Defendant-appellant, Steven Gore, appeals his convictions in the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court of aggravated robbery and kidnapping and the sentences thereon. For the reasons set forth below, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
*200 I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 9, 1993, Lorna Dudash filed a statement with the Campbell Police Department relating a story of her alleged kidnapping and robbery by appellant. Dudash stated that, earlier that day, as she walked to her automobile from a market on Monroe Street, appellant followed her and entered the automobile with her.
Appellant allegedly put a gun under Dudash’s chin and told her to drive down the street, make a left, and then stop. Dudash stated that appellant asked her for money while holding a gun to her leg. She claims that she gave him approximately $200 and then unsuccessfully asked for some of the money back. Nonetheless, appellant contends that he asked Dudash for $100 in drug money that she owed him for crack cocaine and that she voluntarily paid her debt. Dudash testified that, as appellant exited her car, he said “thanks” and “bye.”
Dudash stated that she knew appellant’s name and had only exchanged greetings with him on prior occasions. On the contrary, appellant testified that he was Dudash’s drug supplier. Other people whom appellant may have supplied with drugs are his cousin, who testified that she introduced appellant and Dudash when the latter was in search of drugs, and Dudash’s babysitter, who testified that she has had occasion to see appellant and Dudash at the same place at the same time.
After the jury trial, appellant was found guilty of aggravated robbery ánd kidnapping, but was found not guilty of the accompanying firearm specifications. Prior to sentencing, appellant’s motion to prohibit sentencing on allied offenses of similar import was overruled. On May 16, 1994, appellant was sentenced to five to fifteen years for the kidnapping and ten to twenty-five years for the aggravated robbery. The within appeal followed.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Appellant sets forth two assignments of error for our review, the first of which alleges:
“The Trial Court erred in that the verdict reached by the jury was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented during the trial and the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict,' thus denying the Defendant-Appellant of his due process of law and right to a fair trial.”
Sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are governed by different standards.
State v. Thompkins
(1997),
Weight of the evidence deals with “the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Id.
at 387,
“The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”
Id.,
citing
State v. Martin
(1983),
Appellant argues that Dudash’s testimony accusing him of kidnapping and robbing her is incredible. We agree that it is rare, but not incredible, that a defendant would choose to rob someone with whom he is acquainted in broad daylight. Although the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence may seem to lean toward appellant’s version of the occurrences, we cannot say that “the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”
Furthermore, judging the credibility of trial witnesses is primarily the responsibility of the jury.
State v. DeHass
(1967),
Because the deciding factors in the present case predominately rely upon determinations of appellant’s and Dudash’s credibility, we defer to the jury’s judgment on those witnesses’ character traits relating to truthfulness. Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Appellant’s second assignment of error provides:
*202 “The trial court erred in denying DefendanNAppellant’s motion to prohibit sentencing on allied offenses, therefore denying Defendant-Appellant of his due process and his right to a fair trial.”
Appellant cites R.C. 2941.25, which provides:
“(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one,
“(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or [the exception to (A) ] where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.”
A two-tiered case-by-case analysis is utilized to determine whether two crimes are allied offenses of similar import. The analysis of the particular facts and circumstances of each case consists of a comparison of the elements of each crime and a determination of whether the offender possessed a separate animus or ill will as to each crime.
Newark v. Vazirani
(1990),
Accordingly, we begin comparing the elements of the crimes of which appellant was convicted. The elements of aggravated robbery that pertain to appellant’s conviction are (1) committing a theft offense (2) while having and displaying a deadly weapon. R.C. 2911.01(A)(1). The elements of kidnapping that pertain to appellant’s conviction are (1) using a threat (2) to either remove a person from the place where that person is found or restrain the liberty of the person (3) in order to facilitate the commission of a felony. R.C. 2905.01(A)(2).
Every robbery necessarily involves a kidnapping due to the restraint of the victim’s movements during the robbery. See
State v. Reynolds
(1998),
Because a robbery does not necessarily require asportation, and the asportation in the case at bar was more than merely incidental to the robbery, the offenses have dissimilar elements under the specific facts at hand. The asportation of Dudash was most likely done to facilitate escape after the robbery. See
State v. Brown
(1984),
Moreover, in order to invoke the protection of R.C. 2941.25(A), a defendant “must show that the prosecution has relied upon the same conduct to support both offenses.”
Logan, supra
Because the first tier of
Newark,
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.