*1
STATE OWENS,
Dameniel Preston
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 41174. Idaho,
Supreme Court of
Boise, September 2014.
Feb. *2 Thomas, Appellate B. Idaho State
Sara Boise, Defender, Sally appellant. Public Deputy Appellate Public De- Cooley, Jane argued. fender Wasden, Attor- Hon. G. Lawrence Boise, General, respondent. ney Ken- Attorney Deputy Jorgensen, neth K. General argued.
BURDICK, Justice. Chief Falls appeal This arose from the Twin County court’s denial of Dameniel district for time served. Owens’s motion credit denial, specified In that district his receive credit for Owens would county in a time served issuing eight of his counts of a check one argues without funds. Owens plainly unambigu- Code section his ously requires the district court credit eight prejudgment time served to each his counts. contends we should Owens Hoch, overrule State v. (1981), in that because case beyond improperly went the statute’s
Court plain meaning to hold that credit intended defendant could not receive overrule State separate for each crime. We court’s order vacate district denying time Owens’s motion for served, and remand.
I. AND FACTUAL PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND pled guilty eight of issu- Owens counts ing a On December check without funds. County Falls district court Twin to unified terms of fifteen sentenced Owens months fixed for months with six eight charge. The court ordered the consecutively to each to run other counts grand one theft concurrently with count County. The court ordered that Owens Ada against his sentence for would receive previously time served. In computing imprisonment, filed motion for credit for the term
Owens
motion,
specified
person against
judgment
In
Owens
served.
whom the
entered,
prejudgment time
he
received credit for
shall receive credit
in the
any
issuing
period
eight
on one of the
counts
of incarceration
argued
entry
judgment,
without
that he
if such incar-
check
funds. Owens
*3
credit on each one
ceration
for
offense or an
should have received this
included
for which the
eight
acknowledged
offense
was en-
counts. Owens
tered. The
of
precedent in
remainder
the term com-
Supreme
that Idaho
Court
State
upon
pronouncement
mences
of
v. Hoch held that time served would not be
sen-
thereafter,
term,
tence and if
during
for
credited
each count.
he asked
such
reject
any legal
the defendant
court to
means is
the district
Hoch as “mani-
tem-
porarily
festly
unjust,
imprisonment
released from
wrong,
or unwise” and credit
such
subsequently
thereto,
and
prejudgment
him his
returned
time served for each of
during
pled guilty
large
time
which he
eight
counts he
to.
was at
must
computed
part
not be
of such term.
The district court
motion
denied Owens’s
§
appeal
I.C.
18-309. This
on Idaho
focuses
22, 2013,
May
noting
on
that Owens would
sentence,
section
Code
18-309’s first
receive credit
time served
on one
governs credit
prejudgment
time served.
of issuing
count
a check without funds. Ow-
part
That
of
requires
the statute
courts to
timely appealed.
ens
give
person
a
on his
credit
sentence for the
jail
time he served in
before he was convicted
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
pled guilty
of or
to his crime.
v.
Law Ras
mussen,
455, 457,
104 Idaho
69
We exercise free review over statu
(1983).
tory
interpretation
question
because it is
345, 361,
Dunlap,
law. State v.
155 Idaho
This
interpreted
Court has
Idaho Code
(2013).
objective
Our
prohibiting
section 18-309 as
a court from
interpreting a statute
“to derive the intent
is
crediting prejudgment confinement towards
legislative body
adopted
the act.” more
than one count of
concurrent sen-
Schulz,
(quoting
Id.
v.
State
151 Idaho
Hoch,
tence. State v.
102 Idaho
(2011)).
Statutory
P.3d
In
a defendant ar-
begins
plain
statute’s
gued
he
should have been credited 383
language. Dunlap,
at
155 Idaho
313 days
spent
prejudgment
he
confinement
P.3d at 17. This
Court considers
of his two consecutive sentences.
Id.
whole,
gives
as a
and
their plain,
words
served
to the actual
legis-
conviction. We find no intent
III. ANALYSIS
lature
so convicted should
A.
Idaho Code section 18-309
allows
pyramided simply
that credit
have
because
multiple
defendant
to receive credit on
he was sentenced to consecutive terms for
charges
prejudgment
time
separate crimes.
requires
and therefore
this Court
(internal
omitted). Subsequent
citations
overrule State v. Hoch.
