Baltimore City Board of Elections, et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al.
No. 34
Supreme Court of Maryland
February 3, 2025
September Term, 2023
Opinion by Watts, J.
Supreme Court of Maryland declined to overrule Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 608-09, 415 A.2d 255, 262 (1980), in which Court held that proposed citizen-initiated amendment was not “charter material” given that when “[c]onsidered as a whole, the amendment [was] not addressed to the form or structure of government in any fundamental sense[,]” and that “[t]o permit the voters by charter amendment, to exercise the City’s police or general welfare powers would constitute an unlawful extension or enlargement of the City’s limited grant of express powers and would violate the constitutional requirement that those powers be exercised by ordinance enacted by the City Council.” (Footnote omitted). Supreme Court concluded that overruling Cheeks would allow charter amendment process to be used to enact local laws in contravention of Constitution of Maryland.
Supreme Court of Maryland declined to sever mandatory payment provision from Baby Bonus Amendment, concluding that dominant purpose of Amendment would not be achieved in absence of $1,000 payment provision, which abrogated City’s law-making authority in violation of Constitution of Maryland.
Case No. C-24-CV-24-001320
Argued: August 28, 2024
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 34
September Term, 2023
______________________________________
BALTIMORE CITY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS, ET AL.
v.
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE, ET AL.
______________________________________
Fader, C.J.
Watts
Booth
Biran
Gould
Eaves
Killough,
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Watts, J.
______________________________________
Filed: February 3, 2025
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
2025.02.03 11:54:03 -05‘00’
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
In a well-intentioned effort to mitigate childhood poverty, the Maryland Child Alliance, Inc. (“the Alliance“), Appellant, sponsored a petition proposing an amendment to the Charter of Baltimore City, a document which is the functional equivalent of a state or federal constitution. The proposed amendment would have required payments of at least $1,000 to all new parents who are residents of the City and is known as the “Baby Bonus Amendment.” In Maryland, a charter amendment may be proposed by a resolution of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City or by the Council of a County. See
In this instance, after obtaining signatures of registered voters, the Alliance
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Michael Mocksten, the Director of the Department of Finance of Baltimore City, and Robert Cenname, the Deputy Director of the Department of Finance of Baltimore City (together, “the City“), Appellees, sued the Baltimore City BOE, Scherod C. Barnes, the President of the Baltimore City BOE, and Armstead B.C. Jones, Sr., the Election Director of the Baltimore City BOE (together, “the City Board“), Appellants, as well as the State Board of Elections (“the State Board“), Appellee. The City sought judicial review of the City Board’s certification of the question, a writ of mandamus compelling the City Board to perform its statutory duties, declaratory judgment, and an injunction keeping the Baby Bonus Amendment off the ballot.
The Alliance filed a motion to intervene as a defendant, which the circuit court granted. The City filed a motion for summary judgment; the City Board filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment; and the Alliance filed a motion to dismiss and conditional cross-motion for summary judgment. On August 9, 2024, in a memorandum opinion and order, the circuit court declared that the Baby Bonus Amendment violated
Pursuant to
Accordingly, the Baby Bonus Amendment was not presented as a question on the ballot for the November 2024 Presidential General Election. We now explain the basis for our August 29, 2024 order.
BACKGROUND
The Proposed Baby Bonus Amendment
In February 2023, pursuant to
On July 1, 2024, after validating more than 10,000 signatures, pursuant to
a. Fund established; provision of payments.
- There is a continuing, non[-]lapsing Baltimore Baby Bonus Fund, to be used exclusively for the provision of Baby Bonus Payments to residents of Baltimore City.
- A Baby Bonus Payment is a one-time payment to the birthing parent of a child, upon the birth of a child, unless the conditions in subparagraph (3) or (4) are satisfied.
- By Ordinance, or by proper delegation of regulatory authority, the Mayor and City Council may set forth conditions in which the guardian of a child other than the birthing parent may receive the Baby Bonus Payment instead of the birthing parent.
- By Ordinance, or by proper delegation of regulatory authority, the Mayor and City Council may set forth conditions in which an adopting parent or parent(s) may receive a single Baby Bonus Payment upon the adoption of a child.
- A Baby Bonus Payment shall be at least $1,000.
- A timely Baby Bonus Payment shall be made to all Baltimore City residents who meet the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (2), (3), or (4).
- The Fund shall be administered in accordance with the following standards:
- [T]o the maximum extent feasible, payments should be made within a reasonable time frame to ensure that parents can use the funds to assist with the costs of raising a newborn child[.]
[T]o the maximum extent feasible[,] surplus monies should be used to the purposes set forth in paragraph (a) subparagraph (1). - By Ordinance, or by proper delegation of regulatory authority, the Mayor and City Council shall determine the annual Baby Bonus Payment amount using all relevant data, including, but not limited to: surplus monies in the fund, historical birth rates, estimated future property values, etc.
b. Revenue Source.
