State of Ohio v. Patrick Allen Taft, Jr.
Court of Appeals No. H-18-003
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HURON COUNTY
Decided: April 26, 2019
[Cite as State v. Taft, 2019-Ohio-1565.]
Trial Court No. CRI 2017-0291
Danielle C. Kulik and Kenneth R. Bailey, for appellant.
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MAYLE, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Patrick Taft Jr., appeals the April 20, 2018 judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to 10 years in prison for convictions of sexual battery. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On March 24, 2017, Taft was indicted on five counts of rape in violation of
{¶ 3} Although Taft initially denied engaging in any sexual activity with L.H., he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of sexual battery after a DNA test proved that Taft fathered L.H.‘s child. The trial court accepted his pleas and found him guilty.
{¶ 4} At Taft‘s sentencing hearing, in addition to hearing arguments from counsel, the trial court heard from (1) L.H., whose statement was read by her “big sister” from a youth outreach program; (2) L.H.‘s mother; (3) Taft‘s wife, Tamie Taft; (4) Taft‘s treating psychologist, Dr. Darlene Barns; and (5) Taft.
{¶ 5} L.H., in her letter to the court, said that Taft first raped her on August 26, 2016. Around 4:00 a.m. that day, she woke with Taft‘s hand over her mouth. He told L.H. to move to the floor so that they did not wake the 4-year-old foster child who shared the room with her. L.H. said that Taft raped her daily for months and she was “paralyzed with fear” each time. When L.H. cried, Taft told her that no one would believe her if she reported the abuse and insinuated that he would abuse the 4-year-old if L.H. left the
{¶ 6} L.H. stated that she learned that she was pregnant in February 2017, after she was removed from the Tafts’ home. She “desperately prayed” that her boyfriend—not Taft—fathered the child. When she learned that Taft was the father, her “heart fel [sic] to the ground.” She felt angry at Taft for raping her, sad that she would have to tell friends and family that Taft was the child‘s father, and terrified of the effects that the situation would have on her son. She also said that Taft and his family members harassed her “non-stop” during her pregnancy, both online and while she was working.
{¶ 7} L.H.‘s letter concluded by asking the trial court to hold Taft accountable for his actions by imposing the maximum sentence.
{¶ 8} L.H.‘s mother testified at the hearing. She said that after L.H. disclosed the abuse, Tamie (Taft‘s wife) sent Facebook messages to L.H.‘s friends that included derogatory comments about L.H. and stated that Taft was the father of L.H.‘s baby. L.H.‘s mother asked the court to impose the most severe prison sentence on Taft because he ruined L.H.‘s life by impregnating her by rape, and because L.H.‘s child will inevitably suffer psychological trauma when he finds out that he was conceived by rape.
{¶ 9} Tamie also presented a statement to the court. She described Taft as steady, kind, and hard-working, and said that he was extremely remorseful. She did not blame Taft for the sexual relationship between him and L.H. Rather, Tamie blamed herself for
{¶ 10} Dr. Barns testified that she saw Taft approximately 20 times from August 2017 to January 2018. She gave Taft a “psychological sexual assessment” to determine if he was a sexual predator. Based on that assessment, Dr. Barns determined that Taft was not a sexual predator or pedophile, but was “slowly emotionally seduced, and sexually seduced” by L.H. “into living a fantasy that would fulfill some erotic need.”
{¶ 11} Dr. Barns reported that Taft had no history of sexual deviancy and was “really a family man.” He was very remorseful, realized that he had made a “giant mistake,” and wanted to take responsibility for and help raise the child he fathered with L.H. Dr. Barns believed that Taft was not a threat to the community, would never do anything like this again, and could be rehabilitated.
{¶ 12} When it was his turn to speak, Taft said that he had been employed for over 30 years, was faithful to his wife, and the crimes were out of character for him. He apologized for the “terrible, crazy, stupid thing” that he did and expressed remorse for embarrassing his wife and ruining his family life. According to Taft, the extent of his sexual involvement with L.H. was having sex with her three times over the course of approximately one week.
{¶ 13} When the state addressed the court, it noted that Taft denied sexual involvement with L.H. from the time that the case was filed until he pleaded guilty. Although Taft finally admitted to engaging in sexual activity with L.H. after a DNA test showed that he fathered her child, he continued to deny many of the allegations of sexual
{¶ 14} In response, defense counsel said that the court should “judge [Taft] as a human being more than * * * about what he did or didn‘t do.” Counsel noted that L.H. was almost 18 years old when the alleged conduct happened; Dr. Barns determined that Taft was not a threat to the community; destroying Taft‘s family would not undo what happened; and Taft had no criminal record, was employed, and could financially support the child he fathered with L.H. if he was placed on community control.
{¶ 15} After hearing from both sides, the trial court said that it had considered the principles and purposes of sentencing in
{¶ 16} As to the recidivism factors in
{¶ 17} The court concluded that Taft‘s actions constituted the worst form of the offenses and sentenced him to five years in prison on each count. The court ordered Taft to serve the sentences consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of 10 years. The court determined that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crimes and adequately punish Taft and were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Taft‘s conduct or the danger he poses to the public. The court also found that Taft committed at least two of the offenses as part of a course of conduct and the harm he caused was so great that no single prison sentence would adequately reflect the seriousness of his conduct.