Appeals
Court of
cases have addressed
governs
applied
reasoning.
Code section 18-309
this issue and
Hoch’s
Hernandez,
785, 792,
pre-
postjudgment
credit
v.
See State
That
(Ct.App.1991) (holding
time served.
statute states:
P.2d
that as
gets
for. This indicates
allow the
dant
does not
section 18-309
Idaho Code
jail
time
long
more
as the defendant’s
credit for
to receive
confinement);
actually been
defendant was con-
has
was for “the offense” the
than he
67, 69,
for,
gives
Vasquez,
the court
See
victed
and sentenced
also
(holding
(Ct.App.2005)
If the
the defendant that credit.
multi-
charges
more
form
two or
“where
incarceration for
had delineated credit for
presentence
for the defendant’s
ple bases
description other than
case” or another
“each
confinement,
entitled
the defendant
offense,”
be differ-
the outcome would
“the
imposed on
against each
ent.
long as the credit would
charges as
those
Here,
trial.
was incarcerated before
Owens
duplicative”).
be
issuing counts of
He was
18-
argues that Idaho Code section
Owens
pled guilty.
funds
he
check without
before
*4
unambiguous
has
one reason-
is
convicted, the court sen-
After Owens was
re-
that
defendant
interpretation:
able
eight
offenses of
him for
different
tenced
on
prejudgment time served
credit for
ceives
Thus,
gets
he
issuing a check without funds.
count. The State
each
for each
sentence
he
on
prejudgment
credit for the
time
served
more
asks for credit for
contends that Owens
eight separate
offenses.
hold
each
We
spent
prejudgment
in
actually
time
he
than
plain language
Idaho Code section 18-309’s
by the
by multiplying his time
confinement
unambiguously states that a defendant re-
argues this
The State
number of sentences.
his
for time served on
ceives credit
reject
Owens’s
Court should
offenses,
concurrently
to be served
whether
it en-
to
Hoch because
and continue
follow
consecutively.
or
credit for
receives
sures that
defendant
entered
actually
time
served
before
order,
in
sentences are served
Consecutive
more.
judgment,
but not
begin
and one
does not
until
example, defen-
other sentence ends. For
plain lan-
1.
section 18-309’s
Idaho Code
consecutively
days
to 100
for
dant sentenced
unambiguous.
is
guage
jail.
days in
eight counts will serve 800
18-309’s
However,
Idaho Code section
in
days
if that defendant served
time in
plainly gives credit for
eight
before he was convicted
The
custody against each count’s sentence.
counts,
days
gets 50
credit for each of
he
way.
any
not limit that credit
statute does
then has 50
day
those 100
sentences. He
First,
mandates
Code section 18-309
days left
on
first count. When
to serve
for his
gives
that
a defendant credit
a court
served,
days
left to
that time is
he has
the statute states that a
time
because
served
And so it contin-
serve on the second count.
Second, sec-
person “shall” receive credit.
judgment.
Howev-
ues for each count
“shall
specifies
tion
that
18-309
er,
con-
defendant
to a
when a
is sentenced
any period
judgment
for
receive
sentence, he
his
current
serves all
sentences
entry
judgment
prior
of incarceration
means that if he is
at the same time. That
added).
(emphasis
§
The
...”
I.C.
counts,
days
eight
he
to 100
sentenced
provide
continues
that a defendant
statute
eight
days
all
counts.
will serve 100
total for
requirement
gets
only on a
that
the credit
days of
gets
prejudg-
If that
defendant
in-
or an
was for “the offense
credit,
get
he will
that credit towards
ment
judgment
was
cluded offense
will
eight
at the same time. He
all
counts
mandatory
has a
di-
The statute
entered.”
jail.
days in
This is
then
50 more
serve
specifically
that
conditions credit
rective
plain language requires
how
statute’s
fact that the incarceration
served
credit for time
courts
served.
judgment
was
for which the
for “the offense”
“offense” is
was entered. While
word
incorrectly
2. Hoch was
decided
singular,
phrase “if such incarceration
wrong.
manifestly
was
or an included offense
offense
requires
decisis
that this Court
simply de-
Stare
entered”
which the
was
controlling precedent unless that
a defen-
follows
type of incarceration that
scribes the
manifestly wrong,
proven
ly
has
relied on
precedent
purpose
the statute’s
unwise,
unjust
or
finding
ambiguous.
overrul- without
the statute
over time to be
necessary to
ing
precedent
vindicate
Further,
the Court could not have correct-
principles
remedy
plain,
of law
obvious
ly found Idaho Code section 18-309’s lan-
Grant,
injustice.
