COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. KAREEM MOHAMMED WILLIAMS JR.
No. 182 MDA 2024
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JULY 1, 2025
2025 PA Super 137
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
OPINION BY LAZARUS, P.J.:
Kareem Mohammed Williams, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, after the court found him guilty of possessing a firearm without a license1 following a stipulated bench trial. After review, we affirm.2
At a bench trial held on January 3, 2024, the parties stipulated to the following relevant facts:
- Defendant is Kareem Williams, Jr., DOB: 12/05/2003[,] and was nineteen (19) years old on April 18, 2023.
- On April 18, 2023, [O]fficer Tomas O’Brien of the Spring Garden Township Police Department initiated a traffic stop on a grey Ford Sedan bearing PA registration MCK8575 in the 1000 block of Boundary Avenue in York County. []
- [Williams] was the front passenger in said vehicle and Officer O’Brien noticed that Williams was carrying a fanny/sling[-]type pack on his person.
- During the traffic stop, Officer [Samantha] Cumor asked [Williams] to get out of [the] vehicle and noticed [Williams’] fanny/sling[-]type pack on the front passenger floor of the vehicle.
- Officer Cumor asked [Williams] what was in his fanny/sling[-]type pack and [Williams] stated his pack contained a firearm.
- [Williams] did not have a concealed carry permit and could not legally obtain a concealed carry permit as he was under twenty-one (21) years of age.
- The firearm found in [Williams’] possession [] on April 18, 2023, was a Springfield XDS 9mm with serial number HG906743. Said firearm is functional and capable of discharging the type of ammunition for which it was manufactured.
- The firearm was loaded with eight (8) rounds of 9mm ammunition in the magazine and one round in the chamber. []
Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1, Stipulations of Fact for Bench Trial, 1/5/24.
Prior to trial, on September 12, 2023, Williams filed an omnibus pretrial motion arguing, inter alia, that the court should dismiss the charge for carrying a firearm without a license because
Based on the above-recited stipulations, the court found Williams guilty of one count of carrying a firearm without a license and sentenced him to two-and-a-half to five years’ incarceration and the costs of prosecution, with 260 days’ credit for time served.5 See Order, 1/3/24. Williams filed a timely appeal.
The trial court and Williams have both complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Williams raises the following claims on appeal:
- The trial court erred when it denied [Williams’ m]otion to [d]ismiss:
- The trial court heard no evidence and took no argument on [Williams’] motion, instead relying on [an] unrelated Court of Common Pleas en banc decision[ addressing]
18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6105 , which [was] not relevant to [Williams’] case and to which [Williams] was not a party; [and] - The Commonwealth presented no evidence or argument to sustain its burden of historical analogues for
18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106 and§ 6109 under the test set forth in [New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.] v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 [] (2022);
- The trial court heard no evidence and took no argument on [Williams’] motion, instead relying on [an] unrelated Court of Common Pleas en banc decision[ addressing]
- Sections
6106 and6109 of the Crimes Code violate [Williams’] rights under the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Pennsylvania Constitution:- There is no historical tradition under the Bruen test of prohibiting 18[-]20-year-olds from carrying a firearm in public with or without a license, as required by
18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6109 ; - There is no historical tradition under the Bruen test of prohibiting the possession of a firearm in a vehicle without a license, as required by
18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106 ; [and] - Article I, Section 21 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution on these issues.
- There is no historical tradition under the Bruen test of prohibiting 18[-]20-year-olds from carrying a firearm in public with or without a license, as required by
Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5 (reordered for ease of review; unnecessary capitalization omitted).
In Williams’ first claim, he raises two sub-issues challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss, which we address separately. First, he argues that the court erred by not taking evidence or hearing argument on the Bruen claim raised in his omnibus pretrial motion, but, instead, relying
Williams’ claim fails as Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 577 permits a trial court to rule on such a motion based on the filing alone. See Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 577. Specifically, Rule 577 states the following:
(A) Following the filing of a motion,
(1) if the judge determines an answer is necessary, the court may order a written answer, or it may order an oral response at the time of a hearing or argument on a motion. []
(2) if the judge determines the motion requires a hearing or argument, the court or the court administrator shall schedule the date and time for the hearing or argument. []
Pa.R.Crim.P. 577(A)(1), (2). The rule’s language makes clear that a trial court may decide whether a hearing or additional evidence is necessary to rule upon a motion. See Commonwealth v. Cernick, 272 A.3d 476, at *2 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2022) (Table)6 (“Rule 577(A)(2) confers general discretion to a trial court to determine whether a hearing is required upon the filing of any motion.”). Therefore, the trial court did not err in ruling on Williams’ motion, and he is afforded no relief on this claim.