The Baltimore Baby Bonus Fund shall comprise:
- A mandatory annual appropriation in the Ordinance of Estimates of an amount equal to at least $0.03 on every $100 of assessed or assessable value of all property in the City of Baltimore (except property exempt by law); and
- Grants and donations made to the Fund.
c. Continuing Nature of the Fund.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Charter, unspent portions of the Baltimore Baby Bonus Fund:
- remain in the Fund, to be used exclusively for its specified purposes;
- do not revert to the general revenues of the City; and
- their appropriations do not lapse.
d. Implementation.
By Ordinance, the Mayor and City Council shall provide for the oversight, governance, and administration of the Baltimore Baby Bonus Fund, including:
- methods and criteria for evaluating parental eligibility;
methods and criteria for determining the logistical distribution of the Fund; and - the establishment of any other legislative or administrative rules, regulations, or standards, consistent with this section, governing the Fund, its operations, and programs and services funded by it[.]
Proceedings in the Circuit Court and on Appeal
On July 11, 2024, in the circuit court, the City sued the City Board and the State Board.1 The complaint included four counts which sought: (I) judicial review of the City Board’s certification of the question for placement on the ballot; (II) a writ of mandamus compelling the Defendants to perform their statutory duties under the Election Law Article; (III) declaratory judgment that the Baby Bonus Amendment is unconstitutional; and (IV) an injunction keeping the Baby Bonus Amendment off the ballot.
On July 12, 2024, the Alliance filed a motion to intervene as a defendant. On July 18, 2024, the circuit court granted the motion. On July 23, 2024, the City filed a motion for summary judgment; the City Board filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment; and the Alliance separately filed a motion to dismiss and conditional cross-motion for summary judgment.2 On August 7, 2024, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the motions.
In so ruling, the circuit court addressed a contention by the Alliance that the City lacked standing to bring the action because the City was not “aggrieved” by the determination to place the Baby Bonus Amendment on the ballot. The circuit court found that the City had standing to challenge the certification of the Baby Bonus Amendment because placing the question on the ballot would require the City to draft ballot language and unnecessarily expend funds in support of a proposed amendment that the City alleged to be unconstitutional. The circuit court also determined that, even if the City did not have standing, Mr. Mocksten and Mr. Cenname had standing because, as public officials responsible for administrating the fund, they faced the dilemma of either refusing to put the question on the ballot, or doing so and subsequently learning that the question is unconstitutional.3
Addressing the merits, the circuit court found that the Baby Bonus Amendment
The circuit court concluded that the Baby Bonus Amendment “[was] not addressed to the form or structure of government[,]” “[did] not differ in any material respect from a simple legislative enactment prohibited by Art[.] XI-A, § 3[,]” and “[went] well beyond a mandatory appropriation crossing the line into legislative material prohibited by Art. XI-A, § 3.” (Cleaned up). The circuit court distinguished the Baby Bonus Amendment from another Charter provision, Art. I, § 13 (known as the Children and Youth Fund provision) of the Charter of Baltimore City, stating that the Children and Youth Fund provision “leaves discretion to the City to administer the programs and services in accordance with defined standards” and “does not establish a specific payment to residents, the amount of the payment, and define who is eligible to receive such a payment.”
On August 12, 2024, the City Board and the Alliance filed notices of appeal. On August 28, 2024, we heard oral argument in the case. On August 29, 2024, in a per curiam order, we affirmed the circuit court’s August 9, 2024 order and held that “[t]he circuit court correctly determined that the Baby Bonus Amendment violates
Standard of Review
Whether a circuit court properly granted a motion for summary judgment is a question of law that an appellate court reviews without deference. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm‘rs of St. Mary‘s Cnty. v. Aiken, 483 Md. 590, 616, 296 A.3d 933, 948 (2023). A circuit court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment, however, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Westminster Mgmt., LLC v. Smith, 486 Md. 616, 674 n.34, 312 A.3d 741, 775 n.34 (2024); Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149, 165, 913 A.2d 10, 19 (2006).
DISCUSSION
Forms of Local Government
“There are three forms of local [] government in Maryland: charter; code [];[] and commissioner[.]” Getty v. Carroll Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 399 Md. 710, 713 n.1, 926 A.2d 216, 218 n.1 (2007) (citations omitted). These three terms are shorthand for local jurisdictions with charters, local jurisdictions with code home rule, and jurisdictions with the commissioner form of local government, respectively. See id. at 713 n.1, 926 A.2d at 218 n.1. In addition to local jurisdictions with code home rule, local jurisdictions with charters are also considered to have home rule, which refers to “[a] state legislative provision or action allocating a measure of autonomy to a local government, conditional on its acceptance of certain terms.” Home Rule, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Counties without home rule are most commonly known as “commissioner count[ies,]” Matter of 2022 Legislative Districting of State, 481 Md. 507, 582, 282 A.3d 147, 192 (2022), though they may also be referred to as “county commissioner counties[,]” Green v. High Ridge Ass‘n, Inc., 346 Md. 65, 67 n.2, 695 A.2d 125, 126 n.2 (1997).