154 Ida-
continued
State v.
guage
ambiguous.
implicitly
Justice Bist-
281, 287,
The
ho
points
line’s dissent in Hoch
out two cases
argues
any
Owens
to show
failed
clarify why holding
ambigu-
the statute
present.
are
these circumstances
ous wrong.
majority
The Hoch
cited Mil-
However,
reasoning in
the Court’s
Hoch
ler v.
statute’s
Generally a case
(Wyo.2014).
an
statute.
Idaho’s
it
a new rule “when
breaks new
nounces
(1)
18-
section
Idaho Code
We hold
imposes
obligation” on
ground or
a new
requires
unambiguously
309’s
301,109
Teague,
at
S.Ct. at
states.
489 U.S.
any prejudgment
a defendant
courts to credit
words,
1070, 103
In other
L.Ed.2d at 349.
“a
(2)
count and
on each
incarceration served
if the result
announces
new rule
was
case
an as
incorrectly
relied
State v. Hoch
existing at
precedent
not dictated
intent
that conflicts
sumed
fi
time the defendant’s conviction became
Thus, Hoch
plain language.
the statute’s
(emphasis
original).
We have
nal.” Id.
wrong,
Hoch
manifestly
and we overrule
interpreted Idaho Code section
never before
of law.
plain,
principles
obvious
to vindicate
adding
credit for time served to
receives cred
hold defendant
We therefore
judgment.
consecutive count
Be
any prejudgment
it
interpreting
are now
section 18-309
cause we
on each of his consecutive sentences.
by precedent,
way
that was not dictated
not be
announces a new rule.
section 18-309 will
this case
B.
Idaho Code
retroactively
re-
applied
on collateral
apply this new
We will not
rule
view.
retroactively to
on collateral review
cases
Finally, we
determine
must
excep
rule
of the two
unless the
meets one
retroac
will
this decision
whether we
Rhoades,
Teague.
articulated in
tions
the retroactivi
tively.
explicitly adopted
We
excep
first
tain for reduction of the IV. CONCLUSION days term for time served. four session, later in the 1972 the Leg- We overrule State v. vacate dis- islature further amended both sections. 1972 trict denying court’s order motion Owens’s Laws, §§ Idaho Sess. ch. pp. 6 and served, for credit for time remand for respect 110506. With to Section opinion. proceedings consistent with this Legislature deleted “must” in the third line “in and substituted the discretion of the Justices EISMANN and HORTON concur. court, may.” It is unclear why Legisla- JONES, Justice, dissenting. J. quick ture made such a giving a turnabout — sentencing court discretion whether have I dissent opinion from Court’s because imprisonment terms of served con- legal limiting there is no basis for a trial secutively than mandating they rather judge’s discretion consecutive consecutively may be served it be that imprisonment terms of order establish a —but Legislature became aware of this incarceration, Court’s period minimum which is McCoy, decision State v. what the trial court did in case. this (1971), just was decided judges ability had the to do so under the case, months In earlier. the Court common law and Idaho Code section 18-309 requiring struck down a statute a minimum ability. does not limit that at ten-day jail sentence for drunk drivers “with- requires merely issue Section 309 that a any right judicial out to exercise discretion in credit for sentencing time served be the matter.” at for the for which offense is con- Legislature’s The Court held that the action question victed. In order to answer impermissibly infringed on the inherent au- posed in this case we must examine more thority judiciary under the Idaho Con- than this tree in one forest. stitution. Id. It said: compu- Idaho Code section 18-309 deals *7 tation single imprisonment. of a “term” of always watchful, It This court must be as it does not with deal the issue of past, consecutive has been in the of no one the imprisonment “terms” of convic- separate departments govern- three subject tions. That in upon addressed Idaho powers ment encroach properly the Code section 18-308. belonging to another. Thus we reach the decision in case both this as a matter of Idaho Code sections and 18-308 18-309 construction of the constitution of this 27, were both enacted into law March state and to applica- effect more rational 1972, part comprehensive as of re-write of tion policy. of law and Idaho’s criminal statutes. 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws, 1, Id.1 336, § p. ch. 358. 308 ini- Section
tially read: The context and effect of the 1972 amend- any person
