State v. JonesState v. Jones
OPINION
Rendered on the 2nd day of October, 2020.
MARCY A. VONDERWELL, Atty. Reg. No. 0078311, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Greene County Prosecutor‘s Office, 61 Greene Street, Suite 200, Xenia, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JOHNNA M. SHIA, Atty. Reg. No. 0067685, P.O. Box 145, Springboro, Ohio 45066 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
TUCKER, P.J.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On October 18, 2017, the United States Attorney‘s Office filed a complaint against Jones in Case No. 3:18-cr-00002 before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The charges set forth in the complaint included distribution, possession and production of child pornography.
{¶ 3} On October 23, 2019, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Jones in Montgomery C.P. No. 2018-CR-1627 on one count of rape of a person less than 10 years of age. Additionally, two counts of sexual battery, in violation of
{¶ 4} In the instant case, a Greene County grand jury issued an indictment against Jones on November 27, 2019. The indictment set forth one charge of rape of a person less than 10 years of age.
{¶ 5} Jones entered into a plea agreement with the United States Attorney in Case
{¶ 6} In the case at hand, Jones entered into a plea agreement with the State on February 4, 2020, pursuant to which Jones agreed to plead guilty as charged, and the State agreed to recommend that Jones be sentenced to a term of 15 years to life in prison, with the term to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed in the federal case and the Montgomery County case. At Jones‘s sentencing on February 13, 2020, however, the trial court declined to accept the State‘s recommendation and sentenced Jones to a term of life without the possibility of parole. Jones timely filed a notice of appeal on February 20, 2020.
II. Analysis
{¶ 7} For his first assignment of error, Jones contends that:
JONES’ PLEA WAS NOT VOLUNTARY, KNOWING NOR [sic] INTELLIGENT.
{¶ 8} Jones “is not challenging the trial court‘s adherence to the requirements of Crim.R. 11,” but instead, he “argues that [the] circumstances surrounding [his decision to enter a] plea” rendered the plea “involuntary and thus void.” Appellant‘s Brief 3-4. Specifically, Jones maintains that he believed that he had no choice other than to plead
{¶ 9} To “satisfy the requirements of due process, a plea of guilty * * * must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate” as much. State v. Chessman, 2d Dist. Greene No. 03-CA-100, 2006-Ohio-835, ¶ 15, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); see also State v. Inskeep, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2016-CA-2, 2016-Ohio-7098, ¶ 12, citing State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24520 & 24705, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 13. A trial court accordingly “must comply with
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} In the instant case, Jones implicitly acknowledges that the trial court complied fully with
{¶ 13} Essentially, Jones argues that the trial court violated his right to due process by accepting his plea while refusing to impose the recommended sentence, inasmuch as he chose to plead guilty solely because he believed that he would thereby be “certain” of his eventual release. See Appellant‘s Brief 4. The record offers no support for Jones‘s
{¶ 14} At Jones‘s plea colloquy, the trial court read the parties’ Plea Agreement Report, which concluded with Jones‘s acknowledgement that “his attorney ha[d] explained, and that he under[stood], the [c]ourt [was] not bound by [the] agreement.” (Emphasis added.) Transcript of Proceedings 9:5-10:4, Feb. 4, 2020. Questioning Jones directly, the judge asked whether Jones understood that his plea was the product of an “[a]greement reached [among him], [his] attorney, and the assistant prosecuting attorney, [and that the judge] [did]n‘t have to follow any portion of it,” and Jones answered in the affirmative. Id. at 10:14-10:19. The trial court also read the
{¶ 15} Although Jones now claims that his only reason for entering into the plea agreement was his belief that he would thus be certain to receive a sentence of 15 years to life in prison, the record is bereft of any evidence that he was promised such a sentence or that he was misled into believing that the trial court was legally obligated to follow the parties’ joint recommendation. The fact that Jones had already been sentenced in the federal case and the Montgomery County case, moreover, did not necessarily make his decision to plead guilty in the instant case any less voluntary. Jones reasonably might have believed that pleading guilty was his best chance of preserving the possibility of his
{¶ 16} For his second assignment of error, Jones contends that:
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT‘S EXCESS [sic] SENTENCE.
{¶ 17} Jones argues that he should be resentenced because “the trial court may not have fully considered all relevant factors under [the] circumstances.” Appellant‘s Brief 9-11. Specifically, Jones faults the court for finding that he was unlikely to be rehabilitated, which Jones maintains is contrary to “the facts and mitigating circumstances,” and for failing to recognize that his conduct was not characterized by “several factors that [in other cases] make sexual assault against a child especially harmful.” Id. at 11-13.
{¶ 18} Under
{¶ 19} Pursuant to
{¶ 20} A “trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the authorized statutory range, and [it] is not required to make any findings or give its reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State v. King, 2013-Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, paragraph seven of the syllabus. Even so, the “court must comply with all applicable rules and statutes, including
{¶ 21} Here, the premise of Jones‘s challenge to his sentence is that the trial court should have assigned less weight to the nature of the offense he committed and more weight to mitigating factors, such as the likelihood of rehabilitation. See Appellant‘s Brief 9-14. The trial court, however, was free to determine the relative weight to be accorded the various sentencing factors listed in
{¶ 22} Notwithstanding Jones‘s disagreement with the trial court‘s determination that the harm he caused outweighed all other sentencing factors, as well as with the trial
III. Conclusion
{¶ 23} We hold that Jones intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to one count of rape, irrespective of the fact that he had already pleaded guilty to similar charges in related cases before the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas and the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Furthermore, we hold that the sentence imposed by the trial court was not contrary to law or unsupported by the record. The judgment of the Greene County Common Pleas Court will be affirmed.
HALL, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Marcy A. Vonderwell
Johnna M. Shia
Hon. Michael A. Buckwalter