THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MILLER, APPELLEE.
No. 2018-0948
Supreme Court of Ohio
April 14, 2020
2020-Ohio-1420
FISCHER, J.
Submitted December 11, 2019. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 105363, 2018-Ohio-843.
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-1420
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MILLER, APPELLEE.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Miller, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1420.]
Trial courts must strictly comply with
(No. 2018-0948—Submitted December 11, 2019—Decided April 14, 2020.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 105363, 2018-Ohio-843.
FISCHER, J.
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked whether trial courts in felony cases must strictly comply with the plea colloquy required by
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellee, Shawn Miller, pleaded guilty to a number of crimes in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. During the plea hearing, the trial court enumerated the constitutional rights Miller would be entitled to if he elected to go to trial and Miller affirmatively stated that he understood those constitutional rights. The trial court did not, however, specifically ask Miller whether he understood that he was waiving those rights by pleading guilty. The trial court accepted Miller‘s guilty pleas and sentenced him to an aggregate eight-year prison term and three years of postrelease control.
{¶ 3} On appeal to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, Miller argued that the pleas should be vacated because the trial court had failed to ensure that he understood that by pleading guilty he was waiving the constitutional rights enumerated in
{¶ 4} In a two-to-one decision, the court of appeals vacated Miller‘s guilty pleas, reversed his convictions, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Applying this court‘s decision in State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, the Eighth District concluded that the trial court was required to strictly comply with
{¶ 5} The dissenting judge stated that the totality of the circumstances indicated that Miller knew what rights he would lose by pleading guilty and what rights he would have if he chose to go to trial. Because she concluded that the trial court had “meaningfully conveyed the substance of Miller‘s rights,” she concluded that the trial court had complied with
{¶ 6} This court accepted jurisdiction over the state‘s proposition of law: “A reviewing court applies a substantial compliance standard in determining whether criminal defendants understand they are waiving their constitutional trial rights when entering a plea in a felony case.” See 153 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2018-Ohio-4288, 109 N.E.3d 1259.
II. Analysis
{¶ 7} The state argues that the Eighth District‘s decision elevates form over substance. It asserts that so long as a defendant understands that pleading guilty to an offense waives his or her constitutional trial rights, the trial court has complied with
{¶ 8} Miller responds that the state failed to preserve the issue whether substantial compliance or strict compliance with
A. The Issue in this Case Is Properly Before Us
{¶ 9} As an initial procedural matter, we conclude that the state‘s failure to argue below for a substantial-compliance standard does not constitute a basis for affirming the judgment of the court of appeals. The issue whether substantial compliance or strict compliance applies is not essential to this case. Rather, the critical issue is what
{¶ 10} Moreover, in its opinion, the Eighth District acknowledged that its strict-compliance holding conflicted with the Tenth District‘s holding in State v. Ellis, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-912, 2015-Ohio-3438, ¶ 10-12, that Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, allows substantial compliance with the portion of
B. Legal Background
{¶ 11}
In felony cases the court * * * shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:
* * *
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant‘s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶ 12} Our most relevant precedent regarding the issue of which standard applies is Veney. Of particular relevance is the language of Veney‘s syllabus:
A trial court must strictly comply with
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally advise a defendant before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives (1) the right to a jury trial, (2) the right to confront one‘s accusers, (3) the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, (4) the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (5) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. When a trial court fails to strictly comply with this duty, the defendant‘s plea is invalid. (Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) , applied.)
Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, at syllabus.
{¶ 13} In addressing the question of which standard applied, the Veney court confronted the question whether the trial court‘s failure to advise a criminal
{¶ 14} Veney therefore held that “the trial court must orally inform the defendant of the rights set forth in
{¶ 15} The three justices concurring in part and dissenting in part in Veney agreed that “trial courts when conducting plea colloquies must strictly comply with all parts of
C. What Does Strict Compliance Require?
{¶ 16} We reaffirm the unanimous conclusion of the justices in Veney that trial courts must strictly comply with
{¶ 17} Miller mistakenly equates strict compliance with a requirement that the judge recite the provisions of
[f]ailure to use the exact language contained in
Crim.R. 11(C) , in informing a criminal defendant of his constitutional right to a trial and the constitutional rights related to such trial, including the right to trial by jury, is not grounds for vacating a plea as long as the record shows that the trial court explained these rights in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. Rather, the trial court needs to inform a defendant of those constitutional rights that the defendant will not be able to exercise if the defendant pleads guilty, and the information provided by the court must be in words that the defendant can understand. See
{¶ 18} As we explained in Veney,
[T]he focus, upon review, is whether the record shows that the trial court explained or referred to the right in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant. To hold otherwise would be to elevate formalistic litany of constitutional rights over the substance of the dialogue between the trial court and the accused. This is something we are unwilling to do.
{¶ 19} Thus, the goal of
D. The Trial Court Strictly Complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)
{¶ 20} In this case, as the plea colloquy set forth below shows, the trial court, in language understandable to the average person, not in legalese, set forth the constitutional trial rights listed in
THE COURT: As good as the plea bargains might sound to people, nobody is under an obligation to accept them. You‘re welcome to stay with not guilty and go to trial instead. Right, Mr. Miller?
DEFENDANT MILLER: Yes, Your Honor.
* * *
THE COURT: And if you go to trial, you always have your lawyers. Can‘t afford one, one is appointed no cost to you. Understood, * * * Mr. Miller?
DEFENDANT MILLER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And you know that at trial you‘re presumed innocent. The burden is on the prosecutor. They have to come in with evidence. They have to prove each of the original charges against you with evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
If there is one or more charges on the list that they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt, you would be acquitted and discharged of that count if they couldn‘t prove to that degree. Understood, Mr. Miller?
DEFENDANT MILLER: Yes, Your Honor.
* * *
THE COURT: So at trial you‘re welcome to take the witness stand in your defense but you have a right to stay off the stand and remain silent. No one can make you talk or even comment on your silence. Understood, * * * Mr. Miller?
* * *
DEFENDANT MILLER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And do you understand that you and your lawyer get to cross-examine all the witnesses that the prosecutor brings in here to try to build a case against you * * *? You understand that? * * * Do you, Mr. Miller?
DEFENDANT MILLER: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. So the other thing you need to know, your lawyer can issue subpoenas to select your witnesses, get them on the witness stand. The Court will enforce those subpoenas to help you get them here to testify for you. * * * Understood, Mr. Miller?
DEFENDANT MILLER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Any questions from any of you?
* * *
DEFENDANT MILLER: No.
Although Miller argues that some synonym of the word waiver must be used in the plea colloquy in order to ensure that the defendant understands the ramifications of pleading guilty, it is clear from the transcript excerpt set forth above that that is not true. The court strictly complied with
{¶ 21} We see no error in this exchange. Common sense tells us that the trial judge‘s use of easily understood words conveyed to Miller that he would be waiving certain constitutional rights if he were to plead guilty and that the exchange resulted in Miller‘s plea being voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. To reach any other result would raise form over substance. We refuse to require trial courts to use particular words during the plea colloquy.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 22} We reaffirm our holding in Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, that trial courts must strictly comply with
{¶ 23} Because we conclude that the trial court strictly complied with
Judgment reversed and convictions reinstated.
LISA L. SADLER, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for STEWART, J.
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gregory Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Patrick J. Milligan Co., L.P.A., and Patrick J. Milligan; and James E. Kocka, for appellee.