A “charter is equivalent to a constitution.” Save Our Streets v. Mitchell, 357 Md. 237, 248, 743 A.2d 748, 754 (1998) (cleaned up). As with a constitution, a charter “provide[s] a broad organizational framework establishing the form and structure of government in pursuance of which the [local jurisdiction] is to be governed and local laws enacted.” Id. at 248-49, 743 A.2d at 755 (citation omitted). “[T]he basic function of a charter is to distribute power among the various agencies of government, and between the government and the people who have delegated that power to their government.” Id. at 248, 743 A.2d at 754 (cleaned up).
The Home Rule Amendment and Baltimore City’s Charter
In short, under
Baltimore City is among the local jurisdictions with charters. See Charter of Balt.
A proposed amendment shall be submitted to the voters of Baltimore City or the County at the next Congressional or Presidential General Election occurring after the corresponding petition has been filed. See
Baltimore City’s earliest charter was enacted in 1898 by Ch. 123 of the Acts of 1898. See Cheeks, 287 Md. at 599, 415 A.2d at 257. The express powers granted to the City by the General Assembly in the 1898 charter were codified as Article 4, Section 6 of
In 1918, the General Assembly also adopted the Express Powers Act, granting express powers to counties that adopted a charter under Art. XI-A. See id. at 600 n.2, 415 A.2d at 257 n.2. In 1920, in Chapter 555 of the Acts of 1920, the General Assembly expressly provided the voters of Baltimore City the power as set forth in
The Parties’ Contentions
In this case, the City Board and the Alliance contend that the Baby Bonus Amendment does not violate
The Alliance contends that the $1,000 mandatory payment does not render the amendment unconstitutional and points out that the Charter of Baltimore City already contains several provisions that limit or affect the Mayor and City Council’s budgetary authority, including provisions that require the City to allocate a percentage of hotel tax proceeds to tourism promotion, direct that certain employees who are transferred from the Police Department to another department retain specific pension benefits, and create an Affordable Housing Trust Fund which mandates that certain payments be deposited into the fund. Relying in part on this observation, the Alliance argues that this Court’s holding in Cheeks, 287 Md. 595, 415 A.2d 255, that a charter amendment must concern the “form or structure” of government, was clearly wrong. The Alliance requests that we overrule Cheeks and, as a consequence, not apply in this case its holding that a charter amendment must concern the form and structure of government. The Alliance also asserts that, should this Court find any provision of the Baby Bonus Amendment to be invalid, the provision could be severed, leaving the balance of the amendment’s text intact and available for placement on the ballot.
The City responds that because the Baby Bonus Amendment is not limited to
Relevant Case Law
Our case law furnishes multiple examples of circumstances in which we have held that charter amendments violated, or did not violate,
We observed, however, that Art. XI-A does not itself confer legislative powers upon local jurisdictions; instead, it requires that the General Assembly expressly “enumerate and delegate” those powers to jurisdictions electing a charter type of government. Id. at 57, 388 A.2d at 529. We explained that these legislative powers are usually those affiliated with the objects of government—namely, “powers to legislate for the benefit of the health, safety and general welfare of the local community.” Id. at 57, 388 A.2d at 529 (footnote
We made clear that when voters adopt a charter in a home rule county, they have the power to propose and adopt any provision concerning the “form of government” they wish to be subject to, so long as the provision does not violate the federal or state constitution. Id. at 59, 388 A.2d at 530. We explained that ”
After setting forth the above framework, we concluded that the citizen referendum at issue did not require any implementing legislation. See id. at 61-62, 388 A.2d at 532.
Next, in Cheeks, 287 Md. at 601-02, 609-10, 612-13, 415 A.2d at 258, 262, 264, we considered whether voters could amend the Charter of Baltimore City to establish a non-elective Tenant-Landlord Commission with authority to set rental rates throughout the City10 and held that the proposed amendment violated
Additionally, the charter amendment provided for rent stabilization and a base rent ceiling, stating in pertinent part:
(a) Rent Stabilization. As of March 1, 1980, and for so long as the system of rent controls are set forth herein shall be in effect, no landlord may increase, offer to increase, or give notice of intent to increase the rent for a rental unit to an amount in excess of the base rent ceiling for that rental unit, except as provided in this Article.
(b) Base Rent Ceiling. The rent in effect on November 1, 1978 for any rental unit plus the allowable increase, as set forth below, shall constitute the base rent ceiling. The allowable increase, calculated as a percentage of the rent in effect as of November 1, 1978, is as follows:
- If the rent includes the cost of all utilities, the allowable increase is six (6) per cent, if heat only then five and one-half (5.5) per cent;
- If the rent includes the cost of the gas and electric utilities only, the allowable increase is five (5) per cent;
- If the rent includes the cost of gas and electric utilities, but not both, the allowable increase is four and one-half (4.5) per cent; or
- If the rent includes neither heat, gas nor electric utilities, the allowable increase is four (4) per cent.
Id. at 622, 415 A.2d at 268-69 (quoting proposed Art. 6(a), §§ 9(a)-(b) of the Charter of Balt. City).
We also held that the parts of the amendment that were unconstitutional could not be severed from creation of the non-elective Tenant-Landlord Commission. See id. at 609, 614, 415 A.2d at 262, 265. We explained that, although amicus curiae had suggested that the unconstitutional parts could be severed and that there was a severability clause in the amendment, the parties took “the position that the amendment is not so severable but rather is integrated as a whole.” Id. at 614, 415 A.2d at 265. We concluded that, “[a]fter careful consideration of the amendment‘s provisions, we agree[d] with the parties and therefore [found] that no part of the amendment [was] severable.” Id. at 614, 415 A.2d at 265 (citations omitted).
