STATE OF OHIO v. WHITTINGTON DAVIS
CASE NO. 16 MA 0078
STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS SEVENTH DISTRICT
January 26, 2018
[Cite as State v. Davis, 2018-Ohio-376.]
Hon. Mary DeGenaro, Hon. Cheryl L. Waite, Hon. Carol Ann Robb
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Mahoning County, Ohio Case No.16 CR 196; JUDGMENT: Affirmed as modified. Remanded for sentencing.
For Plaintiff-Appellee Attorney Paul Gains Mahoning County Prosecutor Attorney Ralph Rivera Assistant Prosecutor 21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor Youngstown, Ohio 44503-1426
For Defendant-Appellant Attorney Christopher Lacich 100 East Federal Street, Suite 600 Youngstown, Ohio 44503
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Whittington Davis, appeals the trial court‘s judgment denying his suppression and
{¶2} Davis was indicted for one count of Trafficking in Marijuana,
{¶3} The State‘s first witness, Officer George Wallace, testified that he responded to a “call over the radio for drug activity in front of the Downtown Circle, O‘Donold‘s area.” He was specifically told that the call involved “two black males and a white female.” When he arrived at the scene he observed three black males and one white female. Wallace was concerned about his safety and the safety of others. He approached Davis and asked if he had any drugs, contrаband, controlled substance, or weapons on him to which Davis stated that he did not.
{¶4} Wallace then requested and received permission to conduct a pat down on Davis. During the pat down, in Davis’ right cargo pocket, Wallace felt “several different packages.” Wallaсe retrieved nine individually packaged baggies of marijuana from Davis’ person. Wallace testified that in his experience and professional opinion, multiple packages found on one person are an indication of drug trafficking.
{¶5} Officer Richard Geraci testified that he took possession of the marijuana and conducted a test on a sample of it. Afterwards, he sent the evidence to the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigations (BCI). Geraci stated that there is a close connection between the number of narcotic packages found when dеtermining whether the individual is suspected of trafficking as opposed to possessing. Geraci
{¶6} Zach Dawson, a BCI forensic scientist in the drug chemistry section, analyzed the submitted evidence and concluded that the substance was marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance.
{¶7} At the close of the State‘s case, Davis made a
{¶8} Davis took the stand in his own defense. He stated that on the date in question he left Warren, Ohio and traveled to downtown Youngstown by bus. He then walked to an apartment on the east side of town where he gave someone a tattoo and was paid $10 and ten bags of marijuana for his services. He admitted he smoked some of the marijuana as he walked downtown after completing the tattoo and that is why police found only nine bags on him. He also admitted that he had been previously convicted of possession of crack cocaine and having a weapon while under disability. Davis admitted he had possession of marijuana, but no intent to sell.
{¶9} The jury found Davis guilty of Trafficking in Marijuana and the trial court sentenced him to a twelve-month prison tеrm.
Motion to Suppress
{¶10} Davis’ first of two assignments of error asserts:
The trial court erred by failing to suppress marijuana and other evidence obtained from defendant-appellant Davis as a result of an illegal search and seizure in violation of Davis’ rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶11} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. As the trial court is best suited to evaluate witness credibility, an appellate court must uphold the findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible
{¶12} Davis argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the search that uncovered the marijuana was conducted without a search warrant or vаlid consent. The State contends that Davis gave verbal consent for the officer to conduct a Terry pat-down of his person. State v. Parker, 12th Dist. No. CA2001-06-143, 2002-Ohio-1730, provides guidance as the same confusion between consent and a Terry pat-down is evident in the present matter:
When a search occurs without a warrant, the state has the burden to show that the search comes within оne of the judicially recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975 (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51, 482 N.E.2d 606. One exception allows for a brief investigatory stop and search where specific facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id.; Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed 889 (1968)], at 21-22. Another exception exists when searches are conducted with consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854; State v. Posey (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427, 534 N.E.2d 61. * * *
When a person is lawfully detained by police and consents to a search, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. Florida v. Royer (1983), 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1323-24, 75 L.Ed.2d 229; State v. Pierce (1998), 125 Ohio App.3d 592, 598, 709 N.E.2d 203. In determining whether consent was voluntary, a court must consider the tоtality of the circumstances. Schneckloth at 222; State v. Childress (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 217, 448 N.E.2d 155, paragraph one of the syllabus. Although appellant argues that in this case there was no suspicion that would
allow for a further search, the Terry requirement of reasonable suspicion is avoided entirely when a person voluntarily consents to a search. State v. Wilt (Feb. 22, 2002), Montgomery App. No. 19108, unreported, 2002 WL 272593 at *3.
State v. Parker, 12th Dist. No. CA2001-06-143, 2002-Ohio-1730, *2.
