State v. Jerome Jenkins Jr.State v. Jerome Jenkins Jr.
AFFIRMED
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, and Adam Sinclair Ruffin, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Senior Assistant Attorney General William Edgar Salter III, of Columbia, for Respondent.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On January 2, 2015, James Daniels entered the Sunhouse convenience store at the intersection of Highway 905 and Red Bluff Road in Longs, South Carolina, on the pretense of buying a bottle of lemonade. James’ actual purpose was to scout the store for Jerome Jenkins and James’ brother McKinley Daniels to rob it. Minutes after James left the store, Jenkins and McKinley entered, masked and armed with pistols. They first encountered Jimmy McZeke, who worked at the store. Jenkins and McKinley fired at McZeke, but both missed. McZeke then ran into the bathroom at the back of the store and locked the door. Jenkins followed McZeke and shot at him through the bathroom door. The gunshots shattered
McKinley stayed at the front of the store where the store clerk—Bala Paruchuri—stood behind the cash register. McKinley pointed his pistol at Paruchuri, went behind the counter, and robbed Paruchuri of the money in the register. Jenkins quickly returned to the front of the store. As he and McKinley left the store, both shot Paruchuri. According to the store‘s video security system that recorded the entire sequence, Jenkins and McKinley were in the store for thirty-seven seconds. Paruchuri died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds.
The State charged Jenkins with murder of Paruchuri, attempted murder of McZeke, and armed robbery, and sought the death penalty for the murder charge. During defense counsel‘s opening statement in the guilt phase of trial, Jenkins admitted his guilt, stating through counsel, “Let me say this to you. I listened to the Solicitor‘s presentation, and a lot of what he said is true. I will tell you this right up front, straight up: Jerome Jenkins is guilty. . . . He‘s guilty of the charges that the State has brought against him.” The jury found Jenkins guilty of all three charges, and after the twenty-four-hour mandatory waiting period, the case proceeded to the sentencing phase of trial.
During the sentencing phase, the State introduced evidence that Jenkins and the Daniels brothers robbed two additional convenience stores—one Scotchman and a second Sunhouse—within hours of each other on January 25, 2015, three weeks after the first Sunhouse robbery and murder. As in the first Sunhouse robbery and murder, James scouted each store minutes before Jenkins and McKinley entered wearing masks and armed with pistols. In the course of the robbery of the second Sunhouse store, Jenkins shot and killed the store clerk Trisha Stull.1
Also during the sentencing phase, the State introduced Jenkins’ prior convictions for burglary in the second degree
Jenkins called two SCDC officers to testify they had not had any disciplinary issues with Jenkins. Jenkins also presented witnesses testifying—among other things—Jenkins had three young children, was a “respectful guy,” and was “vulnerable to the influence of others” because he was “very immature.”3 Dr. Donna Maddox—an expert in forensic psychiatry—diagnosed Jenkins with several mental health disorders, including post-traumatic stress disorder, an unspecified depressive disorder, and a substance abuse disorder. Dr. Maddox also testified Jenkins was “under the influence” of McKinley or James.
The trial court charged the jury on two statutory aggravating circumstances: the defendant committed the murder while in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon and the defendant committed the murder while in the
The jury unanimously found both statutory aggravating circumstances existed and sentenced Jenkins to death for the murder of Bala Paruchuri. The trial court sentenced Jenkins to thirty years in prison for attempted murder and thirty years in prison for armed robbery but did not indicate whether the sentences were consecutive or concurrent.
II. Analysis
Under our mandatory duty to review a sentence of death, we must “consider the punishment as well as any errors by way of appeal.”
A. Sentencing by Court on a Guilty Plea
The first error Jenkins alleges on appeal is the trial court denied him the right to plead guilty and be sentenced by a jury. As Jenkins acknowledges, however,
Jenkins argues the Supreme Court‘s 2016 decision in Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 136 S. Ct. 616, 193 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2016), requires that a jury impose the sentence in all capital cases, effectively overruling Allen, Crisp, Wood, and Downs. In Hurst, the Supreme Court stated, “The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death.” 577 U.S. at 94, 136 S. Ct. at 619, 193 L. Ed. 2d at 508. Hurst is distinguishable from this case, however, for the same reason we distinguished Ring v. Arizona in Allen, Crisp, Wood, and Downs. Hurst dealt with a Florida statute under which “the jury renders an ‘advisory sentence’ of life or death,” after which, “Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the [trial] court . . . shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death.” 577 U.S. at 95-96, 136 S. Ct. at 620, 193 L. Ed. 2d at 509 (quoting
- Jenkins: I have a question. Is it legal for them to make me go to trial?