In Cheeks, id. at 610-12, 415 A.2d at 263-64, we discussed Ritchmount P‘ship at length and stated that, in that case, we held “that the referendum power is a power affecting the form or structure of local government, as distinguished from the power to enact local laws which must emanate from an express grant of legislative powers by the General Assembly.” As such, under
In Griffith v. Wakefield, 298 Md. 381, 382, 390, 470 A.2d 345, 346, 350 (1984), this Court held that a proposed amendment to the Charter of Baltimore County requiring that resolution of all labor disputes involving county firefighters be conducted using binding arbitration was not proper charter material.11 Relying on Cheeks, we concluded
We concluded that the proposed amendment was “essentially legislative in character” as it would prevent elected county officials from making any independent decisions regarding the “wages, benefits, hours, and working conditions” of county firefighters. Id. at 388, 470 A.2d at 349. We explained that the proposed amendment would require the County Executive to include in the expense budget submitted to the County Council all funds necessary for an arbitrator‘s final decision and that the funds
We noted that, in attempting to distinguish the case from Cheeks, the firefighters association mistakenly relied on Md. Classified Emps. Ass‘n v. Anderson, 281 Md. 496, 380 A.2d 1032 (1977). See Griffith, 298 Md. at 388, 470 A.2d at 349. We stated that, in Anderson, we held that the Harford County Council lacked the authority to enact an ordinance which mandated that a decision of an arbitration board on wages and benefits for county employees would be binding upon the county. See Griffith, 298 Md. at 388, 470 A.2d at 349. We pointed out that, in Anderson, we concluded that, absent authorization by a state public general law or the county charter, the Harford County Council lacked the authority to delegate what was essentially a legislative function to a board of arbitrators. See Griffith, 298 Md. at 388-89, 470 A.2d at 349.
In urging that the proposed charter amendment requiring binding arbitration for resolution of labor disputes was proper charter material, the firefighters association argued that because Anderson “held that authorization of the charter is required, then the matter must be one which is concerned with the form and structure of government and is properly deemed charter material.” Griffith, 298 Md. at 389, 470 A.2d at 350 (cleaned up). We explained that the association‘s reliance on the case was misplaced and that its argument failed “to distinguish between ‘authorization’ on the one hand and a detailed local
We explained that, had the proposed charter amendment in the case simply authorized the Baltimore County Council to enact a binding arbitration system for compensation of county employees and, pursuant to that authorization, the Baltimore County Council had exercised its discretion to enact an ordinance containing provisions similar to those of the amendment, the case would have been distinguishable from Cheeks. See Griffith, 298 Md. at 389-90, 470 A.2d at 350. We pointed out that because the proposed charter amendment did not simply authorize the County Council to enact binding arbitration legislation for county employees and did not authorize any decisions by the legislative body, but instead contained “all of the law on the subject” and deprived the County Council “of all decision-making authority concerning the subject[,]” “[n]othing in the Anderson case support[ed its] validity, under
In Bd. of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 228, 234, 608 A.2d 1222, 1226, 1228-29 (1990), in two cases, one involving two proposed amendments to the Charter of Anne Arundel County and one involving a proposed amendment to the Charter of Baltimore County, we explained the reasons for earlier orders of this Court requiring each county‘s Board of Election Supervisors to place property tax limitation amendments on the ballots, with parts of the amendments severed,
With respect to the property tax limitation charter amendments in both counties, we held that the tax cap portion of the amendments, which “would have placed a percentage
Second, we held that the escape clause provisions of the amendments—which would have permitted the county councils to increase property tax rates for a tax year above
We held that the roll back and escape clause provisions of the property tax limitation amendments were severable from valid portions of the amendments. See id. at 245, 608 A.2d at 1234. We explained that a strong presumption toward severability exists, and that this presumption exists even in the absence of an express clause indicating that the drafters intended for any invalid or unconstitutional provisions to be severed. See id. at 245-46, 608 A.2d at 1234. Where the dominant purpose of an enactment can largely be carried out despite invalid parts, “courts will generally hold the valid portions severable and enforce them.” Id. at 246, 608 A.2d at 1235 (cleaned up). We stated that the dominant purpose of the property tax limitation amendments “was to place a cap on property tax revenues[,]” that the tax cap provisions were facially valid, and that the purpose of the tax cap could be achieved without the invalid roll back or escape clause provisions. Id. at 246, 608 A.2d at 1235. Because we determined that severing the invalid parts of the amendments would not
In Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 240-41, 743 A.2d at 750, this Court considered whether a proposed amendment to the Montgomery County Charter that would have prohibited the expenditure of county funds to install or maintain speed bumps and required removal of all previously installed speed bumps within one year of the amendment‘s effective date was unconstitutional.14 We also considered whether a proposed amendment to the Harford County Charter that would have required developers to meet several “adequacy” standards before expanding private or public property was unconstitutional. Id. at 243-44, 743 A.2d at 752.15 We held that both proposed amendments imposed tight
We reiterated the basic principle that a county charter is the functional equivalent of a state or federal constitution and is “‘intended to provide a broad organizational framework establishing the form and structure of government[.]‘” Id. at 248-49, 743 A.2d
We concluded that neither of the proposed charter amendments involved the imposition of “general and fundamental limitations on a governmental power[.]” Id. at 253, 743 A.2d at 757. We determined that both charter amendments were analogous to those examined in Cheeks and Griffith, as they prescribed detailed legislative schemes. See Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 253, 743 A.2d at 757.16 We explained, though, that a proposed charter amendment simply being “lengthy” or “detailed” is not dispositive as to
In Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 428 Md. 723, 735-36, 749-50, 53 A.3d 1184, 1191-92, 1200 (2012) (“Atkinson I“), we considered whether a charter provision, Charter § 812, which directed the Anne Arundel County Council to implement binding arbitration in labor disputes, violated
the charter provision directing the County Council to adopt a binding arbitration ordinance was proper charter material. See id. at 747-50, 53 A.3d at 1198-1200. Likewise, we held that the binding arbitration provision did not preclude the County Council from exercising “law-making discretion,” as it left all details for implementation to the County Council. Id. at 749-50, 53 A.3d at 1200.
