*1 CAROLINA SKIPPER SOUTH Argued February April 1986 Decided No. 84-6859. *2 White, J., opinion Court, Brennan, delivered the in which Mar- shall, Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, JJ., joined. Powell, J., opinion concurring judgment, Burger, J., filed an in which C. Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 9. by appointment Bruck, David I. of the Court, 474 U. S. argued petitioner. the cause and filed briefs for Attorney Coombs, Jr., Harold M. Assistant General of argued respondent. Carolina, South the cause for himWith Attorney on the T. Medlock, brief was Travis General.* opinion delivered the of the Court. Justice White Skipper Petitioner Ronald was convicted in a South Caro- capital rape. sought lina trial court of murder and The State penalty, separate sentencing hearing the death and a jury § (1985), held before the trial under S. C. Code 16-3-20 provides jury sentencing which for a bifurcated trial and capital Following by cases. introduction the State of aggravation (principally evidence in of the offense petitioner’s history sexually behavior), peti- of assaultive presented mitigating testimony tioner evidence his own and that of his former wife, mother, his sister, his and his grandmother. testimony, part, This for the most concerned * A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of Alabama et al. Graddick, Crump, David A. Charles Attorney Steve Alabama, General of Clark, Attorney Kelly, Arkansas, James J. General of Chief State’s Attor Smith, Jim ney Connecticut, Attorney James T. General of Jones, Attorney Webster, L. Idaho, William General of Attorney General Zimmerman, Missouri, LeRoy S. Attorney Pennsylvania, General of Baliles, Attorney Gerald L. Eikenberry, Kenneth 0. Virginia, General of McClintock, Attorney and Archie Washington, G. General of Attorney General of Wyoming. upbringing.
the difficult circumstances of his Petitioner and briefly peti- his wife, former however, both testified during tioner had conducted himself well Tk months spent jail he between his arrest and trial. Petitioner also during prior period testified that of incarceration he had equivalent high diploma earned the of a school that, imprisonment sentenced to life rather than to death, he attempt would himself in behave and would to work so money support family. that he could contribute sought jailers Petitioner also to introduce of two “regular jail and one visitor” to the to the effect that good adjustment” during spent tioner had “made his time jail. however, court, trial ruled that under the South *3 Supreme Carolina Court’s in Koon, decision State v. 278 (1982) (Koon I), E. S. C. 298 S. 2d 769 such evidence would be irrelevant and hence inadmissible. The decision judge I, Koon stated, stood the rule that “whether [petitioner] adjust adjust” can or not was an “not issue this App. case.” 11. hearing closing arguments during After the course of — prosecutor pose
which the contended that would disciplinary problems likely sentenced and would rape prisoners, jury id., other at 13-14—the sentenced appeal, petitioner tioner to death. On contended that the excluding trial court had committed constitutional error jailers testimony testimony and the visitor: the of petitioner argued, witnesses, these would have constituted mitigating relevant and such evidence, exclusion of improper this Court’s in Lockett Ohio, under decisions v. (1978), Eddings Oklahoma, 438 U. S. 586 v. 455 U. S. Supreme rejected Court South Carolina petitioner’s stating: contention, judge properly
“The trial
refused to admit evidence of
[petitioner’s]
adaptability to
life.
State
future
supra.
past adaptabil-
Koon,
evidence of
However,
his
ity
through
his former wife,
admitted
testimony.
contention is
This
mother and his own
his
328 E. 2d
61-62
42, 48,
285 S. C.
S.
without merit.”