When is convicted of two analyzed by or ment of Section 308 was this Lawrence, more before pro- crimes sentence has been in Court State v. 98 Idaho upon either, (1977), him imprison- nounced the P.2d 989 follows: subsequently purport 1. The Idaho Constitution was amendment did not to affect the inherent permit Legislature amended in to the to authority aspects of Idaho courts in other of mandatory establish minimum Const., V, sentences that sentencing. § Idaho art. 13. courts, by could not be reduced the but the contrary, primary the effect of the On the the courts had discre- At common law the essentially was to reinstate amendment sen- impose consecutive tionary power to modified law rule which had been common legislation not permissive tence by prior statute. the necessary____In the common law Idaho in cases otherwise rule of decision § by I.C. 73-116. statute. provided recently matter This addressed the Court § intended 18- legislature I.C. Unless Cisneros-Gonzalez, in State v. entirely the common law abrogate to (2004), as follows: sentences pertaining to consecutive rule § of 18-308 is not the source Idaho Code imposing from con- prohibit the court authority impose to cumulative a court’s in except the narrow sentences secutive Lawrence, sentence. State require- meet range of cases the com- Under section,2 in the district court ments of that law, mon courts in have discre- had common law au- this case would have impose to cumulative sen- tionary power thority impose the consecutive sentence. Prior to that common- tences. 18-308, § in find no I.C. ei- We evidence authority slightly. law was modified For- in after the amendment ther before or § consec- required mer Code 18-308 abrogate any legislative intent to imprisonment utive in cases terms modify law with re- the common rule provisions. fell its Id. In 1972 within falling scope within spect to cases imposi- was amended make the statute § of I.C. 18-308. discretionary tion of consecutive sentences 400-01, pri- P.2d at 990-91. The Court scope. Id. at in its “[T]he the cases within mary continued: was essen- effect of amendment tially rule to reinstate common law modify intended § The former prior modified stat- which had been that the the common law rule to extent P.2d at 991. ute.” 98 Idaho at apparently were to im- courts mandated in pose sentences eases within consecutive above, As Sections and 309 were noted scope of There was noth- that section. initially meas- legislative the same enacted in that that the ing section which indicated days later in the ure amended deprive legislature intended to the courts during the same same measure authority impose of this common law initially 309 did not contain session. Section in other cases. On consecutive sentences merely provided provision. a time served It § 18-308 an contrary, I.C. indicates criminal imprisonment that a in a term opposite intention. de- action to run when the commenced actually place to the In 1972 amended I.C. fendant was delivered 18-308, imprisonment. substituting § “in the at the same discretion court, recognize and may”, for the “must”. Section 308 was amended to word I.S.L.1972, Thus, p. court’s restore a trial discretion ch. imprisonment per- which, terms of to its amendment successive or more con- consecutive sentences sons before the court two mandated victions, provide changed by eliminating the 309 was amended some cases was Section *8 computing imprison- the of mandatory response in term language perhaps “[i]n — ment, against judg- the McCoy, person in the whom opinion to this Court’s State v. entered, ment shall receive credit supra. McCoy held that the courts held was entry of any period prior incarceration to of certain discretion constitutional the judgment, was for impair. could not if such incarceration legislature nothing find offense included offense for which setting we Viewed phrase The last § of was entered.” I.C. 18-308 indicative amended require to change merely was intended any legislative intent to the statute offense served to the to consecutive sentences. credit for time prohibit so as Here, McCoy, reading: See State v. inserted a footnote 2. Court (1971)." power "Assuming legislature has the to do so. ultimately history is im- of
for which the
term
Sections
and 309
that indicates
other
posed,
charge
rather than some
legislative
do so.
intent to
may
jailed
prior
the defendant
have been
Section 308 has not been amended since
sentencing.
and
conviction
Section
1972.
309 was amended in 1975 in a
statutes,
interpreting
it
When
is critical to
here.
fashion
relevant
1975 Idaho Sess.
Legislature’s
determine the
intent.
“This Laws,
1, p.
§
ch.
559. Section 309 was
freely reviews
of a
Court
again
judg-
amended in 1996 to add “in the
application
its
to the
The
statute and
facts.
following
ment”
“credit.” 1996 Idaho Sess.
primary
is
function of the court
to determine Laws,
167, 1,§
eh.
pp. 55253.