We explained that it is “settled” law that binding arbitration provisions are fit for inclusion in a county charter. Id. at 745, 53 A.3d at 1197 (citing Anderson, 281 Md. at 512, 380 A.2d at 1041 (“[H]ad a State public general law or the County Charter authorized the binding arbitration provisions enacted by the County Council, the provisions would be valid.“) (Emphasis added)); Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Fraternal Ord. of Anne Arundel Det. Officers and Pers., 313 Md. 98, 111, 543 A.2d 841, 848 (1988) (“[A] charter county may
We rejected the position that only a county council may ultimately decide whether to adopt a binding arbitration policy for county employees. See id. at 748, 53 A.3d at 1199. We noted that the charter provision at issue significantly differed from the charter amendment before the Court in Griffith, as it did not “contain[] all of the law on the subject” of binding arbitration. Atkinson I, 428 Md. at 747-48, 53 A.3d at 1198. We observed that, in Griffith, we “illustrated a proper recognition of the Council‘s constitutional law-making power” by “hypothesizing” a charter amendment that provided that the Council may adopt binding arbitration but “[left] to the Council the policy question of whether, and if so, how, binding arbitration should operate.” Atkinson I, 428 Md. at 747, 53 A.3d at 1198.
We concluded that the charter provision at issue altered only the “form or structure of government,” as it provided for a “method or system” for resolving labor disputes. Id. at 749-50, 53 A.3d at 1199-1200 (cleaned up). We held that, because the charter provision, Charter § 812, “made [a] policy decision” only, and left all details concerning its implementation to the County Council,18 the provision did not “unconstitutionally preclude
the exercise of the County Council‘s law-making discretion.” Id. at 749-50, 53 A.3d at 1200.
In Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 236 Md. App. 139, 179-80, 181 A.3d 834, 857-58 (2018) (“Atkinson II“), the Appellate Court of Maryland relied on our holding in Atkinson I, in which this “Court decided that the voters of Anne Arundel County determined in Charter § 812 that the County Council would not have discretion to reject the effect of binding arbitration[,]” and concluded that “the voters also determined through Charter §§ 811 and 812 that the Council cannot define and limit the subject matter of collective bargaining and arbitration to a de minimis level.” (Cleaned up). The Appellate Court noted that a permissible charter amendment must afford a county council with significant “discretion and control regarding an area under its authority pursuant to
The Alliance contends that our holding in Cheeks that proper charter material addresses the form or structure of government was “clearly wrong” and argues that it should be overruled. We could not disagree more. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, “we follow and apply our prior decisions even though, if we were starting from a clean slate, we would reach a different decision today.” Bennett v. Gentile, 487 Md. 604, 621, 321 A.3d 34, 44 (2024) (citation omitted). The doctrine of stare decisis is not absolute, but it is “[o]nly in rare circumstances” that this Court should overrule its own precedent. Wadsworth v. Sharma, 479 Md. 606, 630, 278 A.3d 1269, 1284 (2022) (cleaned up). “We recognize two extremely narrow situations where it would be appropriate” to overrule our own precedent—“when the decision is clearly wrong and contrary to established principles or where there is a showing that the precedent has been superseded by significant changes in the law or facts.” Id. at 630, 278 A.3d at 1284 (cleaned up).
