State of Maryland v. Terrell Henry Fields
No. 784
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND
July 2, 2026
Opinion by Graeff, J.
September Term, 2022
SECOND AMENDMENT – AGE-BASED RESTRICTIONS ON FIREARM POSSESSION – SEVERABILITY
The circuit erred in dismissing the charges against appellant on the ground that the statutes involved violated the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. To assess a challenge to a gun regulation, we look to the two-part test set forth in New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass‘n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 10 (2022). First, we determine whether the Second Amendment covers appellee‘s conduct. Second, if that is the case, we determine if the statute is consistent with this Nation‘s historical traditions of firearm regulation.
The circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the counts charging violations of
Case No. CT191003X
REPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 784
September Term, 2022
______________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
TERRELL HENRY FIELDS
______________________________________
Graeff,
Tang,
Beachley, Donald E.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Graeff, J.
______________________________________
Filed: July 2, 2026
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
On appeal, thе State presents the following question for this Court‘s review:
Did the circuit court err in dismissing appellee‘s charges on Second Amendment grounds?
For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 29, 2019, detectives from the Prince George‘s County Police Department executed a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by appellee. They observed him “reach with both hands and recover an item from his waistband area,” which he then placed underneath the driver‘s seat. The officers then saw, in plain view in the center console, a bag containing what the officers suspected to be marijuana. During a subsequent search of the vehicle, the officers found a .40 caliber semi-automatic Smith and Wesson handgun with an extended magazine. The handgun was loaded with one round in the chamber and nineteen rounds in the magazine. At the time of his arrest, appellee was 20 years old. He did not have a permit for the handgun, nor had he attempted to apply for one.
On October 3, 2019, a Grand Jury indicted appellee on six counts, including: (1) possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime in violation of
Between December 13, 2019, and June 6, 2022, the court continued the case several times. There were various reasons for the continuances, including the COVID-19 pandemic.
On June 24, 2022, appellee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, which was decided one day earlier, invalidated Maryland‘s firearm permitting scheme, which required, pursuant to
On June 27, 2022, the court held a hearing on appellee‘s motion to dismiss. Appellee‘s counsel argued that
Counsel then addressed the constitutionality of
The court granted appellee‘s motion to dismiss the charges. It characterized the Bruen opinion as “fairly Draconian and myopic,” stating that “[w]hat was contemplated during colonial times simply could not be envisioned to encompass the breadth and depth of society 300 years later.” Nevertheless, based on the court‘s interpretation of Bruen, it granted the motion to dismiss.
On June 30, 2022, the State filed its Notice of Appeal.3 On January 9, 2023, the parties filed a joint motion to stay briefing, stating that the Maryland Supreme Court‘s forthcoming decision in Fooks v. State, 490 Md. 458 (2025), cert. denied, 2026 WL 490722 (U.S. 2026), would “provide guidance for the appropriate decision in” the case sub judice. This Court granted the motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review dismissal rulings based on the interpretation of constitutional, statutory, or case law de novo. Jackson v. State, 485 Md. 1, 28 (2023). Moreover, “[t]he proper scope of a constitutional right, and its application to a particular set of facts, are issues of law” which we review de novo. Pizza di Joey, LLC v. Mayor of Balt., 470 Md. 308, 339 (2020).
DISCUSSION
The State contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing the charges against appellee. It argues that the court‘s analysis of the Second Amendment, which protects “the right of the people to keep and bear arms,” was wrong for several reasons.
With respect to the dismissal of the count charging a violation of
Appellee contends that the court cоrrectly granted his motion to dismiss the gun charges. He argues that
I.
Second Amendment Legal Background
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008), the Supreme Court of the United States stated that it was engaging in the “first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment,” and it concluded that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and possess arms in the home for self-defense. The Court clarified, however, that the right provided by the Second Amendment was not unlimited, and it was “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id. at 626. The Court made clear that its ruling did not “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id. at 626–27. This list did “not purport to be exhaustive.” Id. at 627 n. 26.
