In Re: Zambrano
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Garland
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.
GARLAND, Circuit Judge.
Regulo Zambrano applies for leave to file a second motion to vacate his criminal sentence pursuant to
I
In April 1995, a jury convicted Zambrano on charges relating to a conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of
After his convictions became final, Zambrano mounted a collateral attack pursuant tu
Zambrano now seeks leave to file a second
II
Under
(1) newly discovered evidence ...; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
As Zambrano does not rely on newly discovered evidence, the only question before us is whether
Booker
is a new rule of constitutional law “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”
In Tyler, the Court acknowledged that, “with the right combination of holdings,” it could “make a rule retroactive over the course of two cases.” 533 U.S. at 666, 121 S.Ct. 2478. But “Multiple cases can render a new rule retroactive only if the holdings in those cases necessarily dictate retroactivity of the new rule.” Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 669, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that “[t]he Court ... can be said to have ‘made’ a rule retroactive ... only where the Court’s holdings logically permit no other conclusion”). That might be so, for example, if‘the court were to hold in one case that a rule is of a particular type, and in another “that all [such] rules apply retroactively.” 533 U.S. at 666, 121 S.Ct. 2478; see id. at 668-69, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The “Supreme Court does not ‘ma[k]e’ a rule retroactive,” however, “when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts.” 533 U.S. at 663,121 S.Ct. 2478.
The possibility of a Tyler two-step does not assist Zambrano. Booker was an application of the Apprendi rule to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and of the Court’s previous application of Apprendi to find unconstitutional a state’s determinate sentencing regime in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 749. But the Supreme Court has never expressly held either of those cases retroactive on collateral review, and we have concluded that the Court has not “made” either case retroactive within the meaning of § 2255. See In re Hinton, 125 Fed.Appx. 317 (D.C.Cir.2005); In re Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 9 (D.C.Cir.2002).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that not every application of Apprendi has retroactive effect. In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), the Court held that, “because Arizona law authorized the death penalty only if an aggravating factor was present, Apprendi required the existence of such a factor to be proved to a jury rather than to a judge.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (describing the holding of Ring). Nonetheless, in Summerlin, the Court held that Ring “does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review.” 542 U.S. at 358, 124 S.Ct. 2519.
Zambrano argues that
Booker
is ultimately an extension of
In re Winship,
which held that the Constitution “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged,” 397 U.S. 358, 365, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and he notes that the Supreme Court has held that
Winship
is to be given “complete retroactive effect,”
Ivan V. v. City of New York,
407 U.S. 203, 205, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2
But there are too many
Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that not even a more direct application of Winship is necessarily retroactive. In Tyler itself, the Court concluded that it had not made Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), retroactive. Cage held that “a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tyler, 533 U.S. at 658, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (describing Cage). Notwithstanding that Cage was based on the finding “that the instruction at issue was contrary to the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ requirement articulated in Winship,” Cage, 498 U.S. at 41, 111 S.Ct. 328, Tyler determined that the Court had not made the Cage rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 664, 121 S.Ct. 2478.
For these reasons, we conclude that
Booker
is not a new rule of constitutional law “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court” within the meaning of
denied.
Notes
. In
Tyler,
the Court addressed
. Ivan V., itself, was a case on direct review. There, the Supreme Court reversed tire New York Court of Appeals’ decision that Winship was not to be applied “retroactively” to a direct appeal in which the initial adjudication had taken place before Winship was decided. 407 U.S. 203, 203-04, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972). In subsequent cases, the Court suggested that Winship also applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562-63 n. 21, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982).