(1985),
granted
to consider
Second, Supreme the State im was not ruling trial court’s arguing Court from prevent introducing it did not because proper conduct of establish past good jail purposes evidence of character, only but foreclosed introduction ing good evidence of his adaptability of “irrelevant” future in the no clear for this contention support life. There is case, explicitly rely this the trial court did not record of to have excluded petition such distinction and any appears for any conduct whatsoever. good purpose er’s evidence of distinction between use proposed The State’s character and use of prove good conduct to past good good future conduct same evidence establish from the decision the South Carolina seems to be drawn Koon, State v. altogether, in another case Court Supreme (Koon II), denied, S. E. 2d 625 cert. 285 S. C. court “fu- There, the stated although U. S. 1036 *6 prison [is] adaptability ture to irrelevant evidence because prior character, record, does not bear on a defendant’s or the prison [p]ast offense[,] circumstances of his . . . behavior on and, therefore, does bear a defendant’s character is rele- C., vant.” 285 S. 328 S. E. 626. 2d, at This distinction explained dispo- above, is elusive. As we have defendant’s adjustment peaceful sition to make a well-behaved and to life prison aspect is itself an is his character that its sentencing nature relevant to the determination.2 Accord- ingly, precise meaning practical significance of the argument II decision Koon and of the State’s is difficult Assuming, any however, to assess. that the rule would precluding the effect case have ducing the defendant from intro- explicit purpose otherwise admissible evidence convincing jury spared that he be should the death penalty pose danger jailers he because would no undue to his prisoners or and could useful fellow lead a life behind bars imprisonment, pass if sentenced to fife the rule not would Eddings. ruling in muster under Since the trial court’s this credibly it can case—whether not said to be consistent II—sX had effect, with Koon least this it cannot under stand Eddings.
Finally,
suggest
to
that
State seems
exclusion of the
proffered testimony
proper
testimony
because
merely
testimony
petitioner
cumulative of the
and his for-
ability
adjust
We do
hold that all facets of the
to
defendant’s
prison
potentially
life must be
mitigating.
treated
relevant and
For
example,
quarrel
have no
with
Supreme
we
the statement of the
Court of
[the defendant]
South
that “how often
will take a
is
Carolina
shower”
irrel
Plath,
State
sentencing
1, 15,
evant to the
determination.
281 S. C.
denied,
619, 627,
S. E.
cert.
mer wife behavior satisfactory, that, sentenced and of attempt he would to use death, rather than to productively think, and would not cause trouble. We time characterizing cumu- excluded evidence as however, implausible the facts and its as harmless is lative exclusion *7 present petitioner was to us. The evidence allowed before jail in the sort of evidence the issue of his conduct self-serving. jury naturally to discount as a would tend par- and, more disinterested The witnesses— jailers particular had no reason ticular, of who would have favorably charges— predisposed one of toward their to be greater quite naturally given weight be much would jury. confidently can conclude that credible evi- Nor we good petitioner prisoner have had would dence prosecutor upon jury’s The him- deliberations. no effect closing argument, dangers much of the made self, pose prison, and so far as would sentenced to went tioner expected petitioner rape in- could to other assert that be appears reasonably circumstances, Under these mates. bearing upon petitioner’s likely that the of evidence exclusion (and likely jail upon hence, future behavior behavior jury’s impose prison) affected decision to have any the exclu- Thus, standard, the death sentence. under sufficiently prejudicial the evidence was to constitute sion of error. reversible mitigating by the state trial court of relevant
The exclusion impeded sentencing jury’s ability carry out considering all facets of the character its task of relevant resulting record of the individual offender. death although the State is not stand, cannot of course sentence seeking again impose precluded sentence, from death through hearing sentencing provided new at that it does so any petitioner permitted present and all relevant which is mitigating S., at evidence that is 455 U. available. Supreme judgment 117. The Court South Carolina is therefore reversed insofar as it sentence, affirms the death proceedings and the case is remanded for further not incon- opinion. sistent with this
It is so ordered.
Powell,
Justice
with whom The Chief
Justice
Rehnquist
Justice
join, concurring
judgment.
Although
agree
I
death sentence must
required by
vacated,
that result
is
our decisions
(1978),
Ohio,
Lockett v.
U. S.
v. Okla
judgment
homa,
“[Petitioner’s] her wife said he told . . . that he had been raped prison. history you With his and what know you raper him, who do think the about was and who do following colloquy place 1 The took at the close of the cross-examination: “Q: you got Horry County jail the fellow that when to the went to You are cell, kicking right? the Yes,
“A: Sir. you are, you “Q: you. That’s the kind of fellow but are nice [T]hat’s today, right?” App. 7. given rapee opportunity
you the think was? And the abusing again who loser, this four time sexual do with get raped prison? you Ronald think will Will Skipper Skipper, big old Ronald who knocks robust [sic] in of the or will it be some head, the side woman boy prison? little mitigating
“These circumstances submitted are signifi- . . That has defendant. . the defendant shown positive adjustments to educa- cant and confinement and employment him to skills that enable be stable kicking tion productive prisoner. Didn’t he admit on prisoner he is. the bars over there? That’s kind Kicking Kicking App. the bar. on bars....” 14. evidence that undermine this Petitioner had offered would argument: guards of two and a line of had visitor, all whom would have testified awaiting trial court well while trial. The behaved Supreme relying on Court of evidence, excluded that Koon, Carolina’s decision State v. S. C. South death, 2d 769 Petitioner sentenced to S. E. Supreme affirmed the sentence. Court South Carolina 285 C. 328 S. E. 2d S.