- Court: Make you go to trial?
- Jenkins: Basically, they made me go to trial. I didn‘t get no plea or nothing. So, is it legal?
- Court: I mean, you have the right to plead guilty if you want to plead guilty.
- Jenkins: Plead guilty to the death sentence?
- Court: Right. I mean, we are both kind of smiling at each other as we say that, but I mean, there are some people who believe criminal defendants do not have a right to plead guilty. You know, I don‘t think you can stop somebody from pleading guilty as charged. But, you know --
- Jenkins: So if I plead guilty to the death sentence, I would be on death row?
- Court: Yeah.
- Jenkins: Not a chance.
- Court: Right. . . .
We wish to be very clear this was error by the trial court. See generally Crisp, 362 S.C. at 415-16, 608 S.E.2d at 431-32 (discussing the propriety of a trial court‘s statements to a capital defendant concerning his right to a trial by jury); State v. Owens, 362 S.C. 175, 178, 607 S.E.2d 78, 79-80 (2004)
The question then becomes whether the error warrants reversal. In Crisp and Owens, we rejected the idea the error in those cases could be harmless, stating in Crisp “such
comments by a trial judge during a guilty plea proceeding are fundamentally erroneous and constitute prejudicial error.” 362 S.C. at 417, 608 S.E.2d at 432. In Owens, we recited our discussion of prejudicial error from Pierce, in which the Court explained, “It is virtually impossible to determine the actual effect the judge‘s improper statements had on Pierce.” Owens, 362 S.C. at 178, 607 S.E.2d at 80 (quoting Pierce, 289 S.C. at 434, 346 S.E.2d at 710). In each of those six cases—Crisp, Owens, Gunter, Pierce, Cooper, and Butler—however, the trial court made the erroneous statements during the hearing at the conclusion of which the defendant made the choice whether to exercise his right to a jury trial or his right to remain silent. Thus, the prejudicial effect of the trial court‘s erroneous statements was known by this Court to be present in the mind
In this case, on the other hand, the erroneous comments were made on March 7, jury qualification did not begin until May 6, and the trial itself did not start until May 10. On April 26, the trial court heard motions, including Jenkins’ “Motion to Find
On May 10—the morning of trial and only moments before opening statements—Jenkins again brought up his motion to declare subsection
We believe that statute is unconstitutional and it takes away a defendant‘s right to plead guilty and be sentenced by a jury. We think every defendant is entitled to have a jury trial, that every defendant is entitled to have a jury trial on the issue of sentencing in a capital case; this being a capital case.
Jenkins still did not mention what the trial court said at the March 7 hearing, again relying only on the argument we rejected in Allen, Crisp, Wood, and Downs. The trial court did not immediately respond. Jenkins’ counsel then explained to the trial court,
So, what we want to do is -- because we cannot plead guilty and then have a sentencing trial by jury, what we want to do is explain to the jury in this case that we are not pleading not guilty, that we admit guilt as to the issues in this case . . . , but that the only way we could have a jury do the sentencing is to go through this process, which means the State has to present evidence and we have to wait and
let the jury hear the aggravating and mitigating factors in order to make their decision.
Jenkins’ counsel then asked the trial court “to inquire of Mr. Jenkins if that is his understanding and if he is on board with that, and whether or not that is okay with him. Because, obviously, this is not something that is commonly done.” After confirming both defense counsel believed the strategy to be in Jenkins’ best interest, the trial court spoke directly to Jenkins, beginning with a specific reference to the March 7 conversation,
You and I have talked before on the record that if you did plea, then I would be the one -- we would have a sentencing trial, but there is no jury, just up to me.8 I think you said something like, “I like you, but not like that,” or something like that.9 We all kind of chuckled about it . . . .
After a lengthy dialogue, the trial court confirmed Jenkins understood the strategy. The trial court then approved the strategy, stating, “I think it is a very good strategy, and a very positive strategy.”