Williams next contends that the trial court erred in relying on an “unrelated” en banc Court of Common Pleas of York County decision.
Appellant’s Brief at 16. Williams asserts that this was error because the en banc decision dealt with a different section of the criminal code than the one he was charged with—section
In its opinion, the trial court relies only in part on Jamison: “namely[,] the jurisdictional points and decision with respect to whether Pennsylvania law affords greater protection than federal law for firearms licensure remain directly applicable to this case.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/20/24, at 2.; see also Jamison, at 8–9 (“There is not a single case to support the argument that the Pennsylvania Constitution offers greater protection with respect to firearms ownership and possession than the Second Amendment.”). It also relied on Bruen, a recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United States considering a Second Amendment challenge, discussed further infra. Id. Furthermore, while Williams relies on Ney to claim that a trial court may not rely on evidence outside of the record, Ney dealt with a judge who relied upon his own internet job search in making a ruling—a far cry from a judge citing to an en banc decision by the court it sits on as persuasive legal reasoning. See Ney, 917 A.2d at 868. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in relying, in part, on Jamison, and Williams is entitled to no relief.
Williams’ next claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden under the Bruen test. See Appellant’s Brief at 18. Williams’ position is that it was “the Commonwealth’s burden to show the challenged statute is consistent with traditional firearm regulations.” Id.
This claim is unavailing because Williams waived this argument by failing to properly preserve it. “Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be
In his second argument, Williams raises three sub-issues, which we address separately. First, Williams argues that sections
to Bruen, is “protected conduct under the Second Amendment.” Id. at 18. Williams argues that, because his conduct is protected under the Second Amendment, under Bruen, it becomes the Commonwealth’s burden to “show the challenged statute is consistent with traditional firearm regulations[.]” Id. He claims that doing so would require the Commonwealth to “affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id.
Regarding section
government’s argument in Evanchick and the Third Circuit’s reasons for rejecting those arguments. See id.
The Commonwealth’s response to Williams primarily rests on its argument that, because 18-to-20-year-olds were treated as “infants,” i.e., minors or non-adults, with limited political and civil rights at the time of the founding, it is not against our nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation to curtail their access
The Commonwealth dedicates a significant portion of its brief to attempting to rebut Williams’ argument regarding 18-to-20-year-olds being mandated to serve in state militias at the time of the founding. See id. at 24-26. One component of the Commonwealth’s argument is the distinction between a “right” and an “obligation.” See id. at 25. To illustrate, while citizens today have “a duty to participate in jury service,” they do not have “a right to be chosen to serve on a jury.” See id., citing Walsh and Cornell, supra, at 3077. It follows, according to the Commonwealth, that it is error to assume that because an 18-year-old in 1792 could have been legally obliged to serve in a militia and bear arms as a part of that service, he had a corresponding right to bear arms outside of and independent from that obligatory service. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 25. The Commonwealth also posits that minors required to serve in a militia were not expected to arm themselves for service; instead, it was commonly understood that their parents, guardians, or the local government or state would provide them with arms. See id. at 25-26. Therefore, according to the Commonwealth, a “regulation that limits licenses to carry concealed [weapons] . . . is consistent with this nation’s historical tradition.” See id. at 26.
A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute presents a pure question of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Farmer, 329 A.3d 449, 451 (Pa. Super. 2024). Williams, as the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute, carries the “high burden” of demonstrating it “clearly, palpably, and plainly” violates the Second Amendment. See Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 333 A.3d 417, 426 (Pa. Super. 2025), citing Commonwealth v. Omar, 981 A.2d 179, 185 (Pa. 2009).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has only once taken up a challenge to a firearm regulation under the Bruen test. See Barris v. Stroud Township, 310 A.3d 175 (Pa. 2024). Barris was decided before the Supreme Court of the United States announced its decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), wherein it expanded upon its decision in Bruen and attempted to clarify how lower courts are to apply the Bruen test.11 See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690–702. We will, therefore, attempt to synthesize the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Barris with Rahimi’s updated guidance on applying Bruen.
