State v. JordanState v. Jordan
STEPHENS, J.—Erick Jordan asks this court to reverse a Court of Appeals decision affirming his convictions and sentence for second degree murder with a firearm enhancement and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. At issue is whether differences between self-defense standards in Washington and Texas bar a sentencing court from finding that manslaughter convictions in these states are legally comparable. We hold they do not and affirm the lower court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 13, 2007, Jordan fatally shot Maurice Jackson in front of two civilian witnesses and two police officers. Report of Proceedings (RP) (June 10, 2008) at 35-37; Clerk‘s Papers (CP) at 11. He fled from the scene but was
At sentencing, the State proved that Jordan had previously been convicted of voluntary manslaughter in Texas in 1992. RP Sentencing (Jan. 16, 2009) at 15-17, 19. Jordan, however, objected to the inclusion of the Texas conviction in his offender score, arguing that his prior Texas offense was not legally comparable to any Washington offense because Washington and Texas have different standards for self-defense. Id. at 8. The trial court rejected this argument, finding voluntary manslaughter in Texas to be legally comparable to second degree murder in Washington. Id. at 19-20. Inclusion of the Texas conviction increased Jordan‘s offender score to eight,1 and the trial court sentenced him accordingly to a standard-range sentence of 417 months. CP at 155, 169-72. Jordan appealed his sentence, arguing, inter alia, that his Texas conviction was not legally comparable
The Court of Appeals agreed with Jordan that his Texas conviction for voluntary manslaughter was not comparable to Washington‘s second degree murder because a person could be convicted of voluntary manslaughter in Texas without intentionally causing the death—a necessary element of second degree murder in Washington. State v. Jordan, No. 63016-4-I, slip op. (unpublished portion) at 7 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2010). The court, nonetheless, upheld the trial court‘s offender score calculation because voluntary manslaughter in Texas is legally comparable to first degree manslaughter in Washington, which scores the same points as second degree murder under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA),
ANALYSIS
Questions regarding the comparability of offenses present issues of law that we review de novo. See State v. Stockwell, 159 Wn.2d 394, 397, 150 P.3d 82 (2007). Under the SRA, the standard sentencing range for an offense is determined by cross-referencing a defendant‘s offender score with the offense‘s seriousness level on the sentencing grid provided under
Due Process Does Not Require Comparability of Defenses
When considering out-of-state convictions, the SRA provides that “[o]ut-of-state convictions for offenses shall be classified according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided by Washington law.”
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
Well-settled precedent recognizes that the sentencing process is “less exacting than the process of establishing guilt.” Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1994). Minimal due process
In Blakely, however, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment‘s right to a jury trial (as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and hence applicable to the states), coupled with the Fourteenth Amendment‘s due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, provides a constitutional limit on the facts that a sentencing court can use to support a sentence above a statutorily mandated range.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that Blakely‘s constitutional protections do not apply to “‘the fact of a prior conviction,‘” Id. at 301 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000)). Only where the exact facts of a prior offense is used to increase the statutory maximum sentence a sentencing judge is authorized to enter does Blakely-type due process clause protections apply to limit judicial inquiry into the underlying circumstances of the prior conviction. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 186 L. Ed. 2d 438 (2013); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 161 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2005).
In this case, we do not have a debate about either the existence of the prior conviction or the facts of the underlying conviction. Instead, only the effect of the prior conviction is at issue. The parties disagree about whether a particular Texas conviction, with particular elements, and specific jury instructions (which are part of our record) is legally “comparable,” in the language of
RCW 9.94A.525(3) Does Not Require Comparability of Self-Defense Laws
When interpreting the meaning of statutes, “‘[t]he court‘s fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature‘s intent.‘” State v. Pannell, 173 Wn.2d 222, 226-27, 267 P.3d 349 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Dep‘t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)).
We have repeatedly recognized that the legislature purposefully created the SRA scheme broadly in order to “‘ensure that defendants with equivalent prior convictions are treated “the same way, regardless of whether their prior convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere.“‘” State v. Morley, 134 Wn.2d 588, 602, 952 P.2d 167 (1998) (quoting State v. Villegas, 72 Wn. App. 34, 38-39, 863 P.2d 560 (1993) (quoting State v. Weiand, 66 Wn. App. 29, 34, 831 P.2d 749 (1992))). The SRA instructs that “[o]ut-of-state convictions for offenses shall be classified according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided by Washington law.”
Given the legislature‘s broad purpose and the SRA‘s loose point assignment, we have interpreted the SRA as requiring rough comparability—not precision—among offenses. See Stockwell, 159 Wn.2d at 397 (noting “comparability analysis is not an exact science“). Accordingly, we have declined to interpret the SRA to require judges to “conduct the tedious task of comparing out-of-state criminal procedures to in-state procedures” as part of its comparability analysis, reasoning that such interpretation would be “clearly contrary to the purposes of the SRA.” Morley, 134 Wn.2d at 596-98. Moreover, we noted that such interpretation would defeat the SRA framework because it “would exclude every out-of-state conviction from a defendant‘s criminal history.” Id. Instead, we have consistently confirmed that legal comparability is satisfied when the elements of the foreign offense are comparable to those of a Washington offense. Sublett, 176 Wn.2d at 87 (lead opinion); Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d at 415; Lavery, 154 Wn.2d at 255-56.
We recognize that in Washington, absence of self-defense has been considered an “element” of the crime. State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 493-94, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983) (“Once the issue of self-defense is properly raised,” then
Requiring sentencing courts to consider the nuances of out-of-state self-defense laws is not only unnecessary under the SRA‘s comparability analysis, but it would also have far-reaching effects. Consider the possible nuances of self-defense. Unlike Washington, some 19 states still impose a common-law duty to retreat as a condition of claiming self-defense outside the home. See Eugene Volokh, Duty to Retreat and Stand Your Ground: Counting the States, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 17, 2013, 10:11 AM), http://www.volokh.com/
Subjecting diverse out-of-state self-defense laws to the SRA comparability analysis would also create the “minitrials over prior convictions” we have consistently rejected. Wiley, 124 Wn.2d at 686; State v. Irish, 173 Wn.2d 787, 790, 272 P.3d 207 (2012) (declining to “turn the current sentencing proceeding into an appellate review of all of the defendant‘s prior convictions” (citing State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 188, 713 P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796 (1986))). And, construing the SRA as requiring analysis of the context of self-defense laws would likely generate a tidal wave of claims for postconviction relief. See Morley, 134 Wn.2d at 598 (noting that such a holding “would apply retroactively to the date the SRA was enacted,” and that “every single prisoner with out-of-state prior convictions” could attack his or her sentence (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wn.2d 558, 568, 933 P.2d 1019 (1997))). This would flout the legislature‘s intent in creating a rough comparability scheme under the SRA.
CONCLUSION
Jordan‘s Texas manslaughter conviction was properly counted in his criminal history under the SRA. We adhere to our long-standing interpretation of the SRA as not requiring exact comparability and hold that a court need not analyze divergent self-defense laws as part of its comparability analysis. Nor does due process impose such a requirement. Because Jordan‘s sentence was consistent with both the SRA and constitutional minimums, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
Stephens, J.
WE CONCUR:
madsen, C.J.
J.M. Johnson, J. P.T.
Wiggins, J.
Owens, J.
Gonzalez, J.
Fairhurst, J.
Gordon McCloud, J.