Thus, Jenkins’ trial counsel had at least three opportunities to object to the trial court‘s March 7 error: (1) the March 7 hearing, which—though ex parte—was attended by both defense counsel, (2) the April 26 hearing, and (3) the May 10 hearing. The trial court‘s playful May 10 recitation of the March 7 conversation indicates he did not realize what he told Jenkins on March 7. In fact, we see no indication in the record that the trial court was ever aware his March 7 comments could have been an issue or could have improperly influenced Jenkins’ decision on his constitutional right to not plead guilty. If defense counsel had objected to the March 7 comments at any of the at least three opportunities, the trial court could have taken steps to correct its error. Or, in the unlikely event the trial court actually meant what he said, a different error
In addition to counsel‘s obligation to object to the trial court‘s March 7 error, the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to independently explain to a criminal defendant the law applicable to each significant issue in his case, particularly where the defendant must make an important decision about exercising a constitutional right. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 694 (1984) (“From counsel‘s function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant‘s cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.“). It is inconceivable that defense counsel did not have an extended conversation with Jenkins—probably on more than one occasion—about his right to a trial by jury, and consequently, what the law permitted and required of the trial court if Jenkins decided not to exercise his right to a trial by jury. This is particularly true in this case, where we know the question of a guilty plea was very much on the mind of Jenkins and his lawyers. In those conversations, it is equally inconceivable counsel did not explain to Jenkins that the trial court would be required by law to consider both death and life as options for his sentence, and to do so with an open mind without preconceptions as to which sentence the evidence would warrant the trial court impose.
Therefore, as to the first error Jenkins alleges on appeal, we stand by our holdings in Allen, Crisp, Wood, and Downs that the subsection
Finally, because the March 7 error occurred nine weeks before trial—nine weeks before Jenkins had to actually decide whether to exercise his right to a trial by jury—we do not know whether the trial court‘s erroneous comments actually affected Jenkins’ decision to exercise his right to a trial by jury. In Owens and Pierce, we found the erroneous comments were prejudicial with specific reliance on our finding, “It is virtually impossible to determine the actual effect the judge‘s improper statements had on [the defendant].” Owens, 362 S.C. at 178, 607 S.E.2d at 80; Pierce, 289 S.C. at 434, 346 S.E.2d at 710. In this case, it is quite possible “to determine the actual effect the judge‘s improper statements had on” Jenkins and to determine whether trial counsel‘s later conversations with him—or the trial court‘s statements during the May 10 hearing—cured Jenkins’ apparent interpretation of the trial court‘s March 7 comments. That possibility lies in the post-conviction relief process, during which counsel‘s conversations with Jenkins between March 7 and May 10 can be fully explored, and Jenkins’ actual understanding of both what the trial court told him and his right to have a fair and impartial trial court sentence him if he pled guilty can also be fully explored.
B. Statement by McKinley Daniels
The second error Jenkins alleges on appeal is the trial court‘s refusal to admit into evidence, during the sentencing phase, a statement made by Jenkins’ co-defendant McKinley to Jenkins’ expert witness Dr. Maddox. Dr. Maddox interviewed
The State argues the trial court was correct to find the statement is hearsay because Jenkins offered the statement in evidence to prove the truth of what McKinley asserted in his statement to Dr. Maddox—that McKinley did in fact tell Jenkins to kill Stull. See
This Court and our court of appeals have made it clear that—in South Carolina—
We begin our analysis of whether the trial court properly excluded the evidence in this case by observing the obvious fact that evidence often serves dual purposes. Here, McKinley‘s statement to Dr. Maddox would be useful to the jury for the improper hearsay purpose of determining whether McKinley did in fact tell Jenkins to kill Stull during the second Sunhouse robbery and murder. McKinley‘s statement would also be useful for the legitimate purpose of explaining the basis for Dr. Maddox‘s opinion that Jenkins was “under the influence of . . . McKinley.” In State v. Perry, 430 S.C. 24, 842 S.E.2d 654 (2020), we addressed how a trial court should analyze this situation. We stated, “To the extent a trial court finds evidence . . . does serve these dual purposes, the court must determine whether the evidence has sufficient probative force for serving the legitimate purpose that the evidence should be admitted, despite its inherent tendency to serve the improper purpose.” 430 S.C. at 31, 842 S.E.2d at 657-58.
We hold the same analysis must be conducted under
When information is reasonably relied upon by an expert and yet is admissible only for the purpose of assisting the jury in evaluating an expert‘s opinion, a trial court applying this Rule must consider the information‘s probative value in assisting the jury to weigh the expert‘s opinion on the one hand, and the risk of prejudice resulting from the jury‘s potential misuse of the information for substantive purposes on the other. The information may be disclosed to the jury, upon objection, only if the trial court finds that the probative value of the information in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert‘s opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Id.
