I“), the court affirmed thе Joneses’ convictions but vacated their sentences and remanded for resentencing, see id. at ¶ 113-114. In State v. Jones, 2016-Ohio-7702, 76 N.E.3d 596 (“Jones II“), the court upon reconsideration vacated the decision in Jones I and again affirmed the convictions and—after applying a different analysis regarding the propriety of their sentences—again vacated their sentences and remanded for resentencing, see id. at ¶ 117-118. The Eighth District then granted the state‘s motion for en banc consideration and heard the Joneses’ appeals en banc due to a conflict between its decision in Jones II and one of its prior decisions that also involved the standards for appellate review of felony sentences. State v. Jones, 2018-Ohio-498, 105 N.E.3d 702, ¶ 1 (“Jones III“). Ultimately, in the decisiоn now on appeal to this court, it vacated the Joneses’
{¶ 12} The Eighth District‘s en banc decision in Jones III focused on
The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court‘s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court‘s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶ 13} In Jones III, a majority of the judges of the Eighth District joined the holding stated in the lead opinion that our decision in State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, interpreted
Nevertheless, it is fully consistent for appellate courts to review thosе sentences that are imposed solely after consideration of the factors in
R.C. 2929.11 and2929.12 under a standard that is equally deferential to the sentencing court. That is, an appellate court may vacate or modify any sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law only if the appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the sentence.
Id. Based on these statements, the lead opinion in Jones III stated that an appellate court may review “the considerations under
{¶ 15} Jones III also included a new opinion by the three-judge panel that had heard Jones I and Jones II. In that opinion, the panel applied the reasoning of the en banc court‘s lead opinion to the Joneses’ cases and concluded that the record did not support their sentences because those sentences did not advance the overriding purposes of felony sentencing, as stated in former
A tragedy occurred in this case: T.J. died. On this record, however, we find that imprisoning her parents for ten years does not advance the two primary purposes of felony sentencing, that is, to protect the public from the Joneses and to punish them using minimum sanctions. The record demonstrates that the Joneses exercised poor judgment in the care of T.J. But they cared for her nonetheless and did what they believed was best for her. The public does not need to be protected from them—the likelihood of this happening again is almost nonexistent. And as for punishment—what greater punishment can there be than the death of their child.
Id. at ¶ 152. The panel therefore vacated the Joneses’ sentences and remanded the cases for resentencing. Id. at ¶ 153.
{¶ 16} The state sought this court‘s discretionary review of one proposition of law: ”
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 17} “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and accordingly, we review the matter de novo.” State v. Vanzandt, 142 Ohio St.3d 223, 2015-Ohio-236, 28 N.E.3d 1267, ¶ 6.
A. R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12
{¶ 18} Before considering the parties’ arguments, it is important to understand exactly what
(A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.
(B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in division (A) of this section, commensurate
with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and its impact upon thе victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.
(C) A court that imposes a sentence upon an offender for a felony shall not base the sentence upon the race, ethnic background, gender, or religion of the offender.
{¶ 19}
Unless otherwise required by section 2929.13 or 2929.14 of the Revised Code, a court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an offender for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the Revised Code. In exercising that discretion, the court shall consider the factors set forth in [divisions (B) through (F)] of this section * * * and, in addition, may consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.
{¶ 20} We have previously held that neither
{¶ 21} The state argues that an appellate court is not permitted to modify or vacate a sentence based on its own finding that the record does not support the sentencing court‘s findings under
{¶ 22} Amicus curiae, the Ohio Attorney General, argues in support of the state that
{¶ 23} The Joneses each respond that a sentence is “contrary to law” under
{¶ 24} At the outset, we find it necessary to distinguish the holding of the en banc court in Jones III from the other significant conclusion reached in the lead opinion. In the en banc decision, 7 of the 12 judges of the Eighth District held that our decision in Marcum interpreted
{¶ 25} This distinction matters because, as explained below, the panel‘s decision in Jones III appears to have relied on reasoning stated in the lead opinion to review whether the record supports the Joneses’ sentences, not just the specific findings by the trial court under
1. The en banc court‘s holding that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court to review whether the record supports findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12
{¶ 26} The holding of the en banc court was that our decision in Marcum had interpreted
{¶ 27} As discussed above, we held in Marcum that
{¶ 28} Beyond that, nothing in the text of
{¶ 29} The Eighth District therefore erred by relying on dicta in Marcum and by concluding that
2. The lead opinion‘s conclusion that an appellate court may review whether the record supports a sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12
{¶ 30} The lead opinion concluded that an appellate court may review “the considerations under
{¶ 31} As an initial matter, the lead opinion‘s conclusion in this regard makes a distinction between a sentence that is “contrary to law” and one that is “not supported by the record.” In so doing, it appears to track the types of review permitted in
{¶ 32} We also reject any suggestion that
{¶ 33} The General Assembly did not define the term “contrary to law.” In such a situation, we generally look to a term‘s ordinary meaning at the time the statute was enacted. See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 532, 539, 202 L.Ed.2d 536 (2019); see also id. at ___, 139 S.Ct. at 544 (Ginsburg, J, concurring) (agreeing that words in a statute should generally be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning at the time the statute was enacted but noting that a legislative body “may design legislation to govern changing times and circumstances” and citing decisions illustrating that principle).
