406 P.3d 868
Idaho2017Background
- Two consolidated appeals: State v. Rios‑Lopez (convictions 2001) and State v. Young (convictions 2013), each seeking additional credit for pre‑judgment incarceration under Idaho Code § 18‑309.
- Both defendants had already received credit for time served on one count under the prevailing construction at sentencing (Hoch).
- After this Court’s decision in State v. Owens (2015), which interpreted § 18‑309 to permit credit on each count and overruled Hoch, both defendants moved under I.C.R. 35(c) for additional credit on all counts.
- District courts denied the Rule 35(c) motions as Owens does not apply retroactively to convictions that were final before Owens was decided.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Idaho Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the denials, holding Owens announced a new rule that applies only prospectively and to cases on direct review as of its date.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Owens entitles defendants with final judgments to additional § 18‑309 credit via a Rule 35(c) motion | State: Owens is a statutory interpretation and should not be barred retroactively to defendants filing Rule 35(c) motions | Defendants: Owens requires credit on each count; Rule 35(c) permits a motion "at any time" to correct credit, so relief should be available | Owens announced a new rule and is prospective only; defendants with final convictions before Owens are not entitled to relief |
| Whether Rule 35(c)’s "at any time" language overrides Owens’ nonretroactivity | State: Rule 35(c) corrects computational errors under existing law and does not authorize retroactive application of a new judicial rule | Defendants: A Rule 35(c) motion may be filed at any time to correct credit, so Owens should be applied when the motion is filed | Rule 35(c) is limited to correcting computational errors under the law in effect at sentencing; it does not authorize retroactive application of Owens |
| Whether the original credit awards complied with § 18‑309 as then‑construed (Hoch) | State: Sentences were correctly computed under Hoch at the time of sentencing | Defendants: The statutory text requires credit per count (Owens) and thus Hoch was wrong | Court: Sentences were correctly computed under Hoch at sentencing; no computational error shown that would invoke Rule 35(c) |
| Whether Owens meets Teague exceptions to permit retroactive application | State: Owens is not substantive nor a watershed procedural rule | Defendants: (implicit) Owens should apply broadly | Court: Owens is a new rule that fits neither Teague exception, so it is not retroactive |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1 (Idaho 2015) (interprets § 18‑309 to permit credit for prejudgment incarceration against each count and holds the ruling is a new rule applied prospectively)
- State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351 (Idaho 1981) (previous construction denying pyramiding of credit across consecutive sentences)
- State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189 (Idaho 2017) (reinforces Owens’ textual reading that multiple offenses can each provide the basis for prejudgment custody credit)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (U.S. 2005) (announced a new Sixth Amendment sentencing rule and applied it only to cases pending on direct review or not yet final; used as analogy for nonretroactivity)