State v. NobleState v. Noble
Ronson Joe Noble was indicted by the grand jury for second degree murder in violation of
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
Defendant contends the trial judge erred in allowing the state on redirect examination to introduce in evidence the shotgun used in the commission of the crime. He argues that he suffered prejudice as a result thereof.
On direct examination, Deputy Diane Childress testified that, after the body of the victim had been removed from the scene of the crime, she and another officer found a shotgun in a rack in one of the back bedrooms of the house. The gun was photographed in its original position, removed from the rack and taken to the police station. On cross-examination, defendant questioned Childress as to where she had observed the gun and if it was on the rack. He also questioned her about fingerprints on the gun. She replied that she had removed prints but they were only smudges. Prior to trial, the state and defendant had agreed that Childress could bring the gun into the courtroom. She held the gun in plain view of the jury during her entire
The redirect examination must be confined to the subject matter of the cross-examination and to the explanation of statements elicited on cross-examination; but the application of this rule is within the discretion of the trial judge, provided that the opportunity be not denied to recross on the new matter brought out on the redirect. (Emphasis added.)
The state‘s inquiry and subsequent introduction in evidence of the shotgun on redirect examination would appear to be within the scope of defendant‘s cross-examination. In any event, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Defendant was permitted to recross-examine the witness as to the matter in question. Nor do we find that defendant suffered any prejudice. State v. Hathorn, 395 So.2d 783 (La.1981).
Assignment of Error No. 1 is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
Defendant contends the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that the state failed to introduce any evidence of specific intent, an essential element of the crime of second degree murder.
On review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, it must be determined whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Buxton, 416 So.2d 71 (La.1982). Our review of the record reveals the following facts.
On November 27, 1979, defendant left his home early in the morning. When he returned, his two sisters were seated in the living room watching television along with the victim, Donald Ray Monroe. Upon entering the house, defendant asked his sisters what they had cooked for the day. When they replied nothing, he appeared to be upset and “hostile.” Defendant watched television for a short time, then went outside and ran around the house two or three times. Defendant repeated this act several times and then went into his parents’ bedroom. He removed from a gun rack a shotgun which his father had unloaded prior to storage several months earlier. He then returned to the living room and shot and killed Monroe. Neither of defendant‘s sisters saw him actually shoot the victim. However, one of them testified that after the shooting she observed defendant holding the gun close to the victim‘s neck. Defendant returned to the bedroom and placed the shotgun back in the gun rack. After his sisters fled the house, defendant kicked out a window in the living room, left the house and rode his sister‘s bicycle to a neighborhood grocery store about seven blocks away. Speaking in a normal manner, he told the lady who ran the store, Mrs. Handy, that someone had been shot. He then sat down and smoked a cigarette. When asked, defendant told her that he had shot the victim. When asked why, he said, “I don‘t know.” Mrs. Handy sent someone to find out what had happened. When she was informed that the victim was dead, she told defendant that the police were at his house and he should return home. Defendant went outside the store, smoked another cigarette, and then rode off on the bicycle. At no time did defendant request help for the victim. He was apprehended by the police several blocks away and was taken to the parish jail. He appeared to the officers as being calm and collected.
Defendant gave a statement to the police which can be summarized as follows: Defendant went into his parents’ bedroom and
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
In the instant case, defendant‘s sister testified that after the gun went off she looked up and defendant was holding the gun to the victim‘s neck. It can be inferred from the fact that defendant shot the victim in the head from close range that he actively desired his death to follow. State v. Boyer, 406 So.2d 143 (La.1981). Additionally, she testified that when defendant returned home and asked what they had cooked to eat he appeared to be upset and was hostile. Defendant‘s father testified that the gun was unloaded when he placed it on the gun rack several months before the shooting. The police discovered that the drawer where the shells were kept was open immediately after the shooting. Finally, defendant left the scene and went to a local grocery. At no time did he ever request help for the victim.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have determined that defendant had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Hence, the trial judge did not err in denying defendant‘s motion for a new trial on this ground.
Assignment of Error No. 3 is without merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 4 AND 5
Defendant contends the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial in finding that he failed to establish the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence and in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
At arraignment, defendant entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Thereafter, pursuant to
At trial, defendant elicited the testimony of three doctors, Drs. Keith Nabours and Etienne R. Brown of the original sanity commission, and Dr. David S. Post, a practicing clinical psychologist who administered tests to defendant the night before the trial. Additionally, defendant introduced
A legal presumption exists that the defendant is sane and responsible for his actions.
The evidence indicates that the defendant may have been ill both before and after the criminal act took place. However, defendant presented no evidence, neither lay nor professional, that he could not distinguish between right and wrong with reference to the shooting which took place, the standard for insanity in this state. On cross-examination, defense witness Dr. Nabours admitted that it was entirely possible that a person suffering from schizophrenia could distinguish right from wrong and that it would not be unusual for him to be able to do that. In addition to the expert testimony, the jury had the benefit of the lay testimony as to defendant‘s actions and attitude both before and after the crime.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that defendant did not establish the affirmative defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, and we find that any rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Moore v. Duckworth, 443 U.S. 713, 99 S.Ct. 3088, 61 L.Ed.2d 865 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Hathorn, 395 So.2d 783 (La.1981). Hence, the trial judge did not err in denying defendant‘s motion for a new trial on this ground.
Assignments of Error Nos. 4 and 5 are without merit.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.