{¶13} This Court, recognizing that consent is a valid exception, explained:
“To rely on the consent exception of the warrant requirement, the state must show by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given.” State v. Posey (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427, 534 N.E.2d 61, quoting Bumper v. North Carolina (1968), 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797. Clear and positive evidence is not significantly different from clear and convincing evidence, which is the amount of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations to be proved. State v. Ingram (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 341, 346, 612 N.E.2d 454. Whether the defendant gave consent voluntarily, as opposed to being coerced or placed under duress, is a question of fact to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. Ludington, 7th Dist. No. 99-CO-13; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
State v. Bell, 7th Dist. No. 06-MA-189, 2008-Ohio-3959, ¶ 75.
{¶14} Officer Wallace testified that he received consent to pat down Davis. Davis denied that he gave any consent. The trial court deemed the credibility оf the officer more reliable than that of Davis. Accordingly, Davis’ first assignment of error is meritless.
Sufficiency and Manifest Weight
{¶15} Davis’ second of two assignments of error asserts:
Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant-appellant‘s
Criminal Rule 29 motion and/or verdict convicting the defendant-appellant was based on evidence that was legally insufficient and against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶16} We will address Davis’ three arguments within this single assignment of error in turn. First, a court must order the entry of a judgment of acquittal on a charged offense if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on the offense.
{¶17} “A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence tests whether the state has properly discharged its burden to produce competent, probative, evidence on each element of the offense charged.” State v. Petefish, 7th Dist. No. 10 MA 78, 2011-Ohio-6367, ¶ 16. Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113, 1997-Ohio-355, 684 N.E.2d 668.
{¶18} Conversely, weight of the еvidence is “the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.” Thompkins at 387. A conviction will only be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence in exceptional circumstances. Id. This is because the trier of fact is in a better position to determine credibility issues, having viewed the demeanor, voice inflections and gestures of the witnesses. State v. Petteway, 7th Dist. No. 16 JE 0004, 2017-Ohio-716, ¶ 17 (internal citations omitted).
{¶20} Davis was convicted of one count of drug trafficking:
(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following:
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(2) Prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for distribution, or distribute a controlled substance or a controlled substаnce analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance or a controlled substance analog is intended for sale or resale by the offender or another person.
{¶21} Davis argues that he is guilty of drug possession, as opposed to drug trafficking, and that his conviction is unsupported by the evidence. The Eight District considered similar circumstances:
The evidence showed that approximately 17 grams (less than one ounce) of marijuana was seized. The majority of this marijuana was packaged in eight smаll envelopes which were in a bag on the seat between appellant and another occupant of the car. One small envelope was also recovered from appellant‘s person.
The evidence, circumstantial in nature, was sufficient to convict appellant of possession of the eight small packets of marijuana. However, no evidence at all was presented on the “trafficking” elements. It was necessary for the state to show that appellant knowingly prepared the marijuana for shipment; shipped, transported or delivered the marijuana; prepared the marijuana for distribution or distributed the marijuana. One of these activities is a necessary element for drug trafficking. The evidence presented sufficiently proves possession; it does not, however, prove any of the delineаted activities.
State v. Vanhorn, 8th Dist. No. 44655, 1983 WL 5899, *4-5:
{¶22} Here, there was no investigation involving the storeowner for further information when the police arrived on the scene. No testimony was presented that Davis packaged the marijuana, exchanged any packages, or accepted money for marijuana from anyone, all indicia of trafficking. The State‘s sole evidence to support the trafficking conviction is the manner in which the marijuana was packaged: in nine small, individually wrapped baggies. On its own, this is insufficient to establish intent to sell. Davis possessed 5.76 grams of marijuana, much less than the аmounts involved in Vanhorn.
{¶23} Davis admitted that he possessed the marijuana as a result of bartering the marijuana for tattoo services, and also that he had smoked one baggie before his encounter with police. While there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of his intent to possеss and use marijuana, we cannot say that the same level of evidence is demonstrated regarding the intent to sell. This is further bolstered by the fact that tattoo equipment was discovered in Davis’ bag. Thus, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis intended to sell or rеsell the marijuana in order to sustain a trafficking conviction. Accordingly, Davis’ second assignment of error is meritorious.
{¶24} While the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction under
(A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.
* * *
(C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of one of the following:
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(3) If the drug involved in the violation is mari[j]uana or a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance containing mari[j]uana other than hashish, whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of possession of mari[j]uana. The penalty for the offense shall be determined as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(3)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), or (g) of this section, possession of mari[j]uana is a minor misdemeanor.
(b) If the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds one hundred grams but is less than two hundred grams, possession of mari[j]uana is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.
{¶25} When a verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, “but if the evidence shows the defendant is not guilty of the degree of crime for which he was conviсted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser crime included therein, the court may modify the verdict or finding accordingly, without granting or ordering a new trial.”
{¶26} The evidence relied on by the jury to find Davis guilty of drug trafficking is sufficient to establish an
{¶27} In sum, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, but there
Waite, J., concurs.
Robb, P. J., concurs.