Daniel Hamrick, Petitioner, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2015-002164
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court
Filed May 15, 2019
Opinion No. 27886
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI. Appeal from Charleston County. Deadra L. Jefferson, Trial Court Judge. Larry B. Hyman Jr., Post-Conviction Relief Judge. Heard January 10, 2019.
REVERSED
Appellate Defenders Jennifer Ellis Roberts and David Alexander, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent.
Around 3:20 a.m. on November 14, 2011, Daniel Hamrick struck Ahmed Garland—a road construction worker—while driving on U.S. Highway 17 in the town of Mount Pleasant. Garland suffered permanent brain injuries as a result. The State contends Hamrick struck Garland while Garland was stepping off of a paving machine located behind a row of cones delineating the construction zone from the designated lane of travel. Hamrick concedes he struck Garland, but contends it happened in the lane of travel.
Within five minutes of the incident, Officer Daniel Eckert arrived at the scene and administered first aid to Garland. Emergency medical service professionals arrived at the scene less than ten minutes later, and Officer Eckert began interviewing Hamrick and other witnesses. Several witnesses claimed to smell alcohol on Hamrick‘s breath, and Hamrick admitted he drank one beer earlier in the morning. Officer Eckert asked Hamrick to perform field sobriety tests, but Hamrick refused. At 3:40 a.m., Officer Eckert informed Hamrick he was not free to leave. He instructed Hamrick to remain by the front of Officer Eckert‘s car.
At 4:08 a.m., Officer Andrew Harris—the lead investigator—arrived. Officer Harris interrogated Hamrick and instructed him to perform sobriety tests. Hamrick performed the tests, which indicated to Officer Harris that Hamrick was intoxicated. At 4:40 a.m., Officer Harris formally placed Hamrick under arrest, handcuffed him, administered Miranda warnings to him, and directed officers to transport Hamrick to the Mount Pleasant police station for a breathalyzer test.
When Hamrick arrived at the police station, the breathalyzer machine malfunctioned. After the machine became operational, Hamrick refused to take a breathalyzer test. Officers then took Hamrick to East Cooper Hospital, where at 6:55 a.m., they told Hamrick he was required to provide a blood sample pursuant to the mandatory blood testing provision of
As an alternative ground for excluding the blood test results from trial, Hamrick argued his blood was not drawn within three hours of Hamrick‘s arrest as mandated by
During trial, Officer Harris testified he documented the point of impact inside the construction zone, as opposed to inside the designated lane of travel. Woodrow Poplin, a mechanical and civil engineer, testified as an expert witness for Hamrick. Poplin testified Officer Harris‘s reported point of
The jury found Hamrick guilty of felony driving under the influence resulting in great bodily injury.1 The trial court sentenced Hamrick to fifteen years in prison. Hamrick‘s trial counsel failed to appeal, and Hamrick filed a post-conviction relief application alleging counsel was ineffective for not doing so. The post-conviction relief court agreed, and granted Hamrick a belated direct appeal pursuant to White v. State, 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974). As White requires,2 Hamrick filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking this Court to consider the belated appeal. We transferred the petition to the court of appeals pursuant to
II. Analysis
We begin with the trial court‘s error in permitting Officer Harris to give opinion testimony on the subject of accident
A. Officer Harris‘s Testimony
To prove Hamrick guilty of felony driving under the influence, in addition to proving he was “under the influence of alcohol,” the State must prove he committed “any act forbidden by law or neglect[ed] any duty imposed by law in the driving of the motor vehicle, which . . . proximately cause[d] great bodily injury . . . to another person.”
The State called several eyewitnesses who were on the scene when it happened. However, none of them testified with specificity to where the impact occurred. The State also called Officer Harris. From the outset of his testimony, the State attempted to demonstrate Officer Harris‘s qualifications as an expert in accident reconstruction. Throughout his testimony, the State pursued opinion testimony as to whether Hamrick struck Garland in the designated lane of travel or within the construction zone. The State asked, “Through your investigation and documentation of the scene did you develop an approximate point of impact?” Before Officer Harris could complete his answer, Hamrick objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. The State then asked Officer Harris whether he “ma[de] any measurements.” Officer Harris‘s answer was not responsive, and conveyed his opinion on accident reconstruction. He testified, “I marked a possible point of impact based on what information I had been given.” Hamrick objected, and the trial court again sustained the objection. The solicitor changed the subject and finished Officer Harris‘s direct examination on the question of whether Hamrick was intoxicated.
On cross-examination, Hamrick‘s counsel highlighted many of the deficiencies in Officer Harris‘s qualifications in accident
On re-direct examination, the State resumed asking Officer Harris about his training in accident reconstruction, including the reconstruction of “automobile pedestrian collisions.” As a part of his answer to questions about his qualifications, Officer Harris began to explain his opinion on the trajectory of Garland‘s body after impact. Hamrick objected on the basis of his qualifications. Then, for the first time, the State requested the trial court find Officer Harris met the
The State continued attempting to elicit Officer Harris‘s opinion, asking, “Is there enough evidence . . . to determine the point of impact,” and “could you reach a conclusion about point of impact.” Even after Officer Harris answered “no” to those questions, the State continued, “Combined with witness testimony and witness statements taken from the scene, does that help you in making that sort of conclusion,” referring to Officer Harris‘s conclusion regarding the point of impact. Hamrick continued to object, in an obvious effort to keep
The State then asked Officer Harris whether it was “possible” for Hamrick to have swerved into the construction zone from the designated lane of travel and hit Garland without hitting any cones or the paving machine. Hamrick‘s counsel immediately stated, “Objection, Judge. . . . He‘s not been qualified to render such an opinion.” Finally, the trial court ruled, stating, “He investigated the accident. He has training and experience. He does not have to be qualified as an expert to render a lay opinion based on his rational perception.” After another off-the-record discussion, the court again stated only, “You may proceed.” In the testimony that followed, Officer Harris never specifically identified a point of impact. He did, however, give his opinion that the impact did not occur in the designated lane of travel, but occurred behind the cones in the construction zone.
We find the trial court erred in two respects. First, the court incorrectly characterized Officer Harris‘s testimony as “lay” opinion. Under
Second, the trial court failed to make the necessary findings that the State established the foundation required by
Our review of the record convinces us Officer Harris did not possess the necessary qualifications to give an opinion in accident reconstruction. His training in the field was limited to a few courses he took over a period of several years. He had no other training or education that would otherwise demonstrate he was qualified as an expert to give an opinion on accident reconstruction. Accident reconstruction is a highly technical and specialized field in which experts employ principles of engineering, physics, and other knowledge to formulate opinions as to the movements and interactions of vehicles and people, under circumstances lay people—even trained officers—simply cannot understand. A law enforcement officer who attended several classes on the subject does not possess the necessary qualifications to satisfy the “qualified as an expert” element of the
Because Officer Harris gave opinion testimony on the subject of accident reconstruction, and the State failed to lay the
B. Harmless Error
We quickly dispense with any suggestion the trial court‘s error was harmless. Officer Harris‘s opinion testimony was critical to the State‘s ability to prove an “act forbidden by law” or that Hamrick “neglect[ed] any duty imposed by law in the driving of the motor vehicle,” and on that basis prove Hamrick “proximately cause[d] great bodily injury” to Garland.
C. Video of Poplin‘s Experiment
To combat the State‘s theory the collision occurred inside the construction zone, Hamrick called Poplin to testify about Poplin‘s investigation of the incident and his opinion the point of impact was in Hamrick‘s designated travel lane. To test his opinion, Poplin conducted an experiment to determine whether it was possible for Hamrick to have struck Garland in the construction zone as reported by Officer Harris. Poplin videotaped his experiment, and Hamrick‘s counsel sought to introduce the video into evidence.
The trial court expressed concern over Hamrick offering the video into evidence as an attempt to re-create the incident. The trial court stated, “[T]here‘s no concrete evidence in the record as to what the point of contact would have been or was, and . . . I cannot be assured of the accuracy of any re-enactment.” The trial court stated, “You normally have video
We find the trial court conducted an erroneous analysis of the admissibility of the video. The proper analysis begins with the question of whether the evidence is relevant. See
First, we disagree with the trial court‘s characterization of the video as a re-creation or demonstration of how the incident happened. Certainly, Hamrick offered Poplin‘s opinion testimony generally to demonstrate how the incident did happen. But the video was offered to prove how the incident did not happen. It was substantive evidence—not demonstrative—offered to prove Hamrick‘s car could not have struck Garland inside the construction zone—as Officer Harris testified it had—without also knocking over the cones or striking the paving machine. See 2 Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 401:10 (8th ed. 2018) (“The results of experiments are substantive evidence, . . . . Sometimes the purpose of the experiment is to determine how a particular event . . . did not occur.” (footnote omitted)). As substantive, relevant evidence, the trial court did not have the discretion to
Further, if the trial court was concerned the video would mislead the jury, it was required to conduct an on-the-record
Because we reverse on the error of the admission of Officer Harris‘s opinion testimony, and because the probative value of Poplin‘s video may be different in the absence of that testimony, it is not necessary for us to rule whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the video. On remand, however, the trial court should consider the State‘s objections to the video under the proper legal framework.
D. Motion to Suppress Blood Test Results
The State offered the results of Hamrick‘s blood test as part of its effort to prove Hamrick was “under the influence of alcohol” as required by
i. Three-Hour Statutory Requirement
We first discuss Hamrick‘s motion to exclude the test results based on the timing requirement in
The failure to follow policies, procedures, and regulations, or the provisions of this section, shall result in the exclusion from evidence of any test results, if the trial judge or hearing officer finds that this failure materially affected the accuracy or reliability of the test results or the fairness of the testing procedure . . . .
ii. Fourth Amendment Ground for Suppression
Hamrick argued the test results should be suppressed because his blood was drawn without a warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We find that even if there was a Fourth Amendment violation, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, and therefore, the test results will not be suppressed.
The “compulsory administration of a blood test . . . plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767, 86 S. Ct. at 1834, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 918. “In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430, 439 (2014); see also State v. Weaver, 374 S.C. 313, 319, 649 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2007) (“[A] warrantless search will withstand constitutional scrutiny where the search falls within one of several well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.“).
There are two exceptions to the warrant requirement that could be applicable in this case—consent and exigent circumstances. See generally State v. Counts, 413 S.C. 153, 163, 776 S.E.2d 59, 65 (2015) (providing “consent” and “exigent circumstances” are recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement). The exigent circumstances exception “‘applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.‘” McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148-49, 133 S. Ct. at 1558, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 704 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, 874-75 (2011)). As to consent, pursuant to South Carolina‘s implied consent statute,
The exclusionary rule is a “judicially created remedy” for a Fourth Amendment violation. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285, 294 (2011). “[T]he sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement.” 564 U.S. at 246, 131 S. Ct. at 2432, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 300. The rule does not apply “when the police act with an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful.” 564 U.S. at 238, 131 S. Ct. at 2427, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 295. “Where there is no misconduct, and thus no deterrent purpose to be served, suppression of the evidence is an unduly harsh sanction.” State v. Adams, 409 S.C. 641, 653, 763 S.E.2d 341, 348 (2014).
When the officers made the decision to draw Hamrick‘s blood without a warrant, the law appeared to support the existence of exigent circumstances and the validity of statutory implied consent. There is nothing in this record that in any way suggests the officers did not “act with an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful.”
III. Conclusion
We REVERSE Hamrick‘s conviction for felony driving under the influence resulting in great bodily injury and remand for a new trial.
REVERSED.
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Thomas E. Huff, concur.