State v. HenrikssonState v. Henriksson
Timothy R. Evans, 29 North “D” Street, P.O. Box 687, Hamilton, Ohio 45013, for defendant-appellant
O P I N I O N
RINGLAND, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Kathleen Henriksson, appeals from her conviction in the Butler County Areа III Court for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in her breath. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
{¶2} On the evening of October 13, 2009, apрellant was stopped by Trooper Scott Bierer, a nine-year veteran with the Ohio State Highway Patrol, after he observed her “driving
{¶3} After Trooper Bierer transported her to the local Ohio State Highway Patrol Post, appellant submitted tо a breathalyzer test, the results of which indicated her sample contained .241 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. It is undisputed that prior to requesting appellant to submit to the breаthalyzer test, Trooper Bierer read the applicable portions of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) Form 2255 to appellant. Appellant was subsequently charged with, among оther things, operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of
{¶4} On July 1, 2010, after denying her motion to suppress, the trial court found appellant guilty of operating a motоr vehicle with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in her breath in violation of
{¶5} Appellant now appeals from her conviction, raising three assignments of error for review. For ease of discussion, appellant‘s first and second assignments of error will be
Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶7} “THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.”
{¶8} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress.
{¶9} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burkhead, Preble App. No. CA2008-11-022, 2009-Ohio-4466, ¶7; State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶8. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence in order to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Eyer, Warren App. No. CA2007-06-071, 2008-Ohio-1193, ¶8. In turn, the appellate cоurt must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact so long as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Lange, Butler App. No. CA2007-09-232, 2008-Ohio-3595, ¶4; State v. Bryson (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 397, 402. After accepting the trial court‘s factual findings as true, the appellate court must then determine, as a matter of law, and without deferring to the trial court‘s conclusions, whether the trial court applied the appropriate legal standard. State v. Forbes, Preble App. No. CA2007-01-001, 2007-Ohio-6412, ¶29; State v. Dierkes, Portage App. No.2008-P-0085, 2009-Ohio-2530, ¶17.
{¶10} Initially, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress because, according to her, Trooper Bierer lacked probable cause tо effectuate her arrest. We disagree.
{¶11} As this court has previously stated, probable cause to arrest exists “when, at the moment of arrest, the arresting officer had sufficient information, derived from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances, to cause a prudent person to
{¶12} In this case, and as noted above, prior to initiating a traffic stop of appellant‘s vehicle, Trooper Bierer testified that he saw appellant “driving erratically within her lane” and change lanes without signaling. In addition, Trooper Bierer testified that after approaching appellant‘s vehicle, which had a “strong odor of an alcoholic beverage,” he noticed appellant, who admitted to drinking “a little” vodka, exhibited glаssy eyes and had an odor of alcoholic beverage on her person. Furthermore, after she completed the standardized field sobriety tests, Trooper Bierer testified that аppellant told him she “probably” had too much to drink and asked if he “would follow her home.” We find these facts sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest appellant for driving while under the influence of alcohol. See Way at ¶33; State v. Hammons, Warren App. No. CA2004-01-008, 2005-Ohio-1409, ¶5; State v. Baker, Warren App. No. CA2009-06-079, 2010-Ohio-1289, ¶53; Wilmington v. Taylor, Butler App. No. CA2009-11-018, 2010-Ohio-3255, ¶20; see, also, State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 2000-Ohio-212. Therefore, because Trooper Bierer had probable cause to effectuate her arrest, appellant‘s first argument is overruled.
{¶13} Next, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress because she “was never advised that if she took [a breathalyzer test] and it read .17 or ovеr she would automatically receive increased penalties.” However, contrary to appellant‘s claim, pursuant to
{¶14} In light of the foregoing, because we find no error in the trial court‘s decision denying her motion to suppress, appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶16} “THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AS TO THE HGN AND THE IN CAR VIDEO TAPE.”
{¶17} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court еrred by excluding evidence regarding the HGN test results, as well as video of the traffic stop taken from Trooper Bierer‘s in-dash camera. We disagree.
{¶18} A trial court‘s decision to admit or exclude evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Craft, Butler App. No. CA2006-06-145, 2007-Ohio-4116, ¶48; State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 121, 123, 2002-Ohio-68. An abuse of discretion implies that the court‘s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, and not merely an error of law or judgment. State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, ¶130.
{¶19} In this case, appellant was tried for violating
Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶21} “THE COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING [APPELLANT] TO SIX DAYS OF CONFINEMENT.”
{¶22} In her third assignment of error, аppellant argues that “the court erred in its interpretation of the law and that [she] could have been sentenced to the minimum of 3 days.” However, contrary to appellant‘s claim, and pursuant to
{¶23} Judgment affirmed.
POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.