Such
give
legislative
and
effect to the
intent.
definitively
Section 309
first
interpret-
was
reading
from a
intent should be derived
of
ed in 1981.
State v.
Reg’l
the whole act at issue.” St. Luke’s
(1981). There,
we held
Ctr.,
Med.
Ltd. v. Bd.
Comm’rs Ada
of
of
that the
I.C.
Cnty.,
clearly
of
18-309 is
person
give
convicted of
Interpretation
Section
neces-
a crime credit
may
sarily
prior
for such time as he
requires consideration of Section 308.
have served
sentencing upon
Section
bears the
to the actual
title “successive terms
conviction.
imprisonment”
acknowledges
find
the dis- We
no intent of the
that a
impose
person
trial
cretion of the
court to
successive
so
should
convicted
have that credit
imprisonment
terms of
pyramided simply
where
is
because he was sen-
two
convicted of
or more crimes. The second
tenced to
separate
consecutive terms for
imprisonment
only upon
term of
State,
commences
crimes. See
Miller
was incarcerated for separate charges. It is a fundamental absolutely nothing There is in the section of statutory rule construction suggesting that the defendant multi- receives Legislature courts will not ascribe to the ple credits for additional offenses. an intent consequences, to create absurd To essentially read it in that fashion would thus, an interpretation absurdity avoiding gut ability the trial court’s mini- always preferred.... mum imprisonment pursuant fixed terms of This case foregoing to Idaho illustrates that the Code section 19-2513 that the trial presents applica- court determines in difficulties for its its discretion should be it, consecutively, by the after the It tion trial courts. Under a defen- one other. *9 should, course, infringe would given also trial com- dant of be full the court’s credit authority mon law to by sen- on his consecutive sentence or sentences in nothing statutory jail tences. There is spent awaiting disposition for time in 10 him; George of the state.” W. Watkins charges against but case law charge or of a 540, 537, Family Messenger, 797 answer for v. held to a defendant is
where (1990). And, 1385, legisla 1388 “[t]he to P.2d charges, he is not entitled numerous by presumed not to intend to overturn jail pyramided ture is time credit have his of law unless an long principles for the established credit on each sentence being given plainly appears by express so jail awaiting disposi- intention to do spends in full time he language employed or the admits charges cases.... declaration multiple tion of construction.” of no other reasonable jail in to an- a defendant is held When Further, cases, multiple charges or swer for presumed Legislature him to be aware sentencing judge who sentences first Certainly, give him earlier decisions. this Court’s jail or to state shall abrogate Legislature in that how to or sentences our knows credit on the sentence spent from this This Court will all time in between decisions Court. case for interpret abrogating arrest case and the date statute as date of his that was though the defen- common law unless it is evident of such sentence even Legislature’s may have also held to answer intent. dant been charges during or all of for other some Caldwell, City Irr. Dist. v. 153 Pioneer jail time If the such time. defendant’s 593, 601-02, 810, P.3d 288 pro- exceeds the sentence or sentences omitted). (2012) (internal citations by sentencing judge, the first nounced interpreted that have statutes like Courts judge give the defen- next shall uniformly interpreted them as Idaho’s have credit for such excess on the sentence dant requiring trial courts to permitting by him. pronounced single credit for (capitalizations original). multiple a defendant is convicted of where interpretation Court’s of Section offenses and receives consecutive sentences. The Hoch See, Tauiliili, 195, e.g., from v. 96 Hawaii 29 has stood as law of this State State 309 (2001) (“Courts juris- opinion. the date of It had P.3d 918 in other 1981 until this years having agree that a law of the State for 15 when dictions similar statutes been the Legislature 309 in 1996. who consecutive sen- amended Section receives presentenee is entitled to a Between 1981 there were several tences against Appeals dealing aggregate with once of the consecutive Court of cases State, ”); Blankenship receive 135 Md. question whether defendant should terms.... v. (2000) (stating pre A.2d single multiple App. credit or credits for 743 charged view that not enti- incarceration when the court’s a defendant is Hernandez, multiple multiple for each offense “is offenses. See State v. tled credits (Ct. 785, 792, undeviating line with the resolution (holding convict our under virtual- App.1991) that a defendant same issue sister states statutes”); ly offenses to con ‘credit for time ed of and sentenced identical served’ Sanchez, Neb.App. receive v. current sentences not entitled to State (1994) sentence); (noting v. that