Two years later, the Court held “that the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the states” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). The Court stated that the Second
In 2022, the Supreme Court issued another groundbreaking decision. In Bruen, 597 U.S. at 10, the Court held “that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual‘s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” This Court recently summarized the holding in Bruen, as follows:
The case arose from a challenge to the constitutionality of New York‘s licensing regime, which made it a crime to possess any firearm without a license, and provided that, to obtain a license to carry a concealed gun, the applicant must show “proper cause.” Id. at 11. The “proper cause” requirement had been interpreted to require an applicant to “demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the community.” [Bruen, 597 U.S. at 12].
The Court stated that, if “the Second Amendment‘s plain text covers an individual‘s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” Id. at 24. The Court held that the plain text of the Second Amendment, which provides that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,” protects an individual‘s right to carry handguns publicly for self-defense. Id. at 32–33. Based on that plain language, the government had the burden to justify any regulation on handguns by showing that it was “consistent with this Nation‘s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 33–34. The Court acknowledged that “the right to keep and bear arms in public has traditionally been subject to well-defined restrictions governing the intent for which one could carry arms, the manner of carry, or the exceptional circumstances under which one could not carry arms.” Id. at 38. It concluded, however, that the “historical record compiled by respondents does not demonstrate a tradition of broadly prohibiting the public carry of commonly used firearms for self-defense” or “limiting public carry only to those law-abiding citizens who
demonstrate a special need for self-defense.” Id. at 38. Accordingly, the Court held that New York‘s proper cause licensing requirement was unconstitutional. Id.
Hicks v. State, ___ Md. App. ___, ___, 2026 WL 1601794, at *6 (2026).
The Court distinguished “may issue” permitting schemes from “shall issue” schemes, explaining that a “shall issue” regime required authorities to issue concealed-carry licenses “whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 13. States with “shall issue” schemes did not grant “licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need or suitability.” Id. at 13. “May issue” regimes, by contrast, which in 2022 included six states, including Maryland and New York, required an applicant to make a special showing of need to carry a firearm in public and gave authorities “discretion to deny concealed-carry licenses even when the applicant satisfies the statutory criteria, usually because the applicant has not demonstrated cause or suitability for the relevant license.” Id. at 13–15. As indicated, the Court held that New York‘s “may-issue” permitting scheme requiring a showing of proper cause was unconstitutional. Id. at 38–39.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito stated that Bruen “decide[d] nothing about who may lawfully possess a firearm,” and it did not “expand the categories of people who may lawfully possess a gun.” Id. at 73 (Alito, J. concurring). Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate opinion for himself and Chief Justice Roberts, noting that the Bruen opinion did “not prohibit States from imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for self-
Prior to Bruen, Maryland had a “may-issue” licensing regime that required applicants for a permit to demonstrate a “good and substantial reason” to possess a handgun, interpreted to mean that an applicant “must demonstrate having received actual threats or assaults” to qualify for a permit. In re Rounds, 255 Md. App. 205, 210–11 (2022) (quoting
In 2023, the General Assembly amended
PS § 5-306 to remove the “good and substantial reason” requirement, effective October 1, 2023. 2023 Md. Laws Ch. 651. Maryland is now a “shall issue” state, and its citizens are authorized to obtain a concealed carry permit provided that they are 21 years of age or a member of the uniformed services, do not have any disqualifying offenses or mental disorders, do not have a substance abuse disorder, have successfully completed a firearms training course, and “based on an investigation . . . ha[ve] not exhibited a propensity for violence or instability that may reasonably render the person‘s possession of a handgun a danger to the person or to another.”PS § 5-306(a) . Applicants must also show that they are “not otherwise prohibited by State or federal law from purchasing or possessing a handgun.”Id. § 5-306(a)(10)(ii) .
Hicks, 2026 WL 1601794, at *7 (footnotes omitted).
In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Court clarified Bruen‘s analysis, “which lower courts had struggled to apply.” Fooks, 490 Md. at 463. In that case,
Rahimi, therefore, clarified that the “Second Amendment permits more than just those regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791.” Id. at 691–92. The Second Amendment does not prohibit “the enactment of laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse.” Id. at 698.