II correctly The Court concludes the exclusion proffered testimony process. Ante, 5, n. due 1. violated supra, vacated a death sentence Gardner v. we ground sentencing judge had that the considered a on the *9 presentence report permitting the without de- confidential report. plurality the that the see concluded fendant process “the was denied due because death sen- defendant imposed, part, at least on informa- the basis of tence was deny explain.” opportunity Id., no had or at tion which he J.). (opinion id., also at 364 See Stevens, (White, analysis concurring judgment) (applying J., the same Amendment). Eighth Gardner, under As permitted “deny explain” in this case or may, part, his which death sentence have rested. This aggravated by prosecutor’s closing argument, error was emphasized exaggerated petitioner’s which misconduct Therefore, after his arrest. death sen- tence violates rule Gardner.
Ill A unnecessarily ground The Court abandons this narrow holding proffered decision for broader one, testi mony mitigating evidence that must be admitted under Eighth my reasoning view, Amendment. the Court’s Eighth requires is flawed. The Amendment that the sen tencing authority mitigating consider “relevant evidence” concerning the defendant’s or “character record” and “the cir Eddings supra, Oklahoma, cumstances of the offense.” supra, at Ohio, Lockett v. 114; at 604. But the States, and authority” Court, not this retain “the traditional to determine particular categories what evidence within the broad de in Lockett scribed is relevant in the first in long stance. 438 S., U. n. 12. As as those deter they long minations are reasonable—as as do not foreclose consideration of factors tend reduce the defend culpability Eddings, supra, ant’s crime, see at 115- respect 116—this Court should them. why
I see no reason State not, could consistent with principles, good these exclude evidence a of defendant’s be- following jail long havior in his arrest, as the evidence argument is not offered to rebut such as that prosecution tendered here. Such evidence has no bearing at all on offense,” the “circumstances since it concerns the defendant’s behavior after the crime has been necessarily say anything committed. Nor does relevant *10 phrase was record,” “character or about a defendant’s Eddings. in Lockett and used clearly that lessens the focus on evidence
Those decisions culpability he con- the crime for which was for defendant’s sentencing jury con- in Lockett barred from victed. The youth, sidering her “lack of of the defendant’s evidence relatively part specific minor death,” and “her intent cause obviously at Such evidence S., crime.” 438 U. 597. the degree strongly mor- defendant which the bore the responsible ally since her we have held crime; indeed, for pen- -precludes application of the death that similar alty precisely Enmund v. for this reason. judge In refused 798-801 782,
U. S. youth history “beatings and to consider defendant’s by disturbance.” 455 father, harsh and severe emotional emphasized at 115. that this evidence tended to S.,U. We responsibility noting acts, defendant’s diminish the responsible youths adults,” “are mature than less they punishment “‘deserve less because id., capacity their have less to control conduct adolescents long-range Id., than adults.’” at 115, to think terms Century quoting Task n. Fund Force on Sen- Twentieth Young tencing Policy Confronting Youth Offenders, Toward type required to be Crime 7 of evidence admit- pertained under Lockett and thus to conduct and ted prior ex- crime, and to nature and circumstances participation in the crime. tent of the defendant’s this “mitigating” time, classifies as for the first Court case, crime that occurred and after accused conduct after charged. definition, nei- Almost such conduct has been respon- crime nor reduces his ther excuses the defendant’s sibility properly therefore, for its It cannot, commission. “mitigating considered evidence” that the sentencer must consider under the Constitution.