The United States Supreme Court has reiterated that “the right to keep and bear arms is among the ‘fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.’” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690, citing McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010). “Like most rights, though, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690, citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (internal quotations omitted). When a statute is challenged under the Second Amendment, Bruen’s standard is as follows:
When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.”
Barris, 310 A.3d at 203, quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24.
Analyzing a Second Amendment challenge entails considering “whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin [the Nation’s] regulatory tradition.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692, citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26–31. It is the Commonwealth’s burden to show that the regulation “is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 689, quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. We must then determine whether the Commonwealth has proven that the regulation is “relevantly similar to laws that our tradition is understood to permit, apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692, quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29 (internal quotations omitted).
One method we can employ to determine whether historic and modern regulations are “relevantly similar” is by looking at the “how and why” behind the regulations, i.e., whether the regulations “impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified[.]” Barris, 310 A.3d at 185–86, quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29; Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692 (“Why and how the regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry.”). The analysis does not require a “historical twin” or “dead
Furthermore, the High Court’s Second Amendment precedents do not render our jurisprudence “trapped in amber.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691. Just as the Second Amendment’s protection “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not [yet] in existence[ at the founding,]” so too does it permit “more than just those regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791.” Id. at 691–92, quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582. That said, while we do not need a “historical twin” to deem a regulation constitutional, we “must be careful not to read a principle at such a level of generality that it waters down the right.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 740 (Barrett, J., concurring).
In Evanchick, the appellee provided evidence that, at the time of the founding,12 individuals younger than 21 were “infants” in the eyes of the law and thus not part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. See Evanchick, 91 F.4th at 131–32. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected those arguments because it held that: (1) it did not need to examine the first step of the Bruen analysis—figuring out whether the appellant is part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment—through the retrospective “historical analogue” test of the second step; (2) the fact that those under 21 years of age lacked certain legal rights at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification did not, ipso facto, mean that they were not under the umbrella of “the people;” and (3) because 18-to-20-year-olds were among the people protected by other constitutional rights, it would follow that they are within the ambit of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. See id. Additionally, the Third Circuit juxtaposed what it characterized as a “conspicuously sparse record of state regulations on 18-to-20-year-olds at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification” with the Second Militia Act of 1792, which “required all able-bodied men to enroll in the militia and to arm themselves upon turning 18.” See id. at 136, citing
In Rahimi, the United States Supreme Court considered a Bruen challenge to
threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed.” Id. at 698.
Here, we conclude that section
Turning to the second step, it becomes the Commonwealth’s burden to “justify its [regulation] by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Barris, 310 A.3d at 208, citing
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. The Commonwealth has presented evidence of a historical tradition of individuals aged 18-to-21 being prohibited from possessing firearms. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 18-27.
Since before the founding, our nation’s state legislatures have categorically disarmed groups judged too dangerous to be able to safely or responsibly bear arms. As summarized by then-Judge Amy Coney Barrett, “founding-era legislatures categorically disarmed groups whom they judged to be a threat to the public safety.” Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 458 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting). In the pre-founding era, Catholics were disarmed for refusing to swear allegiance to the sovereign or independent states, while in the founding-era, slaves and Native Americans were similarly prohibited from possessing firearms because they were perceived as “immediate threats to public safety and
In the 19th century, as guns became more dangerous and accessible, legislatures enacted a variety of prohibitions of the sale and/or the possession of guns by, inter alia, “tramps” or “vagrants,”18 persons of unsound mind,19 and intoxicated persons.20 At least 29 jurisdictions limited the sale of firearms to, or the possession of firearms by, individuals below a set age.21
Aside from legislative prohibitions on certain groups purchasing and/or possessing firearms, the founding-era treatment of 18-to-20-year-olds as minors is likewise weighty evidence of a historical tradition. The founding “generation shared the view that minors lacked the reason and judgment necessary to be trusted with legal rights[,]” and that, accordingly, “infants were subject to the ‘power’ of their parents until they reached age 21.” See National Rifle Association v. Bondi, 133 F.4th 1108, 1117 (11th Cir. 2025), citing 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, at 452-53 (1871). Among the legal rights minors lacked at the time of the founding were the right to enter into contracts or sue without joining their guardian. See Lara, 125 F.4th at 449 (Restrepo, J., dissenting). Further, when founding-era youths went off to college, universities, standing in loco parentis, often prohibited students from carrying firearms both on and off campus. See id. at 450–51 (discussing founding-era weapons bans at Yale University, University of Georgia, University of North Carolina, and University of Virginia). This understanding of the legal status of minors at the founding and the restrictions on bearing arms to which they were subject lends itself to the
conclusion that our nation has a historical tradition of restricting the rights of those aged 18 to 20.