In Fooks, 490 Md. at 465, the Supreme Court of Maryland applied Bruen and Rahimi to
The Court additionally held that “felon dispossession laws like § 5-133(b)(2) are consistent with our Nation‘s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 498. The Court noted that, when the Second Amendment was ratified, “the right to keep and bear arms was not viewed as inconsistent with the prohibition on the possession of firearms by categories of individuals thought to present a special danger unrelated to whether they had previously engaged in or demonstrated a propensity for violence.” Id. at 499. The Court also considered evidence that English and early American legislatures disarmed distrusted groups “for reasons other than demonstrated dangerousness.” Id. at 499-501. The Court agreed with other courts that found a historical tradition of prohibiting firearm ownership by categories of individuals who were perceived to present “an unacceptable risk of danger if armed.” Id. at 504-05 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1128 (8th Cir. 2024)). The Court found that
In United States v. Hemani, ___, U.S. ___, ___, 2026 WL 1751710 at *12 (June 18, 2026), the Supreme Court of the United Stated held that the prosecution of Mr. Hemani for possession of a firearm while he was an unlawful user of a controlled dangerous substance i.e., use of marijuana a few times a week, was not consistent with the Second Amendment. The Court stated that “[t]he Second Amendment protects the right of ‘all Americans’ to keep and bear firearms for self-defense.” Id. at *4 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 581). In
Moreover, those historical laws “usually provided some form of process before an individual lost any of his liberties,” whereas the statute at issue “automatically divests an individual of his constitutional right to bear arms the moment he becomes an unlawful user . . . without any pre-deprivation process” Id. at *2. Accordingly, the Court held that the government had not carried its “burden of showing its prosecution of Mr. Hemani complies with the Second Amendment.” Id. at *12.4
With that background in mind, we turn to the issues рresented here.
Constitutional Challenge Here
Appellee argues that
Plaintiffs contesting the validity of a firearms law under the Second Amendment may bring either an “as-applied” or a “facial” challenge to the law. [United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 317–20 (4th Cir. 2012)]. In an as-applied challenge, the court focuses on the circumstances of the particular plaintiffs and whether, in light of those circumstances, the challenged law was unconstitutionally applied to those plaintiffs. Id. at 319.
By contrast, in a facial constitutional challenge a plaintiff asks the court to declare that the statute is invalid. As the Supreme Court has explained, “facial challenges are ‘disfavored’ because they ‘often rest on speculation,’ ‘short circuit the democratic process,’ and ‘run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint.‘” Bianchi, 111 F.4th at 452 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)). So to succeed in a facial constitutional challenge, a plaintiff confronts a much more difficult task, namely, to establish that there is “no set of circumstances” under which the law would be valid. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1898 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also Moore, 666 F.3d at 318–19 (“[T]he Supreme Court has long declared that a statute cannot be held unconstitutional if it has constitutional application.”). “The stakes are higher in a facial challenge, so the bar goes up as well.” United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2024).
In this case, as indicated, appellee challenges two statutes. With respect to
Charge Pursuant to PS § 5-133(a)(1)
As indicated, appellee contends that
To assess this claim, we look to the two-part test Bruen established for constitutional challenges to gun regulations. First, we must determine whether the Second Amendment covers appellee‘s conduct. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. Second, if that is the case, we must determine if the statute is “consistent with this Nation‘s historical traditions of firearm regulation.” Id.
A.
Plain Text of the Second Amendment
The first step in the analysis under Bruen is whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers appellee‘s conduct. In Bruen, the Court found that the petitioners, “two
The question here is whether appellee, who was 20 years old at the time of his arrest, was part of “the people” that the Second Amendment protects. Id. at 24. If so, “the Constitution presumptively protects” his conduct. Id.
The parties disagree regarding whether appellee‘s challenge satisfies this first step. The State argues that, during the Founding-era, individuals under the age of 21 “were not understood to be part of ‘the people‘” protected by the Second Amendment. Rather, it asserts that, at the time of the founding, individuals under the age of 21 were legally minors who were viewed as lacking reason and judgment and “lacked the full rights of adult citizens.” Since minors did not enjoy rights independent of their parents, the State argues that “the founding era would not have understood the Second Amendment right to reach those under 21.”
Appellee contends that individuals under 21 are part of “the people” covered by the Second Amendment. He notes that the same term, “the people,” is used in both the First and Fourth Amendments, which apply to individuals under the age of 21, including those under 18. He argues, therefore, that the term “the people” in the Second Amendment must include individuals under 21.