We discern no basis on which to overrule Cheeks. In Cheeks, 287 Md. at 607, 415 A.2d at 261, we held that, to comply with
Rather than being anywhere even close to clearly wrong, our holding in Cheeks ensures that a county‘s “law-making power” remains vested in a legislative body as required by
Applying the Principles Above to this Case
Based on our review of the authority above, we hold that when a charter amendment precludes the local legislature‘s meaningful exercise of discretion in an area under the ambit of
Although it is a well-meant effort to combat childhood poverty, the Baby Bonus Amendment is not an amendment that relates to the form and structure of government in any fundamental sense. The Baby Bonus Amendment is akin to a legislative enactment in that it mandates the making of mandatory minimum payments to certain residents of the City and encroaches on the City‘s discretion to address matters of public health and welfare concerning children and new parents, which pursuant to
With its requirement of a mandatory minimum payment to parents and guardians of newborns, the Baby Bonus Amendment does not permit the City discretion or control regarding the making of mandatory minimum monetary payments. The proposed amendment dictates the groups of residents who are to receive payments from the City and the minimum amount that the payments must be. The Baby Bonus Amendment leaves nothing for the City Council to resolve aside from procedural matters that do not meaningfully impact the operation of the Amendment. See Griffith, 298 Md. at 386, 470 A.2d at 348. As such, the Baby Bonus Amendment is analogous to the proposed charter amendments that we held to be unconstitutional in Cheeks, Griffith, and Save Our Streets. For instance, in Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 252-53, 743 A.2d at 757, we noted that the proposed charter amendment was marked by “the specificity characteristic of county
The Baby Bonus Amendment is materially distinguishable from the charter amendments in Atkinson I and Smallwood that were determined to be valid. In Atkinson I, 428 Md. at 747-48, 53 A.3d at 1198-99, we held that the charter provision that directed the county council to implement binding arbitration in labor disputes was proper charter material as it left “fleshing out of the directive to the County Council.” The county council retained authority over “possible mediation, each step in the selection of the neutral arbitrator, timing, the powers of the arbitrator, receipt of final offers of each party, [] factors to be considered by the arbitrator after receiving evidence, the final, binding award, possible revision thereof by agreement, post-hearing motion[s] or court action[s], and implementation of the award as part of the budget process.” Id. at 750, 53 A.3d at 1200. By contrast, the Baby Bonus Amendment resolves all decisions of any significance with respect to its mandated minimum payment and leaves essentially nothing for the City Council to “flesh out,” aside from how to distribute the payments to eligible residents. This case is much closer to Cheeks and Griffith, which involved, to quote Atkinson I, 428 Md. at 746, 53 A.3d at 1197, attempts to “includ[e] what amount[ed] to [] entire statute[s] in the Charter[.]”
In Smallwood, 327 Md. at 238, 608 A.2d at 1231, we held that proposed amendments that placed a percentage cap on local property taxes were proper charter material because “a limitation on the power of a legislative body to raise revenue is at the heart of the form and structure of our government[.]” (Citations omitted). Relying on
The Children and Youth Fund
In its brief, the Alliance contended that the Baby Bonus Amendment was directly analogous to other provisions of the Baltimore City Charter, in particular the Children and Youth Fund, and pointed out that the funding provision of the Children and Youth Fund is identical to that of the Baby Bonus Amendment. The Children and Youth Fund amendment was added to the Charter through City Council resolution and voter ratification. The Alliance asserted that prior to its adoption the Baltimore City Law Department reviewed the proposed Children and Youth Fund Amendment and “found no constitutional problems with the Children and Youth Fund proposal—failing to mention at all any alleged usurpation of legislative or police powers that it now claims with the Baby Bonus.” (Cleaned up).
“This Court has taken the position that the method or system for budgeting and appropriating revenues set forth in a county‘s charter, including the executive budget system in effect in several counties, constitutes proper charter material under Article XI-A, § 1. The budgetary and appropriation system ‘is a fundamental aspect of the form and structure of’ a home rule county‘s government. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel County v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 241, 608 A.2d 1222, 1232 (1992).”
Atkinson I, 428 Md. at 749, 53 A.3d at 1199-1200 (cleaned up) (emphasis added). After reaffirming this basic principle, in a footnote, we stated: “In view of our holding, we need not address Petitioners’ argument that the Cheeks requirement of ‘charter material’ does not apply to a Charter amendment that is proposed by the Council, as contrasted with those amendments that are initiated by voters’ petitions for a Charter referendum.”21 Id. at 750 n.11, 53 A.3d at 1200 n.11.
The City Council‘s resolution for the Children and Youth Fund amendment was ratified by voters on November 8, 2016, in the November 2016 Presidential General
Although some of the language of the Baby Bonus Amendment is undeniably identical to that of
(a) Fund established; Scope.
(1) There is a continuing, non[-]lapsing Baltimore City Children and Youth Fund, to be used exclusively for purposes of establishing new and augmenting existing programs for and services to the
children and youth of this City. (2) These programs and services must be from among those designed to:
(i) ensure that Baltimore‘s children and youth are healthy, are ready to learn and succeed in school, and live in stable, safe, and supportive families and communities;
(ii) ensure that Baltimore City supports families as an important part of the City population and civic culture;
(iii) focus on the prevention of problems and on supporting and enhancing the strengths of children, youth, and their families;
(iv) complement the City‘s community development efforts;
(v) strengthen community-based networks of recreation and after-school services in all neighborhoods; and
(vi) ensure that children and youth with the highest needs receive maximum benefit from the Fund.
