State v. VeneyState v. Veney
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Moyer
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} Once again, we are asked to clarify the duties of the trial court in accepting pleas to felony charges and to determine the consequences of the trial court’s failure to comply with
I. Case Background
{¶2} Appellee, Thomas L. Veney, was indicted on one count of felonious assault in violation of
{¶ 3} Veney initially entered a not-guilty plea to all charges but later entered guilty pleas to the lesser included offense of attempted felonious assault and one firearm specification. The other count and firearm specification were dismissed. The trial court accepted the pleas, found Veney guilty, and sentenced him to two years for felonious assault and three years on the firearm specification for an aggregate prison term of five years. Veney appealed, asserting that his plea was invalid because the trial court had failed to explain the nature of the charges and failed to inform him that the state had to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.
{¶ 4} The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court because the trial court did not strictly comply with
{¶ 5} The court of appeals certified its judgment as being in conflict with the judgments in State v. Scott (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 401, 406-407, 680 N.E.2d 1297; State v. Cogar (Oct. 20, 1993), Summit App. No. CA-16234, 1993 WL
{¶ 6} In summary, the state argues that (1) the trial court need only substantially comply with the duty to advise the defendant of the state’s obligation to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, (2) a flawed plea colloquy does not require automatic reversal, (3)
II. Legal Analysis
{¶ 7} We have clearly stated, “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450. The United States Supreme Court has held that a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to jury trial, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, and the right to confront one’s accusers cannot be inferred from a silent record. Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274.
A.
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} “In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:
{¶ 10} “(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved,
{¶ 11} “(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
{¶ 12} “(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.”
{¶ 13} Before accepting a guilty or no-contest plea, the court must make the determinations and give the warnings required by
B. Substantial Compliance with
{¶ 14} Although we had initially insisted on strict compliance with
{¶ 15} Ohio’s substantial-compliance standard was further developed in State v. Strawther (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 298, 10 O.O.3d 420, 383 N.E.2d 900; State v. Billups (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 31, 11 O.O.3d 150, 385 N.E.2d 1308; State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 20 O.O.3d 397, 423 N.E.2d 115; and State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474. We explained: “Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving. Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made must show a prejudicial effect.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 108, 564 N.E.2d 474. To demonstrate prejudice in
{¶ 16} We have also clarified that in reviewing the totality of the circumstances, a court must determine whether the defendant understood the consequences of waiver. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N. E.2d 51, ¶ 12. Because (1) Griggs had confessed and had signed a written guilty-plea form and (2) Griggs and his counsel assured the court that he was aware of the rights he was waiving, we determined that the trial court had substantially complied -with
{¶ 17} Our precedent, therefore, establishes that a defendant must show prejudice before a plea will be vacated for a trial court’s error involving
C. Strict Compliance with
{¶ 18} Despite the evolution of substantial compliance as a standard for the court’s nonconstitutional notifications and determinations required by
{¶ 19}
{¶ 20} Although the right to be proven guilty by the state beyond a reasonable doubt is one of the five rights included within
{¶ 21} Yet, as the United States Supreme Court held the year after Boykin, the right to have the state prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is a constitutionally protected right of an accused. In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368. We therefore reject the state’s contention and instead hold that the duty to advise the defendant of the right to have guilt proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt is among the duties of
D. Consequences of the Court’s Failure to Strictly Comply
{¶ 22} Having found that a court must strictly comply with
{¶ 23} To properly frame this issue, we must review Ballard, which marked the first time that we explicitly made the connection between the strict-compliance standard and the constitutional rights in
{¶ 24} In Ballard, we cited Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 242-243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, for the principles that a defendant must be apprised of certain constitutional rights3 before his or her plea may be considered intelligent and voluntary and that plain error results when a trial court fails to explain those rights. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d at 476-477, 20 O.O.3d 397, 423 N.E.2d 115.
{¶ 25} However, we found a split of authority on the issue of “whether the complete omission of a Boykin constitutional right alone is cause to nullify a
{¶ 26} We adopted the latter view: “[A] guilty plea is constitutionally infirm when the defendant is not informed in a reasonable manner at the time of entering his guilty plea of his [Boykin rights].” (Emphasis added.) Ballard at 478, 20 O.O.3d 397, 423 N.E.2d 115. We then crystallized this concept in the syllabus with unarguably mandatory language: “Prior to accepting a guilty plea from a criminal defendant, the trial court must inform the defendant that he is waiving his [.Boykin rights].” (Emphasis added.) Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 27} This requirement is tempered only slightly by the second paragraph of the syllabus: “Failure to use the exact language contained in
{¶28} We look to the record to determine whether a trial court strictly complied with this duty. Id. at 481, 20 O.O.3d 397, 423 N.E.2d 115. Following this rule, we upheld Ballard’s plea even though the trial court failed to specifically mention the right to a jury trial by name, because the trial court did inform Ballard that “ ‘neither the Judge nor the jury’ ” could draw any inference if Ballard refused to testify and that he “ “was entitled to a completely fair and impartial trial under the law.’ ” Id. at 479, 481, 20 O.O.3d 397, 423 N.E.2d 115, fn. 7.
{¶ 29} Thus, pursuant to the strict-compliance standard set forth in Ballard, the trial court must orally inform the defendant of the rights set forth in
{¶ 30} In the present case, it is undisputed that the trial court plainly failed to orally inform Veney of his constitutional right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This failure to strictly comply with
III. Conclusion
{¶ 31} We hold that a trial court must strictly comply with
{¶ 32} We answer yes to the certified question and agree with the court of appeals that the trial court must strictly comply with
Judgment affirmed and cause remanded.
Pfeifer, O’Connor, and O’Donnell, JJ., concur. Lundberg Stratton, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.Notes
. The certified question accepted asks whether a trial court must strictly comply with the
. The court of appeals did not consider Vene/s claim that he had not understood the nature of his charges. Veney at ¶ 16, fn. 4.
. In view of our holding in this case, the principles applicable to the “Boykin rights” extend to all five rights listed in
Concurrence in Part
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 33} I agree with the portion of the syllabus that mandates that trial courts when conducting plea colloquies must strictly comply with all parts of
{¶ 34} We have held that when a trial judge fails to explain the constitutional rights set forth in
{¶ 35} Interpreting
{¶ 36} Allowing the state the chance to rebut the presumption that a defendant has been prejudiced does not confuse the standards of strict compliance and substantial compliance. The majority recognizes that under the substantial compliance standard, the burden is on the defendant to show prejudice, which means showing that the plea would otherwise not have been entered. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d at 108, 564 N.E.2d 474. A requirement that the state must overcome a presumption of the plea’s invalidity when the trial court does not strictly comply with
{¶ 37} Moreover, federal law does not require automatic vacation of a plea when a judge fails to inform a defendant of a Boykin right. See United States v. Vonn (2002), 535 U.S. 55, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90. Instead, the court reviews the entire record — including written pleas and statements that constitutional rights were reviewed with counsel — to determine whether the defendant understood and voluntarily made the plea. Id. at 74-75, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90. We have previously adopted this rule in Ballard, acknowledging that when determining whether a defendant was adequately informed of his
{¶ 38} To the contrary, the majority opinion now concludes that strict compliance brooks no mistakes by the trial court in its oral recitation to the defendant. In its overly formalistic view of the consequences of failure to strictly comply with
{¶ 39} Because I disagree with these draconian consequences as applied to every case, I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the state should have an opportunity to rebut the presumption that a plea is unknowing and involuntary with evidence from the entire record.
Lundberg Stratton and Cupp, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.