{¶ 18} Taft now appeals, raising four assignments of error:
- THE COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING PATRICK TAFT, JR. TO MAXIMUM CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES CONTRARY TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE, THE LAW, THE FACTORS OF SENTENCING, AND THE PURPOSE OF FELONY SENTENCING.
- PATRICK TAFT, JR. SUFFERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE HE PROVIDED DEFENSE
COUNSEL EVIDENCE OF MITIGATION BUT DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO SUBMIT ANY AS EXHIBITS. - PATRICK TAFT, JR. WAS DENIED HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINE WITNESSES DURING SENTENCING.
- PATRICK TAFT JR., WAS IMPROPERLY DENIED POST CONVICTION RELIEF ON ITS FACE AND WITHOUT A HEARING.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Taft‘s Sentences are not Contrary to Law
{¶ 19} In his first assignment of error, Taft argues that the trial court improperly imposed maximum, consecutive sentences. We review sentencing challenges under
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court‘s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) .
{¶ 20} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court sentences the defendant within the statutorily permissible range, properly applies postrelease control, and expressly states that it considered the principles and purposes of
{¶ 21} If the appellate court finds that a sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law, it may vacate or modify the sentence “only if the appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the sentence.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 23. Notably, “[t]he appellate court‘s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion.”
{¶ 22} Taft argues (1) the trial court failed to comply with
1. The Trial Court Properly Imposed Consecutive Sentences
{¶ 23} First, we address Taft‘s challenge of the trial court‘s imposition of consecutive sentences. Before imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court is required to make three findings: (1) consecutive sentences are “necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender * * *;” (2) imposition of consecutive sentences is not “disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and to the danger the
{¶ 24} A sentencing court must make its findings under
{¶ 25} The transcript of Taft‘s sentencing hearing shows that the trial court made the findings required by
The Court is going to find that consecutive sentences here are necessary to protect the public from future crimes and to adequately punish the offender in this case.
The Court finds consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct nor to the danger that he poses to the public, and here, at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
more courses of conduct, and the harm that was caused by those multiple offenses was so great no single prison sentence for any of the offenses caused would adequately reflect the seriousness of his conduct.
The court also included its
{¶ 26} Moreover, Taft has not shown that the record clearly and convincingly fails to support consecutive sentences. Although Taft complains that there is no evidence of “great or unusual” harm, the trial court determined that Taft was L.H.‘s foster parent, his position as a foster parent allowed him to commit the offenses, he committed multiple offenses against L.H. over a period of time, he impregnated L.H. with a child whom she will have to raise alone, and he continued to deny his “responsibilities” until the DNA test proved that he fathered L.H.‘s child. This is sufficient to support a finding under
2. The Trial Court Properly Imposed Maximum Sentences
{¶ 28} Taft also argues that the trial court improperly imposed maximum sentences for three separate reasons. He argues that the trial court (a) did not make certain findings before imposing maximum sentences, (b) improperly used an element of the offense as an aggravating factor, and (c) allegedly violated his constitutional right to remain silent by using his silence as a basis for imposing maximum sentences. We find each of these arguments unpersuasive.
(a). The Trial Court was not Required to Make Factual Findings
{¶ 29} Taft‘s claim that the trial court was required to make certain factual findings before imposing maximum sentences is flatly incorrect. He cites cases interpreting a version of
(b). The Trial Court did not Improperly Consider an Element of the Offense
{¶ 30} Taft also relies on pre-Foster cases to argue that the trial court cannot use an element of the offense as a basis for imposing maximum sentences. He cites a single post-Foster case—State v. Stroud, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 07 MA 91, 2008-Ohio-3187—that is distinguishable.
{¶ 31} In Stroud, the Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed the defendant‘s sentence for voluntary manslaughter when the only reason the trial court gave for imposing a maximum sentence was that the defendant caused the victim‘s death—which was one of the elements of the crime—and “the trial court did not explain why that fact was more than simply an element of the offense.” Id. at ¶ 2. In contrast, as discussed more fully below, the trial court here relied on more than Taft “having a relationship with his foster child” (i.e., Taft engaging in sexual conduct with L.H. while he was her “guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis * * *,” as prohibited by
{¶ 32} We have reviewed the record, and we find that the trial court did not penalize Taft for exercising his constitutional right to remain silent when it imposed maximum sentences.