In a lengthy hearing outside the jury‘s presence, the trial court conducted this very analysis on the admissibility of McKinley‘s statement to Dr. Maddox. After hearing from both parties, the trial court ruled the statement is inadmissible hearsay. We begin our review of the trial court‘s analysis by pointing out that Dr. Maddox‘s opinion did not specifically address the
Maddox‘s opinion
Turning to the “prejudicial effect” on the State from the jury‘s consideration of McKinley‘s statement for its truth, the fact the statement relates only indirectly to the first Sunhouse robbery and murder diminishes the prejudice. In addition, the admission of the statement would have significantly helped the State in another respect because the statement directly contradicts what Jenkins told investigators in interviews admitted into evidence in the sentencing phase, that he denied participation in the second Sunhouse robbery and murder. The State placed particular emphasis on Jenkins’ guilt in the Scotchman robbery and the second Sunhouse robbery and murder as justification for its seeking, and the jury‘s imposing, the death penalty.15 The statement would thus have supported the State‘s sentencing phase argument that the death penalty is warranted against Jenkins because he committed the second Sunhouse robbery and murder. Therefore, we find the jury‘s use of McKinley‘s statement for its truth would have been only minimally prejudicial to the State.
Whether the trial court erred in excluding the statement McKinley made to Dr. Maddox is a close question. Some members of this Court would have admitted the statement, while others agree with the trial court and would have excluded it. The standard is whether the probative value of the statement for explaining Dr. Maddox‘s opinion “substantially outweighs” the probative value for its truth. Ultimately, we cannot say the trial court‘s decision to exclude the statement
is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice“).16
C. Closing Argument
The third error Jenkins alleges on appeal is the trial court‘s refusal to allow defense counsel to tell the jury in his closing argument of the sentencing phase “that the verdict for life . . . does not have to be unanimous” or “that one vote for life would result in a life sentence.” The trial court found the first statement was in “direct contradiction” to what it was going to instruct the jury and the second statement was “not necessarily true either, because if there is no unanimity as to aggravating circumstances, then the options for the Court are 30 to life.”17 The trial court also noted it was not permitted to charge the jury on the consequences of a deadlock, citing State v. Adams, 277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Torrence. Jenkins contends the trial court should have allowed counsel to make these statements and its failure to do so placed an unreasonable limitation on Jenkins’ right to a meaningful closing argument. We disagree.
If members of the jury after a reasonable deliberation cannot agree on a recommendation as to whether or not the
death sentence should be imposed on a defendant found guilty of murder, the trial judge shall dismiss such jury and shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as provided in subsection (A).
In Adams, this Court considered the previous version18 of this statute and held the consequence of a deadlock was not required to be charged to the jury. 277 S.C. at 124, 283 S.E.2d at 587. We noted a unanimous vote by the jury is the normal and required result, while an “undecided jury is the exception.” Id. We stated, “That portion of the statute addressing the legal effect given to the existence of an unalterably divided jury is addressed to the trial judge only. . . .” Id.
We considered again whether the jury should be told of the consequences of a deadlock in Winkler v. State, 418 S.C. 643, 795 S.E.2d 686 (2016). In Winkler, the jury specifically asked the trial court during deliberations in the sentencing phase to “explain what happens if we‘re not able to reach a unanimous decision.” 418 S.C. at 647, 795 S.E.2d at 689. The trial court refused to answer that and a similar question, and trial counsel did not object. 418 S.C. at 647-48, 795 S.E.2d at 689. We held trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object because there was no applicable precedent to support an objection. 418 S.C. at 653-54, 795 S.E.2d at 692. We stated, “A juror‘s knowledge that if the jury does not reach a verdict the court will impose a sentence of life in prison will not help the juror understand the evidence, or assist the jury in reaching a verdict.” 418 S.C. at 656, 795 S.E.2d at 693. We then expressed concern “that informing the jury what the sentence will be if they do not reach a verdict creates a risk that some juror‘s attention may be diverted away from the duty to deliberate, and perhaps even alert a juror that he or she can control the sentence by refusing to deliberate.” Id.
In Adams, we held “the legal effect” of a deadlock “is addressed to the trial judge only.” 277 S.C. at 124, 283 S.E.2d at 587. In Winkler, we suggested instructing the jury as to the consequences of a deadlock may interfere with a jury‘s deliberations. 418 S.C. at 656, 795 S.E.2d at 693. Here, Jenkins argues defense counsel should be permitted to do what we suggested in Adams and Winkler the trial court should not do, inform the jury that one juror may control the outcome of the case by refusing to
deliberate. We disagree and now hold a party may not argue the consequences of a deadlock in its closing argument to the jury. The risk we discussed in Winkler does not disappear because trial counsel, instead of the trial court, argues the law to the jury. In a death penalty trial—in any trial—a jury verdict must be unanimous.