Other courts have addressed this issue, and we find those cases instructive. In Lara v. Comm‘r. Pa. State Police, 125 F.4th 428, 436–39 (3rd Cir.), cert. pending, No. 24-1329
These cases are persuasive, but we need not definitely decide this issue. Rather, we will take the approach adopted by other circuits of the United States Courts of Appeal and “assume without deciding that [individuals under 21] are part of ‘the people’ and are therefore covered by the [Second] Amendment‘s text.” McCoy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 F.4th 568, 575 (4th Cir. 2025), cert pending, No. 25–24 (U.S. 2025). Accord Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1130 (“[W]e assume, but do not decide, that individuals under the age of 21 are part of ‘the people’ protected by the Second Amendment.”); Picon v. United States, 343 A.3d 57, 63 (D.C.) (assuming, without deciding, that 18-to-20-year-olds with no criminal history are part of “the people” the Second Amendment protects), cert. pending, No. 25-5713 (U.S. 2025).
We thus turn to address whether Maryland‘s regulation of the right of those 18 to 20 years old to possess firearms passes the second step of the Bruen analysis.
B.
Historical Tradition
Once there is a showing that a defendant‘s conduct is entitled to protection under the Second Amendment, the government bears the burden to show that the challenged regulation “is consistent with this Nation‘s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 34. “If the regulation is consistent with the Nation‘s historical tradition
In addressing the legality of
In assessing whether a regulation is consistent with historical principles, the inquiry turns on “[w]hy and how the regulation burdens the right” to bear arms. Id. If a regulation addresses the same problem as historical restrictions, it shares the same “why” as the historical restrictions. Id. If a regulation shares a “why” with historical restrictions, “it is lawful if it is ‘similar’ to those restrictions in ‘how’ it burdens the right.” Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1114 (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692).
To determine whether
Courts addressing this issue with respect to laws restricting possession of firearms for minors similarly have looked to both time periods. See Picon, 343 A.3d at 66 (the law of both the Founding-era and the Reconstruction-era “restricted firearm possession by individuals under twenty-one”); Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1117 (“both eras restricted the purchase of firearms by minors”). Even courts that have looked primarily at sources from the Founding-era to interpret the Second Amendment have recognized that a public understanding of the Second Amendment when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791 is not limited to restrictions in effect at that time. See Lara, 125 F.4th at 436–39. Laws enacted in the late nineteenth century, around the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, can “confirm a court‘s understanding of Founding-era public meaning.” Id. at 441. Accord McCoy, 140 F.4th at 578 (laws enacted in the later nineteenth century can confirm the meaning of the Second Amendment when “consistent with founding-era history”).
In addressing whether the prohibition on possession or purchase of firearms by 18-to-20-year-olds is sufficiently analogous to this Nation‘s historical tradition of firearms regulation, we note that courts in other jurisdictions have reached differing conclusions.
Similarly, in Reese, 127 F.4th at 600 (5th Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals held that a federal statute prohibiting the sale of handguns to 18-to-20-year-olds was “unconstitutional in light of our Nation‘s historic tradition of firearm regulation.” The court pointed to the 1792 Militia Act and held that the government failed to “ovеrcome this clear and germane evidence that eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds enjoyed the same Second Amendment rights as their twenty-one-year-old peers at the founding.” Id. at 596. Accord Worth v. Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677, 698 (8th Cir. 2024) (Minnesota did not meet its burden to show a historical analogue to its restriction on obtaining a permit to carry a handgun for those under 21).