B origins applies It is recall of the useful to the rule the Court today. years ago, Carolina, Ten in Woodson v. North 428 carry U. S. we determined that States could not (1976), 280 penalty “particularized out the death without some consid- aspects eration relevant of the character and record of (plurality opinion). Id., each convicted defendant.” at 303 Louisiana, also Roberts v. See U. S. (1976) 428 325, 333-336 (plurality opinion). That determination from the con- flowed always by culpability viction that “individual is not measured category Georgia, the crime committed.” Furman v. dissenting), quoted U. S. C. (1972) 408 402 238, (Burger, J., supra, supra, Roberts, Woodson, in at also 298. See at 333. unconstitutionally arbitrary Thus, reasoned, we considering or execute a man woman without factors show- ing “just appropriate that death was not a sentence.” supra, supra. Woodson, at 304. Enmund Cf. v. naturally Lockett from our followed decision But it from Woodson. also follows Woodson and its com- only panion cases that States are bound to consider those justice central factors are to the fundamental of ex- recognized society important ecution. We have has legitimate and deterrence, interests retribution and that provide necessary justification impos- these interests for ing penalty. Gregg Georgia, death U. S. (joint opinion). Society’slegitimate for desire (1976) 183-187 strong respect is less with to a defendant who retribution played role for which he was minor murder convicted. Similarly, penalty Lockett, U. S., at 597. the death Cf. against re- has little deterrent force defendants who have capacity considered choice. Cf. duced degree concerning S., n. Evidence U. 11. age participation in his crime, defendant’s or and emo- history, directly justice bear on the fundamental tional thus That cannot be said punishment. simply of imposing capital arrest. the defendant’s behavior prison following by in retribution can be lessened Society’s hardly interest murderer, that a brutal for self-interested knowledge has model of while reasons, been a deportment in- trial sentence. is awaiting society’s important Nor served such a murderer by allowing terest deterrence avoid the death his counsel’s advice penalty following himself in a controlled tightly behave environment.2
IV *12 if a to to Even defendant’s well apparent capacity adjust fell of the that scope mitigating within factors prison under Lockett and must be considered a State have in should to exclude evidence of conduct right trial or One arrested for a awaiting sentencing. capi- while crime, awaiting tal convicted defendant particularly incentive in sentencing, every has to behave flawlessly behavior cause the good might sentencing authority life.3 in Good behavior those circumstances would spare many types murders, penalty have that for “the We noted death undoubtedly Gregg Georgia, is a significant deterrent.” v. 428 U. S. (actual id., pen also at 186 185-186 See deterrent value of death alty particular complex in contexts “is a factual issue resolution of legislatures”). properly with the This inev which rests deterrent value itably escape is diluted are when defendants allowed to execution based nothing responsibility. that have do with factors their criminal consequences they extend such mistakes further than the in which cases occur, for when some defendants are to avoid execution on irrel able based criteria, graver injustice executing is a far in evant there risk of others. (1972) Georgia, (White, J., Furman v. 408 U. S. See 311-314 concur accept ring). proposition I thus find it that difficult the Constitution factors, compels willingness States consider such as a defendant’s to con prison rules, plainly advancing form to undermine deterrence without goals. retributive today’s competent capital
3 After decision defense counsel cases will trial, Eagle awaiting instruct their clients to behave like while Scouts cases, particularly awaiting sentencing. capital while this will be more customary important to a defendant than the advice of in a criminal counsel rarely predictive prisoner conduct to the after imposed. For reason, sentence has been this further state reasonably courts could determine such evidence has probative Certainly little or no it value. will aid the “distinguishing [the the few sentencer cases which death many penalty] imposed is from the cases in which is not.” Georgia, supra, concurring), Furman J., v. at (White, quoted Gregg Georgia, supra, v. at 188. contrary apparently The Court’s determination rests on authority the notion that the little or States have no to decide types probative that certain of evidence have insufficient justify ante, value to their But at 7, admission. cf. n. 2. rejected explicitly approach, Lockett such an S.,U. at good special 604, n. for 12, and reason. This has Court no expertise deciding particular categories whether of evi- speculative dence are too or insubstantial to merit consider- Estelle, ation sentencer. Cf. 463 U. S. Barefoot 880, 899-902 It little sense, then, makes to substi- judgment tute our relevance that of courts state legislatures. necessary Nor is such intrusive review this guard against fundamentally unjust context to executions. plausibly equate type One cannot issue in capital Lockett and with *13 defendant anyone assaulting awaiting has refrained from while sentencing. disposition I trial or would therefore leave subject of evidence of the kind involved here to the States, requirements process. due client to himself trial advise his behave while the courtroom. It is compliance with indeed novel doctrine this advice a defendant charged capital “mitigating with murder becomes factor” the sen- tencing judge jury must —as a matter of constitutional law —consider passing sentence.