(3) The Fund shall be administered in accordance with the following standards:
(i) programs and services shall be provided and funds allocated based on best practices and successful and innovative models;
(ii) to the maximum extent feasible, funds shall be allocated equitably among services for all age groups – from infancy to transitional-aged youth;
(iii) programs and services shall be gender-responsive and culturally competent; and
(iv) programs and services shall be designed to strengthen collaboration among service providers for children, youth, and their families, including collaboration among public agencies and non-profit organizations.
* * *
(b) Limitations on use. The Children and Youth Fund may not be used to substitute for or replace funding for children and youth programs or services provided in the Ordinance of Estimates for Fiscal Year 2017, except to the extent that federal, state, or private agency funds for those programs or services have since been discontinued.
(c) Revenue sources.
The Children and Youth Fund shall comprise:
(1) a mandatory annual appropriation in the Ordinance of Estimates of an amount equal to at least $0.03 on every $100 of assessed or assessable value of all property in the City of Baltimore (except property exempt by law); and
(2) grants and donations made to the Fund.
(d) Continuing nature of Fund.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Charter, unspent portions of the Children and Youth Fund:
(1) remain in the Fund, to be used exclusively for its specified purposes;
(2) do not revert to the general revenues of the City; and
(3) their appropriations do not lapse.
(e) Implementation.
By Ordinance, the Mayor and City Council shall provide for the oversight, governance, and administration of the Children and Youth Fund, including:
(1) methods and criteria for identifying specific program and services eligible for funding by the Fund;
(2) methods and criteria for allocating available funds among eligible
programs and services; and (3) the establishment of any other legislative or administrative rules, regulations, or standards, consistent with this section, governing the Fund, its operations, and programs and services funded by it.
In considering the constitutionality of the Baby Bonus Amendment, the circuit court noted that the Children and Youth Fund sets forth “broad parameters” for programs and services for City youth—rather than a detailed legislative scheme—and “leaves meaningful discretion to the City,” and concluded that the Children and Youth Fund is distinguishable from the Baby Bonus Amendment. We agree.
Unlike the Baby Bonus Amendment, the Children and Youth Fund does not mandate what programs the City must establish to support its youth, nor does it provide that monetary payments to residents are required to support youth. In operating the Children and Youth Fund, the Mayor and City Council are explicitly tasked with developing the “methods and criteria for identifying specific programs and services eligible for funding,” “allocating available funds among eligible programs and services,” and “establish[ing] [] any other legislative or administrative, rules, regulations, or standards” that advance the objectives of the Children and Youth Fund.
The same flexibility is not provided by the Baby Bonus Amendment, which
Although the Baby Bonus Amendment affords the City the discretion to establish the “methods and criteria for evaluating parental eligibility[,]” “the logistic[s] [for] distribution of the Fund[,]” and “any other legislative or administrative rules, regulations, or standards” that advance the objectives of the Baby Bonus Amendment, these provisions
Severance
In Smallwood, 327 Md. at 246, 608 A.2d at 1235, we stated that “when the dominant
Although the Alliance contends that the primary purpose of the Baby Bonus Amendment may be effectuated without the mandatory $1,000 payment provision and that if invalid the provision could be severed from the amendment, the plain language of the Baby Bonus Amendment does not support severability. The dominant purpose of the Baby Bonus Amendment is to address childhood poverty in Baltimore City through mandatory payments of at least $1,000 to the birth parents, adoptive parents, or guardians of newborns.24 Without the $1,000 mandatory payment provision, the Baby Bonus Amendment would provide that “a timely Baby Bonus Payment shall be made” to “the birthing parent of a child, upon the birth of a child” and that “[b]y Ordinance, or by proper
The $1,000 mandatory minimum payment provision is the heart of the proposed Baby Bonus Amendment. Without the mandatory payment provision, the Baby Bonus Amendment would have no practical effect, as the City would be able to enact legislation authorizing payments in any amount, no matter how small. Unlike the tax caps in Smallwood, with severance of the mandatory payment amount in this case, absent meaningful additional implementing legislation from the City Council, the amendment would have no effect on its own. The only thing that would be clear is that the City would be directed to make a one-time payment to birthing parents (and adoptive parents and guardians)—which is a circumstance that in and of itself, under our case law, is a directive akin to legislation in an area that is reserved for the Mayor and City Council under Art. XI-A instead of a charter amendment that addresses the form and structure of government. Given that the dominant purpose of the Baby Bonus Amendment would not be achieved without the invalid provision requiring at least a $1,000 mandatory payment amount and that the substance of the proposed charter amendment is not proper charter material,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, in our order of August 29, 2024, we concluded that the Baby Bonus Amendment did not concern proper “charter material,” and therefore violated
Notes
In Cheeks, 287 Md. at 600 n.3, 415 A.2d at 258 n.3, we described Sections 1-6 of Art. XI as follows:
Section 1 of Art. XI relates to the Mayor’s election, qualifications, compensation, powers, duties, and term of office. Section 2 relates to the composition of the City Council, the qualifications of the members, their compensation, term of office, powers and duties. Section 3 relates to the election of members of the City Council. Section 4 relates to sessions of the City Council. Section 5 relates to the holding of additional offices or employments by the Mayor and City Council members and prohibits their interest in certain contracts. Section 6 relates to the removal of the Mayor from office.
