872 S.E.2d 620
S.C.2022Background
- On Jan. 2, 2015, Jerome Jenkins Jr. (age 20) and an accomplice entered a Sunhouse convenience store, robbed it, and Jenkins fatally shot clerk Bala Paruchuri; Jenkins was later convicted of murder, attempted murder, and armed robbery.
- Jenkins admitted guilt during the guilt-phase opening; a Horry County jury convicted him and later sentenced him to death after the penalty phase.
- The State presented aggravating evidence at sentencing including Jenkins' involvement in two additional robberies (one resulting in another murder) three weeks later, prior convictions, and 26 SCDC disciplinary incidents while held as a "safekeeper."
- Pre-trial, the trial judge made an ex parte, off-the-record‑tone comment (March 7) suggesting a guilty plea would result in a death sentence; defense counsel did not object contemporaneously.
- Trial rulings at issue: exclusion of a co-defendant’s hearsay statement to defense psychiatrist (proffered under Rule 703), limits on defense closing argument about deadlock consequences, juror qualifications (Jurors 350 and 161), admission of SCDC misconduct, and exclusion of evidence about the Lee Correctional Institution riot.
- The South Carolina Supreme Court conducted mandatory review under S.C. Code § 16‑3‑25 and affirmed conviction and the death sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Constitutionality of S.C. Code §16‑3‑20(B) and judge's March 7 comment | State: §16‑3‑20(B) is constitutional; guilty pleas require judge sentencing | Jenkins: statute unconstitutional; March 7 judge comment coerced plea decision and showed preconception | Court: §16‑3‑20(B) constitutional; March 7 comment was error but not preserved (no contemporaneous objection) and remediable in PCR if shown ineffective assistance |
| 2) Admissibility of McKinley Daniels’ statement to Dr. Maddox (Rule 703 vs hearsay) | Jenkins: statement admissible to explain expert opinion that Jenkins was dominated/influenced | State: statement is hearsay if offered for truth; admission would prejudice State | Court: Trial did proper Rule 703 balancing; exclusion within discretion—close call but no abuse of discretion |
| 3) Closing argument on deadlock consequences (inform jury one vote for life suffices) | Jenkins: counsel should tell jury a single juror for life yields life sentence | State: such argument improperly instructs jury and risks coercion/diversion from deliberations | Court: counsel may not argue consequences of deadlock; trial court correctly barred those statements |
| 4) Juror qualification (Juror 350: moral comment; Juror 161: prior exposure) | Jenkins: Juror 350’s "not necessarily morally correct" means she was unfit; Juror 161 had pretrial exposure via detention work/BOLO | State: Both jurors said they would follow instructions and decide on evidence | Court: Trial court did not abuse discretion—follow‑up questioning showed both could be impartial and follow the law |
| 5) Admission of SCDC pre‑trial disciplinary infractions and exclusion of Lee riot evidence | Jenkins: SCDC safekeeping may have been unlawful; State should not benefit from unconstitutional confinement; Lee riot evidence was mitigating/contextual | State: Misconduct evidence relevant to future dangerousness; riot evidence irrelevant because Jenkins didn’t participate | Court: SCDC misconduct admissible as relevant to future dangerousness; Lee riot testimony irrelevant and properly excluded |
| 6) Mandatory proportionality and passion/prejudice review under §16‑3‑25 | Jenkins: trial errors and facts make death arbitrary/excessive | State: aggravators supported (murder during armed robbery/larceny) and case comparable to affirmed death sentences | Court: Evidence supports statutory aggravators; sentence not excessive or disproportionate; death sentence affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Downs, 361 S.C. 141, 604 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 2004) (upholding §16‑3‑20(B) where defendant pleads guilty and waives jury sentencing)
- State v. Crisp, 362 S.C. 412, 608 S.E.2d 429 (S.C. 2005) (trial judge improper statements during plea colloquy can be prejudicial)
- State v. Allen, 386 S.C. 93, 687 S.E.2d 21 (S.C. 2009) (same legal framework on jury waiver and plea sentencing)
- Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (U.S. 2016) (Sixth Amendment requires jury to find each fact necessary to impose death—distinguished on facts here)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (U.S. 2002) (framework on jury factfinding for death penalty issues cited and distinguished)
- State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 737 S.E.2d 490 (S.C. 2013) (Rule 703 does not automatically render hearsay admissible because an expert relied on it)
- Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1986) (prior conduct and the defendant’s future dangerousness are relevant at sentencing)
- Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (U.S. 1961) (juror familiarity with case does not require disqualification if juror can set aside impressions and decide on trial evidence)
- State v. Moore, 357 S.C. 458, 593 S.E.2d 608 (S.C. 2004) (upholding death sentence in convenience‑store robbery/murder—used in proportionality comparison)
- State v. McWee, 322 S.C. 387, 472 S.E.2d 235 (S.C. 1996) (similar fact pattern affirming death sentence; used in proportionality analysis)