State v. ForkState v. Fork
Criminal law—Definition of “motor vehicle” in
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, we consider which definition of “motor vehicle” applies to the crime of aggravated vehicular assault. We also consider whether the Polaris Ranger involved in this case (the “Polaris“) should be classified as a “utility vehicle.”
{¶ 2} Appellee, Joshua Fork, was driving the Polaris while under the influence of alcohol when he crashed, injuring his passengers. Appellant, the state of Ohio, charged Fork with multiple counts, including aggravated vehicular assault. At trial, there was a dispute over the applicable definition of “motor vehicle” and whether the Polaris was a motor vehicle for the purposes of that crime.
{¶ 3} Because the aggravated-vehicular-assault statute is a penal law, the definition of “motor vehicle” in
{¶ 4} We therefore affirm the judgment of the Sixth District.
I. Facts and Procedural History
A. The Party
{¶ 5} On a summer‘s night in 2020, Fork attended a party in Burgoon, Ohio. Among the many others in attendance were sisters Leah and Sarah Doering and Leah‘s boyfriend, Travis Perkins. As the night progressed, Fork had a couple of beers, and a little before 1:00 a.m., Fork took the Doering sisters and Travis for a ride in the Polaris. The Polaris is pictured below:
{¶ 7} As a result of the crash, the state charged Fork with multiple counts, including two counts of aggravated vehicular assault, a third-degree felony, in violation of
B. The Trial
{¶ 8} At trial, Fork testified that he bought the Polaris for “farm work” and “farm use.” When asked what he used it for, Fork responded, “Farm work, hauling rocks, hauling bags of seed to the planter, removing limbs and such from the farm.” When asked specifically what he used the Polaris for on the farm, Fork testified, “We use it for—we pull a sprayer with it; like I said, we pick up rocks, trim trees, haul bags of seed, just about anything you can do on the farm with it.” Fork submitted five pictures of the Polaris into evidence, including the one pictured above.
{¶ 9} Travis gave additional insight into the Polaris. When asked whether it was a “self-propelled vehicle,” Travis testified that “[i]t had an engine.” Travis also testified that the Polaris had a bed on it as well as a “farm placard,” i.e., a bright orange triangle, on the back.
{¶ 10} A dispute arose between the state and Fork regarding the applicable definition of “motor vehicle” to use in the jury instructions for the charges of aggravated vehicular assault. The state asserted that
C. The Appeal
{¶ 11} Fork appealed to the Sixth District. After looking to the prefatory language of both
{¶ 12} The state appealed, and we accepted jurisdiction, 170 Ohio St.3d 1428, 2023-Ohio-1665, 209 N.E.3d 714, to consider the following three propositions of law:
[1.] The definition of a “motor vehicle” as it applies to
R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) is the definition found inR.C. 4511.01 and not the definition found in [R.C.]4501.01 as determined by the 6th District Court of Appeals.[2.] The 6th District Court of Appeals’ Application of [State v. Eikleberry, 184 Ohio App.3d 219, 2009-Ohio-3648, 920 N.E.2d 394 (9th Dist.)] to Fork is contrary to the Ohio Supreme Court‘s precedent defined by Muenchenbach.
[3.] A “Use Standard” must be applied in this matter as the “Polaris” was not used for its principal purpose or any other legal purpose.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 13} We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, 938 N.E.2d 342, ¶ 8. “The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ.” United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820). Therefore, “[t]he question is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. “When the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly has said,” Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12, and apply it as written, Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18.
{¶ 14} In addition, we review a record for evidence sufficient to support a conviction by asking “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.‘” State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in Smith at 102, fn. 4. “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).
B. R.C. 4501.01(B)‘s Definition of “Motor Vehicle” Applies
{¶ 15} In its first proposition of law, the state asks us to determine which definition of “motor vehicle” applies in this case. The plain language of the relevant statutes guides our decision here. A person commits aggravated vehicular assault when that person, “while operating * * * a motor vehicle, * * * cause[s] serious physical harm to another person * * * as the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code.”