courts have credit for each Matthews N.W.2d 83, 87, (Ct.App. uniformly interpreted like Nebras- statutes 1987) against the (holding properly permitting only a credit defendant was ka’s including citations to aggregate for each two consecutive sentence and denied credit sentences). cases); Boettcher, 144 unhappy many If the v. Legislature was such (1988) (“The had manner which Idaho courts Wis.2d 423 N.W.2d with the custody Hoch time in be credited on applying Section 309 under the total should been against days im- decision, certainly attempted day-for-day basis the total it could have sentences.”); Endell posed it in the consecutive change the Hoch (Alaska Johnson, Ct. It not do amended that section in 1996. did juris- (noting in other legislature App.1987) that courts so. “It is assumed that when uniformly full knowl with similar statutes have or amends a statute it has dictions enacts existing interpreted requiring them as one edge judicial decisions
H sentence); aggregate post State v. who against did bail would be entitled to (hold- (N.D.1987) against Arcand, 23, credit each their 403 N.W.2d sentences. only jail applied be to ing “that should Johnson, (Alaska 769, v. Endell sentences”); Effinger the first of consecutive Ct.App.1987). Similarly, empha- courts have (Minn.1986) v. 380 N.W.2d sized that such interpreting as re- statutes “in (holding that situations of consecutive quiring multiple incompati- credits “would be sentences, applied credit should be to purpose ble with the basic of consecutive sentencing only might the first sentence since to do tend to in- otherwise defeat the credit’”); judges.” Finally, tent of would constitute ‘double have Aaron, courts noted that the ad- 103 N.M. by produce (“Other vanced Owens would con- bizarre (N.M.Ct.App.1985) jurisdictions with instance, sequences in certain cases. For “a ... held that is [similar] statutes have charged separate criminal who is with 25 multiplied by not to the number of be differ- pretrial batteries and is in nine months cus- Sodders, imposed.”); ent State v. sentences tody and then receives nine months sen- (Ariz.Ct.App. 130 Ariz. consecutively tence on each count would be 1981) (holding that Arizona’s statute “does immediately if discharged multiple-time cred- require presentence incarceration Boettcher, its to were be allowed.” State v. given credit must be on each consecutive (1988). 144 Wis.2d 423 N.W.2d imposed”). judge The trial obviously this case in- statutes, interpreting In their these courts tended Owens to serve minimum term of guided by involving have been considerations years prison four becoming eligible before policies that motivate the statutes parole. That is judge because the sen- of interpreting requiring the effect them as (I.C. tenced Owens to a “unified sentence credit for each consecutive sentence. “The 19-2513) months; of 15 sen- unified require grant- of statutes which (fixed) comprised tence peri- is of a minimum ing presentence of credit for months, od of by confinement of six followed equal protection rights to assure that the period an indeterminate of custody nine indigent defendants cannot who afford months,” eight for each of violating counts of post are bond not violated.” State v. San- (b). 18-3106(a), Idaho Code section This is chez, 2 Neb.App. N.W.2d all judgment contained within one wherein indigent An defendant who cannot contemplated the district court that Owens would, statute, secure a bond such absent eight would serve fixed imprison- terms of serving up end than a more time well-heeled each, other, six ment of months one after the defendant who did a bond. secure No simi- for a combined fixed term of four providing lar considerations motivate a credit years becoming eligible A parole. before for each in- consecutive sentence. Both the clearly district court authority has digent and well-heeled defendant will have a fixed term sentence for offense and to served the same their time on consecutive require that the terms be consecutive- sentences if credit for the incar- ly. applies served credit applied ceration one of indigent aggregate portion fixed of the defendant’s In consecutive sentences. successive terms until the credit is exhaust- fact, providing multiple credits would lead to ed. The entered the district inequitable an situation di- clearly other in keeping with the discretion rection: him afforded under Idaho Code 19- section authority Section and the inherent interpretation contrary to pre- [A]n judiciary and not at all inconsistent
vailing jurisdictions in other would lead with Section 309. anomalous results. Offenders arrested multiple charges managed who to secure Justice Pro Tem WALTERS concurs. bail release on and later received consecu- actually penalized tive sentences would be bail; posting they required be would length
serve the full their consecutive
terms, similarly whereas situated offenders