Other courts, however, have upheld age restrictions under the second step of Bruen, finding that such restrictions are consistent with the Nation‘s historical tradition of firearm regulation. For example, in Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1122, the United States Court of Appeals
To be sure, these last two cases addressed restrictions on the salе of firearms to individuals under the age of 21, not possession of firearms. Other courts, however, have upheld restrictions on the ability of those under 21 to possess and carry firearms. In Picon, 343 A.3d at 65, the court held that there were no constitutional problems with the District of Columbia‘s firearm registration and licensing statutes, noting that history revealed “a regulatory tradition of restricting access to firearms based on age for those considered to lack the judgment and discretion to use them safely.” The court stated that restrictions on the ability to purchase firearms “necessarily implicates their ability to possess and carry them.” Id. It concluded that “restricting the purchase of firearms by individuals under twenty-one is therefore a historical analogue relevantly similar to laws regulating the ability of those under twenty-one to possess or carry firearms.” Id. at 65–66. Accord Pennsylvania v. Williams, 341 A.3d 144, 154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025) (state law restricting
Based on our review of this caselaw, we conclude that the burden that
In Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1117, the court noted that, “[a]t the Founding, a person was an ‘infant[ ]’ or a ‘minor[ ]’ in the eyes of the law until age 21.” (quoting Zephaniah Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 213 (1795)). The founding generation believed that minors “lacked the reason and judgment necessary to be trusted with legal rights.” Id. “Because of their lack of reason, infants were subject to the ‘power’ of their
The age of majority remained 21 “from the country‘s founding well into the twentieth century.” Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1122 (quoting Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 Tul. L. Rev. 55, 64 (2016)). The reduction in the age of majority occurred during World War II, when the war effort “necessitated lowering the conscription age to 18,” prompting states to lower the age of majority. Id. In 1971, when the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was ratified, individuals were granted the right to vote at age 18. Id. For most of the first 200 years of our nation‘s history, however, the “law limited the rights of individuals under the age of 21, including their purchase of firearms.” Id.
Although the Founding-era lacked express prohibitions on the possession of firearms, “the limitations on the legal rights of minors were so pervasive that states had no
Appellee points to founding-era militia laws as support for his argument that “the historical record demonstrates that persons aged under 21 regularly possessed firearms.” The Second Militia Act of 1792 required that all “free[,] able-bodied[,] white male citizen[s] . . . who [are] or shall be of age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years . . . be enrolled in the militia . . . [and] provide himself with a good musket or firelock . . . or with a good rifle.” Williams, 341 A.3d at 156 (alterations in original) (quoting Second Militia Act of 1792)).
The law requiring service in the militia, however, does not support a traditiоn of possession of guns by minors for a couple of reasons. Initially, although militia members were required to furnish their own weapons, “an obligation is not the same thing as a right–an individual‘s duty to do something does not mean they have a corresponding, unassailable right to do that thing.” Id. “[A]lthough many colonies permitted or even required minors to own and possess firearms for purposes of militia service, nothing like a right for minors to own and possess firearms has existed at any time in this nation‘s history.” Illinois v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 329 (Ill. 2013).
Moreover, the disconnect between militia service and a right to bear arms is further shown by state laws enacted to address the problem related to the inability of minors to purchase firearms required for their militia service. See Picon, 343 A.3d at 64 (noting that some states exempted individuals under 21 from the firearm requirement, some explicitly
For these reasons, and others set forth in Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1117–23, Picon 343 A.3d at 63–67, and Glover, ___ A.3d at ___, 2026 WL 771472, at *7–12, we conclude that
With respect to the “why,”
Founding-era law precluded individuals under the age of 21 from purchasing arms because they lacked cash and the capacity to contract. Access to arms was a matter of parental consent. When Founding-era laws required minors to carry arms for militia service, states required their parents to provide the arms. And universities, standing in for students’ parents, imposed significant restrictions on both firearm aсcess and use. Consistent with these Founding-era limitations, states in the nineteenth century expressly prohibited the sale of arms to minors with some exceptions for parents to provide firearms to their children.
Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1123.
As indicated, Bondi and McCoy involved the right to purchase firearms. In Picon, 343 A.3d at 65, however, the court explained that “a restriction on the ability of those under twenty-one to purchase firearms necessarily implicates their ability to possess and carry them.” This Nation‘s historical tradition of restricting the purchase of firearms by individuals under 21, thereforе, is a “historical analogue relevantly similar to laws regulating the ability of those under twenty-one to possess or carry firearms.” Id. at 65–66. See also United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (“There is some evidence that the founding generation would have shared the view that public-safety-based limitations of juvenile possession of firearms were consistent with the right to keep and bear arms,” and therefore, a “ban on juvenile possession of handguns is part of a longstanding practice of prohibiting certain classes of individuals from possessing
We conclude that the restriction on gun possession set forth in
IV.