D. Juror Qualification
The fourth and fifth errors Jenkins alleges on appeal are the trial court‘s qualification of two jurors. Generally, there are three ways to disqualify a juror in a capital case. The first way—inapplicable here—is when the juror falls into a category requiring automatic disqualification. The second way is based on constitutional requirements and a juror‘s views on capital punishment. When a juror‘s “views regarding capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror, then he should be excluded for cause.” State v. Bell, 302 S.C. 18, 25, 393 S.E.2d 364, 368 (1990) (applying Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851-52 (1985)); see also State v. Dickerson, 395 S.C. 101, 114, 716 S.E.2d 895, 902 (2011) (“A juror must be excused from service if the juror‘s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S. Ct. at 852, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 851-52)). The third way is when the juror is not capable of rendering a fair verdict of guilt or innocence based on the
Unless a juror is statutorily disqualified under the first option, juror qualification is within the discretion of the trial court, and this Court has recognized, “Deference must be paid to the trial court who saw and heard the juror.” State v. Woods, 382 S.C. 153, 159, 676 S.E.2d 128, 132 (2009) (applying abuse of discretion standard under option two (citing State v. Green, 301 S.C. 347, 354, 392 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1990))); see also State v. Hardee, 279 S.C. 409, 413, 308 S.E.2d 521, 524 (1983) (“Where a juror unequivocably states he is not conscious of any bias or prejudice and he can give the defendant and the state a fair and impartial trial and render a verdict according to the law and evidence, there is no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s decision to qualify the juror.” (citing State v. Johnson, 248 S.C. 153, 163-64, 149 S.E.2d 348, 353 (1966))).
i. Juror 350
During individual juror qualification, defense counsel asked Juror 350 if she understood “that in South Carolina that you are never required to vote for the death penalty?” Juror 350 responded, “Yes.” Defense counsel then asked her if it was “a moral decision you would make after hearing any aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances after His Honor instructs you on the law?” and whether she “would make that decision on [her] own?” The juror answered “Yes” to both questions. Defense counsel then asked her, “And do you also understand you could give a life sentence for any reason or no reason just because that is what you want to do?” Juror 350 responded, “Yes, but that is not necessarily morally correct.” Jenkins now argues the “not necessarily morally correct” answer indicates Juror 350 was not constitutionally qualified under Wainwright.
This “morally not” statement, I took that to mean people shouldn‘t just base their decisions on what someone looks like or something else, you need to listen to the facts and circumstances of each case and follow the law, listen to the aggravating and mitigation that may be presented. She said she is willing and able to do that, and that she would consider all of that. And she said very clearly she could impose either sentence depending upon the facts and circumstances.
It is clear to us from the juror‘s answers to the follow-up questions that Juror 350 meant she would not sentence someone to death just because she wanted to. She stated her decision “should be decided on facts and evidence, not just because I want to or I don‘t want to.” Nothing in her responses indicates her personal opinions for or against the death penalty would have “prevented or substantially impaired” the performance of her duties as a juror. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by qualifying Juror 350.
ii. Juror 161
During individual juror qualification, Juror 161 stated he received an e-mail with information and photographs about this case in early 2015 because he was a detention officer at Myrtle Beach Police Department. The juror also stated he had
Jenkins now argues Juror 161 should have been disqualified “not because of his employment at MBDC alone, but because of the fact that through his employment he had viewed a BOLO and still shots of appellant.” Thus, Jenkins argues the trial court should have disqualified Juror 161 under the third option of juror disqualification. We disagree. The trial court confirmed Juror 161 had not heard or read anything about the case since 2015 and ensured the juror would disregard the prior information and base his decision solely on the evidence presented in Jenkins’ trial. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 1642-43, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751, 756 (1961) (“It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. . . . It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.“); DeLee v. Knight, 266 S.C. 103, 111-12, 221 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1975) (affirming the trial court‘s finding that jurors were qualified because “Each stated he would abide by the instructions of the court and render a just verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial, without regard to any preconceived ideas resulting from pretrial publicity” (citing Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722-23, 81 S. Ct. at 1642-43, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 756)). Based on this and Juror 161‘s assurances to the trial court that he would decide the case based on the evidence presented at Jenkins’ trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying the juror.