Williams’ argument against section
As for the Second Militia Act, Williams conflates a legal obligation or duty imposed on a citizen with a legal right. The Second Militia Act required all “free[,] able-bodied[,] white male citizen[s] . . . who [are] or shall be of age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years . . . be enrolled in the
militia . . . [and] provide himself with a good musket or firelock . . . or with a good rifle[.]”
Additional context regarding the manner in which states effectuated the Second Militia Act’s requirement that individuals provide their own arms further erodes support for Williams’ conclusion. Given the limitations on the legal status of individuals under the age of 21, discussed supra, states enacted laws to address minors’ inability to procure the required firearms for their service. These laws took various forms: Pennsylvania and Delaware exempted minors entirely from the requirement to provide their own firearms; seven states required parents to acquire firearms for their sons’ militia service; and twelve states made parents legally liable if their minor children did not appear for service with the requisite firearms. See Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1119–20 (listing statutes). “By 1826, at least 21 of the 24 states admitted to the Union—representing roughly 89 percent of the population—had enacted laws that placed the onus on parents to provide minors with firearms for militia service.” See id. at 1120 (citation omitted). These supplemental laws are indicative of a founding-era assumption that minors were restricted in their access to firearms.
Going even further, in the latter-half of the nineteenth century, twenty jurisdictions passed laws restricting firearm access
Based upon this history of both common law and statutory restrictions on access to firearms by minors, among other groups, from the pre-founding era through the latter half of the 19th-century, we find that a national historical tradition exists of restricting firearm access to individuals deemed unable to responsibly bear arms, particularly 18-to-20-year-olds. The “how” and “why” of these laws and section
Turning to section
The Commonwealth notes at the outset of its argument regarding section
While Williams makes a compelling case that our historical tradition is rather quiet on the question of carrying firearms in “the available forms of transportation in the 19th century,” Appellant’s Brief, at 31, we do not need a regulation of that sort to
Instead, this Court need only, and does, consider section
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 50. Carrying a weapon concealed on one’s person versus storing it in the glovebox or center console is, to this Court, a distinction without a difference. If anything, the additional number of spaces in which to store a firearm within a vehicle, the variety of firearms that can be carried within a vehicle as opposed to concealed on one’s person, and the portability provided by modern vehicles all weigh in favor of section
Therefore, as section
defense may continue to do so.”) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (“[T]he majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”).
Williams’ last argument, that Article I, Section 21 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution, is also unavailing. This Court has at least twice had the recent opportunity to take up the question of whether the Pennsylvania Constitution’s arms-bearing provision provides greater
Based on the foregoing, we hold that, as applied to Williams, sections
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/01/2025
Notes
See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 742–43 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citations omitted).The message that lower courts are sending now in Second Amendment cases could not be clearer. They say there is little method to Bruen’s madness. It isn’t just that Bruen’s history-and-tradition test is burdensome (though that is no small thing to courts with heavier caseloads and fewer resources than we have). The more worrisome concern is that lower courts appear to be diverging in both approach and outcome as they struggle to conduct the inquiry Bruen requires of them. Scholars report that lower courts applying Bruen’s approach have been unable to produce “consistent, principled results,” and, in fact, they “have come to conflicting conclusions on virtually every consequential Second Amendment issue to come before them[.]” Given this, it appears indisputable that, after Bruen, “confusion plagu[es] the lower courts.”
That every citizen, so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch, with a box therein, to contain not less than twenty four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball; or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch, and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear so armed, accoutred[,] and provided, when called out to exercise or into service, except, that when called out on company days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack.