STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Corey Dale YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant. State of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Marco Antonio Rios-Lopez, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No. 45125
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 2017 Term.
Filed: November 29, 2017
406 P.3d 868
Eric D. Fredericksen, Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sally Cooley, Deputy Appellate Public Defender argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Russell J. Spencer, Deputy Attorney General argued.
BURDICK, Chief Justice.
This consolidated appeal from the Ada and Blaine County district courts concerns credit for time served under
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. State v. Rios-Lopez
In October 2001, Rios-Lopez was convicted of three counts of trafficking cocaine and three counts of failure to affix illegal drug tax stamps. On the three trafficking counts, the district court imposed a sentence of fourteen years, with seven years fixed. On the three drug tax stamps counts, the district court imposed a sentence of two years, with one year fixed. The district court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. The district court awarded 253 days of credit for time served under
Some fifteen years later, Rios-Lopez moved for additional credit for time served. He filed a pro se motion under
B. State v. Young
In March 2013, Young was convicted of two counts of burglary and two counts of grand theft. On the first burglary count, the district court imposed a sentence of one year fixed. On the second burglary count, the district court imposed a sentence of nine years, with one year fixed. On the first grand theft count, the district court imposed a sentence of eight years, with one year fixed. On the second grand theft count, the district court imposed a sentence of two years, with one year fixed. The district court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. The district court awarded 94 days of credit for time served on the first burglary count. Young did not directly appeal his conviction or sentence within 42 days of the district court‘s judgment.
In December 2015, Young moved for additional credit for time served. He filed a pro se motion under
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When addressing a petition for review, we give “serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly review[] the decision of the lower court.” State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 491, 337 P.3d 647, 650 (2014). “This Court thus acts as if the case were on direct appeal from the district court.” State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 576, 225 P.3d 1169, 1171 (2010). “The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is subject to free review by the appellate courts.” State v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 381, 384-85, 373 P.3d 699, 702-03 (2016) (quoting State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005)).
At issue are the district courts’ orders denying Appellants’
Appellants’ arguments implicate
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the judgment was entered shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be computed as part of such term.
I.C. § 18-309(1) .
Appellants were sentenced under the construction of
Appellants do not contend they were sentenced incorrectly under Hoch. Rather, they seek relief under Owens, where, nearly 34 years after Hoch, this Court pronounced a different construction of
Idaho Code section 18-309 ‘s language plainly gives credit for prejudgment time in custody against each count‘s sentence. The statute does not limit that credit in any way. First,Idaho Code section 18-309 mandates that a court gives a defendant credit for his time served because the statute states that a person “shall” receive credit. Second,section 18-309 specifies that a person “shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment....”I.C. § 18-309 (emphasis added). The statute continues to provide that a defendant gets the credit only on a requirement that incarceration was for “the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.” The statute has a mandatory directive that specifically conditions credit for time served on the fact that the incarceration was for “the offense” for which the judgment was entered. While the word “offense” is singular, the phrase “if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered” simply describes the type of incarceration that a defendant gets credit for. This indicates that as long as the defendant‘s prejudgment jail time was for “the offense” the defendant was convicted of and sentenced for, the court gives the defendant that credit. If the legislature had delineatedcredit for incarceration for “each case” or another description other than “the offense,” the outcome would be different. Id. at 4, 343 P.3d at 33; accord State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189, 192, 395 P.3d 809, 812 (2017) (“It is irrelevant if the defendant‘s incarceration rests on several, unrelated offenses, as the fact remains that each offense provides a basis for the defendant‘s incarceration.“). Owens thus overruled Hoch, recognizing that Hoch had “erroneously relied on the statute‘s legislative purpose without finding the statute was ambiguous.” 158 Idaho at 5, 343 P.3d at 34.
Owens then addressed whether its holding would apply retroactively. Owens reasoned that it had “interpret[ed]
This Court‘s interpretation of
Idaho Code section 18-309 ‘s plain language meets neither exception. First, the statute‘s plain language does not alter the class of persons or the conduct the law punishes. The statute only alters the amount of time a person spends incarcerated after the court determines he committed punishable conduct. Second, the statute is not a watershed rule implicating a trial‘s fundamental fairness because defendants sentenced under the statute still received a fair plea, trial, and sentencing. The statute only affects the punishment after trial. Also, the trial court already had discretion to sentence the defendant to concurrent counts or consecutive counts. In sum, our new rule does not meet either exception. Therefore, we apply this Court‘s new interpretation ofIdaho Code section 18-309 ‘s plain language only prospectively and to cases now on direct review. Id. at 6-7, 343 P.3d at 35-36.
Here, Appellants are not entitled to credit for time served under Owens. Owens was decided on February 9, 2015. Rios-Lopez’ judgment of conviction has a file-stamped date of October 17, 2001. He timely filed a direct appeal, “contending that there was error in the admission of evidence and prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, and that the sentences are excessive,” but the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion in 2003. A remittitur was issued on October 29, 2003, at which time Rios-Lopez’ judgment of conviction became final by operation of
Appellants counter that a “motion to correct a court‘s computation of credit for time served” may be made “at any time” under Rule 35(c). Appellants are correct that Rule 35(c) states: “A motion to correct a court‘s computation of credit for time served, granted pursuant to
We are not persuaded. Appellants forget that they were not sentenced after Owens was decided. Nor were their cases pending on direct review when Owens was decided. Instead, their judgments of conviction were already final when Owens was decided. We resolved the retroactivity question in Owens and were unequivocally clear that its construction of
Appellants are correct to further note that
Our reasoning finds support under federal law. In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the United States Supreme Court evaluated whether the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a judge—rather than a jury—from determining a fact used to enhance a sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Booker was a consolidated appeal that arose after two district judges had found facts by a preponderance of the evidence during sentencing, facts which juries had not found when determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 227-29, 125 S.Ct. 738. The facts the district judges found warranted sentence enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines, which, in turn, were binding on the district judges. Id. at 226-27, 125 S.Ct. 738. One of the district judges, bound by the Sentencing Guidelines, sentenced the defendant in light of the additional facts found during sentencing. Id. at 227, 125 S.Ct. 738. But the other district judge, citing Sixth Amendment concerns, sentenced the defendant according to the facts the jury found. Id. at 228-29, 125 S.Ct. 738. On review, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment precludes a sentence enhancement based on the sentencing judge‘s determination of a fact the jury never found (aside from a prior conviction) and, therefore, excised the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines that were mandatory and made them discretionary. Id. at 244-59, 125 S.Ct. 738. Having pronounced a “new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions,” the Court instructed that Booker‘s holding would apply to all cases “pending on direct review or not yet final.” Id. at 268, 125 S.Ct. 738 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987)).
Since Booker, convicted criminal defendants across the country have sought writs of habeas corpus under
Similar to Booker, we clearly expressed the construction of
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the orders of the district courts.
Justices JONES, HORTON, BRODY and BEVAN concur.
BURDICK
Chief Justice