State v. HarrisonState v. Harrison
The defendant, Willie Harrison, Jr., was charged by bill of information on September 9, 1982 with armed robbery in violation of
The facts of this case are as follоws: On August 18, 1982, at approximately 1:00 a.m., the defendant approached Ms. Burdellia Edwards at the house which she shared with Wordell Hughes. Harrison asked Edwards where he could find Hughes. Ms. Edwards had known Harrison for a long time and, therefore, told him that Hughes could be found at a friend‘s house about three blocks away. The defendant then left in the direction of the friend‘s house. At that time, Harrison was wearing dark pants and a dark shirt. (Tr. pp. 12-15).
Wordell Hughes testified that he was watching television at his friend‘s house when Harrison entered the house and asked to speak to him. They went into the hallway, and Hughes gave Harrison $4.00. Harrison then left. He was still dressed in jeans and a shirt. (Tr. pp. 16; 28).
Hughes testified that he had known Harrison for many years and that he recognized his voice before even turning around to look at him. Although Harrison had a stocking over his face, both Hughes and another person at the house, Ms. Charle Bass, recognized Harrison‘s face. Ms. Bаss testified that she saw a jeans leg rolled up under the dress Harrison was wearing. (Tr. pp. 19-21; 29-30).
After Harrison left, a few people who witnessed the shooting helped Hughes back to his own house. From there, Ms. Edwards accompanied him to the hospital. (Tr. pp. 12; 31).
Both Ms. Betty Richburg and Harrison testified that they were together at thе time of the shooting. They maintained that they had spent the night together at his mother‘s house, and that Harrison had not left the house after about 9:15 p.m. the night beforе the shooting. Harrison testified that he knew Hughes but had never had any problems with him. He denied robbing or shooting Hughes, and he denied being at the scene of the shooting.
A rеview of the record discloses that there are no errors patent.
Although not alleged as an assignment of error, the sufficiency of evidence to support appellant‘s conviction must be reviewed as per State v. Raymo, 419 So.2d 858 (La.1982). In assessing the sufficiency of evidence in a direct evidence case, the reviewing court must determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendаnt guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Fuller, 414 So.2d 306, 310 (La.1982).
The appellant was convicted of armed robbery and attempted first degree murder. In order to support his cоnviction for armed robbery, the State had to prove that the appellant committed (1) a theft; (2) of anything of value; (3) from the person of or from the immеdiate control of another; (4) by use of force or intimidation; (5) while armed with a dangerous weapon. Here, approximately $40.00 were taken from Hughеs after he was shot in the head. He unhesitatingly identified the appellant as the man who shot and robbed him. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prosеcution, the jury could have convicted the appellant of armed robbery. State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685 (La.1981); State v. Tucker, 405 So.2d 506 (La.1981).
The appellant was also convicted of attempted first degree murder. First degree murder, as defined by R.S. 14:30, includes the killing of a human being “(w)hen the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the pеrpetration or attempted perpetration of ... armed robbery.”
In the case аt bar, the appellant was perpetrating an armed robbery when he put the gun to Hughes’ head and then shot him. Hughes received serious injuries. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have found the appellant guilty of attempted first degree murder beyond a reasonаble
In his only properly raised assignment of error, defendant cоntends that the sentences imposed are unconstitutionally excessive as prohibited by
“The defendant is 25 years old and has a record of criminal violations dating back to 1971. This record consists of some 36 arrests for a variety of crimes; including theft, receiving stolen things, burglary, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and attempted murder.
The defendant‘s conduct in the instant case was deliberate and cаlculated to cause death or serious bodily harm. He shot his victim in the face for no apparent reason before he even gave the victim сhance to comply with his commands to give up his money. Such conduct shows a viciousness which is untreatable.” (Tr. pp. 56-57)
The sentences imposed are sеvere but the crimes committed call for severe punishment. State v. Donahue, 408 So.2d 1262 (La.1982).
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1 requires that the trial judge enumerate his reаsons for sentencing and that the sentence be tailored to fit the particular offense and the particular offender. A review of the trial judge‘s reаsons for sentencing clearly shows that there was compliance with the requirements of
In a supplemental brief filed by the defеndant, he alleges that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. It is well settled that the issue of whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel is more properly raised by application for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, where a full evidentiary hearing may be conducted if warranted. State v. Brown, 384 So.2d 983 (La.1980); State v. Malveaux, 371 So.2d 820 (La.1979).
Finding no reversible error in the record before us, we affirm defendant‘s convictions and sentences.
AFFIRMED.