The charter provision stated as follows:
(a) Scope of the referendum. The people of Anne Arundel reserve to themselves the power known as ‘The Referendum,’ by petition to have submitted to the registered voters of the County, to approve or reject at the polls, any ordinance or part of any ordinance of the County Council. The referendum petition against any such ordinance shall be sufficient if signed by ten per centum of the qualified voters of the County calculated upon the whole number of votes cast in the County for Governor at the last preceding gubernatorial election. Such petition shall be filed with the Board of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel County within forty-five days after the ordinance becomes law.
Ritchmount P’ship, 283 Md. at 52 n.4, 388 A.2d at 527 n.4 (quoting Art. III, § 308 of the Charter of Anne Arundel County).
Cheeks, 287 Md. at 617, 415 A.2d at 266 (quoting proposed Art. 6(a), § 3 of the Charter of Balt. City).(a) Composition: There shall be in the City of Baltimore a Tenant-Landlord Commission (“the Commission“) composed of five (5) resident, registered voters of Baltimore City appointed by the City Council. Two (2) members shall be landlords, one of whom shall be a landlord owning, managing or having interests in less than ten (10) rental units. Two (2) members shall be tenants and not own, manage or have interest in any rental property, one of whom shall be a low to moderate income person. One member shall be a home-owner and shall not own or have interest in any rental unit.
Griffith, 298 Md. at 386-87, 470 A.2d at 348 (cleaned up).[T]he amendment mandates that if the certified employee organization or organizations representing the fire fighters and the county have not reached a written contract agreement on terms and conditions of employment by the first day in March in any year, submission to a board of arbitration is mandatory upon the request of either party. The amendment sets forth, in minute detail, the composition, function and powers of the board. The board is to be composed of three members. One member is to be appointed by the County Executive and one is to be appointed by the certified fire fighters organization; both of these members must be selected within four days of the request for arbitration. The third member is to be selected by the two previously chosen members, also within four days, from a list of candidates furnished by the American Arbitration Association. In the event that two arbitrators are unable to agree on the choice of the third arbitrator, the American Arbitration Association is to select the third arbitrator, who shall act as chairman of the board of arbitration. The board is to begin the arbitration proceedings within seven days after the selection of the chairman and to make its decision within fifteen days after the commencement of the arbitration proceedings, although the chairman may extend this time requirement. The board is granted the power to administer oaths, compel the attendance of witnesses, and require the production of evidence by subpoena. The proposed amendment also delineates the factors to be considered by the board in making its award.
Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 240 n.2, 743 A.2d at 750 n.2 (quoting proposed § 311(C) of the Charter of Montgomery County).County funds shall not be spent to install or maintain on any road or street any permanent physical obstacle to vehicular movement, which for purposes of this section means any speed bump or hump. Any such device previously installed shall be removed within twelve months after this section takes effect, unless the Council by an affirmative vote of seven members approves its continued use at that location, after a public hearing for which notice was posted at or near the location of the device.
Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 242 n.4, 743 A.2d at 751 n.4 (quoting proposed Art. VII, § 710 of the Charter of Harford County).Adequacy standards for the use or the development of public and/or private property for residential or commercial purposes are not met where:
- the existing County, State and Federal roads, including road segments and intersections, in all directions from each point of entrance of the property through the intersection with the first arterial roadway to the next intersecting collector or higher functional classification road as defined by the Harford County Transportation Plan are accommodating vehicular traffic at a level of service of “D” or below as defined by the Highway Capacity Manual or other equivalent standard in use by the County, or
- the existing County, State and Federal roads, or any road segment within three miles of the property, are accommodating vehicular traffic at a level of service of “D” or below as defined by the Highway Capacity Manual or other equivalent standard in use by the County, or
- the existing State and Federal roads, or any road segment, outside of the County are accommodating vehicular traffic at a level of service of “D” or below as defined by the Highway Capacity manual or other equivalent standard, and the low level of service is directly or proximately caused by vehicular traffic originating from within the County, or
- the police, fire, or emergency medical response services providing service to the property, are not sufficient to meet the needs of the existing residential and business population according to applicable standards established for each type of service, or
- the recreational facilities and public open space are not sufficient to meet the needs of the existing residential population according to applicable standards established for recreational facilities and public open space.
(a) In addition to the right granted to County employees in Section 811 of this Article to organize and bargain collectively, the County Council shall provide by ordinance for binding arbitration with authorized representatives of the appropriate employee bargaining unit in order to resolve labor disputes with the County‘s law enforcement employees. The
Id. at 750, 53 A.3d at 1200. We noted that the County Council later amended this ordinance to provide that the binding arbitration system did not require the County Council “to appropriate funds or enact legislation necessary to implement a final written [arbitration] award.” Id. at 726, 739, 53 A.3d at 1186, 1193.It cover[s] possible mediation, each step in the selection of the neutral arbitrator, timing, the powers of the arbitrator, receipt of final offers of each party, ten factors to be considered by the arbitrator after receiving evidence, the final, binding award, possible revision thereof by agreement, post-hearing motion or court action, and implementation of the award as part of the budget process.