State v. JonesState v. Jones
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to clarify the trial judge’s duties under
I. Case Background
{¶ 2} Appellee, Joseph Jones Sr., was charged with three counts of domestic violence for allegedly hitting his fiancee’s children with a bug zapper. Two days before trial, Jones filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
{¶ 3} Two weeks later, Jones filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, pursuant to
{¶ 4} Jones argued to the Seventh District Court of Appeals that because the trial court failed to inform him of the effect of the plea of no contest as required by
{¶ 5} The Seventh District certified its decision as being in conflict with the Tenth District’s decision in State v. Horton-Alomar, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-744, 2005- Ohio-1537,
II. Legal Analysis
{¶ 6} A trial court’s obligations in accepting a plea depend upon the level of offense to which the defendant is pleading. State v. Watkins,
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} ‘With reference to the offense or offenses to which the plea is entered:
{¶ 9} “(1) The plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} The procedure set forth in
{¶ 13} As we summarized and explained in Watkins, “[i]n all cases, the judge must inform the defendant of the effect of his plea. In felony cases and misdemeanor cases involving serious offenses, a judge must also ‘addres[s] the defendant personally’ and ‘determin[e] that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily.’ ”
{¶ 14} Jones entered a plea of guilty to a charge of domestic violence, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of
Rules of Construction as Applied to
{¶ 15} Jones maintains that because he was not told of the effect of both a guilty and a no contest plea by the court, his guilty plea was invalid. He advances this
{¶ 16} The rules of construction set forth in the Ohio Revised Code are helpful on this point. R.C 1.02(F) provides that “ ‘[a]nd’ may be read ‘or,’ and ‘or’ may be read ‘and’ if the sense requires it.” This rule operates to avoid inadvertent consequences when logic demands. See Ramage v. Cent. Ohio Emergency Servs., Inc. (1992),
{¶ 17} Cómmon sense requires that “and” be read as “or” in
{¶ 18} “ * * *
{¶ 19} “(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest * * (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 20} For petty misdemeanors,
The Effect of a Plea for Purposes of
{¶ 21} As we have already noted, whenever accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, the trial court is required to inform a defendant of the effect of the plea.
{¶ 22} Although the state and amicus curiae acknowledge that informing the defendant of
{¶23} Our previous cases suggest that
{¶ 24} Similarly, in a case involving a felony guilty plea, we observed: “
{¶25} We hold, therefore, that to satisfy the requirement of informing a defendant of the effect of a plea, a trial court must inform the defendant of the appropriate language under
{¶ 26} We now must examine the record to see whether the trial court told Jones the effect of the guilty plea.
The Colloquy
{¶ 27} Before accepting the guilty plea on the day of trial, the trial court engaged in the following colloquy with Jones:
{¶ 28} “THE COURT: First of all, do you understand that you do have a right to have a trial in this matter and the trial can be held in front of either a jury or a judge? Do you understand that?
{¶ 29} “MR. JONES: Yes.
{¶ 30} “THE COURT: As a matter of fact, you understand we’re set for a trial by jury today and you saw the jurors out there ready to go forward; correct?
{¶ 32} “THE COURT: You understand that if you enter this plea that you are now giving up that right to the jury that you and your attorney demanded; do you understand that?
{¶ 33} “MR. JONES: Yes.
{¶ 34} “THE COURT: You understand that at that trial the State of Ohio would have been required to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand that?
{¶ 35} “MR. JONES: Uh-huh.
{¶ 36} “THE COURT: You understand that at that trial you would have had the right to subpoena witnesses for you and the right to cross examine any against you. Understand that?
{¶ 37} “MR. JONES: Yes.
{¶ 38} “THE COURT: And you understand that at that trial you would have had the right to testify yourself or to remain silent, and had you chosen to remain silent that no one would have been allowed to comment on that fact. Do you understand that, sir?
{¶ 39} “MR. JONES: Yes.
{¶ 40} “THE COURT: Finally, you understand that by pleading guilty that you do put yourself on the mercy of the court regardless of what is in this plea agreement and that you could receive up to 180 days in the county jail today and a fine of up to $ 1,000 in court costs. Do you understand that?