{¶ 16} The parties do not dispute that Fork was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and that in doing so, he caused others serious physical harm. The issue is whether the vehicle Fork was operating was a motor vehicle for purposes of
{¶ 17} We consider two potentially applicable definitions of “motor vehicle.”
{¶ 18} The plain language of
{¶ 19}
{¶ 20} The state resists these conclusions. It argues that it would be absurd to require two separate definitions of “motor vehicle“—one for an OVI violation and one for an aggravated-vehicular-assault offense. But the state misreads these statutes. An OVI violation occurs when a person, while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of those things, operates a “vehicle.”
{¶ 21} Additionally, the Ohio Jury Instructions do not control our analysis. The Ohio Jury Instructions cite
{¶ 22} Therefore, we hold that
C. A “Utility Vehicle” Is Defined by the Vehicle‘s Principal Purpose
{¶ 23} In the state‘s second and third propositions of law, it argues that we should determine whether the Polaris is a “utility vehicle,” as defined in
{¶ 24}
{¶ 25} In Muenchenbach, we determined whether, for purposes of establishing immunity for public-entity defendants under
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27} Therefore, we hold that because
D. The Polaris Is a “Utility Vehicle”
{¶ 28} Our final determination is whether the Polaris is a “utility vehicle” as defined in
1. The Polaris Is Self-Propelled and Designed with a Bed
{¶ 29} It is apparent from the record that the Polaris is both “self-propelled” and “designed with a bed,”
2. The Polaris‘s Principal Purpose
{¶ 30} The Polaris also meets the definition‘s qualifying requirement of being designed “principally for the purpose of transporting material or cargo in connection with construction, agricultural, forestry, grounds maintenance, lawn and garden, materials handling, or similar activities,”
{¶ 31} The pictures admitted into evidence demonstrate that the Polaris was designed for the principal purpose of transporting materials and cargo, and Fork‘s testimony adds further support. Fork testified repeatedly that the purpose of the Polaris was for “farm” related activities such as “hauling rocks, hauling bags of seed to the planter, removing limbs and such from the farm,” “pull[ing] a sprayer,” “trim[ming] trees,” and “just about anything you can do on the farm.” In addition, both Travis‘s testimony and Fork‘s pictures admitted at trial show that the Polaris had a “farm placard” on the back, further indicating that its principal purpose was for farm-related activities.
{¶ 32} The state attempts to refute this, arguing that Fork‘s testimony that he used the Polaris outside of its principal purpose, such as driving to and from the party, matters in this case. But the Polaris‘s ancillary use for recreation does not affect the Polaris‘s principal purpose. Indeed, the state could have attempted to extract testimony about the Polaris‘s principal purpose, or it could have introduced evidence showing that the Polaris‘s principal purpose did not fit the qualifying language of
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 33} There is no doubt that Fork‘s actions on that fateful summer night in 2020 left a lasting effect not only on him but on those involved. The state, in exercising its prosecutorial power, sought to hold Fork criminally liable based on the law that the General Assembly has provided. But as we have explained, the state misinterpreted the law. Statutory interpretation requires us to look at the plain language of the relevant statutes and no further.
{¶ 34} When performing statutory interpretation, it is important to apply the law as written. When the General Assembly begins a statute with a statement that directs the objects of such statute or explains it, courts and litigants must follow those directions and explanations. And when the General Assembly provides explicit qualifying language in a statutory definition, courts and litigants must take note of that particular language to discern the definition‘s meaning.
{¶ 35} In sum, we hold that when a statute defines “motor vehicle” for penal laws, that definition applies to the crime of aggravated vehicular assault found in
{¶ 36} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
FISCHER, DeWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., concur.
Beth A. Tischler, Sandusky County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kathryn Sandretto, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Huey Defense Firm, Blaise Katter, and D. Timothy Huey, for appellee.
Steven L. Taylor, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.