CR § 4-203
The State contends that the circuit court also erred in dismissing the two counts charging violations of
(a) Prohibited. − (1) Except as prоvided in subsection (b) of this section, a person may not:
(i) wear, carry, or transport a handgun, whether concealed or open, on or about the person;
(ii) wear, carry, or knowingly transport a handgun, whether concealed or open, in a vehicle traveling on a road or parking lot generally used by the public, highway, waterway, or airway of the State;
(iii) violate item (i) or (ii) of this paragraph while on public school property in the State;
(iv) violate item (i) or (ii) of this paragraph with the deliberate purpose of injuring or killing another person; or (v) violate item (i) or (ii) of this paragraph with a handgun loaded with ammunition.
(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that a person who transports a handgun under paragraph (1)(ii) of this subsection transports the handgun knowingly.
(b) Exceptions − This section does not prohibit:
(1) the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun by a person who is authorized at the time and under the circumstances to wear, carry, or transport the handgun as part of the person‘s official equipment, and is:
(i) a law enforcement official of the United States, the State, or a county or city of the State;
(ii) a member of the armed forces of the United States or оf the National Guard on duty or traveling to or from duty;
(iii) a law enforcement official of another state or subdivision of another state temporarily in this State on official business;
(iv) a correctional officer or warden of a correctional facility in the State;
(v) a sheriff or full-time assistant or deputy sheriff of the State; or
(vi) a temporary or part-time sheriff‘s deputy;
(2) the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun, in compliance with any limitations imposed under
§ 5-307 of the Public Safety Article , by a person to whom a permit to wear, carry, or transport thehandgun has been issued under Title 5, Subtitle 3 of the Public Safety Article[.]
(Emphasis added).
At the time of the offenses,
(a) A permit is valid for each handgun legally in the possession of the person to whom the permit is issued.
(b) The Secretary may limit the geographic area, circumstances, or times of the day, week, month, or year in which a permit is effective.10
Appellee contends that the circuit court properly dismissed the charges against him because
At the time of appellee‘s charges, in 2019,
[T]he Secretary [of the Maryland State Police] shall issue a permit within a reasonable time to a person who the Secretary finds . . . based on an investigation[,] . . . has good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.
(Emphasis added).
The State, conceded, as it must, that the GSR requirement was unconstitutional under Bruen. See In re Rounds, 255 Md. App. at 212 (the “good and substantial reason” requirement of
The standing issue is an interesting one. As the State notes, appellant never applied for a permit or showed that doing so would have been futile, based on age or a failure to have a good and substantial reason for a gun.12 Nevertheless, for purposes of this opinion, we will assume, without deciding, that appellee has standing to challenge his conviction. We focus instead on the State‘s severability argument.
The Supreme Court of Maryland recently discussed severability, noting that there is “a strong presumption ‘that a legislative body generally intends its enactments to be severed if possible.‘” Engage Armament LLC v. Montgomery Cnty., ___ Md. ___, ___, 2026 WL 1144313, at *18 (Md. Apr. 28, 2026) (quoting Sugarloaf Citizens Ass‘n. v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 574 (1990)). The Court stated that “[t]he test to determine whether a provision is severable is if a legislative body would ‘have enacted the statute or ordinance if it knew that part of the enactment was invalid[.]‘” Id. (quoting Cnty. Council of Prince George‘s Cnty. v. Chancey Enters., 454 Md. 514, 540 (2017)). “When the dominant purpose of an enactment may largely be carried out notwithstanding [its] partial invalidity,
Here, the legislative intent regarding severability is clear. In 2014, the General Assembly enacted legislation providing as follows:
(a) In general. — Except as otherwise provided, the provisions of all statutes enacted after July 1, 1973, are severable.
(b) When part of statute found to be unconstitutional or void. — The finding by a court that part of a statute is unconstitutional, or void does not affect the validity of the remaining portions of the statute, unless the court finds that the remaining valid provisions alone are incomplete and incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.
Moreover, after Bruen invalidated the “good and substantial reason” requirement, see In re Rounds, 255 Md. App. at 212, the General Assembly repealed this provision. 2023 Md. Laws, Ch. 651, § 1 (H.B. 824). The legislature, however, left the remaining provisions of
Accordingly, we hold that the invalid GSR provision was severable, leaving in place a permitting scheme that made appellee‘s conduct criminal. Appellee has not shown that
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE‘S COUNTY REVERSED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.