{¶ 33} Generally speaking, a defendant‘s right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10, survives sentencing, and a trial court may not draw an adverse inference from the defendant‘s silence. State v. Dahms, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-11-028, 2012-Ohio-3181, ¶ 9, citing Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999). However, because lack of remorse is a sentencing factor under
3. The Trial Court did not “Ignore” Mitigating Evidence
{¶ 35} Taft argues that the trial court failed to comply with
{¶ 36} Under
{¶ 37} A sentencing court is “not obligated to give a detailed explanation of how it algebraically applied each seriousness and recidivism factor to the offender.” Id. at ¶ 11. In fact, no specific recitation is required; merely stating that the court considered the statutory factors is sufficient. Id. Further, the trial court is not required to give any
{¶ 38} Here, the record makes clear that the trial court considered all applicable seriousness and recidivism factors in
{¶ 39} Additionally, the court noted in the sentencing entry that it considered the seriousness and recidivism factors in
{¶ 40} In Taft‘s final argument against his sentence, he contends that the trial court ignored the directive in
{¶ 41} Under
{¶ 42} “[C]onsideration of the appropriate factors set forth in
{¶ 43} The record also makes clear that the trial court considered
{¶ 44} Moreover, although it was not required to give the reasons behind its sentence, Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, at syllabus, the trial court explained to Taft that it found his crimes particularly troubling because of
the position that you were in, the repeated nature of the activities here, the fact that you were a foster parent, the fact that it resulted in the birth of a child, [and] the fact you continued to deny your responsibilities up until you were forced to face them based on the DNA test * * *.
{¶ 45} To contradict the trial court‘s findings, Taft points to his low score on the recidivism assessment that he took during the presentence investigation and Dr. Barns‘s opinion that he is not a threat to the community. The trial court, however, apparently did not find that these facts outweighed the seriousness of Taft‘s crimes. Given the fostering relationship between Taft and L.H., the ongoing nature of the sexual abuse, L.H.‘s pregnancy, and Taft‘s reluctance to accept responsibility for his actions until a DNA test proved the child‘s paternity, we find no error in the trial court‘s conclusion.
B. Taft‘s Trial Counsel Provided Effective Representation
{¶ 47} In his second assignment of error, Taft argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not submit mitigating evidence (in addition to the statements from Tamie, Dr. Barns, and Taft) at the sentencing hearing. The state counters that the failure to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing is insufficient, without more, to prove that trial counsel was ineffective.
{¶ 48} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show “(1) deficient performance of counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s errors, the proceeding‘s result would have been different.” State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 204. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” State v. Sanders, 94 Ohio St.3d 150, 151, 761 N.E.2d 18 (2002), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
{¶ 49} Properly licensed Ohio lawyers are presumed to be competent, State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 62, and there are “countless” ways for an attorney to provide effective assistance in a case, so “[j]udicial
{¶ 50} “[C]ounsel‘s decision not to present mitigating evidence during sentencing can be considered sound trial strategy based upon the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Stan, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 16 BE 0029, 2017-Ohio-7756, ¶ 20; State v. Harris, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-18-013, 2019-Ohio-813, ¶ 11. Generally, trial strategy and tactical decisions—even debatable ones—cannot form the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Grissom, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-08-008, 2009-Ohio-2603, ¶ 22.
{¶ 51} Here, we presume that Taft‘s trial counsel‘s failure to present certain mitigating evidence at sentencing was sound trial strategy, and Taft does not point to anything in the record that indicates otherwise. Moreover, based on the evidence in the record and the trial court‘s characterization of Taft‘s crimes, his argument that he would have received a lesser sentence if trial counsel had proceeded with Taft‘s proposed victim-blaming strategy is speculative at best. And such speculative claims do not support a finding of ineffective assistance. See State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 104. We find, therefore, that Taft‘s second assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 52} In his third assignment of error, Taft claims that he was denied his due process right to cross-examine L.H. during the sentencing hearing because the trial court improperly allowed someone else to read L.H.‘s hearsay statements, which included statements regarding additional criminal conduct by Taft. The state contends that the trial court‘s admission of L.H.‘s statement was not prejudicial because the Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings, the trial court was statutorily required to consider a victim impact statement, Taft did not have a right to cross-examine L.H., and dismissed charges can be considered at sentencing.
{¶ 53} The victim of a crime has a right under
{¶ 54} Although
{¶ 55} Our review of the sentencing hearing shows that the trial court properly allowed L.H.‘s “big sister” from a youth outreach program—whom L.H. designated as her representative—to read the letter that L.H. wrote. L.H. had the right to make a statement at sentencing and was statutorily permitted to designate someone else to speak to the court on her behalf. Furthermore, the content of L.H.‘s statement was proper because her descriptions of Taft raping and impregnating her were related to the five rape charges that the state dismissed in exchange for Taft‘s guilty pleas, and nothing in the plea agreement prevented the court from considering the dismissed rape charges at sentencing. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court considering L.H.‘s statement.
{¶ 56} Taft‘s third assignment of error is not well-taken.
D. Taft did not Appeal the Trial Court‘s Decision on Postconviction Relief
{¶ 57} Finally, in Taft‘s fourth assignment of error, he argues that on June 1, 2018, the trial court improperly denied his petition for postconviction relief without holding a hearing.
{¶ 58} A trial court‘s decision granting or denying a petition for postconviction relief is a final, appealable order.
{¶ 59} Taft did not file a notice of appeal of the trial court‘s postconviction decision. Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the issues he raises regarding the trial court‘s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. We find that Taft‘s fourth assignment of error is not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 60} Based on the foregoing, the April 20, 2018 judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Taft is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, P.J.
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
JUDGE
CONCUR.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.