THE CITY OF BRYAN, APPELLEE, v. HUDSON, APPELLANT.
No. 95-1513
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Submitted October 9, 1996—Decided February 4, 1997.
77 Ohio St.3d 376 | 1997-Ohio-261
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Williams County, No. WM- 94-014.
For purposes of establishing a valid consent or refusal to take a breath-alcohol-concentration test in the context of an administrative license suspension pursuant to
Arthur, O’Neil, Mertz & Bates Co., L.P.A., and E. Charles Bates, for appellant.
Ronald J. O’Brien, Columbus City Attorney, David M. Buchman, City Prosecutor, and Brenda J. Keltner, Assistant City Prosecutor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, city of Columbus.
{¶ 1} On August 23, 1994, appellant, Robert S. Hudson, was arrested by Officer Jeremy Jones of the Bryan Police Department for speeding, operating a motorcycle without a helmet, and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Officer Jones transported appellant to the Bryan police station, where he read the top portion of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV“) Form 2255 to appellant, advised him of his Miranda rights, asked him to submit to a breath-alcohol-concentration (“BAC“) test, and advised him of his right to obtain an alternate chemical test at his own expense. After the appellant refused to submit to the BAC test, Officer Jones suspended appellant‘s driver‘s license pursuant to the administrative license suspension (“ALS“) provisions of
{¶ 2} On August 25, 1994, appellant filed an ALS appeal and a request for occupational driving privileges in the Bryan Municipal Court, in which he asserted that his license suspension should be terminated because the arresting officer failed to inform him of the consequences of refusing to be tested or of submitting to the requested test. At the September 2, 1994 ALS hearing, Officer Jones testified that when he and the appellant arrived at the police station, he read appellant the “top portion” of BMV Form 2255 verbatim in front of a witness and that appellant said he understood what was read to him. The trial court rejected appellant‘s assertion that he had not been properly advised of the consequences of a refusal to take the BAC test. Accordingly, the trial court denied appellant‘s appeal of his ALS for refusing to submit to the BAC test.
{¶ 3} The court of appeals affirmed the appellant‘s conviction, holding that “(1) the advice prescribed by
{¶ 4} The court of appeals also certified that its decision was in conflict with the decisions of the Court of Appeals for Franklin County in Columbus v. Ocker (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 596, 647 N.E.2d 205, and the Court of Appeals for Portage County in State v. Given (Dec. 23, 1994), Portage App. No. 94-P-0012, unreported, on the following question: “whether, for purposes of establishing a valid consent or refusal to take a blood [sic] alcohol concentration test in the context of reviewing
{¶ 5} This cause is now before the court upon determination that a conflict exists.
{¶ 6} The issue certified to this court is whether, for purposes of establishing a valid consent or refusal to take a breath-alcohol-concentration test in the context of reviewing an administrative license suspension pursuant to
{¶ 7} Under
{¶ 8}
“(2)(a) The advice given pursuant to division (C)(1) of this section shall be in a written form containing the information described in division (C)(2)(b) of this section and shall be read to the person. * * *
“(b) The form required by division (C)(2)(a) of this section shall read as follows:
“‘You now are under arrest for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or both alcohol and a drug of abuse and will be requested by a police officer to submit to a chemical test to determine the concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, or alcohol and drugs of abuse in your blood, breath, or urine.
“‘If you refuse to submit to the requested test or if you submit to the requested test and are found to have a prohibited concentration of alcohol in your blood, breath, or urine, your driver‘s or commercial driver‘s license or permit or nonresident operating privilege immediately will be suspended for the period of time specified by law by the officer, on behalf of the registrar of motor vehicles. * * *‘” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 10} Further, in State v. Given (Dec. 23, 1994), Portage App. No. 94-P-0012, unreported, the Portage County Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion as the Franklin County Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the provisions of
{¶ 11} The court of appeals observed that to allow such an interpretation as proposed by the Ocker and Given courts would be “to impose a requirement upon police officers that is so wholly impractical that it could not reasonably have been intended by the legislature in its drafting of the statute.” We agree, and in analyzing the construction of
{¶ 12} There are so many factors to be considered by a police officer that it would be difficult even to begin to try to make an assessment—factors such as accurate prior arrest or conviction history, prior refusals or consents, lack of a driver‘s license, municipal violations, etc. See
{¶ 13} A court must give effect to all words of the statute. State v. Moaning (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 126, 128, 666 N.E.2d 1115, 1116, citing Shover v. Cordis Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 213, 218, 574 N.E.2d 457, 461. Further, unless there is ambiguity, legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself.
{¶ 14} Informing an arrestee of the consequences of his actions in the ALS process is not only a requirement of
{¶ 15} Therefore, we hold that the advice which must be given to an arrestee under
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, BAIRD, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., CONCUR.
WILLIAM R. BAIRD, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, J.