E. Admissibility of pre-trial misconduct and Lee Correctional Institution prison riot
The sixth error Jenkins alleges on appeal is the trial court‘s admission of evidence in the sentencing phase of trial regarding
introduce evidence of the riot in response to the State‘s evidence of his own pre-trial misconduct.
The admissibility of any evidence begins with the basic premise that “All relevant evidence is admissible. . . .”
As to the disciplinary infractions, the trial court admitted the evidence during the sentencing phase, stating, the “testimony is directly relevant and appropriate of the issues that are at hand in the juror‘s determination of whether or not the appropriate sentence is life or death.” We agree the evidence is relevant. The Supreme Court has stated, “Consideration of a defendant‘s past conduct as indicative of his probable future behavior is an inevitable and not undesirable element of criminal sentencing: ‘any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person‘s probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose.‘” Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 1671, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7 (1986). The Supreme Court continued, “evidence that a defendant would in the future pose a danger to the community if he were not executed may be
When evidence is found relevant—as it is here—the next question is whether any rule of evidence or provision of law operates to exclude the evidence. See
Jenkins argues evidence of his pre-trial misconduct should have been excluded because it occurred while the State “unconstitutionally” held him for over three years pre-trial in maximum security prison and on death row. However, Jenkins does not point to any rule of evidence or other statutory or constitutional provision that excludes this type of evidence. He merely argues that it is unfair for the State to use his own conduct against him. We disagree and find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Jenkins’ pre-trial misconduct.
Turning to the Lee prison riot, Jenkins argues evidence of the riot was relevant in response to the State‘s introduction of his misconduct to show he acted in an unruly manner because he lived in an unruly environment at SCDC. The trial court refused to allow the testimony, finding evidence of the riot was irrelevant. We agree. We have stated “the Eighth Amendment demands that a capital defendant be given wide latitude to present any relevant evidence of potentially mitigating value that might convince the jury to impose a sentence of life in prison instead of death.” Bowman v. State, 422 S.C. 19, 36, 809 S.E.2d 232, 241 (2018). The proffered testimony here reveals that although Jenkins was housed at Lee during the time of the riot, he was not involved in the riot
III. Mandatory Review of the Death Sentence
Concluding none of the errors alleged on appeal support reversal of Jenkins’ death sentence, we turn to our review of the punishment itself. Pursuant to
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and (2) Whether the evidence supports the jury‘s or judge‘s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in Section 16-3-20, and (3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
As to
Turning to
In capital cases where the State proceeded on the same aggravating circumstances and in which there were similar circumstances, we have affirmed the sentence of death. In State v. Moore, 357 S.C. 458, 593 S.E.2d 608 (2004), the Court upheld Moore‘s death sentence in connection with an armed robbery of a convenience store in which Moore killed a store clerk and shot at a witness in the store. 357 S.C. at 460-61, 465, 593 S.E.2d at 609-10, 612, aff‘d, Moore v. Stirling, Op. No. 28088, (Howard Adv. Sh. No. 12 at 30) (reaffirming the holding from the direct appeal and finding, again, “Moore has not established that his capital sentence is disproportionate“). Moore entered the store without a gun, took the store clerk‘s gun
away from him, shot and killed the store clerk, shot at a witness with the purpose of killing him, and robbed the store before he left. 357 S.C. at 460-61, 593 S.E.2d at 609-10. Moore‘s crimes are less egregious than those Jenkins admitted to committing in this case because Jenkins entered each convenience store with a gun.
In State v. McWee, 322 S.C. 387, 472 S.E.2d 235 (1996), the Court upheld McWee‘s death sentence under similar circumstances. McWee and an accomplice shot and killed a store clerk in a convenience store and robbed the store before they left. 322 S.C. at 390, 472 S.E.2d at 237. During the sentencing phase, the State introduced evidence McWee and his accomplice
Jenkins admitted he entered the first Sunhouse convenience store, shot and killed Paruchuri, shot at McZeke, and robbed the store before he left. The jury found him guilty of murder, attempted murder, and armed robbery. Jenkins’ crimes are highly similar to the murder we reviewed in McWee and more egregious than the murder we reviewed in Moore. Jenkins’ admission to those crimes coupled with the aggravating circumstances of Jenkins’ future dangerousness and the evidence that Jenkins committed two more armed robberies and a murder just weeks later leads us to conclude the death sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm Jenkins’ conviction and death sentence.
AFFIRMED.
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN and JAMES, JJ., concur.