{¶ 34} The term “contrary to law” was used in former
{¶ 35} The General Assembly enacted former
(1) That the record does not support the sentence;
(2) That the sentence included a prison term [for certain felonies and, if the sentencing court did not make certain findings under
R.C. 2929.13(B) , that the procedures in that provision] were
not followed or that * * * there is an insufficient basis for imposing a prison term for the offense;
(3) That the sentence did not include a prison term [for certain felonies and that either the procedures in
R.C. 2929.13(D) ] were not followed or that * * * there is an insufficient basis for overriding the presumption [against a prison term] and imposing a sanction other than a prison term for the offense;(4) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
(Emphasis added.) Id., Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 7564-7565.
{¶ 36} In 2000, however, the General Assembly materially amended this provision, condensing it to the two scenarios found in
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court‘s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (E)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (H) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant; [or]
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
Former
{¶ 37} This amendment eliminated the broad stand-alone provision from the first paragraph of the original version of
{¶ 38} In our view, this evolution reveals two things of importance to this case. First, when
{¶ 39}
3. The holding of the merits panel
{¶ 40} We next turn to the question whether the judgments of the merits panel vacating the Joneses’ sentences might nonetheless be justified under
{¶ 41} The merits panel‘s opinion appears to have substituted its own judgment for that of the trial court regarding the appropriate sentences for the Joneses under
{¶ 42} Given this, the panel erred in the same way the lead opinion did. Nothing in
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 43} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Eighth District‘s judgments and reinstate the sentences imposed by the trial court.
Judgments reversed.
FRENCH, DEWINE, and BEATTY BLUNT, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, J., concurs, with an opinion.
FISCHER, J., concurs, with an opinion.
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion.
LAUREL BEATTY BLUNT, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for STEWART, J.
KENNEDY, J., concurring.
{¶ 44} Because the majority adopts the views expressed in my separate opinion in State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-Ohio-4761, 141 N.E.3d 169, ¶ 44 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment only), that (1) our statement in ¶ 23 of State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, at ¶ 23, is dictum that is not binding in future cases and (2) “an appellate court is without authority to review a sentencing court‘s determinations under
FISCHER, J., concurring.
{¶ 45} I fully concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to additionally address the arguments raised by appellees, Randy and Carissa Jones,
{¶ 46} I acknowledge the Joneses’ concerns about meaningful appellate review. But for the reasons stated in the majority opinion,
{¶ 47} There is also no reason to believe that a trial court‘s consideration under
{¶ 48} Second,
{¶ 49} Third,
DONNELLY, J., dissenting.
{¶ 50} Today‘s decision is a vote of no confidence in our appellate court judges. In essence, they are told that they are incapable of appropriately and selectively reviewing outlier criminal sentences to ensure a trial court‘s compliance with
{¶ 51} As I explained in my dissenting opinion in Gwynne, a meaningful and lawful criminal sentence is a sentence that is clearly and convincingly supported by the record, proportional to a defendant‘s conduct, and deliberately considered in accordance with all relevant law. Id. at ¶ 45 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). Because
{¶ 52} In this case, the Eighth District Court of Appeals reviewed a record in which, although the sentencing judge said that the purposes of felony sentencing set forth in
{¶ 53} Based on this record, the appellate court determined that the record did not support the ten-year sentences imposed—one year less than the maximum
{¶ 54} To be sure, judges are human and the death of a child caused by the parents’ neglect is hard for anyone to stomach, but sentences must still fit the crime and be governed by objective factors, as dictated by Ohio law. No judge should let emotion rule the day. Appellate courts serve as an independent and impartial layer of review to correсt outcomes that lack legal justification.
{¶ 55} The Ohio General Assembly has wisely mandated that trial courts take into account the objective sentencing considerations prescribed by
{¶ 56} By determining that
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda and Kevin Filiatraut, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.
James J. Hofelich, for appellee Randy Jones.
Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee Carissa Jones.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Zachery P. Keller, Deputy Solicitor General, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.