{¶ 41} “MR. JONES: Yes.
{¶ 42} “THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to waive or give up those rights now and enter a plea of guilt to one count of domestic violence?
{¶ 43} “ * * *
{¶ 44} “THE COURT: Is that what you want to do, sir?
{¶ 45} “MR. JONES: Yeah, I guess.
{¶ 46} “THE COURT: Well, you don’t have to guess. You have to tell me. Only you know.
{¶ 47} “MR. JONES: Yes.
(¶ 48} “THE COURT: Okay. You’ve had the opportunity to discuss this with your attorney; correct?
{¶ 49} “MR. JONES: Yes.”
{¶ 50} From the recitation on the record, we note that the trial court asked whether Jones understood that (1) he had a right to a bench or jury trial in which the state would bear the burden to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2)
{¶ 51} Although
The Requirement to Show Prejudice
{¶ 52} “[F]ailure to comply with nonconstitutional rights [such as the information in
{¶ 53} Jones contends that he was not aware that he was forfeiting the right to challenge, on appeal, the constitutionality of the domestic violence statute after the passage of Section 11, Article XV of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 54} Jones presented no evidence that at the time of his guilty plea, he claimed innocence. Under Griggs, any error by the trial court in failing to
{¶ 55} We hold that, under the totality of the circumstances, Jones was aware that a plea of guilty was a complete admission of guilt and that he was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to inform him of
III. Conclusion
{¶ 56} “[Although it can validly be argued that the trial court should adhere scrupulously to the provisions of [
{¶ 57} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County. Because the Seventh District Court of Appeals did not address Jones’s second assignment of error on his motion to vacate his guilty plea, we remand for consideration of that assignment of error.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
. As conditions of his probation, Jones was to report, attend anger management classes, and undergo a psychological evaluation with counseling, if needed.
. Thus, there is no absolute right to enter a no contest plea. The court may also refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, as
.
. We recently upheld the constitutionality of
Concurrence in Part
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 58} I concur in the reversal of the judgment of the court of appeals and the holding that in accepting a plea to a misdemeanor involving a petty offense, a trial court is required to inform the defendant only of the effect of the specific plea being entered. However, I dissent from the majority’s holding in this case that the trial court failed to inform this defendant of the “effect of the plea” under
{¶ 60} In plain English, the trial court informed the defendant of the “effect” of his plea. In my view, the court does not need to tell the defendant that “pleading guilty” really means “pleading guilty.” Unless common sense truly is dead, a defendant should know that. I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 61} The majority holds that a trial court accepting a plea of guilty or no contest from a defendant charged with a petty misdemeanor must inform him or her only of the effect of the specific plea being entered, not of all three pleas listed in
{¶ 62} When faced with an issue of statutory or rule interpretation, we must first look to the plain language of the statute or rule and apply it as written if its meaning is unambiguous and definite. See State v. Lowe,
{¶ 63} I fail to see the ambiguity in such a sentence in view of the use of “and,” the conjunctive word. A trial court must advise a defendant seeking to enter a plea of guilty or no contest of the effect of each listed plea. Given the clear plain-language meaning of the rule, we must apply it as written. See Lowe,
{¶ 64} In reaching a different conclusion, the majority does not note an explicit ambiguity in
{¶ 65} To support this argument, the majority cites
{¶ 66} Furthermore, the in pari materia doctrine may be used only when there is some ambiguity present in the plain language. See State ex rel. Burrows v. Indus. Comm. (1997),
{¶ 67} Even if the rule is ambiguous as written, the in pari materia doctrine still supports the plain-language reading. The majority fails to factor
{¶ 68} In short,
{¶ 69} In such a circumstance,
{¶ 70} The majority’s final argument is that substituting “or” for “and” in the last line of
{¶ 71} However, the plain language meaning fits perfectly into the hierarchy. Under
{¶ 72} Therefore, I would hold that the trial court was required to inform appellee of the effects of all three pleas listed in
. The juxtaposition of “plea” and “pleas” in these subsections is puzzling. The confusion is heightened by the fact that the two primary publishers of legal authorities in Ohio, Thomson West and Anderson, print different versions of the rule. In Thomson West’s publications,